THE  EEVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 


THE  REVOLUTION  IN 
VIRGINIA 


By  H.  J.  ECKENRODE,  Ph.D. 

ASSOCIATE  PROFESSOR  OE  ECONOMICS  AND  HISTORY 
IN  RICHMOND  COLLEGE 


BOSTON  AND  NEW  YORK 

HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 

($fc  fttocr.siDe  prcs£  (2Tambrit>0e 

1916 


COPYRIGHT,    1916,   BY   HAMILTON  J.   ECKENRODK 
ALL   RIGHTS  RESERVED 

Publishtd  March  iqib 


PREFACE 

The  present  work  is  chiefly  based  on  the  original  sources 
of  information  in  the  archives  department  of  the  Virginia 
State  Library.  This  great  collection  has  been  used  before, 
of  course,  and  some  of  the  papers  are  in  print,  but  I  think 
that  no  one  but  myself  has  ever  examined  it  exhaustively 
with  a  view  to  such  a  book  as  The  Revolution  in  Virginia. 
I  have  given  references  to  the  manuscript  collection  as  it 
is  now  classified  in  those  specific  cases  where  references 
may  be  of  use;  in  the  case  of  generalizations  I  have  fol- 
lowed the  inferences  which  I  have  drawn  from  my  study 
of  the  mass  of  material. 

I  am  under  obligations  to  Mr.  William  G.  Stanard,  of 
the  Virginia  Historical  Society;  Dr.  W.  E.  Dodd,  of  the 
University  of  Chicago;  Dr.  D.  R.  Anderson,  of  Richmond 
College;  and  Dr.  Douglas  S.  Freeman,  for  reading  the 
manuscript  and  making  useful  suggestions.  My  debt  to 
Mr.  James  D.  Wise,  who  spent  much  time  in  aiding  me  to 
make  revisions,  is  so  great  that  I  am  at  a  loss  to  devise  a 
fitting  acknowledgment. 

H.  J.  ECKENRODE. 


CONTENTS 

I.  Beginning  of  the  Revolution      ....      1 
II.  The  Radicals 32 

III.  The  Struggle  for  Norfolk  .        .        .        .58 

IV.  The  County  Committees 96 

V.  Convention  and  Committee  of  Safety        .        .  123 

VI.  The  Democratic  Republic 157 

VII.  Rule  of  the  Council 174 

VIII.  The  Fall  of  Jefferson 195 

IX.  Spread  of  Disaffection 232 

X.  Military  Operations 261 

XI.  End  of  the  War 276 

XII.  The  Progress  of  Democracy        ....  294 
Index 303 


THE  REVOLUTION  IN 
VIRGINIA 

CHAPTER  I 

BEGINNING  OF  THE  REVOLUTION 

The  American  Revolution  was  a  movement  with  two 
distinct  aspects.  On  one  side  it  was  marked  by  the  union 
of  hitherto  independent  communities  and  the  beginning 
of  common  institutions  and  of  a  common  life.  The  other 
phase  witnessed  the  progress  of  the  revolt  within  the  colo- 
nies themselves  and  the  creation  of  their  individual  gov- 
ernments. The  method  of  historians  in  treating  of  the 
Revolution  generally  has  been  to  take  the  most  striking 
incidents  in  the  history  of  the  colonies  in  the  years  imme- 
diately preceding  1776  and  join  them  to  an  account  of  the 
workings  of  the  Continental  Congress  and  the  campaigns 
of  the  Continental  army.  The  internal  growth  of  the  new- 
made  States  is  almost  entirely  ignored,  probably  because 
in  some  instances  it  is  not  well  known.  But  in  this  stage 
of  American  history,  when  the  national  life  was  so  feeble, 
the  progress  of  events  in  Massachusetts  and  Virginia  was 
more  important  than  the  deliberations  of  Congress.  No 
adequate  account  has  been  given  of  the  spiritual  change 
which  came  over  Massachusetts  and  Virginia  in  the  Rev- 
olutionary epoch  and  which  had  such  great  influence  on 
the  development  of  the  nation.  Because  the  early  history 


:^;';*:;  ;TKe;bevOlution  in  Virginia 

of  the  individual  States  has  not  been  well  worked  out, 
there  are  certain  hiatuses  in  our  histories,  such,  for  in- 
stance, as  the  lack  of  an  account  of  the  origin  of  the  Demo- 
cratic Party.  Historians  give  us  the  impression  that  it 
sprang  full-grown  from  the  head  of  Jefferson,  that  he  was 
its  creator.  But  the  Democratic  Party  had  come  into 
existence  in  an  undefined  way  before  the  great  political 
genius  of  Jefferson  laid  hold  of  it  and  moulded  it  to  his 
purposes.  Jefferson  was  a  Virginian  and  the  Democratic 
Party  as  a  political  movement  with  real  purposes  was 
likewise  a  Virginia  product;  the  story  of  its  rise  is  one  of 
the  most  interesting  chapters  of  Revolutionary  history. 

In  a  brief  analysis,  the  Revolution  was  the  result  of  the 
clash  between  imperial  expansion  and  colonial  develop- 
ment— two  forms  of  progressivism — just  as  the  Puritan 
Revolution  was  the  outcome  of  the  conflict  of  expanding 
monarchy  with  the  growing  idea  of  popular  rights,  mainly 
expressed  through  religion.  In  Virginia  the  colonial  con- 
stitution had  become  well  defined  before  the  middle  of 
the  eighteenth  century.  Based  on  the  fine  old  principle 
of  the  Englishman's  inherent  right  of  self-government,  it 
had  acquired  certain  fixed  positions  without  much  refer- 
ence to  strict  logic.  It  was  really  the  result  of  a  long  con- 
test; the  history  of  Virginia,  like  that  of  the  other  colo- 
nies, is  little  more  than  a  series  of  disputes  with  the  royal 
governors,  who  served  the  colony  greatly  in  some  ways  and 
in  other  ways  were  out  of  touch  with  colonial  life  and 
i  needs.  Parliament  exerted  a  variable  control  over  the  colo- 
nies, from  time  to  time  passing  taxation-without-repre- 
sentation  statutes,  but  generally  leaving  the  provincials 
sufficiently  alone  to  cause  itself  to  be  looked  on  admir- 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  REVOLUTION         3 

ingly  as  the  palladium  of  liberty.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
causes  of  the  Revolution  were  practical  far  more  than 
theoretical.  The  colonies  endured  Parliamentary  super- 
vision so  long  as  this  was  not  too  vigorous;  customs  laws 
were  of  small  account  while  smuggling  went  unchecked. 
Only  when  the  British  government  attempted  to  enforce 
its  customs  acts  and  ventured  to  impose  other  and  bur- 
densome taxes,  like  the  Stamp  Act,  did  the  taxation-with- 
out-representation  protest  appear;  then  the  provincials, 
with  all  of  Englishmen's  gravity  in  asserting  a  paradox, 
denied  the  Parliamentary  right  of  taxation.  If  we  think 
they  may  have  been  deficient  in  argument  while  right  in 
principle,  it  should  be  remembered  that  the  king's  lawyers 
produced  good  precedents  in  the  ship-money  case  in  1637. 
In  a  political  struggle  both  sides  always  prove  themselves 
right  by  any  number  of  constitutional  citations,  but,  nev- 
ertheless, the  victory  of  one  side  carries  with  it  far  more 
right  and  happiness  than  the  triumph  of  the  other. 

Opposition  to  the  British  government  did  not  begin 
with  the  Stamp  Act  in  1765.  Before  this  time  the  colony 
had  on  many  occasions  successfully  resisted  the  royal  au- 
thority; indeed  a  legislature  noted  for  its  independence 
had  existed  in  Virginia  since  1619.  In  1635  this  assembly 
forcibly  sent  the  royal  governor  Harvey  back  to  England 
because  it  resented  his  efforts  to  enlarge  his  powers.  Vir- 
ginia tardily  and  reluctantly  acquiesced  in  the  rule  of 
Commonwealth  and  Protectorate,  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
broke  out  in  1676  in  open  rebellion  against  its  Cavalier 
governor,  who  sought  to  play  the  tyrant.  Ten  years  later, 
in  1686,  the  House  of  Burgesses  refused  to  allow  the  gov- 
ernor and  council  to  lay  a  tax,  and  it  did  not  favor  the 


4  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

establishment  of  a  post-office  in  America  by  act  of  Par- 
liament. 

The  high  spirit  of  the  Virginia  assembly  quickened  in 
the  eighteenth  century  with  the  colony's  rapid  growth  in 
wealth,  population,  and  culture.  The  governors  of  that 
period  found  themselves  continually  at  odds  with  the 
House  of  Burgesses  in  attempting  to  secure  votes  of 
money;  Dinwiddie  even  had  difficulty  in  obtaining  sup- 
plies for  the  French-and-Indian  War.  This  dual  govern- 
ment by  royal  governor  and  local  assembly  resulted  in 
the  attachment  of  certain  constitutional  powers  to  either 
party,  with  a  neutral  zone  between,  while  outside  of  both 
loomed  the  vague,  ill-defined  claims  of  Parliament.  The 
governor  was  selected  by  the  king  and  represented  him. 
Along  with  the  ordinary  executive  routine,  he  appointed 
most  of  the  colonial  officials;  called  out  the  militia  against 
the  Indians  and  made  treaties  with  them;  suggested  legisla- 
tion and  approved  or  vetoed  bills,  but  with  a  final  reserva- 
tion to  the  Privy  Council;  sat  as  chief  judge  in  the  general 
court;  and,  finally,  inducted  clergymen  of  the  established 
church  into  parishes  —  though  he  had  not  the  power  of 
appointing  them.  The  governor's  council,  which  acted  in 
the  threefold  capacity  of  consulting  executive  body,  the 
highest  court  and  the  upper  chamber  of  the  legislature, 
was  appointed  for  life  by  the  British  Privy  Council  on 
the  governor's  nomination,  and  was  generally  under  his 
influence.  The  House  of  Burgesses,  the  representative 
branch  of  the  assembly,  consisted  of  two  members  for 
each  county  and  single  members  for  boroughs.  It  initi- 
ated money  bills  in  the  manner  of  the  House  of  Commons 
and  was  the  most  important  and  powerful  branch  of  the 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  REVOLUTION         5 

colonial  government,  successfully  asserting  its  rights  and 
privileges  on  many  occasions  in  opposition  to  the  governor 
and  council. 

With  the  increase  of  the  number  of  counties  in  the  eight- 
eenth century  and  the  rise  of  a  large  class  of  landed 
proprietors  whose  main  public  ambition  took  the  form 
of  representing  fellow  countrymen  in  Williamsburg,  the 
House  of  Burgesses  grew  greatly  in  power  and  prestige. 
Virginia  in  its  earlier  period  had  been  a  more  or  less  demo- 
cratic community  and  it  always  contained  a  sturdy  small- 
farmer  class,  tenacious  of  its  self-respect.  Lyon  G.  Tyler 
has  pointed  out  that,  while  in  New  England  the  poor  man 
was  addressed  as  "goodman,"  in  Virginia  he  insisted  on 
his  right  to  "mister." 

But  the  eighteenth  century  saw  the  rise  of  a  strong 
aristocracy,  based  on  the  possession  of  the  comparatively 
valuable  lands  of  the  tidewater  section  tilled  by  white 
indented  servants  and  negro  slaves.  Ownership  of  great 
tracts  of  cleared  lands  and  abundance  of  cheap  labor  en- 
abled the  planters,  in  spite  of  the  wasteful  agricultural 
system  then  in  vogue,  to  raise  large  enough  crops  of  to- 
bacco to  leave  a  considerable  surplus  above  expenses. 
The  settlers  had  gone  from  England  to  Virginia  for  the 
same  reason  that  settlers  go  everywhere  —  to  make  a 
living.  After  the  first  hard  age  of  settlement,  when  men 
struggled  to  subdue  nature  and  lived  and  died  toiling  re- 
lentlessly, there  succeeded  a  period  of  relaxation,  enjoy- 
ment, and  growing  refinement,  wherein  the  descendants 
of  successful  land-patentees  and  tobacco-growers  gave 
themselves  an  English  education,  found  pleasure  in  society 
and  sport,  and  took  to  politics  as  a  means  of  gaining 


6  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

influence  and  distinction.  And  since  the  Virginia  colonists, 
unlike  those  of  New  England,  were  fully  in  accord  with 
the  feelings  of  the  majority  of  Englishmen,  they  were 
without  dissenter  ideas  in  religion  or  politics.  It  was 
natural,  therefore,  that  they  should  take  as  their  ideal  of 
imitation  the  English  country  gentleman,  whose  thoughts 
and  habits,  considering  the  necessary  differences  between 
England  and  Virginia,  they  reproduced  with  remarkable 
fidelity.  This  planter  class,  generally  fairly  well  informed 
for  the  times  and  enjoying  considerable  leisure,  possessed 
great  power  among  a  poor  and  ignorant  population:  they 
took  over  almost  as  a  right  the  local  offices,  and  the  ambi- 
tion of  the  ablest  or  most  pushing  led  them  to  the  House 
of  Burgesses. 

The  majority  of  planters  did  not,  of  course,  profit  by 
their  opportunities.  Many  of  them,  in  the  fervor  of  their 
liking  for  English  country  life,  merely  wasted  their  means 
and  leisure  in  sport  and  dissipation.  Horse-racing  for 
large  stakes  flourished  in  Virginia  between  1730  and  1775, 
and  at  the  beginning  of  the  Revolution  a  considerable 
number  of  large  landholders  bad  ruined  themselves  by 
gambling  and  high  living.  Many  estates  were  on  the  mar- 
ket. But  the  colonial  system,  with  all  its  great  drawbacks, 
offered  a  wonderful  chance  of  development  to  ambitious 
and  willing  men.  Politics  was  a  respectable  career,  and 
not  a  business  as  it  is  so  often  nowadays;  it  invited  the 
best  men.  The  planter  had  a  sufficient  and  tolerably  se- 
cure income  derived  from  his  crops;  he  could  give  much 
time  to  reading  and  public  affairs  without  private  injury, 
because  he  usually  had  an  overseer  to  superintend  the 
labor  of  his  slaves;  and  gradually  there  developed  a  race 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  REVOLUTION  7 

of  politicians  remarkable  for  their  combination  of  theo- 
retical training  with  practical  experience  —  men  well  read 
in  English  law  and  history,  and,  later,  open  to  the  great 
liberal  tendencies  of  the  middle  eighteenth  century.  The 
liberal  movement,  which  influenced  America  as  well  as 
western  Europe,  had  the  effect  in  Virginia  of  disturbing 
that  deep-rooted  idolatry  of  English  institutions  which 
had  given  birth  to  the  Virginia  aristocracy.  A  typical 
product  of  eighteenth-century  liberalism  in  Virginia  was 
George  Mason,  the  broad-minded  and  capable  thinker  who 
wrote  the  constitution  of  1776. 

The  House  of  Burgesses  was  largely  made  up  of  plant- 
ers, who  were  Englishmen  in  feeling,  but  who  neverthe- 
less asserted  the  dignity  and  independence  of  the  body 
in  which  they  sat  in  opposition  to  attempts  or  imagined 
attempts  of  the  British  authorities  to  stretch  their  juris- 
diction. They  were  reinforced  about  the  middle  of  the 
century  by  another  self-willed  element  actually  hostile 
to  the  imperial  government,  the  representatives  from  the 
new  middle  and  western  counties.  This  piedmont  and 
mountain  section  was  much  more  democratic  in  feeling 
and  much  less  cultured  and  wealthy  than  the  east,  even 
for  the  standard  of  those  days.  The  western  or  "  upland  " 
members  for  many  years  were  too  few  and  inexperienced 
to  do  more  than  vote  with  the  controlling  majority  led 
by  skilled  politicians,  but  they  were  never  quite  in  har- 
mony with  the  tidewater  and  eventually  asserted  them- 
selves successfully  against  it. 

Several  serious  clashes  with  the  royal  government  in 
the  decade  preceding  the  Stamp  Act  illustrated  the  grow- 
ing independence  and  self-consciousness  of  the  House  of 


8  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

Burgesses.  When  Governor  Dinwiddie  in  1753  attempted 
on  his  own  initiative  to  levy  a  fee  of  a  pistole  for  signing 
land  patents,  the  Burgesses  protested  in  the  memorable 
and  prophetic  words  of  Richard  Bland:  "The  rights  of 
the  subject  are  so  secured  by  law,  that  they  cannot  be 
deprived  of  the  least  part  of  their  property  but  by  their 
own  consent."  The  governor  in  reply  claimed  that  he  was 
acting  according  to  the  king's  instructions  and  strictly 
within  the  king's  rights  over  vacant  lands,  but  the  House 
refused  to  accept  his  explanation:  it  declared  that  those 
who  paid  the  pistole  fee  would  be  regarded  as  betrayers 
of  the  people,  and  thereby  established  a  precedent  for  se- 
curing uniformity  through  holding  offenders  up  to  public 
obloquy  later  used  with  great  effect  in  suppressing  Tory- 
ism. The  British  Privy  Council,  when  appealed  to  as  the 
final  authority  in  the  fee  dispute,  allowed  the  Burgesses  to 
have  their  way.  Before  the  passage  of  the  Stamp  Act  the 
British  government  at  times  inclined  to  be  almost  too 
conciliatory  towards  the  colonies. 

It  is  probable  that  the  House  of  Burgesses  was  mistaken 
in  the  pistole  contention,  for  the  title  to  vacant  lands  was 
unquestionably  vested  in  the  king,  and  the  governor  as 
the  royal  representative  was  hardly  outside  his  rights  in 
levying  a  fee.  Still,  it  had  not  been  demanded  before,  and 
the  Virginians  felt  that  advantage  was  being  taken  of  a 
technical  right  to  introduce  a  new  and  insidious  custom 
and  a  possible  precedent  for  future  taxes. 

This  controversy  was  the  prelude  to  a  much  more  im- 
portant dispute  hinging  on  the  king's  power  of  interference 
with  colonial  legislation.  The  colonial  constitution,  as  has 
been  noted,  recognized  three  powers  in  the  state  —  king, 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  REVOLUTION  9 

Parliament,  and  local  assembly.  The  king's  power  was 
mainly,  though  not  entirely,  delegated  to  the  governor, 
who  received  instructions  from  home  outlining  his  pol- 
icy; these  instructions  were  regarded  as  law.  Parliamen- 
tary authority  was  by  general  colonial  consent  limited  to 
the  regulation  of  commerce.  Needless  to  say,  the  exten- 
sive right  of  regulating  commerce  when  interpreted  in 
the  loose  construction  fashion  might  seem  to  sanction  al- 
most any  stretch  of  governmental  jurisdiction,  but  as  a 
matter  of  fact  Parliament  was  not  inclined  to  be  unduly 
vexatious  before  1760.  Most  colonial  ills  flowed  from  other 
sources.  < 

The  assembly,  which  was  the  strictly  local  branch  of 
government,  exercised  wider  powers  than  modern  law- 
making bodies  —  executive  and  judicial  as  well  as  legisla- 
tive. At  first  the  small  upper  house,  representing  a  few 
allied  families,  held  a  dominating  position,  but  as  the  col- 
ony grew  in  age  and  population  the  House  of  Burgesses 
more  and  more  tended  to  become  the  important  chamber. 
The  council  was  Tory  in  feeling,  while  the  Burgesses  cher- 
ished the  Whig  tradition  of  English  liberty,  and  its  inde- 
pendent-minded leaders  were  bound  to  come  into  conflict 
with  the  British  government  as  soon  as  the  latter  should 
attempt  to  stretch  its  prerogatives. 

The  first  important  controversy  between  colony  and 
home  government,  however,  did  not  result  from  Parlia- 
mentary taxation,  but  from  the  royal  authority  as  exer- 
cised in  colonial  legislation.  The  Church  of  England  es- 
tablishment in  Virginia,  the  miniature  state  church  of  the 
colony,  furnished  the  occasion,  and  the  conflict  decided 
the  long-debated  question  whether  the  control  of  the  es- 


10  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

tablishment  lay  finally  with  the  assembly  or  the  British 
officials.  In  1758  the  assembly  passed  an  act  which  par- 
ticularly affected  the  ministers  of  the  established  church 
and  aroused  their  ire.  This  so-called  "Twopenny  Act" 
compounded  debts  and  the  salaries  of  officials,  which  were 
payable  in  tobacco  by  legal  regulation,  in  money  at  the 
rate  of  twopence  a  pound.  The  measure  was  possibly  nec- 
'essary  on  account  of  the  low  price  of  tobacco  and  the 
weight  of  taxation  due  to  the  French-and-Indian  War,  then 
in  progress,  but  the  assembly  had  passed  a  similar  law  in 
1755  and  seemed  about  to  establish  a  rule  of  scaling  down 
^salaries  when  tobacco  was  high  without  providing  any  com- 
pensation when  it  fell  below  the  normal,  as  it  frequently 
did.  The  state-supported  clergy,  who  naturally  objected 
to  this  heads-I-win-tails-you-lose  system,  appealed  to  Eng- 
land and  succeeded  in  enlisting  the  services  of  the  Bishop 
of  London,  the  colonial  diocesan.  The  bishop  took  up  the 
cudgels  in  a  letter  denouncing  the  Virginia  government. 
■»  The  final  stage  in  the  passage  of  a  colonial  law  was  the 
king's  assent,  but  the  assembly  hastened  to  put  the  Two- 
penny Act  into  effect  upon  securing  the  governor's  ap- 
proval, without  waiting  to  hear  from  England,  although 
the  act  altered  a  statute  which  the  king  had  approved. 
In  other  words,  the  Virginia  assembly  dared  to  legislate 
on  its  own  authority  and  in  practical  disregard  of  the  king. 
The  Bishop  of  London  hinted  that  such  action  was  in  the 
nature  of  treason;  it  was  at  least  not  strictly  constitutional. 
In  answer  to  the  bishop's  letter  two  high-spirited  Vir- 
ginians, Landon  Carter  and  Richard  Bland,  sprang  to  the 
defense  of  the  assembly  and  there  followed  a  merry  war  of 
pamphlets,  in  which  John  Camm,  president  of  William  and 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  REVOLUTION        11 

Mary  College,  supported  the  side  of  the  clergy.  In  this 
dispute  the  theory  of  the  colonial  constitution  was  first 
clearly  defined  by  the  chief  writer  participating,  Richard 
Bland.1 

Richard  Bland,  of  Prince  George,  deserves  a  word  of 
mention,  since  he  more  than  any  other  man  was  the 
author  of  the  Revolution  in  Virginia.  He  was  born  in  1710 
and  died  in  1776,  spanning  the  whole  preliminary  period  of 
the  Revolution  in  his  mature  manhood.  His  education  was 
of  peculiar  value  for  these  critical  decades  from  1755  to 
1775;  after  a  preliminary  course  in  William  and  Mary  he 
studied  history  and  law  at  the  University  of  Edinburgh, 
and  was  probably  the  best  constitutional  lawyer  in  the 
colonies.  He  saw  with  great  clearness  and  astuteness  on 
just  what  grounds  the  legal  resistance  to  the  British  policy 
might  be  effectively  placed  and  most  of  the  remonstrances 
emanating  from  the  House  of  Burgesses  were  his  work. 
In  personality  Bland  was  of  that  type  of  Virginian  which 
is  best  illustrated  by  the  figure  of  George  Mason,  that 
type  considered  characteristically  Virginian,  —  half  prac- 
tical farmer,  half  classical  scholar  and  lawyer ;  genial,  well- 
mannered,  personally  somewhat  untidy  and  careless  of 
clothes. 

Bland  defended  the  assembly's  action  in  setting  aside  a 
law  approved  by  the  king  on  the  plea  that  action  was  some- 
times necessary  before  the  king's  will  could  be  learned. 
"Salus  populi,  suprema  lex"  he  impudently  quoted.  In 
brief,  the  colony  had  to  consider  its  own  best  interests, 
even  at  the  expense  of  constitutional  forms.  But  the  royal 
council,   to   which  Virginia's   action  was   not  especially 

1  H.  J.  Eckenrode's  Separation  of  Church  and  State  in  Virginia,  24  et  seq. 


1%  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

palatable,  "  disallowed,' '  that  is,  vetoed  the  Twopenny 
Act,  and  left  the  clergy  the  remedy  of  suing  in  the  courts 
for  the  difference  between  their  money  commutations 
and  their  salaries  in  tobacco  according  to  the  prices  cur- 
rent in  1758.  Several  ministers  took  advantage  of  this 
decision  to  bring  suit  and  some  judgments  were  obtained. 
One  of  the  cases  came  up  in  Hanover  Court  in  1763,  with 
the  parish  minister,  Maury,  the  plaintiff.  Patrick  Henry, 
then  an  obscure  young  lawyer,  represented  the  defendants, 
who  were  the  vestry.  In  the  speech  delivered  on  this  oc- 
casion, Henry  boldly  asserted  Bland's  doctrine,  put  for- 
ward three  years  earlier,  that  the  assembly  had  the  right 
to  pass  necessary  legislation  without  interference  from 
England.  He  even  went  so  far  as  to  declare,  in  terms  that 
simply  thrilled  his  audience,  that  the  king  in  vetoing  a 
reasonable  and  beneficial  measure  had  forfeited  the  right 
to  his  subjects'  obedience.  This  speech,  which  is  generally 
regarded  as  the  beginning  of  the  Revolutionary  movement 
in  Virginia,  actually  marks  the  end  of  an  agitation  lasting 
for  five  years.  Henry  played  Luther  to  Bland's  Erasmus, 
carrying  to  their  conclusion  the  principles  which  the  con- 
stitutional lawyer  had  outlined  in  his  pamphlet  of  1760. 

As  it  happened,  the  seed  fell  on  prepared  ground.  The 
once  solidly  Episcopalian  Hanover  County  was  now  full 
of  dissenters,  and  Presbyterians  largely  manned  the  jury, 
which  brought  in  a  nominal  verdict  of  one  penny  damages. 
It  proved  the  ruin  of  the  clerical  cause.  Virginia  rang 
with  Henry's  name  and  the  great  body  of  people,  who  had 
hitherto  viewed  the  matter  with  indifference,  now  took 
sides  against  the  preachers.  This  outburst  of  enthusiasm 
led  in  later  times  to   an  obscuring  of  the  actual  issues 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  REVOLUTION        13 

involved,  and  Henry  was  presented  somewhat  in  the  light 
of  a  tribune  combating  class  privilege.  In  truth,  however, 
the  Twopenny  Act  had  been  devised  by  the  ruling  clique 
in  the  House  of  Burgesses,  which  would  have  been  incon- 
veniently taxed  if  the  ministers  had  been  paid  according 
to  the  letter  of  the  law.  The  dissenters  did  play  a  part, 
but  it  was  subordinate.  Henry's  real  importance  in  the 
case  consisted  in  the  coup  by  which  he  turned  a  quarrel  of 
the  House  of  Burgesses  and  the  courts  into  a  general 
political  issue.  It  was  Henry's  great  work,  as  the  "Par- 
sons' Cause"  first  showed,  to  enlist  the  body  of  Virginia 
people  in  the  Revolutionary  movement,  which,  without 
him,  would  have  taken  a  different  direction. 

The  clergy  were  defeated  in  the  Virginia  courts  by  the 
popular  clamor  raised  by  Henry;  the  British  Privy  Council 
also  ruled  against  them  on  some  technicality  when  appeals 
were  carried  to  that  body.  Though  the  dispute  had  thus 
ended  in  the  complete  discomfiture  of  the  clergy,  the  war 
of  pamphlets  continued  for  several  years  longer;  John 
Camm,  the  clerical  leader,  exchanged  fire  again  and  again 
with  Bland  and  Carter.  Camm  believed  that  the  control 
of  the  Virginia  establishment  belonged  properly  to  the 
king,  not  to  the  assembly;  and  this  unpopular  theory, 
along  with  the  clergy's  unsuccessful  appeal  from  the  Vir- 
ginia courts  to  the  Privy  Council,  tended  to  alienate  many 
persons  from  the  state  church  and  foster  the  growth  of 
dissent  in  eastern  Virginia.  Presbyterians  and  Baptists 
now  appeared  in  numbers  in  even  the  most  conservative 
counties. 

Bland,  in  his  later  pamphlets  in  the  Twopenny  case,  and 
in  his  "Inquiry  into  the  Rights  of  the  British  Colonies," 


14  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

published  in  1766,  advanced  beyond  his  first  position,  until 
he  came  to  assert  that  all  men  born  under  an  English  gov- 
ernment are  subject  only  to  laws  made  with  their  own  con- 
sent.1 In  his  Stamp  Act  pamphlet  of  1766  he  ingeniously 
outlined  the  distinction  between  the  external  government 
of  England  and  the  internal  government  of  the  assembly 
and  between  external  and  internal  taxation,  basing  the 
colonial  right  to  internal  self -taxation  on  the  common  law, 
which  follows  the  Englishman  around  the  world,  as  well  as 
on  specific  grants  in  royal  charters.  He  defined,  probably 
more  clearly  than  any  other  colonial  writer,  the  difference 
between  the  external  authority  of  Parliament  to  pass  acts 
for  the  regulation  of  commerce  and  the  internal  power  of  the 
assembly  to  levy  any  tax  it  might  see  fit,  which  distinction 
has  survived  in  the  American  Constitution  of  1787.  This 
difference  between  "external"  and  "internal"  government, 
rather  ridiculous  to  Charles  Townshend  and  not  altogether 
convincing  to-day,  was  an  ingenious  effort  of  the  colonial 
mind  to  offer  some  real  objection  in  law  to  the  encroach- 
ments of  the  British  ministry.  From  the  Pistole  Fee  to 
1776  Bland  was  busy  in  occupying  defensive  positions 
against  England,  and  these  were  none  the  less  effective 
that  they  sometimes  happened  to  be  novel. 

Opinion  in  Virginia  over  the  "Parsons'  Cause"  had  been 
practically  unanimous  except  for  the  parsons,  who  natu- 
rally viewed  the  constitution  in  another  light.  But  in  1765, 
with  the  crisis  brought  on  by  the  Stamp  Act,  party  differ- 
ences began  to  appear  for  the  first  time.  On  this  occasion 
the  middle  and  western  sections  rose  to  a  place  of  influence 
never  afterwards  lost.  The  country  beyond  the  Blue  Ridge 
1  Colonel  Dismounted,  21a. 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  REVOLUTION        15 

was  being  rapidly  settled  by  non-English  races  —  Germans 
and  Scotch-Irish  —  who  had  little  of  the  Virginian  rev- 
erence for  Anglican  institutions.  The  Presbyterian  and 
democratic  Scotch-Irish  were  reinforced  by  the  piedmont 
country  between  the  tidewater  and  the  mountains,  which 
had  also  been  affected  by  dissent  and  democracy.  Counties 
were  being  formed,  and  all  that  the  new  section  needed 
was  a  vigorous  and  self-assertive  leader.  At  length  he 
appeared. 

Before  Patrick  Henry's  debut  in  the  assembly  in  1765, 
Virginia  was  ruled  by  a  coterie  of  eastern  members  —  an 
astute,  far-seeing,  and  experienced  group  of  politicians,  of 
whom  the  chief  was  John  Robinson,  speaker  of  the  House, 
of  Burgesses  and  treasurer  of  the  colony.  Robinson  be- 
longed to  the  type  which  controls  a  conservative  com- 
munity; he  was  well  connected,  rich,  polished,  genial,  and 
possessed  of  fair  mental  powers.  He  ruled  inter  pares  by 
virtue  of  his  popularity  and  a  certain  force  of  character. 
This  group  led  by  Robinson  had  governed  with  consider- 
able efficiency  and  usually  managed  to  overreach  the  gov- 
ernor and  get  their  way  with  the  home  administration. 
But  in  1764  they  had  been  appalled  by  the  declaratory  act 
preceding  the  Stamp  Act,  which  laid  down  the  doctrine  of 
the  Parliamentary  right  of  taxing  the  colonies.  The  House 
of  Burgesses  registered  a  dignified  though  emphatic  protest, 
but  Parliament,  in  disregard  of  colonial  objections,  passed 
the  Stamp  Act  in  the  following  year,  1765.  Patrick  Henry 
took  his  seat  in  the  House  as  a  member  for  Louisa  at 
the  May  session  of  1765,  when  the  news  of  the  act  was 
fresh. 

Robinson  and  his  group  had  long  held  undisturbed  pos- 


16  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

session  of  the  House  of  Burgesses,  but  Henry,  instead  of 
containing  himself  in  the  presence  of  the  silk-stockinged 
and  self-important  gentlemen  from  the  tidewater,  as  might 
have  been  expected  of  a  newcomer  ignorant  of  the  legis- 
lative "ropes,"  signalized  his  entry  by  assuming  the  cham- 
pionship of  popular  measures.  A  good  opportunity  stood 
at  hand,  but  one  which  only  a  man  of  nerve  would  take. 
The  ruling  clique  in  Virginia,  like  all  ruling  cliques,  could 
not  entirely  refrain  from  abusing  a  long  lease  of  power. 
John  Robinson  partly  owed  his  commanding  place  to  an 
accommodating  disposition,  for  it  had  been  his  habit  to 
lend  the  public  funds  to  friends  on  their  personal  security. 
As  he  was  a  man  of  large  wealth  for  the  times,  the  colony 
apparently  did  not  run  much  risk  of  loss  by  this  procedure, 
while  a  number  of  free-living,  money-spending  politicians 
and  planters  profited  by  the  use  of  the  treasury  as  a  bank 
until  Robinson  became  involved  for  a  great  amount. 

The  situation  finally  became  so  serious  that  the  speaker 
and  his  friends  devised  a  plan  of  securing  specie  from 
England  and  lending  it  to  planters  on  land  security;  this 
would  have  enabled  Robinson  to  transfer  to  the  treasury 
the  securities  he  held  for  the  public  money  loaned.  Henry 
boldly  fell  athwart  the  scheme,1  and,  according  to  Jeffer- 
son, defeated  it,  though  the  journal  shows  that  the  bill 
actually  passed  the  House  of  Burgesses  and  was  lost  in  the 
council.  In  the  debate  on  the  loan-office  Henry  gained  a 
valuable  ally  in  Richard  Henry  Lee,  another  ambitious 
politician  of  radical  predilections,  who  succeeded  in  bring- 
ing about  an  investigation  of  the  treasury.  This  cut-and- 
dried  performance  resulted  in  Robinson's  vindication  for 
1  William  Wirt's  Life  of  Patrick  Henry,  53. 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  REVOLUTION        17 

the  time  being,  but  on  his  death  in  1766  a  defalcation  of 
more  than  one  hundred  thousand  pounds  came  to  light. 
Nevertheless,  the  parties  implicated  looked  out  for  them- 
selves so  cleverly  that  they  were  not  called  to  account, 
and  Robinson,  being  dead,  could  not  protect  himself.  A 
large  part  of  his  estate  was  sold  for  the  benefit  of  the 
colony,  which  was  not  entirely  reimbursed.  The  names  of 
the  borrowers  never  came  to  light,  but  the  scandal  had 
some  effect  on  popular  opinion  and  assisted  in  paving  the 
way  for  the  rise  of  a  novus  homo. 

The  loan-office  was  quickly  crowded  into  the  back- 
ground by  weightier  measures,  for  at  this  same  session  of 
1765  Patrick  Henry  took  the  lead  in  opposition  to  the 
Stamp  Act.  He  precipitated  a  sensational  crisis  by  sud- 
denly introducing  in  the  House  a  set  of  resolutions  which 
openly  and  indignantly  denied  the  right  of  Parliament 
to  tax  the  colonies.  It  was  the  best-judged  move  of  his 
whole  wonderful  career,  and,  in  effect,  the  beginning  of  the 
American  Revolution.  At  this  time  the  colonies  had  taken 
no  stand  on  the  taxation  question  and  their  future  action 
was  uncertain,  yet,  if  the  right  of  taxation  was  not  to  be 
conceded,  definite  and  emphatic  protest  was  imperative. 
With  all  deference  for  modern  American  writers  who  make 
out  such  a  good  case  for  the  British  government,  it  should 
be  observed  that  the  Stamp  Act,  no  matter  on  what  excel- 
lent legal  grounds  it  might  stand,  was  a  genuine  measure 
of  oppression.  It  was  a  subtle  tax,  affecting  almost  every 
relation  of  life.  If  it  had  been  tamely  submitted  to,  any 
governmental  tyranny  might  have  been  expected.  The 
plea  of  levying  a  tax  on  America  for  colonial  defense  should 
not  blind  us  to  the  obvious  intention  of  the  British  gov- 


18  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

eminent  also  to  milk  the  fat  American  cow  for  its  own 
benefit. 

The  boldness  of  the  resolutions  and  the  violence  of 
Henry's  speech  alarmed  the  circle  of  eastern  planters,  who 
were  as  much  opposed  to  the  Stamp  Act  as  the  orator,  but 
who  preferred  to  carry  on  their  opposition  in  the  time- 
honored  method  of  respectful  petition.  At  a  later  date 
and  in  a  period  of  glorification  of  the  Revolution,  it  was 
claimed  that  Henry  won  a  victory  over  the  "court"  or 
British  faction  in  the  House  of  Burgesses.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  no  English  party  existed  in  Virginia  at  this  time  or 
afterwards.  The  nearest  approach  to  such  a  party  was  the 
council,  which  was  closely  allied  to  the  governor,  but  the 
council's  influence  had  been  steadily  declining  for  some 
years  and  had  practically  disappeared  by  the  Revolution. 
Certainly  no  English  party  had  a  place  in  the  House  of 
Burgesses,  if  by  that  term  is  meant  sl  group  willing  to 
subordinate  the  colony  to  the  will  of  the  British  govern- 
ment. The  leaders  acting  against  Henry  to  defeat  his  reso- 
lutions were  Speaker  Robinson,  Edmund  Pendleton,  Pey- 
ton Randolph,  Robert  Carter  Nicholas,  Richard  Bland, 
and  George  Wythe,  all  of  whom  with  the  exception  of 
Robinson  became  active  revolutionists  a  decade  later. 
The  speaker,  it  is  true,  stood  near  the  governor,  Fauquier, 
and  was,  so  to  speak,  in  touch  with  the  home  government, 
but  it  is  almost  certain  that  he  would  have  sided  with  his 
associates  if  he  had  been  living  in  1775,  since  he  had  taken 
the  lead  in  protests  and  in  the  first  committee  of  corre- 
spondence. Assertion  of  colonial  rights  was  nothing  new 
to  the  House  of  Burgesses;  it  had  always  been  a  singularly 
independent  body.   It  had  thwarted  Governor  Dinwiddie 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  REVOLUTION        19 

consistently,  it  had  asserted  itself  in  the  "Parsons'  Cause" 
and  in  the  Pistole  Fee,  and  in  1764  it  had  memorialized 
against  the  declaratory  act  preceding  the  Stamp  Act. 
Landon  Carter,  George  Wythe,  Richard  Bland,  Peyton 
Randolph,  and  others  of  the  so-called  "court"  party 
formed  the  committee  to  draw  the  protest.  No  view  could 
be  more  mistaken  than  that  Henry  originated  the  spirit 
of  resistance  to  British  claims  in  the  Virginia  House  of 
Burgesses;  that  spirit  had  always  existed. 

But  if  he  did  not  initiate  the  opposition,  he  did  show 
the  wisdom  of  immediate  and  emphatic  action.  With  his 
unrivaled  faculty  for  seizing  the  psychological  moment, 
Henry  rightly  judged  that  the  time  had  passed  for  re- 
spectful representations  to  the  "best  of  kings"  and  that 
the  hour  of  rough  and  vigorous  action  had  arrived.  The 
speech  he  made  in  defense  of  his  resolutions  was  startling 
and  seditious  in  the  extreme.  After  a  stormy  debate  of 
two  days,  May  29-30,  1765,  the  resolutions,  somewhat 
amended,  passed  the  House.  Jefferson,  loitering  in  the 
lobby  watching  the  scene  instead  of  attending  his  classes 
at  William  and  Mary,  describes  the  fat  and  excited  Peyton 
Randolph  as  rushing  past  him  swearing  that  he  would 
have  given  five  hundred  guineas  for  a  single  vote  to  help 
defeat  Henry.  Yet  this  man,  who  so  passionately  resented 
the  orator's  bold  stand  on  the  Stamp  Act,  afterwards  be- 
came the  speaker  of  the  Revolutionary  House  of  Burgesses 
and  of  conventions,  and  the  first  president  of  the  Conti- 
nental Congress.  Robert  Carter  Nicholas,  who  a  year  later 
succeeded  Robinson  as  treasurer,  was  an  important  Revo- 
lutionary leader,  as  was  Edmund  Pendleton,  chairman  of 
the  Committee  of  Safety  and  president  of  the  constitu- 


20  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

tion-making  convention  of  1776.  George  Wythe,  another 
of  Randolph's  associates,  played  a  prominent  part  in  the 
creation  of  the  State  government  and  is  credited  by  Jeffer- 
son as  being  the  only  man  in  Virginia  sharing  his  own 
extreme  views  of  the  colonial  constitution.  Richard  Bland 
had  been  the  most  effective  literary  representative  of 
colonial  rights. 

Jefferson  admits  that  there  was  no  difference  in  principle 
on  the  Stamp  Act  resolutions  between  the  opposing  parties 
in  the  House  of  Burgesses,  but  merely  a  difference  on  the 
question  of  their  expediency.  "They  were  opposed,"  he 
says,  "by  Randolph,  Pendleton,  Nicholas,  Wythe,  and  all 
the  old  members  whose  influence  in  the  House  had  till 
then  been  unbroken."1  The  resistance  of  the  tidewater 
planters  was  due  to  two  things  —  to  the  leadership  of  a 
member  outside  of  the  old  circle  and,  in  greater  part,  to 
Henry's  irreverent  allusions  to  the  king.  The  Virginian  of 
that  day,  however  much  he  might  object  to  the  policy  of 
the  British  ministry,  entertained  a  profound  respect  for 
the  person  of  the  sovereign;  and  the  sentence  which  is 
almost  all  of  the  great  speech  that  has  come  down  to  us  — 
"Caesar  had  his  Brutus,  Charles  the  First  his  Cromwell, 
and  George  the  Third"  —  was  drowned  in  the  cries  of 
"Treason"  rising  from  a  deeply  shocked  assembly.  That 
rebellious  speech  startled  a  wider  audience  than  the  cham- 
ber which  heard  it;  it  ran  through  the  colonies  and  gave  rise 
to  the  agitation  ending  in  Parliament's  repeal  of  the 
offending  statute. 

The  Virginia  leaders  had  intended  a  constitutional  protest 

1  Wirt's  Life  of  Patrick  Henry ,60.  Jefferson's  Works  (Memorial  edition), 
xv,  168. 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  REVOLUTION       21 

against  the  Stamp  Act;  they  did  not  wish  to  commit  the 
colony  to  a  resistance  that  the  British  government  might 
construe  as  treason.  The  event  showed  that  the  orator  was 
right,  not  they,  and  that  a  bold  face  intimidated  the  min- 
istry where  mildness  and  the  spirit  of  conciliation  would 
only  have  confirmed  it  in  its  course.  So  perhaps  it  is  not 
to  be  wondered  at  that  writers  of  succeeding  generations, 
imbued  with  the  prevailing  democratic  ideas  and  viewing 
the  events  of  1765  retrospectively,  should  have  translated 
the  conservative  ring  of  planters  and  lawyers,  which  was 
thoroughly  patriotic  in  temper  if  cautious  in  action,  into  a 
party  advocating  submission  to  England,  and  Henry,  the 
agitator  and  incendiary,  into  an  innovator  forcing  a  decla- 
ration of  colonial  rights  through  a  hostile  House.  We  are 
further  informed  that  the  public  so  fully  indorsed  Henry 
and  condemned  his  opponents  that  at  the  ensuing  election 
for  the  assembly  of  1766  many  delegates  who  voted  against 
the  resolutions  failed  of  reelection.1  A  number  of  changes 
did  take  place  in  the  personnel  of  the  succeeding  House  of 
Burgesses,  but  the  rejected  conservatives  must  have  been 
very  minor  victims,  since  in  no  case  was  a  conservative 
leader  defeated.  More  than  this,  Peyton  Randolph,  the 
leading  conservative,  was  elected  speaker  in  place  of  John 
Robinson  —  a  strange  victory  indeed  for  the  patriots  to 
have  won  over  the  "court"  party.  An  explanation  of  Vir- 
ginia politics  in  the  decade  preceding  the  Revolution  on 
the  theory  of  a  "court"  or  British  party  leads  to  a  di- 
lemma. We  are  led  to  conclude  that  Patrick  Henry,  by 
the  sheer  force  of  genius,  prevailed  on  the  planters  to  stand 

1  W.  W.  Henry's  Patrick  Henry,  i,  110.  Journals,  House  of  Burgesses 
(Virginia  State  Library),  1766-69,  ix. 


22  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

up  for  rights  to  which  they  had  been  indifferent  before,  or 
that  he  forced  them  because  of  his  popularity  to  advocate 
principles  they  did  not  believe  in.  They  were  enlightened 
by  the  rather  unlearned  Henry  on  the  subject  of  constitu- 
tional law,  or  were  driven  by  fear  of  the  populace  into  that 
basest  of  opportunism,  insincere  revolution.  The  whole 
history  of  the  House  of  Burgesses  —  proud,  independent, 
and  tenacious  of  its  privileges  —  speaks  against  such  a 
theory. 

In  fact,  it  was  not  Henry  who  influenced  the  conserva- 
tive leaders  so  much  as  it  was  the  conservative  leaders 
who  furnished  him  with  thunder.  The  orator  began  his 
career  by  putting  into  practice  in  his  Hanover  speech  the 
arguments  Richard  Bland  had  introduced  to  the  small 
reading  public  in  the  pamphlet  of  1760.  Henry's  eloquence 
metamorphosed  the  reasoning  of  the  constitutional  lawyer 
into  clear  common  speech.  Again,  in  1765,  he  endued 
with  all  the  fire  of  his  passion  the  protests  which  the  House 
of  Burgesses  had  made  in  1764  in  rather  tame  phraseology. 
In  neither  case  was  there  a  difference  of  principle;  in  both, 
all  the  difference  in  the  world  in  power  and  effect. 

The  great  crisis  of  1765  did  not,  therefore,  witness  the 
beginning  of  the  resistance  to  the  British  policy;  that  re- 
sistance had  begun  long  before  and  was  properly  the  re- 
sult of  the  colony's  rapid  development  into  a  strong  and 
populous  state.  None  the  less,  Henry's  appearance  on  the 
stage  was  a  momentous  event  in  American  history,  for  it 
marked  the  spread  of  the  spirit  of  revolt  from  the  assembly 
to  the  body  of  the  people,  and  the  rise  of  the  Democratic 
Party.  Henry  was  the  inspirer  and  first  leader  of  that 
party,  which  under  Jefferson  grew  beyond  the  boundaries 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  REVOLUTION        23 

of  Virginia  and  finally  triumphed  in  the  nation  at  large. 
Before  1765  tendencies  existed  in  Virginia,  but  no  parties 
—  hardly  even  factions.  Legislative  action  lay  in  the  hands 
of  a  group  of  large  planters,  and  such  opposition  as  existed 
did  little  more  than  express  the  discontent  of  westerners 
and  the  protests  of  dissenter  preachers  against  the  order 
of  society.  After  1765  there  were  two  more  or  less  clearly 
defined  parties  —  the  conservatives  headed  by  the  old 
leaders,  and  the  democrats,  or  more  properly,  the  pro- 
gressives, led  by  Patrick  Henry  and  Richard  Henry  Lee. 
Party  names  did  not  exist,  but  there  was  true  party  action, 
and  the  opponents,  though  agreeing  mainly  in  their  con- 
stitutional views,  differed  widely  as  to  ways  and  means. 
Accordingly  as  one  faction  or  the  other  predominated,  the 
Revolution  in  Virginia  went  forward  rapidly  or  moved 
cautiously  and  in  the  hope  of  reconciliation  with  England. 
Patrick  Henry,  who  overthrew  the  old  order  and  brought 
in  the  new,  is  the  most  striking  figure  in  Virginia  history. 
In  a  measure  he  was  aided  by  circumstances,  but  the  chief 
factor  in  the  coup  d'etat  was  his  own  overmastering  per- 
sonality. The  hour  and  the  man  coincided.  Henry  con- 
trolled a  majority  in  the  House  of  Burgesses,  where  inar- 
ticulate opposition  to  the  "ring"  had  been  powerless,  and 
he  became  a  rallying  figure  for  all  the  elements  of  dissent 
and  revolution.  The  council,  which  recruited  its  mem- 
bership from  a  circle  of  families  in  the  Williamsburg  neigh- 
borhood, had  drawn  away  in  recent  years  from  the  House 
of  Burgesses  and  the  planter  class  in  general.  The  "con- 
ciliar"  families  more  and  more  tended  to  form  a  separate 
circle  elevated  above  the  other  planters.  Their  sympa- 
thies were  English,  and  they  would  have  become  active 


U  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

Tories  if  the  great  body  of  planters,  who  viewed  them  with 
jealousy  and  distrust,  had  not  been  in  the  saddle.  As  it 
was,  they  became  lukewarm  patriots  and  participated  in 
the  Revolution  in  order  to  save  themselves. 

We  look  back  on  this  period  with  the  knowledge  of 
what  happened.  But  the  effect  of  Henry's  stand  against 
Parliament  was  not  so  striking  as  immediately  to  deter- 
mine the  public  attitude  on  the  issue.  The  courts  practi- 
cally negatived  the  Stamp  Act  by  making  various  excuses 
for  doing  business  without  stamps  and  threatened  to  shut 
up  shop  altogether.  Northampton  Court  even  went  so 
far  as  to  declare  the  Stamp  Act  unconstitutional,  the  first 
instance  in  American  history  of  such  a  declaration.  The 
fate  of  the  act  depended,  however,  not  upon  court  deci- 
sions, but  upon  popular  opinion,  and  in  the  interim  be- 
tween the  adjournment  of  the  assembly  and  the  date  set 
for  the  new  law  to  go  into  effect  —  November  1,  1765  — 
quite  a  few  Virginians  applied  for  office  under  the  tax  com- 
mission in  the  impression  that  it  would  soon  begin  its  work. 
No  less  a  patriot  than  Richard  Henry  Lee  had  sought 
an  appointment.  This  was  an  unfortunate  step  and  one 
his  friends  were  put  to  pains  to  explain,  although  Lee  was 
really  not  so  much  to  blame  as  might  appear  at  first  sight. 
The  Burgesses  had  exhausted  their  resources  of  protest 
without  impressing  the  British  government,  and  the  gen- 
eral belief  in  the  summer  of  1765  seems  to  have  been  that 
submission  was  inevitable.  Benjamin  Franklin  thought 
so  and  made  no  effort  to  dissuade  a  kinsman  who  came  to 
ask  his  advice  about  seeking  a  tax  office.  The  crisis  was 
indeed  grave.  If  the  colonists  believed  that  acceptance  of 
the  Stamp  Act  was  preferable  to  the  risks  of  resistance,  a 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  REVOLUTION        25 

loyalist  party  would  have  arisen  in  Virginia,  as  well  as 
in  other  colonies,  having  the  same  interests  as  the  British 
government.  Signs  are  not  wanting  that  many  men  in 
Virginia  were  willing  to  ally  themselves  with  the  royal 
government  and  prosper  in  its  shadow.  While  the  House 
of  Burgesses  had  resisted  every  effort  of  the  governor  to 
increase  his  authority  and  had  even  asserted  itself  against 
the  royal  prerogative,  these  contests  were  only  skirmishes 
compared  to  a  clash  with  Parliament  over  the  fundamental 
right  of  taxation. 

This  fall  of  1765,  when  the  question  of  the  Stamp  Act 
was  decided,  was  the  critical  moment  in  the  American 
Revolution;  all  that  followed  was  the  direct  result  of  the 
stand  then  taken.  And  it  soon  became  clear  that  Patrick 
Henry  had  done  a  greater  work  than  inspire  a  party  in  a 
legislative  chamber;  he  had  fired  the  people  of  all  the  colo- 
nies into  passionate  resistance  to  the  British  government. 
When  the  commissioner  convoying  the  first  consignment 
of  stamps,  a  Virginian  named  Mercer,  arrived  in  Williams- 
burg, the  populace  rose  and  demanded  that  he  resign  his 
office.  This  was  on  October  30, 1765,  just  before  the  Stamp 
Act  became  operative,  and  the  scene  was  the  most  memo- 
rable the  little  Virginia  capital  had  ever  witnessed.1  An 
excited  crowd  gathered  before  the  coffee-house,  which 
opened  on  the  wide  thoroughfare  named,  with  such  charm- 
ing grandiloquence,  "the  Duke  of  Gloucester  Street." 
The  governor,  accompanied  by  the  speaker  and  other  offi- 
cials, went  thither  to  greet  the  newly  arrived  stamp  com- 
missioner and  found  him  on  the  point  of  being  mobbed. 

1  Journals,  House  of  Burgesses  (Virginia  State  Library),  1761-35, 

LXIX. 


26  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

A  crowd  composed  of  the  best  citizens  of  Williamsburg 
and  planters  of  the  neighborhood  loudly  threatened  to 
"rush  in,"  and  the  speaker  interposed  his  ample  person 
before  the  governor  to  ward  off  possible  missiles  from  the 
representative  of  the  majesty  of  England.  Mercer  was  in 
/  actual  danger  for  a  time,  but  he  promised  to  give  a  prompt 
answer  to  the  demand  for  his  resignation  and  Fauquier's 
coolness  quieted  the  rioters,  who  finally  allowed  the  stamp 
commissioner  to  go  off  under  his  guardianship.  Next  day 
the  prudent  Mercer  resigned. 

This  outburst  was  no  demonstration  of  the  lower  classes, 
but  of  the  well-to-do  and  intelligent  planters,  who  now 
definitely  took  sides  against  England.  Owing  to  a  simi- 
larity of  feeling  among  the  planters  of  eastern  and  southern 
Virginia,  they  acted  unitedly,  and  because  of  their  local 
power  and  influence  they  carried  all  classes  with  them  into 
the  Revolution.  Henry  had  aroused  the  people  generally; 
he  had  particularly  stirred  the  younger  and  liberally  in- 
clined country  gentlemen,  and  they  were  not  afraid  to 
use  violence  to  gain  their  way. 

The  Williamsburg  disturbance  was  followed  by  the  or- 
ganized and  effective  resistance  of  experienced  politicians. 
Richard  Henry  Lee,  who  was  astute  enough  to  know  that 
he  had  made  a  mistake  almost  as  soon  as  he  made  it  and 
quickly  withdrew  his  application  for  a  tax  position,  went 
to  the  extreme  of  opposition  when  he  saw  which  way  the 
wind  blew.  His  excellent  talents  as  a  conspirator  showed 
to  advantage,  when  early  in  the  next  year,  in  February, 
J 766,  he  organized  in  his  own  county  of  Westmoreland 
the  first  "association,"  l  that  form  of  boycott  destined  to 

1  Virginia  Historical  Register,  n,  16. 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  REVOLUTION        27 

give  the  British  government  endless  trouble  and  to  serve 
as  the  immediate  forerunner  of  war  in  1774.  This  "asso- 
ciation" bound  the  subscribers  to  import  no  goods  from, 
England  until  the  Stamp  Act  had  been  repealed,  and  while 
it  did  not  immediately  prove  useful  because  hardly  needed 
under  the  circumstances,  it  remained  a  valuable  precedent 
for  future  service. 

Repeal  quickly  followed  from  the  emphatic  protests  of 
the  colonies.  The  Stamp  Act  could  not  have  been  enforced 
without  troops  and  the  British  ministry  had  no  wish  to 
resort  to  extremities.  This  show  of  weakness  was  fatal  to 
the  authority  of  the  government.  The  colonies  had  learned 
that  Parliament  could  be  intimidated  into  giving  way  and 
never  forgot  the  lesson:  they  went  on  to  resist  all  further 
assertions  of  the  English  right  of  taxing  the  colonies,  no 
matter  on  what  ground.  A  now  definitely  developed  pa- 
triot party  in  Virginia  had  learned,  too,  that  uniform  ac- 
tion might  be  secured  by  exerting  pressure  on  the  individ- 
ual counties,  and  for  this  reason  there  never  was  a  Tory 
party  in  Virginia.  The  west  was  solidly  patriotic  because 
it  was  raw,  democratic,  and  dissenter;  the  east  was  as 
solidly  patriotic  because  the  planter  class,  convinced  that 
its  welfare  lay  in  opposition  to  England,  overawed  the  con- 
siderable but  widely  scattered  loyalist  element,  which  was 
helpless  in  the  face  of  a  well-organized  majority  in  every 
community. 

The  bonfires  and  bell-ringings  over  the  repeal  of  the 
Stamp  Act  might  have  been  spared.  The  English  adminis- 
tration, though  it  had  abandoned  the  attempt  to  enforce 
a  truly  burdensome,  income-producing  tax,  was  not  pre- 
pared to  renounce  the  principle  of  taxation.  It  substituted 


28  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

the  Townshend  Acts  of  1767,  which  were  based  on  the  the- 
ory admitted  by  the  colonists  themselves  of  the  Parlia- 
mentary right  to  regulate  commerce;  duties  were  laid  on 
tea,  glass,  paper,  and  lead  shipped  into  America.  The 
struggle  immediately  recommenced,,  and  the  House  of 
Burgesses,  in  April,  1768,  adopted  a  complaint  written  by 
Richard  Bland  that  the  Townshend  duties  amounted  to 
an  exercise  of  " internal' '  control  and  so  were  unconstitu- 
tional, which  was  an  extension  of  the  doctrine  of  "internal" 
power  to  cover  the  whole  field  of  taxation  and  a  distinct 
advance  over  the  former  position  of  the  provincials.  But 
the  Americans  of  those  days  were  too  English  to  be  much 
disturbed  by  inconsistencies;  with  marvelous  facility  they 
contrived  to  raise  constitutional  objections  to  every  new 
assertion  of  authority  on  the  part  of  the  ministry.  Indeed, 
the  colonists  were  so  thoroughly  aroused  by  the  real  men- 
ace of  the  Stamp  Act  that  they  were  determined  to  sub- 
mit to  no  new  taxes  of  any  kind.  It  is  not  for  us  to  blame 
them.  Liberty  cannot  be  made  strictly  dependent  on  a 
series  of  constitutional  precedents;  law  seldom  measures 
the  real  issues  at  stake  in  history.  However  defective 
the  fathers  may  have  been  in  logic,  —  and  that  they  were 
sometimes  defective  we  must  admit,  —  nevertheless,  they 
stood  for  the  principle  of  self-government  against  the  world- 
old  system  of  arbitrary  rule. 

In  the  following  year,  in  May,  1769,  the  House  of  Bur- 
gesses again  protested  against  the  British  policy,  with  the 
result  that  Lord  Botetourt,  the  governor,  immediately 
dissolved  it.  The  members  nominally  obeyed;  in  reality 
they  merely  adjourned  to  a  private  house,  where  they 
elected  Speaker  Randolph  chairman  and  performed  the  first 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  REVOLUTION        29 

act  of  real  rebellion.  Borrowing  Richard  Henry  Lee's 
scheme  of  three  years  earlier,  they  adopted  a  non-impor- 
tation agreement  which  specifically  boycotted  slaves, 
wines,  and  British  manufactures.  George  Mason,  who  was 
not  then  a  member  of  the  assembly,  drew  this  paper  and 
George  Washington  presented  it.1  Peyton  Randolph,  who 
had  led  the  fight  against  Patrick  Henry  over  the  Stamp 
Act  resolutions,  acted  as  ringleader  in  this  conspiracy 
against  the  home  government.  It  is  true  that  the  non- 
importation agreement  adopted  then  did  not  have  any 
marked  immediate  effect,  but  the  boycott  method  of  re- 
sistance was  carried  a  point  further  in  June,  1770,  when 
an  "association"  was  formed  between  the  Burgesses  and 
the  leading  merchants  of  Virginia.  At  this  stage  of  the 
taxation  controversy,  the  economic  interests  of  the  col- 
ony, commercial  as  well  as  agricultural,  stood  in  united 
opposition  to  the  British  policy.  This  association  bound 
subscribers  not  to  import  from  Great  Britain,  after  Sep- 
tember 1,  1770,  spirits,  foodstuffs,  certain  manufactures,  oils 
and  paints,  or  to  receive  into  keeping  any  of  the  prohibited 
imports  after  June  25, 1770.  Goods  imported  in  conform- 
ity with  the  association  might  be  sold,  but  prices  were  not 
to  be  advanced  because  of  restrictions  laid  on  trade.  In 
order  to  carry  it  into  effect  committees  of  five  should  be 
chosen  in  each  county,  with  authority  to  publish  the  names 
of  violators  of  the  agreement  and  to  examine  the  books 
of  offending  merchants.  The  first  name  signed  to  the  as- 
sociation was  that  of  Peyton  Randolph;  the  next,  that  of 
Andrew  Sprowle,  of  Norfolk,  chairman  of  the  trade  and 
leading  merchant  of  the  colony.  Then  followed  Robert 
1  W.  W.  Henry's  Patrick  Henry,  i,  168. 


30  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

Carter  Nicholas,  Richard  Bland,  Edmund  Pendleton, 
Archibald  Cary,  Richard  Henry  Lee,  Thomas  Jefferson, 
George  Washington,  Benjamin  Harrison,  Thomas  Nelson, 
Jr.,  and  many  others.  At  the  same  time  the  Virginia 
traders  formed  an  organization  at  Williamsburg  to  further 
the  association.  A  committee  of  125  business  men  from 
all  parts  of  the  colony  was  appointed  for  the  purpose  of 
deliberating  on  the  political  situation.1 

While  planters  and  traders  thus  joined  hands  in  support 
of  colonial  liberties,  one  order  of  men  remained  somewhat 
in  sympathy  with  the  British  government.  The  clergy 
had  been  disheartened  by  the  Privy  Council's  abandon- 
ment of  their  cause  in  the  Twopenny  case.  They  had 
yielded  to  their  fate  without  resignation,  because  they  felt 
they  were  in  the  right,  but  their  evident  helplessness  did 
not  tend  to  encourage  them  to  engage  in  other  disputes 
with  the  assembly.  Nevertheless,  a  few  irreconcilable 
spirits,  led  by  John  Camm,  president  of  William  and  Mary 
College,  had  the  courage  to  defy  public  sentiment  in  an- 
other issue.  Virginia  was  still  mainly  Anglican  in  religion, 
though  dissent  was  rapidly  growing  at  the  expense  of  the 
establishment,  but  the  Anglicans  quite  as  much  as  dissent- 
ers opposed  the  foundation  of  a  colonial  episcopate,  that 
scheme  of  the  northern  Anglican  clergy.  Opposition  to  an 
episcopate  on  the  part  of  Virginia  Episcopalians  was  polit- 
ical, of  course,  not  ecclesiastical;  they  feared  that  an  offi- 
cial like  a  bishop  might  lend  a  dangerous  support  to  the 
ministerial  plan  to  control  the  colonies.  Under  Camm's 
influence,  James  Horrocks,  the  commissary  in  Virginia, 
called  a  convention  of  ministers  to  debate  the  episcopate, 
1  Virginia  Historical  Register,  m,  81. 


BEGINNING  OF  THE  REVOLUTION        31 

but  only  a  handful  responded  and  their  interest  was  obvi- 
ously lukewarm.  Camm's  desire  to  strengthen  the  move- 
ment for  a  bishop  therefore  came  to  naught.  He  had,  how- 
ever, displayed  his  own  Tory  and  High  Church  principles 
and  his  action  subjected  the  Episcopal  ministers  in  Virginia 
to  the  suspicions  of  a  part  of  the  populace,  when,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  many  of  them  were  patriots  and  a  few  were 
Revolutionary  leaders.  This  abortive  attempt  to  draw 
the  clergy  into  an  ill-timed  movement  strikingly  illustrated 
the  unanimity  of  public  opinion  in  the  colony  at  that  time; 
Anglicans  joined  hands  with  dissenters  in  opposing  a  po- 
litical scheme  masquerading  under  the  name  of  religion. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE   RADICALS 

The  colonies  were  now  drawing  together  for  a  union  in 
defense  of  their  liberties;  their  action  was  no  longer  local, 
but  taken  with  reference  to  the  common  interests.  When 
a  special  court  of  inquiry  was  established  in  Rhode  Island 
in  1773,  with  power  to  send  accused  persons  out  of  the 
colony  for  trial,  the  progressives  in  the  Virginia  House  of 
Burgesses  resolved  to  take  steps  to  bring  about  a  general 
Continental  understanding.  For  the  past  few  years  the 
conservative  and  progressive  factions  had  almost  lost 
identity  in  the  oneness  of  opposition  to  England,  but  with 
the  close  approach  of  the  Revolution  their  differences 
again  appeared.  In  March,  1773,  during  the  session  of  the 
assembly,  Patrick  Henry,  Richard  Henry  Lee,  and  Thomas 
Lightfoot  Lee,  with  Dabney  Carr  and  Thomas  Jefferson, 
two  promising  young  men  of  the  party,  thinking  that  the 
conservative  leaders  were  insufficiently  zealous  to  be  left 
the  initiative,  hit  on  the  plan  of  forming  intercolonial 
committees  of  correspondence.1  The  measure  easily 
passed  the  House  of  Burgesses;  the  committee  appointed 
consisted  of  Speaker  Randolph,  Nicholas,  Bland,  Pendle- 
ton, Benjamin  Harrison,  Dudley  Digges,  and  Archibald 
Cary,  conservatives,  and  Richard  Henry  Lee,  Patrick 
Henry,  Jefferson,  and  Carr,  progressives.  Thus  while  the 
radicals  succeeded  in  inaugurating  their  policy,  the  older 
faction  controlled  the  committee. 

1  Henry's  Patrick  Henry  t 1, 160. 


THE  RADICALS  33 

This  first  intercolonial  intelligence  bureau,  owing  its 
inception  to  the  fertile  brain  of  Richard  Henry  Lee,  did 
much  to  bring  the  scattered  American  communities  into  a 
harmonious  policy.  The  colonies  were  kept  well  informed 
and  gave  Massachusetts  prompt  and  effective  support  in 
her  troubles.  When  the  news  of  the  Boston  Port  Bill 
reached  Williamsburg  in  the  midst  of  a  session  of  the  as- 
sembly, the  progressive  leaders,  Henry,  the  Lees,  and  Jef- 
ferson, summoned  a  caucus  of  their  followers  and  again 
took  the  bit  in  their  teeth.1  They  fixed  up  a  plan  for  a  day 
of  fasting  on  the  date  when  the  Port  Bill  became  effective, 
and  induced  Robert  Carter  Nicholas  to  introduce  the  reso- 
lution, reasoning  that  his  weight  and  position  would  carry 
it  through.  Fast  days  were  not  much  in  the  Virginia  fash- 
ion, and  Henry  and  Jefferson  in  proposing  to  celebrate  one 
showed  that  they  were  conscious  imitators  of  the  Long 
Parliamentarians.  In  the  excitement  of  the  hour  elderly 
conservatives  stood  hand  in  hand  with  the  younger  pro- 
gressives and  passed  the  fast  resolution  without  opposi- 
tion. 

Dunmore,  the  governor,  dissolved  the  assembly  on  May 
25,  1774,  which  was  all  that  a  shocked  governor  could  do. 
The  Burgesses,  as  before,  gravely  accepted  dissolution  in 
form  and  forthwith  retired  from  the  official  state  house  to 
the  Williamsburg  tavern,  where  in  that  so-called  Apollo 
room,  dedicated  to  colonial  mirth  and  revel,  they  put 
Peyton  Randolph  in  the  chair  and  adopted  another  boy- 
cott association,  besides  taking  the  fateful  step  of  deciding 
to  propose  a  general  congress  of  the  colonies.  Philadel- 
phia was  suggested  as  the  place  and  September  5,  1774, 
1  Jefferson's  Works  (Memorial  edition),  i,  19.  \ 


34  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

as  the  date.  The  meeting  also  issued  a  call  for  the  election 
of  delegates  from  the  counties  to  a  convention  of  the  col- 
ony at  Williamsburg  on  August  1,  1774. 

In  this  unofficial  meeting  in  the  tavern,  where  senti- 
ments might  be  expressed  without  fear  of  interruption,  the 
differences  between  conservatives  and  progressives  again 
came  to  the  surface.  The  radicals,  led  by  Henry,  Mason, 
and  Richard  Henry  Lee,  with  Nicholas  temporarily  aiding 
them,  made  the  sweeping  proposal  of  stopping  payment  of 
British  debts,  ceasing  both  importation  and  exportation 
and  closing  the  courts,  measures  of  open  rebellion.  The 
conservatives,  led  by  Paul  Carrington,  supported  by  Car- 
ter Braxton,  Thomas  Nelson,  Jr.,  and  Peyton  Randolph, 
advocated  payment  of  debts  and  continuance  of  exporting.1 
As  an  association  forbidding  exporting  as  well  as  import- 
ing was  adopted,  victory  lay  with  the  progressives,  though 
debt-collecting  was  not  prohibited. 

The  colony  responded  to  the  association  and  the  call  for 
a  meeting  by  electing  delegates  to  the  August  Convention 
(who  were  for  the  most  part  members  of  the  House  of  Bur- 
gesses) and  appointing  local  committees  to  enforce  the 
boycott.  The  first  of  these  committees,  so  far  as  is  known, 
were  formed  in  the  Virginia  towns  in  May  and  June,  1774.2 
Dunmore  (afterwards  Shenandoah)  County  also  elected  a 
committee  on  June  16,  1774,  and  Fairfax  on  June  18,  at  a 
meeting  over  which  George  Washington  presided.  Other 
counties  followed,  but  in  many  of  them  the  meetings  did 
not  elect  committees,  but  remained  content  with  approv- 
ing the  non-intercourse  association  and  selecting  delegates 
to  the  convention. 

1  Magazine  of  History  (1906),  3, 153.  2  American  Archives,  i,  417. 


THE  RADICALS  35 

This  August  Convention,  patriotically  perspiring  in  the 
midsummer  heat,  adopted  a  more  extreme  association, 
which  bound  subscribers  not  to  import  British  manufac- 
tures and  products  and  slaves  after  November  1,  1774, 
and  to  cease  exporting  tobacco  after  August  10,  1775,  if 
England  did  not  meantime  come  to  terms.  Furthermore, 
merchants  were  required  to  sign  the  association  on  pain 
of  boycott,  and  subscribers,  violating  the  association  and 
detected  by  county  committees,  were  to  be  publicly 
branded  as  "inimical"  to  America.  This  sweeping  em- 
Ibargo  shows  all  the  way  through  the  hand  of  Richard 
Bland,  who  earlier  in  the  summer,  at  the  meeting  in  his  own 
county  of  Prince  George,  had  outlined  a  non-intercourse 
scheme  in  almost  the  words  used  by  the  August  Conven- 
tion.1 

The  August  meeting  of  1774  marks  the  actual  beginning 
of  the  Revolution  in  Virginia.  The  members  of  the  House 
of  Burgesses,  under  the  moderatorship  of  Peyton  Ran- 
dolph, quietly  ignored  the  governor  and  proceeded  to  put 
into  effect  as  a  popular  convention  what  they  would  other- 
wise have  done  as  a  legal  assembly.  Acting  as  direct  rep- 
resentatives of  the  people,  the  convention,  besides  fram- 
ing the  association,  elected  Randolph,  Bland,  Pendleton, 
and  Benjamin  Harrison,  conservatives,  and  Washington, 
Henry,  Jefferson,  and  Richard  Henry  Lee,  progressives, 
as  delegates  to  the  Continental  Congress. 

At  the  assembling  of  the  Congress  in  September,  1774, 
the  strong  Virginia  delegation  made  a  deep  impression, 
and  Peyton  Randolph,  that  portly  gentleman  whose  des- 
tiny it  was  to  head  so  many  bodies,  legal  and  treasonable, 
1  American  Archives,  i,  490. 


36  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

was  elected  president.  The  Virginia  progressives  led  the 
Congress  in  proposing  bold  measures;  indeed,  Patrick 
Henry,  in  his  fire-brand  fashion,  declared  that  govern- 
ment in  America  was  dissolved,  and  that  the  colonies, 
being  reduced  to  a  state  of  nature,  were  (according  to  the 
doctrine  of  Rousseau)  free  to  enter  into  a  new  system  of 
political  contract.1  Richard  Henry  Lee,  father  of  boy- 
cotts, advanced  non-intercourse  as  the  needed  panacea 
to  cure  the  inflamed  British  public  mind,  and  Congress 
adopted  a  stringent  Continental  Association  forbidding 
the  importation  of  British  goods  and  the  exportation  of 
American  products  to  British  territories  after  certain 
dates.  County  and  town  committees  were  to  carry  the 
association  into  effect  and  impose  on  offenders  the  pen- 
alty of  being  published  in  the  newspapers  as  "enemies  of 
America,"  the  "undesirable  citizens"  of  that  place  and 
period. 

Congress,  in  passing  such  a  resolution  and  the  colonies 
in  undertaking  to  enforce  it,  assumed  a  power  to  which 
they  had  no  legal  claim  whatever.  The  Continental  Con- 
gress, which  represented  the  people  of  the  colonies  rather 
than  governments,  was  a  frankly  revolutionary  body,  and 
the  Association  was  economic  war  preceding  bloodshed. 
The  great  boycott  adopted  by  Congress  was  almost  the  same 
in  detail  as  that  drawn  up  by  the  August  Convention  in 
Virginia,  and  was  shrewdly,  one  might  almost  say,  cyni- 
cally, calculated  to  intimidate  the  imperial  government  by 
striking  at  the  Englishman's  proverbially  sensitive  pocket 
nerve. 

This  lengthy  and  tedious  document  bound  the  colonies 
1  John  Adams's  Life  and  Work,  n,  366. 


THE  RADICALS  37 

to  refrain  from  importing  British  goods  after  December  1, 
1774,  —  unless  Pharaoh  had  in  the  mean  time  relented,  — 
and  to  cease  exporting  products  after  September  10,  1775. 
American  manufactures  were  to  be  encouraged  in  every 
way  known  to  an  age  before  the  birth  of  "infant  indus- 
tries'' and  paternal  government.  Goods  brought  in  be- 
tween December  1,  1774,  and  February  1,  1775,  should  be 
reshipped  or  delivered  to  local  committees  for  disposal  and 
invoices  brought  in  after  February  1,  1775,  must  be  re- 
turned unopened.  To  enforce  these  laws,  styled  (with 
unconscious  irony)  "recommendations,"  Congress  directed 
the  appointment  of  committees  in  each  town  and  county 
with  inquisitorial  and  punitive  powers.  The  punishment 
prescribed  —  publication  of  offenders  in  the  newspapers 
—  was  much  more  serious  than  it  sounds,  because  in  the 
excited  condition  of  public  opinion  it  meant  nothing  less 
than  a  mild  form  of  outlawry. 

The  Revolution  began  with  the  enforcement  of  the 
Continental  Association,  which  was,  in  reality,  rebellion. 
At  this  time  the  people  of  the  colonies  were  overwhelm- 
ingly in  favor  of  resistance;  the  Tory  element  was  small. 
It  was  only  when  the  failure  of  the  commercial  war  be- 
came apparent  and  real  war  began  that  a  genuinely  loyal- 
ist party  arose  in  the  colonies;  then  the  importance  of  the 
issue,  dwarfing  in  the  eyes  of  the  colonists  many  griev- 
ances, brought  over  to  the  British  side  the  merchant  class, 
which  found  itself  in  danger  of  being  ruined  by  the  war, 
and  also  in  some  colonies  a  part  of  the  planter  interest.  In 
Virginia,  almost  alone  among  the  colonies,  the  planter 
classes  were  so  united  in  sentiment  and  so  all-powerful 
politically  and  socially  that  a  Tory  party  had  no  chance 


38  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

of  development,  although  there,  as  elsewhere,  the  rudi- 
ments of  such  a  party  existed,  and  might  have  grown  under 
less  adverse  conditions. 

The  Continental  Association  was  carried  out  in  Vir- 
ginia rigidly  and  with  great  effect  owing  to  that  strong 
local  feeling  which  unified  sentiment  to  a  degree  unknown 
to  modern  communities.  Kach  Virginia  county  was  a  little 
world  of  its  own,  somewhat  narrow  and  sell' centered,  hut 
with  a  variety  of  social  strata  and  at  least  a  few  individ- 
uals of  education  and  public  experience.  A  small  group  of 
prominent  men,  usually  connected  by  family  ties,  organ- 
ized the  opin ion  of  each  community.  It  is  true  that  demo- 
cratic feeling  was  by  no  means  absent,  even  in  the  oldest 
and  most  conservative  counties,  but  leaders  customarily 
obtained  their  position  through  wealth  and  social  standing, 
although  the  numerous  rivalries  that  existed  made  ability 
necessary  as  well.  The  represent  a  I  ivc  from  eastern  Vir- 
ginia in  the  Revolutionary  period  usually  was  a  capable 
and  patriotic  man  —  no  mere  well-to-do  landowner. 

The  greater  activity  of  the  enlightened  classes  in  east- 
ern Virginia,  was  largely  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Revolu- 
tion in  the  South  was  not  of  economic  origin.  This  state- 
ment may  seem  heretical  in  the  eyes  of  modern  history 
students,  accustomed  to  find  one  explanation  for  every 
phenomenon  of  human  nature:  nevertheless,  the  evidence 
points  irresistibly  to  such  a  conclusion.  Only  with  diffi- 
culty and  great  straining  can  economic  causes  for  the  Revo- 
lution in  Virginia  be  adduced,  and  when  examined  they 
do  not  appear  convincing.  'Flic  fact  that  the  movement 
began  in  Virginia  with  the  adoption  of  measures  designed 
to  put  economic  pressure  on  England  might  appear  to  give 


THE  RADICALS  39 

weight  to  such  a  theory,  but  the  truth  is  that  these 
i.jjoiis  were  resorted  to  for  purely  political  purposes  and 
to  obviate  the  necessity  of  armed  conflict.  The  Revolu- 
tion En  New  England  was  primarily  economic  and  the 
Jov.r  r  r-Ja-.v  .  I'd  it :  the  revenue  policy  of  the  British  gov- 
ernment threatened  local  industries.  Bat  apart  from  the 
Stamp  Act,  which  would  have  proved  burdensome  alike 
to  all  the  colonies,  the  colonial  policy  of  the  ministry  was 
not  oppressive  to  Virginia.  Nor  did  the  Navigation  Acts 
interfere  greatly  with  the  welfare  of  the  colony,  which 
found  as  good  markets  in  England  as  there  were  elsewhere 
and  which  had  grown  greatly  in  the  eighteenth  century. 
And  it  Is  difficult  to  believe  that  the  king's  plan  to  form 
new  colonies  west  of  the  AJleghanies  forced  the  land-hun- 
gry Virginians,  as  has  been  asserted,  to  go  into  the  Revo- 
lutionary movement:  land  in  the  wilderness  at  that  time 
was  too  cheap  to  fight  about.  The  real  economist,  seeking 
the  most  plausible  motive,  would  pronounce  the  Revolu- 
tion in  Virginia  another  Catalinarian  conspiracy  to  obtain 
relief  for  a  debt-burdened  community  by  declaring  tabula 
rasa.  The  Virginia  planters  were,  indeed  heavily  in  debt 
to  English  merchants,  just  as  the  Southern  planters  of 
1800  were  largely  a  debtor  class  —  though  this  fact  is  not 
used  to  explain  secession.  Furthermore,  Washington, 
Mason,  and  many  other  fervent  patriots  were  not  among 
the  debtors,  nor  were  the  westerners  who  so  ardently  sup- 
ported the  revolt. 

In  truth,  the  Revolution  in  Virginia  was  almost  en- 
tirely politics]  in  origin.  It  was  the  effort,  of  a  community 
singularly  tenacious  of  its  rights  and  jealous  of  the  broad- 
ening shadow  of  the  British  Empire  across  the  world  to 


40  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

secure  certain  positions  for  its  own  safety;  it  was  the  deter- 
mination of  a  proud,  easy-going,  liberty-loving  commu- 
nity, conscious  of  its  importance  in  America  and  of  its  small 
importance  in  English  eyes,  to  maintain  its  old  independ- 
ence and  increase  it.  Chafing  even  during  the  French- 
and-Indian  War  at  any  exertion  of  royal  authority,  the 
Virginians  were  not  prepared  to  admit  the  Parliamentary 
claims  put  forth  in  1764*  Patrick  Henry  had  appealed 
to  this  colonial  jealousy  and  sense  of  difference,  this  vague 
and  subconscious  feeling  of  nationalism,  in  1765,  and  the 
feeling  once  aroused  never  died  out.  The  people  of  Vir- 
ginia believed  that  the  home  government  had  determined 
in  the  Stamp  Act  to  bring  them  to  "  chains  and  slavery," 
and  thought  that  acquiescence  in  any  tax  whatever  would 
mean  the  concession  of  a  principle  which  would  end  in 
colonial  exploitation  for  the  benefit  of  England.  Accus- 
tomed to  self-government  and  to  a  freedom  we  cannot 
understand  to-day,  the  planters  were  prepared  to  take  the 
risks  of  resistance  rather  than  to  submit  to  any  curtailment 
of  their  rights  or  any  check  to  their  development.  They 
began  the  war  reluctantly  and  without  thought  of  separa- 
tion from  England,  but  to  secure  their  former  freedom; 
separation  was  a  measure  reluctantly  adopted  only  when 
it  became  apparent  that  it  was.  inevitable.  And  indeed, 
in  the  closing  weeks  of  1774,  when  the  Virginians  began 
their  active  resistance,  they  had  no  great  expectation  of 
going  to  war  at  all.  It  should  not  be  overlooked  that  the 
Continental  Association,  while  an  active  war  measure, 
was  intended  to  secure  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  diffi- 
culties between  colonies  and  ministry.  The  Association 
was  an  attempt  to  bulldoze  Britain  into  another  such  con- 


THE  RADICALS  41 

cession  as  followed  the  Stamp  Act  agitation,  the  provin- 
cials judging  that  if  they  could  make  their  displeasure 
expensive  enough  to  British  commercial  interests  they 
would  gain  their  point.  The  plan  succeeded  so  far  that  it 
brought  the  British  traders  to  clamor  for  an  understand- 
ing with  the  colonies,  but  it  failed  to  affect  the  government, 
which  this  time  stood  firm.  War  ensued  and  was  to  some 
extent  the  result  of  a  mutual  miscalculation.  The  Asso- 
ciation, intended  really  as  a  peace  policy,  was  a  conserva- 
tive much  more  than  a  progressive  scheme.  Its  leading 
advocate  was  not  Henry  or  Jefferson,  but  Bland,  whose 
outline  Congress  adopted.  The  bolder  minds  among  the 
progressives  seem  to  have  understood  that  war  was  inevi- 
table; and  Patrick  Henry  was  ready  for  it  early  in  1775,  be- 
fore the  first  shot  had  been  fired  at  Lexington  and  while  the 
conservatives  were  still  sanguine  of  a  peaceful  settlement. 
But  Henry  was  the  most  far-sighted  man  of  his  generation. 
With  prompt  enthusiasm  the  conservatives  proceeded 
to  obey  the  recommendations  of  the  Continental  Associa- 
tion, forming  committees  through  all  eastern  Virginia. 
Like  the  August  Convention,  the  committees  had  no  legal 
existence :  nevertheless,  the  convention  had  wielded  more 
than  the  powers  of  the  House  of  Burgesses,  because  un- 
trammeled  by  hostile  governor  and  council,  and  the  com- 
mittees also  exerted  very  great  actual  authority.  The  old 
constitution  quietly  expired  in  the  least  violent  of  rev- 
olutions. This  lack  of  jar  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
class  in  control  of  affairs  wrought  the  change;  no  social 
upheaval  attended  the  overthrow  of  British  sovereignty. 
Members  of  the  House  of  Burgesses  simply  became  dele- 
gates to  the  Virginia  Convention  of  1774,  which  inaugu- 


42  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

rated  the  Revolution;  and  in  the  same  way,  justices,  ves- 
trymen, and  other  prominent  persons  formed  the  new 
county  committees.  Thus  the  old  government  was  elimi- 
nated from  Virginia,  while  all  the  time  the  governor  sat 
in  his  residence  at  Williamsburg,  "the  Palace,"  imagining 
that  everything  would  come  right  again. 

At  first,  indeed,  the  Revolutionary  movement  followed 
time-honored  precedents.  On  court-days  in  November 
and  December,  1774,  the  farmers  of  eastern  Virginia  met 
as  usual  and,  crowded  on  the  court-house  green,  heard  the 
orators  they  had  always  listened  to  hold  forth  on  the  ini- 
quities of  the  British  ministry  and  the  endangered  liberties 
of  America.  As  might  have  been  expected,  they  ended  by 
appointing  these  same  leading  citizens  as  local  committee- 
men to  secure  the  "observation  of. the  Association."  It 
was  the  local  gentry,  not  demagogues,  who  fanned  the 
flame  of  revolution  in  the  tidewater.  It  was  they,  as  we  are 
told,  who  turned  balls  and  parties  into  patriotic  festivi- 
ties, putting  heads  together  over  tables,  after  the  imme- 
morial custom  of  revolutionists,  and  drunkenly  roaring  out 
liberty  songs.1  A  critical  and  unfriendly  observer  at  a 
mass  meeting  to  hang  Lord  North  in  effigy  wrote  that  the 
great  body  of  the  crowd  present  remained  looking  quietly 
on  at  the  scene,  while  a  few  cheering  and  swearing  gentle- 
men supplied  all  the  enthusiasm.2  That  violent  leader, 
Archibald  Cary,  put  up  a  large  pole  at  Williamsburg  deco- 
rated with  a  bag  of  feathers  and  bucket  of  tar  as  a  little 
hint  to  any  who  might  be  found  wanting  in  patriotism  or 
discretion.3 

1  Fithian's  Journal,  96.  2  American  Archives,  I,  970. 

8  Magazine  of  History  (1906),  3,  156. 


THE  RADICALS  43 

The  leaders  of  the  conservative  party  were  conspicu- 
ous in  the  formation  of  county  committees.  Edmund  Pen- 
dleton, the  chief  who  afterwards  succeeded  Peyton  Ran- 
dolph, was  elected  chairman  of  the  Caroline  Committee 
on  December  8,  1774;  Paul  Carrington,  chairman  of  the 
Charlotte  Committee;  Archibald  Cary,  of  the  Chester- 
field Committee;  Robert  Carter  Nicholas,  of  the  James 
City;  Joseph  Jones,  of  the  King  George;  Peyton  Randolph, 
of  the  Williamsburg  Committee,  on  which  Nicholas  and 
George  Wythe  also  served;  Richard  Bland,  of  the  Prince 
George;  Landon  Carter,  of  the  Richmond;  Benjamin^ 
Harrison,  of  the  Charles  City.1  The  county  committee 
system  in  the  east  was  completely  dominated  by  the  old 
leaders,  to  whom  is  largely  due  its  extraordinary  efficiency 
as  an  instrument  to  secure  uniformity  of  sentiment  by 
means  of  encouragement  on  the  one  hand  and  repression 
on  the  other. 

The  first  local  committees,  modeled  on  the  colonial 
committees  of  correspondence,  began  to  be  formed  in  the 
summer  of  1774  after  the  appointment  of  the  Baltimore 
Committee  of  Correspondence.  Alexandria,  on  May  28, 
1774,  elected  a  committee  to  correspond  with  the  Mary- 
land metropolis,  and  three  days  later,  on  May  31,  Dum- 
fries 2  also  appointed  a  committee.  Fredericksburg  came 
next,  on  June  1,  1774. 3  After  the  May  meeting  of  the 
assembly,  when  an  association  was  adopted,  the  local 
committees  of  correspondence  enlarged  their  activities  to 
include  the  enforcement  of  the  boycott,  thereby  antici- 
pating the  committees  formed  in  the  fall  at  the  instance 

1  William  and  Mary  Quarterly,  v,  101-06,  and  245-55. 

8  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  viii,  51.  3  Ibid.,  vm,  54. 


44  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

of  Congress.  The  Dumfries  public  meeting,  on  June  6, 
1774,  instructed  its  committee  of  correspondence  to  take 
up  the  new  duties; l  in  other  places  where  committees  ex- 
isted they  probably  assumed  them  as  a  matter  of  course. 
A  meeting  at  Woodstock,  in  Dunmore  County,  on  June  18, 
1774,  elected  a  committee  both  to  correspond  and  to  en- 
force the  association,2  and  at  some  time  in  June  a  similar 
committee  came  into  being  in  Norfolk.  Fairfax,  Stafford, 
and  Frederick  elected  committees  in  July,  and  other  bodies 
were  doubtless  formed  in  other  places  about  this  time. 

At  the  end  of  1774  the  Continental  Association  im- 
pelled the  formation  of  committees  in  the  eastern  coun- 
ties generally.  The  central,  southern,  and  western  coun- 
ties followed  a  little  later,  until  by  the  middle  of  1775 
probably  every  one  of  the  sixty  counties  had  complied.  A 
committee  "for  seeing  the  Association  duly  executed' ' 
existed  in  Westmoreland  prior  to  November  8,  1774,  for 
we  find  it  sitting  in  a  case  on  that  date.  After  this,  the 
next  committee  elected  under  Continental  regulations,  so 
far  as  we  know,  was  that  of  Henrico,  on  November  17, 
1774.  Hampton  and  Elizabeth  City  followed  on  Novem- 
ber 21;  Warwick,  on  November  23;  James  City  and  Ches- 
terfield, on  November  25;  Richmond  County,  on  Decem- 
ber 5.  This  last  committee  was  the  second  appointed  for 
the  county.  Then  in  rapid  succession  came  Princess  Anne, 
Essex,  Caroline,  Prince  William,  King  and  Queen,  North- 
ampton, Charles  City,  Orange,  Accomac,  King  George, 
Isle  of  Wight,  and  Williamsburg,  all  appointed  in  Decem- 
ber, 1774.  Many  other  counties  selected  their  bodies  early 
in  1775. 

1  American  Archives,  i,  388.  2  Ibid.,  i,  417. 


THE  RADICALS  45 

In  the  first  months  of  activity  the  town  and  county 
committees  worked  as  independent  organizations,  without 
reference  to  any  central  authority.  They  enforced  the  non- 
importation and  exportation  directions  of  the  Association, 
mercilessly  repressed  anti-patriotic  opinion,  encouraged 
Revolutionary  sentiment,  and  prepared  the  colony  for 
armed  resistance  to  England.  A  surprisingly  small  amount 
of  mob  violence  accompanied  the  repressive  measures.  A 
crowd  from  Williamsburg,  in  May,  1774,  boarded  a  ship 
containing  tea,  destroyed  the  prohibited  freight,  and  at- 
tempted to  burn  the  vessel  but  without  success.  In  gen- 
eral, the  local  machines  ran  too  smoothly  to  need  violence. 
The  courts  had  put  up  shutters  and  the  usual  county  ad- 
ministration was  completely  suspended,  but  justices  and 
other  local  officials,  under  the  title  of  committeemen,  con- 
tinued to  exercise  their  powers,  greatly  enlarged;  they 
assumed  an  inquisitorial  authority  over  the  life  of  the 
community.  As  a  loyalist  sadly  lamented:  "Everything 
is  managed  by  committee,  setting  and  pricing  goods,  im- 
printing books,  forcing  some  to  sign  scandalous  conces- 
sions and  by  such  bullying  conduct  they  expect  to  bring 
Government  to  their  own  terms."  * 

History  was  rapidly  made  in  the  spring  of  1775.  The 
House  of  Burgesses,  acting  again  as  a  convention,  without 
governor  or  council,  met  in  March,  1775,  in  the  village  of 
Richmond,  where  it  could  deliberate  with  more  freedom 
than  in  Williamsburg  under  the  governor's  shadow.  The 
tension  in  Boston,  almost  at  breaking-point,  made  the 
meeting  of  even  more  than  ordinary  importance,  since, 
in  view  of  the  evident  failure  of  the  Continental  Associa- 
1  Magazine  of  History  (1906),  3,  157. 


46  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

tion  to  coerce  the  British  ministry,  war  had  passed  from 
the  region  of  possibility  to  that  of  immediate  probability. 

The  strong  men  of  the  colony  mustered  in  force.  They 
were  flushed  with  excitement  and  conscious  of  great  im- 
pending events,  and  they  broke  out  into  a  violent  party 
disagreement  as  to  the  course  to  pursue.  The  conserva- 
tives, despite  the  fruitlessness  of  their  commercial  policy, 
still  hoped  for  an  understanding  with  England;  the  pro- 
gressives were  prepared  for  immediate  war  and  revolution. 

The  struggle  in  the  convention  was  precipitated  over  j. 
pacificatory  declaration  "that  it  is  the  most  ardent  wish 
of  this  colony  (and  they  are  persuaded  of  the  whole  conti- 
nent of  North  America)  to  see  a  speedy  return  of  those 
halcyon  days,  when  we  lived  a  free  and  happy  people."  l 
Immediately  after  the  adoption  of  this  useless,  if  pious, 
prayer,  Patrick  Henry  rose  to  move  that  the  colony  be 
at  once  put  in  a  state  of  defense.  This  bold  challenge  was 
accepted  by  the  conservative  leaders,  Bland,  Pendleton, 
Nicholas,  Benjamin  Harrison,  and  Willis  Riddick,  who 
feared  lest  the  sympathy  of  the  Whig  Party  in  England 
and  Parliament,  upon  which  the  conservatives  now  hung 
their  hopes,  might  be  alienated  by  the  threat  of  force. 
They  still  dreamed  that  the  manufacturing  interests  of 
England  would  succeed  in  moving  the  government  and 
averting  war,  much  as  the  Confederates  fondled  the  delu- 
sion that  the  stoppage  of  the  cotton  supply  would  force 
Europe  to  intervene  in  the  war  between  North  and  South. 
Furthermore,  they  pointed  out  that  the  colony  was  in  no 
condition  to  go  to  war  with  the  first  military  and  naval 
power  in  the  world.  Henry  answered  them  in  the  most 
1  William  Wirt's  Life  of  Patrick  Henry,  116. 


THE  RADICALS  47 

famous  of  his  speeches.  Scouting  the  idea  of  a  peaceful 
accommodation,  the  great  agitator  pleaded  for  military 
preparation  and  ended  his  appeal  with  that  world-thrilling 
sentence:  "  Give  me  liberty  or  give  me  death."  l  It  was  a 
speech  that  stirred  the  patriot  party  in  all  the  colonies,  and, 
naturally,  excited  the  disgust  of  Tories,  who  wrote  home 
that  the  orator  had  denounced  "the  king  as  a  tyrant,  a 
fool  and  puppet  and  Englishmen  and  Scots  as  a  set  of 
wretches  sunk  in  luxury  who  were  unable  to  look  the  brave 
Americans  in  the  face."  2 

Henry's  arming  resolutions,  which  were  supported  by 
Washington,  Jefferson,  and  Richard  Henry  Lee,  and 
aided  by  all  his  own  matchless  eloquence,  barely  passed 
the  convention  by  a  vote  of  65  to  60,3  showing  the  strength 
of  the  conservative  opposition.  The  committee  appointed 
to  prepare  a  plan  of  defense  was,  however,  predominantly 
progressive.  Patrick  Henry,  Richard  Henry  Lee,  George 
Washington,  Andrew  Lewis,  William  Christian,  Thomas 
Jefferson,  and  Isaac  Zane  were  of  this  faction,  while  the 
conservatives  were  represented  by  Robert  Carter  Nicholas, 
Harrison,  Pendleton,  and  Riddick.4  The  personnel  of  the 
committee,  largely  agitators  and  western  fighting  men, 
appeared  to  guarantee  vigorous  military  action,  but  party 
strife  prevented  it.5  It  seems  apparent  that  the  raising  of 
a  military  force  was  only  the  first  part  of  Henry's  plan, 
which,  we  are  informed,  intended  nothing  less  than  com- 
plete revolution  and  the  assumption  of  government  by 

1  William  Wirt's  Life  of  Patrick  Henry,  120-23. 

2  Magazine  of  History  (1906),  3,  158. 

3  Ibid.,  3,  158;  not  exactly  reported. 

4  Wirt's  Life  of  Patrick  Henry,  124. 

8  Magazine  of  History  (1906),  3,  155. 


48  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

the  convention,  including  the  appointment  of  magistrates 
under  new  commissions  and  the  levying  of  taxes.  His  bold 
and  direct  mind  saw  little  wisdom  in  the  efforts  of  con- 
servatives to  maintain  a  show  of  respect  for  the  royal  rep- 
resentative at  Williamsburg  while  preparing  at  Richmond 
for  open  rebellion.  But  the  conservatives,  in  their  loyalty 
to  the  constitution  and  their  shrinking  from  war  with  Eng- 
land, preferred  to  be  inconsistent  rather  than  revolution- 
ary:  although  they  sat  in  a  convention  without  legal  author- 
ity, considering  war  measures  against  England,  they  were 
nevertheless  ready  to  come  together  again  at  the  gover- 
nor's call  as  the  legitimate  assembly  of  the  colony.  Henry 
sought  to  rend  asunder  this  benighted  constitutionalism, 
which  had  no  meaning  now,  and  gain  the  advantages  that 
come  from  taking  a  firm  initiative,  but  the  conservatives, 
who  clung  instinctively  to  the  connection  with  the  crown, 
succeeded  in  putting  off  the  catastrophe  a  little  longer. 
Nicholas,  Harrison,  Bland,  and  Riddick  worked  together 
strenuously  to  this  end. 

As  a  result  of  the  united  and  determined  conservative 
opposition,1  the  March  Convention  bore  little  fruit  and  the 
Revolution  did  not  formally  begin  in  Virginia  before  the 
battle  of  Lexington,  as  would  have  been  the  case  if  Pat- 
rick Henry  had  had  his  way.  The  history  of  the  Revolu- 
tion in  Virginia  throughout  1775  is  a  repetition  of  the  clash 
in  the  March  Convention,  the  conservatives  time  and 
again  postponing  decisive  action  in  their  efforts  to  prevent 
war  and  secure  a  peaceful  settlement  according  to  their 
ideas  of  the  colonial  constitution.  This  anomalous  condi- 
tion of  a  country  in  actual  but  unrecognized  rebellion  con- 
1  Magazine  of  History  (1906),  3,  158. 


THE  RADICALS  49 

tinued  until  late  in  the  summer.  The  courts  were  closed, 
militia  companies  drilled  at  every  court-house,  and  the 
county  committees  busied  themselves  in  hunting  out  and 
suppressing  British  sentiment  wherever  it  appeared :  Dun- 
more,  however,  remained  undisturbed  in  his  "Palace" 
at  Williamsburg.  Seldom  has  history  presented  a  more 
illogical  picture. 
y  Yet,  in  spite  of  the  conservative  fear  and  distrust  of 
Henry's  radicalism,  the  two  wings  of  the  patriot  party 
worked  together  in  some  respects.  The  progressive  wing, 
led  by  Henry,  Jefferson,  Mason,  and  the  Lees,  made  con- 
cessions to  the  older,  English-loving  faction,  which  gen- 
uinely dreaded  revolution  though  hostile  to  the  British 
policy.  The  conservatives,  in  turn,  cooperated  with  the 
radicals  in  necessary  undertakings,  such  as  the  crushing  of 
the  individual  Tories  scattered  through  the  colony.  These, 
if  left  to  themselves,  might  have  combined  to  form  a  party: 
obedience  to  the  Continental  Association  was  demanded 
and  dissent  was  repressed  effectively.  The  chief  conces- 
sion made  by  the  progressives  to  the  conservatives  was 
non-interference  with  Dunmore,  whom  the  older  men 
continued  to  regard  as  the  legitimate  head  of  the  state. 
Undisturbed  as  he  was,  the  one  policy  left  Dunmore  was 
masterly  inactivity:  he  had  no  military  force  at  his  disposal 
and  such  authority  as  he  still  possessed  was  by  grace  alone. 
Dunmore,  however,  mistaking  the  forbearance  of  the 
Virginians  for  timidity,  determined  to  overawe  them  by  a 
sudden  and  audacious  stroke.  On  the  night  of  April  20, 
1775,  a  squad  of  marines  from  the  king's  ship  Magdalen, 
lying  in  the  James  River  near  by,  carried  a  quantity  of 
powder  from  the  colony  powder-house  in  Williamsburg  on 


50  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

board  the  shipj)  The  next  morning,  when  the  townsfolk 
learned  that  their  magazine  had  been  rifled,  they  appeared 
in  the  streets  in  arms,  only  to  quiet  down  finally  under 
the  representation  of  the  town  officials  that  the  powder 
would  be  restored.  The  council  respectfully  requested  the 
governor  to  return  the  colony's  property  and  were  met 
with  the  transparent  excuse  that  it  had  been  removed  for 
fear  of  a  slave  rising  and  would  be  sent  back  when  needed. 
Peyton  Randolph  and  Robert  Carter  Nicholas  played  a 
great  part  in  making  this  evasion  palatable  to  the  Williams- 
burgers,  who,  respecters  of  persons  and  dignitaries  as  they 
were,  could  become  riotous  on  occasions.  A  wild  rumor  sent 
them  to  arms  a  second  time  a  day  or  two  later,  but  their 
excitement  at  last  subsided  and  the  incident  seemed  closed. 
The  inland  people  were  not  so  easily  calmed  as  the 
tractable  population  of  the  capital.  The  news  of  the  pow- 
der seizure  spread  through  the  colony  and  created  great 
excitement.  Some  hundreds  of  volunteers  from  northern 
and  western  Virginia  met  at  Fredericksburg,  ready  to 
descend  on  Dunmore,  while  at  other  muster-places  the 
militia  gathered  in  considerable  numbers.1  But  Peyton 
Randolph,  working  to  quiet  the  agitation,  wrote  around 
in  the  name  of  the  town  corporation  that  the  governor  had 
pledged  himself  to  return  the  powder  and  advised  strongly 
against  violence.  The  musters,  therefore,  melted  quickly 
away  and  left  the  victory  seemingly  with  Dunmore.  His 
lordship,  nevertheless,  had  been  sufficiently  alarmed  by 
the  stir  to  issue,  on  May  3,  1775,  a  proclamation  repeating 
the  slave-insurrection  bugaboo.   As  might  have  been  ex- 

1  C.  R.  Lingley's  Transition  in  Virginia  from  Colony  to  Commonwealth, 
67.  An  excellent  study  of  this  period. 


THE  RADICALS  51 

pected,  the  county  committees  which  then  ruled  Virginia 
received  with  contempt  this  bungling  essay  in  fiction; 
still,  they  were  for  the  most  part  conservative  enough  in 
temper  to  accept  the  explanations  of  the  patriot  leaders 
at  Williamsburg  as  satisfactory. 

At  this  juncture,  however,  the  agitator  who  appeared 
at  every  crisis,  who  had  stirred  the  colony  in  the  "Par- 
sons' Cause"  in  1763  and  again  in  the  Stamp  Act  debate 
in  1765,  seized  the  Heaven-born  opportunity  for  vigorous 
action.  Rousing  the  Hanover  Committee  by  his  fiery 
words,  Patrick  Henry  marched  on  Williamsburg  at  the 
head  of  the  county  volunteer  company.  The  act  was  less 
rash  than  it  seemed :  not  only  could  Henry  count  on  a  large 
and  devoted  following  throughout  Virginia,  but  the  move- 
ment was  so  well  timed  that  it  completely  unnerved  Dun- 
more,  who  had  no  troops  behind  him.  When  the  orator, 
with  the  ever-growing  mob  of  armed  men  that  hastened 
to  him  from  all  sides,  drew  near  Williamsburg,  the  governor 
sent  him  a  message  apparently  offering  payment  for  the 
powder.  In  any  event,  Henry  received  from  a  royal  officer 
a  sum  of  money  for4the  powder  and  thereupon  turned  his 
men  homeward.  He  professed  satisfaction  with  the  result, 
but,  in  reality,  he  had  been  checkmated  in  the  greatest  ef- 
fort of  his  career.  There  can  be  little  doubt  that  he  marched 
on  Williamsburg  prepared  to  take  advantage  of  Dun- 
more's  folly  by  seizing  the  government  and  inaugurating 
the  Revolution  without  further  delay;  but  the  conserva- 
tive leaders  in  Williamsburg,  who  strove  almost  frantically 
to  stave  off  the  crisis,1  brought  such  strong  pressure  to 
bear  on  him  that  he  abandoned  his  plan  in  the  interests  of 
1  Magazine  of  History  (1906),  3,  159. 


52  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

harmony.  The  governor  continued  to  hold  his  place  after 
the  gunpowder  incident  solely  because  of  the  rather  ill- 
judged  procrastination  of  the  conservatives  and  their  ex- 
cessive tenderness  for  constituted  authority. 

Dunmore  now  gave  another  and  supreme  illustration 
of  his  weak  and  unstable  character,  which  oscillated  be- 
tween timidity  and  temerity  according  as  pressure  was 
applied  or  withdrawn.  England  has  been  fortunate  for 
the  most  part  in  her  choice  of  official  representatives  in 
her  colonies  and  vassal  nations;  they  have  usually  been 
men  of  ability,  and  occasionally  of  insight  and  feeling. 
(Was  there  ever  an  administrator  who  surpassed  Raffles 
of  Java?)  But  the  British  government  had  not  acted  with 
its  accustomed  discrimination  in  selecting  the  Scots  Earl 
of  Dunmore  as  governor  of  Virginia  at  a  critical  time  like 
1771.  He  succeeded  two  able  and  popular  men,  Fauquier 
and  Botetourt,  who  had  done  everything  possible  to  recon- 
cile colony  with  mother  country.  Dunmore,  also,  in  his 
rather  flaunting  way,  had  courted  popularity  with  some 
degree  of  success,  although  his  plan  to  prevent  revolu- 
tionary activity  by  proroguing  the  assembly,  whenever 
the  House  of  Burgesses  became  seditious,  had  wearied  the 
Virginians  without  interfering  with  their  programme. 

The  governor  was  mad  enough,  as  soon  as  Henry's  back 
was-  turned  and  his  force  dispersed,  to  issue  a  procla- 
mation branding  him  an  outlaw  and  warning  the  people 
against  aiding  and  abetting  him.  As  Henry  was  the  idol 
of  the  hour  —  the  leader  of  the  colony  as  no  other  Vir- 
ginian had  ever  been  —  and  as  Dunmore  had  no  military 
force  whatever,  such  a  fiery  pronunciamento,  coming  on 
the  heels  of  an  abject  backdown,  was  worse  than  foolish. 


THE  RADICALS  53 

Whatever  his  reason,  Henry  calmly  ignored  the  proclama- 
tion, which  would  have  served  him  as  an  excellent  pre- 
text for  attacking  Dunmore  in  earnest.  Consideration 
for  the  conservatives  probably  kept  him  from  acting, 
but  he  may  have  decided  that  it  was  higher  wisdom  to 
allow  the  inevitable  to  occur  without  his  personal  in- 
terference. 

Owing  to  this  reluctance  of  the  conservatives  to  pre- 
cipitate action,  their  hopeless  crying  of  peace  when  there 
was  no  peace,  the  curious  situation  in  Virginia  continued 
for  a  month  longer.  Dunmore  even  called  a  meeting  of 
the  assembly  for  June  1,  1775,  to  secure  the  reopening  of 
the  courts  and  consideration  of  Lord  North's  compromise 
proposals.  It  is  likely  that  he  at  last  realized  that  his  pol- 
icy of  embarrassing  the  colony  by  refusing  to  convene  the 
legislature  had  merely  resulted  in  his  own  practical  elimi- 
nation from  affairs.  The  Revolutionary  movement,  far 
from  halting  in  the  vacation  of  the  assembly,  had  in  fact 
progressed  faster,  because  unhampered.  The  Burgesses 
were  too  experienced  a  breed  of  politicians  to  be  check- 
mated by  so  obvious  a  ruse  as  prorogation.  Dunmore  was 
finally  able  to  perceive  this. 

The  Virginians  of  that  day  were  either  Englishmen  and 
lacking  in  a  sense  of  humor,  or  they  had  become  Ameri- 
cans and  had  acquired  it  in  a  high  degree.  For,  with  war 
in  full  blast  in  the  North  and  the  colony  in  arms,  th$ 
Revolutionary  Convention  of  March,  1775,  including 
Henry,  actually  met  at  the  governor's  order  on  June  1, 
1775,  as  the  House  of  Burgesses.  The  House  as  the  con- 
stitutional lower  body  of  the  assembly  gravely  consid- 
ered the  acts  it  had  performed  in  its  other  role  of  rebellious 


54  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

convention  and  duly  pronounced  them  good.1  It  did  not, 
however,  gratify  the  governor  by  reopening  the  courts. 
The  schedule  of  fees  to  be  charged  in  judicial  proceedings 
had  to  be  regularly  reenacted;  and  in  the  absence  of  such 
authority  no  fees  could  be  charged  or  business  transacted  2 
—  an  ingenious  constitutional  device  to  secure  the  sub- 
serviency of  the  courts  to  the  House  of  Burgesses.  The 
Burgesses  rejected  North's  conciliatory  offer  to  accept 
the  assurances  of  the  colonies  that  they  would  contribute 
to  the  defense  of  the  British  Empire;  the  Revolution  had 
gone  too  far  to  be  stopped  by  anything  short  of  a  complete 
renunciation  of  the  right  of  taxation  by  Parliament.  Even 
the  conservatives,  anxious  as  they  were  to  preserve  peace, 
demanded  this  much. 

Feeling  against  Dunmore  rose  to  such  a  height  in  the 
House  of  Burgesses  that,  according  to  report,  Richard 
Bland,  the  erstwhile  conservative,  actually  suggested 
hanging  him  and  was  warmly  supported  in  this  extraordi- 
nary proposal.3  What  was  more  alarming  than  these  out- 
bursts, a  force  of  riflemen,  known  as  "shirtmen"  from  their 
long  hunting-frocks,  so  different  from  the  conventional 
European  garb  of  the  tidewater,  had  reached  Williams- 
burg from  the  piedmont  counties,  and  Dunmore  fled  with 
his  family  on  board  the  Fowey  at  Yorktown.  Still  attempt- 
ing to  play  the  governor  from  his  floating  headquarters, 
he  sent  demands  to  the  assembly  from  time  to  time.  On 
June  21, 1775,  the  disgruntled  Burgesses,  who  were  almost 
morbidly  anxious  to  preserve  constitutional  forms  with- 
out regard  to  circumstances,  forwarded  to  the  governor  a 

1  Lingley's  Transition  in  Virginia  from  Colony  to  Commonwealth,  71. 

2  Ibid.,  70.  3  Magazine  of  History  (1906),  3,  160. 


THE   RADICALS  55 

last  protest  against  his  absenteeism  and  concluded  their 
work  without  him,1  adjourning  to  meet  again  on  October 
21, 1775.  The  constitutional  figment  was  now  worn  thread- 
bare; since  the  acts  passed  by  the  assembly  were  not  legal 
without  Dunmore's  approval,  it  was  evident  that  Virginia, 
in  spite  of  her  conservatism,  had  come  to  the  point  of 
undisguised  revolution.  The  colonial  assembly  never  met 
again.  On  October  21,  and  at  two  subsequent  dates,  there 
came  together  a  handful  of  Burgesses,  too  few  to  make  a 
quorum.2  The  House  of  Burgesses,  in  its  role  of  conven- 
tion, assumed  both  the  executive  and  legislative  functions. 
Yet  so  strong  was  the  force  of  legal  practice  and  consti- 
tutional principles  in  Virginia,  so  deep-rooted  the  attach- 
ment of  the  older  conservatives  to  England,  that  one  more 
effort  was  made  to  legalize  the  proceedings  of  the  conven- 
tion. As  late  as  January,  1776,  when  Dunmore  was  a 
defeated  fugitive  and  the  Committee  of  Safety  ruled  in  bis 
stead,  the  governor  wrote  Richard  Corbin,  president  of 
the  council,  —  himself  somewhat  of  a  Tory,  —  express- 
ing a  wish  to  act  as  mediator  between  the  colony  and  Eng- 
land.3 Corbin  sent  this  letter  to  the  Committee  of  Safety, 
which  declined  to  consider  Dunmore's  offer,  but  referred 
it  to  the  next  meeting  of  the  House  of  Burgesses.  Corbin 
then  went  to  Williamsburg  in  February,  1776,  to  consult 
the  Committee  of  Safety,  and,  with  its  consent,  visited 
Dunmore  on  board  his  ship  for  the  purpose  of  inducing  him 
to  commission  the  president  of  the  convention  as  acting 
governor  for  the  adjourned  meeting  of  the  assembly.  Dun- 
more refused  to  grant  the  commission,  thus  frustrating 

1  Lingley's  Transition,  etc.,  74.  2  Ibid.,  75. 

8  Virginia  Gazette  (Alexander  Purdie),  March  1,  1776. 


56  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

the  last  effort  of  the  conservative  leaders  to  continue  the 
government  under  the  colonial  constitution. 

The  convention  that  met  on  July  17,  1775,  disregarded 
the  fugitive  governor,  now  become  an  active  enemy,  and 
at  once  proceeded  to  put  the  colony  on  a  war-footing.  It 
directed  the  enlistment  of  two  regiments  of  troops  and 
attempted  to  provide  an  efficient  militia  system.  Further- 
more, it  filled  an  imperative  need  by  creating  a  revolu- 
tionary executive,  that  junta  known  as  the  Committee  of 
Safety. 

In  the  absence  of  several  of  the  most  noted  leaders, 
sent  as  delegates  to  Congress,  Peyton  Randolph,  Harri- 
son, Henry,  Jefferson,  Wythe,  and  Richard  Henry  Lee, 
the  highest  vote  for  committeeman  was  given  Edmund 
Pendleton,  who  thereby  became  chairman.  He,  with 
Richard  Bland,  who  declined  to  go  to  Congress,  Paul  Car- 
rington,  Dudley  Digges,  Carter  Braxton,  John  Page,  and 
John  Tabb,  conservatives,  and  George  Mason,  Thomas 
Ludwell  Lee,  William  Cabell,  and  James  Mercer,  pro- 
gressives, composed  the  Committee  of  Safety.  The  elec- 
tion was  a  conservative  triumph,  owing  partly  to  the  ab- 
sence of  Richard  Henry  Lee  and  Jefferson,  both  of  whom 
were  in  Philadelphia,  and,  even  more,  to  the  loss  of  Pat- 
rick Henry,  who  aspired  to  military  glory  as  colonel  of 
one  of  the  Virginia  regiments.  Since  Mason,  the  one  strong 
progressive  member  of  the  committee,  was  absent  from 
most  of  its  meetings,  direction  of  affairs  fell  into  the  hands 
of  the  conservatives  under  the  leadership  of  Edmund 
Pendleton,  the  chairman.  This  transfer  of  power  from  pro- 
gressives to  conservatives,  with  some  of  the  aspects  of  a 
coup  d'etat,  led  to  the  postponement  of  hostilities  with 


THE  RADICALS  57 

Dunmore  for  some  months.  Indeed,  the  year  might  have 
expired  peacefully  but  for  the  headiness  of  the  ex-governor, 
who  left  the  Committee  no  choice  but  war.  With  the  pro- 
gressive leaders  out  of  the  way,  at  the  election  of  the  Com- 
mittee of  Safety  the  conservative  faction  succeeded  in 
getting  the  executive  power  in  its  own  hands  and  so  de- 
ferred the  final  step  in  the  breach  with  England;  they 
doubtless  hoped  for  some  eleventh-hour  victory  of  peace 
to  satisfy  colonial  demands  and  yet  leave  the  British  Em- 
pire intact.  The  conservatives  never  realized,  as  Henry 
and  Jefferson  did,  that  such  a  dream  was  the  one  impos- 
sible thing. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  NORFOLK 

The  only  phase  of  the  Revolutionary  War  in  Virginia 
in  which  the  few  open  loyalists  played  any  active  part 
was  in  the  struggle  around  Norfolk  in  the  closing  weeks 
of  1775.  That  any  residents  of  the  colony  dared  side  with 
England  was  solely  on  account  of  Dunmore's  presence  at 
Norfolk  with  a  small  fleet  of  men-of-war  and  a  handful  of 
British  regulars.  His  active  supporters  in  the  colony  were 
confined  to  the  mercantile  class,  shippers  and  their  clerks 
and  dependents  —  the  same  class  that  supported  British 
authority  in  all  the  colonies  because  it  saw  that  war  with 
England  meant  commercial  ruin.  Fortunately  for  the 
patriots  Norfolk  was  a  small  town  of  about  six  thousand 
inhabitants  and  the  local  trading  interest  of  inconsiderable 
numbers;  otherwise,  Virginia  would  have  had  to  contend 
with  a  center  of  disaffection  like  Philadelphia,  a  seaport 
which  must  inevitably  have  fallen  into  British  hands  on 
account  of  its  accessibility  to  sea-power  and  inaccessibility 
to  the  rest  of  the  colony. 

The  royal  governor,  after  abandoning  his  "Palace"  at 
Williamsburg,  in  June,  1775,  made  his  way  to  Norfolk, 
where  he  remained  rather  inactive  for  several  months  for 
lack  of  troops  to  help  him  to  reestablish  himself.  The 
Revolutionary  government,  under  the  direction  of  the  con- 
servative Committee  of  Safety,  had  no  wish  to  disturb  him 
as  long  as  he  kept  reasonably  quiet.  Military  policy  dic- 
tated that  Dunmore  should  be  attacked  without  delay, 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  NORFOLK  59 

for  he  had  no  land  force  of  any  sort  until  the  latter  part 
of  July.  The  progressive  element  would  have  liked  well 
enough  to  begin  hostilities,  but  it  seems  probable  that  the 
conservatives  still  hoped  that  England  would  concede 
the  colonial  demands  and  end  the  dispute.  In  this  hope 
they  were  making  their  last  stand  for  peace. 

Dunmore's  headquarters  were  at  Gosport,  a  village  on 
the  Elizabeth  River  above  Norfolk,  destined  in  later  days 
to  be  the  site  of  the  United  States  navy  yard  from  which 
the  Merrimac  ventured  forth  on  her  famous  career.  At 
first  the  governor  had  at  hand  only  the  sailors  and  marines 
of  the  frigates  Mercury  and  Mars,1  but  he  was  afterwards 
reinforced  by  sixty  men  of  the  Fourteenth  Regiment  of 
the  line,  and  eventually  by  a  hundred  more  of  the  same 
regiment.  This  was  a  force  too  small  to  be  of  importance 
in  itself,  but  valuable  as  a  nucleus  for  building  up  some 
sort  of  military  organization.  Owing  to  the  reluctance  of 
the  Virginia  Revolutionary  government  to  take  the  initia- 
tive, he  was  allowed  time  to  gather  a  small  and  motley 
company  of  recruits,  mostly  Scotch  clerks  and  runaway 
negroes.  With  these  he  soon  succeeded  in  making  himself 
a  good  deal  of  a  nuisance. 

The  county  committees  along  the  Chesapeake  are  said 
to  have  begun  the  war  by  their  rigid  enforcement  of 
the  Continental  Association,  but  the  actual  beginning 
of  hostilities  resulted  from  British  activities  in  August, 
1775.  In  that  month  Captain  Squier,  of  the  sloop-of- 
war  Otter,  cruised  in  the  Chesapeake  and  its  tributaries, 
plundering  plantations  and  carrying  off  provisions  and 
slaves.  He  conducted  this  annoying  warfare  in  ship's 
1  Magazine  of  History  (1906),  3,  160. 


60  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

tenders  and  confined  himself  chiefly  to  raiding  for  provi- 
sions in  the  neighborhood  of  Norfolk;  occasionally,  how- 
ever, a  coasting  schooner  was  seized  and  held  as  a  prize. 

The  earliest  show  of  violence  occurred  on  September  2, 
1775.  On  that  date  Squier,  while  apparently  engaged  in 
one  of  his  chicken-stealing  expeditions  along  the  Bay, 
had  his  tender  driven  ashore  near  Hampton  by  a  storm. 
The  exasperated  inhabitants  took  advantage  of  the  op- 
portunity to  appropriate  the  guns  and  burn  the  tender, 
but  without  offering  to  injure  or  detain  the  crew.  Squier 
made  repeated  demands  for  the  return  of  the  stores  and 
finally  went  to  Hampton  with  several  tenders.  He  at- 
tempted a  landing,  but  a  brisk  fire  from  one  of  the  houses 
drove  him  off  with  a  loss  of  two  killed  and  two  wounded.1 

This  beginning  of  hostilities,  together  with  Dunmore's 
threatening  attitude,  compelled  the  Revolutionary  gov- 
ernment to  move  against  Norfolk.  The  Committee  of 
Safety  gradually  gathered  a  considerable  body  of  militia 
at  Williamsburg,  consisting  in  large  part  of  riflemen,  who 
were  expert  marksmen  with  considerable  experience  in 
bush  fighting  and  by  far  the  most  efficient  soldiers  the  col- 
ony possessed.  These  troops,  when  organized  into  two 
regiments,  formed  a  fairly  well-trained  force. 

During  the  summer  a  strange  condition  of  affairs  existed 
in  Norfolk.  The  rigid  enforcement  of  the  non-exportation 
policy  had  ruined  business  and  greatly  lessened  the  early 
enthusiasm  for  the  colonial  cause  displayed  by  the  mer- 
chants of  that  place.  Besides,  the  presence  of  Dunmore, 
even  though  he  took  no  active  measures  against  the  pa- 
triots, made  necessary  a  policy  of  loyalism  or  neutrality 
1  Virginia  Magazine  of  History  and  Biography,  xiv,  133. 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  NORFOLK  61 

on  the  part  of  those  who  remained  at  home.  Dunmore, 
in  one  way  and  another,  during  his  stay  at  Norfolk  man- 
aged to  gain  a  considerable  number  of  adherents  in  that 
region  and  to  cause  the  revolutionists  no  little  uneasiness. 

But  his  resources  were  too  small  to  be  of  much  use  in  a 
serious  conflict  with  the  provincial  forces.  He  had  about 
three  hundred  British  regulars,  some  sailors,  a  handful  of 
Scotch  merchants  and  clerks  gathered  from  Norfolk  and 
Portsmouth,  and  about  two  hundred  slaves,  ignorant  for 
the  most  part  of  the  use  of  arms.  However  much  hope 
Dunmore's  natural  optimism  may  have  aroused  in  him, 
the  Norfolk  loyalists  did  not  delude  themselves  as  to  the 
seriousness  of  their  position.  They  heard  with  growing 
dismay  the  reports  from  Williamsburg,  whither  the  up- 
country  riflemen  were  flocking  in  numbers,  and  wrote 
pessimistic  letters  home  to  Scotland. 

In  this  preliminary  period  before  the  beginning  of  un- 
disguised war,  Norfolk  was  reduced  almost  to  a  condition 
of  blockade  by  the  county  committees  along  the  Chesa- 
peake. Communication  between  that  town  and  Hampton 
and  Williamsburg  was  cut  and  no  person  might  travel  in 
and  out  of  Norfolk  without  a  pass.  Suspicious  characters 
were  not  allowed  to  come  within  thirty  miles  of  the  place ; 
newspapers  were  held  back  from  it;  and  ships  coming  from 
that  direction  could  not  go  up  the  rivers.  A  small  trade 
of  some  sort  continued,  but  many  of  the  Norfolk  people, 
alarmed  by  the  situation  and  by  the  reported  threats  of 
the  colonial  troops  at  Williamsburg,  moved  into  the  coun- 
try with  their  families  and  effects.1 

1  Andrew  Sprowle's  letter  in  Miscellaneous  Papers  of  the  Committee  of 
Safety  and  the  Convention  of  1775.  Virginia  State  Library. 


62  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

For  some  months  Dunmore  made  no  attempt  to  take 
possession  of  Norfolk,  but  contented  himself  with  remain- 
ing on  his  ships  in  the  harbor  and  assuming  a  rather  over- 
awing attitude.  Naturally  there  was  some  irritation.  In 
spite  of  the  town's  small  size  it  boasted  a  mob,  which, 
unlike  the  merchants,  was  more  or  less  patriotic  in  feeling. 
A  loyalist  named  John  Schau,  who  had  made  himself 
obnoxious,  was  roughly  mishandled  —  apparently  afford- 
ing the  only  instance  in  Virginia  of  violence  offered  to 
Tories  during  the  early  part  of  the  Revolution.  Even  this 
outrage  was  probably  due  to  the  presence  of  the  British, 
who  frequently  visited  Norfolk  from  their  ships  and  in- 
clined to  carry  things  with  a  high  hand.  Early  in  August 
a  few  soldiers  took  possession  of  a  store  in  Gosport  be- 
longing to  Andrew  Sprowle,  the  leading  merchant  in  the 
colony.  Sprowle,  by  quietly  submitting  to  this  quartering 
on  his  property  or  by  a  generally  lukewarm  and  loyalist 
attitude,  awakened  the  suspicions  of  the  Norfolk  borough 
committee,  and  he  was  summoned  to  appear  before  it 
and  give  an  explanation  of  the  use  of  his  house  by  the 
British.  Instead  of  obeying,  Sprowle  replied  that  the  sol- 
diers had  insisted  on  escorting  him  to  the  committee  meet- 
ing in  order  to  protect  him  from  Schau's  fate,  but  added 
that  he  refused  the  escort  for  fear  of  provoking  a  disturb- 
ance. As  an  alternative  he  suggested  that  the  committee 
visit  him  under  a  pledge  of  safe  conduct  on  board  of  one 
of  the  warships  or  at  his  house  in  Gosport.  The  committee 
must  have  believed  that  he  had  been  coerced,  for,  in  its 
reply  of  August  21,  1775,  it  approved  of  his  behavior  and 
thanked  him  for  the  information  given.  "In  the  mean 
time,"  it  wrote,  "they  see  the  fatal  necessity  of  your  sub- 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  NORFOLK  63 

mitting  to  this  Arbitrary  &  Unprecedented  Act  of  Tyr- 
anny —  a  cruel  situation  indeed  when  every  petty  Officer 
in  His  Majesty's  service  assumes  the  Authority  of  an 
Absolute  Monarch,  and  the  private  property  of  a  peace- 
able Citizen  is  seized  upon  as  Lawful  prey."  * 

Sprowle's  case  is  a  sad  example  of  what  usually  hap- 
pens to  prominent  citizens  caught  between  the  upper  and 
lower  millstones  of  civil  conflict.  He  had  no  real  partisan- 
ship, merely  desiring  to  live  in  peace;  but  it  was  not  pos- 
sible in  Norfolk  for  a  man  of  his  position  to  occupy  a  neu- 
tral attitude  during  the  latter  months  of  1775.  Sprowle 
could  not  bring  himself  to  abandon  his  property  and 
seek  safety  in  the  interior  like  the  majority  of  Norfolk 
people  of  patriot  sympathies.  He  stuck  by  his  goods  and 
paid  for  it;  for  Dunmore  later  came  ashore  and  quartered 
his  retinue  on  him,  and,  when  the  approach  of  the  Vir- 
ginia troops  forced  an  evacuation,  ended  by  carrying  the 
merchant  with  his  family  aboard  the  British  fleet.  There 
he  was  treated  with  inhumanity,  till,  worn  out  by  his  mis- 
fortunes and  sufferings,  he  died  on  ship  some  months  later. 
By  a  former  marriage  Sprowle's  wife  had  a  son,  John  Hun- 
ter, who  had  accepted  a  commission  in  the  British  army 
and  was  then  a  prisoner  in  American  hands.  On  the  pre- 
tense of  letting  her  see  her  son,  but  really  to  get  rid  of 
her,  the  governor  allowed  the  widow  to  visit  Norfolk.  The 
Committee  of  Safety,  considering  her  a  dangerous  per- 
son, ordered  her  back  to  Dunmore,  and  he  in  turn  refused 
to  receive  her.  The  poor  shuttlecock  at  length  escaped 
from  an  impossible  situation  by  sailing  for  England.2 

1  Miscellaneous  Papers  of  the  Committee  of  Safety  and  the  Convention 
of  1775. 

8  Legislative  Petitions.  Norfolk  (B4228).  Virginia  State  Library. 


64  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

Dunmore  ventured  on  his  first  act  of  aggression  in  Nor- 
folk in  the  latter  part  of  September,  1775.  One  morning 
a  boatload  of  grenadiers  and  marines  landed  there,  sur- 
prised a  printing  establishment  which  had  been  issuing 
revolutionary  pamphlets  and  manifestoes,  and  carried  off 
both  press  and  printers.  A  crowd  of  several  hundred  peo- 
ple watched  the  proceedings  without  daring  to  interfere. 
The  militia,  when  called  out,  failed  to  respond  in  any 
numbers,  and  the  British  went  back  to  their  ship  full  of 
contempt  for  provincial  valor.1  The  Williamsburg  gov- 
ernment is  said  to  have  blamed  the  Norfolk  people  for 
making  no  fight,2  but  with  the  frigates  lying  in  the  har- 
bor ready  to  open  fire,  the  local  soldiery  could  have  done 
nothing. 

Nevertheless,  the  affair  gave  Norfolk  a  black  mark 
among  the  patriots.  Loyalists  complained  in  their  let- 
ters that  the  provincials  were  breathing  out  threatenings 
against  the  town  and  predicted  that  it  would  be  destroyed 
unless  help  came  from  England.  In  anticipation  of  this 
fate,  a  good  part  of  the  population  moved  into  the  interior 
or  sailed  for  the  British  Isles.  Anthony  Warwick,  a  Tory, 
reported  that  a  third  of  the  people  had  gone  away,  carry- 
ing most  of  their  property.  Deep  apprehension  prevailed 
among  those  who  remained. 

After  the  attack  on  the  printing-press,  Dunmore  went 
on  to  seize  persons  conspicuous  for  activity  in  the  pa- 
triot behalf,  among  them  John  Goodrich,  who  had  re- 
cently brought  powder  into  the  colony  for  the  Committee 
of  Safety.    Goodrich,  a  man  of  rather  low  moral  nature, 

1  Miscellaneous  Papers,  1775-1776  (Virginia  State  Library). 
8  Virginia  Magazine  of  History  and  Biography,  xrv,  134. 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  NORFOLK  65 

was  so  wrought  upon  by  Dunmore's  threats  or  promises 
that  he  changed  sides  —  most  disastrously  for  himself. 
The  governor  also  began  to  put  pressure  on  the  people  of 
the  Norfolk  neighborhood  to  declare  for  the  royal  cause, 
while  in  retaliation  the  county  committees  blockaded  the 
town  more  and  more  rigorously.  A  Tory,  writing  on 
November  10,  1775,  vividly  describes  the  difficulties  cre- 
ated by  the  committees :  — 

It  is  not  now  possible  for  any  of  our  Countrymen  to  travel  the 
Country  without  a  pass  from  Committees  or  Commanding  offi- 
cers, which  none  of  them  can  procure  &  indeed  its  difficult  for 
even  the  Natives  to  get  permission  to  come  here;  so  that  we 
receive  no  Intelligence  of  what  is  doing  in  the  Country  except 
by  water  &  none  but  the  Tenders  belonging  to  the  Men  of  War 
are  allowed  to  come  up  to  this  place.  ...  It  is  now  certain  that 
the  provincials  are  on  their  march  from  Williamsburg  for  this 
place  or  Norfolk,  it  is  uncertain  which,  tho  it  is  generally  believed 
they  come  with  a  professed  Intention  of  destroying  by  fire  both 
Towns  .  .  .  the  whole  Country  are  anxious  to  have  these  Towns 
destroyed  as  they  think  them  places  of  refuge  for  those  who  are 
Inimical  to  what  they  call  the  Liberties  of  America;  &  true  it  is 
there  are  not  so  many  Inhabitants  now  in  both  Towns  but  what 
are  avowed  Tories  &  have  publicly  declared  themselves  friends 
to  Government  &  willing  to  take  up  arms  in  its  defence.  Peti- 
tions and  addresses  are  daily  presented  to  the  Governor  by  the 
Inhabitants  of  Norfolk  &  the  Country  around  it  praying  that 
they  may  be  presented  with  arms  to  assist  in  the  defence  of  them- 
selves &  of  Government  &  some  of  them  have  taken  those  who 
are  most  troublesome  in  their  neighborhood  &  brought  them  on 
Bd  the  Man  of  War  where  they  are  detained  prisoners  &  will 
soon  be  sent  to  Boston  for  their  tryal.1 

The  royal  governor,  partly  by  flattering  and  raising  the 
hopes  of  the  loyally  inclined  and  partly  by  hectoring  the 

1  Miscellaneous  Papers,  1775-1776. 


66  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

neutral,  collected  a  small  levy  of  auxiliaries  —  possibly 
two  hundred  in  all.  In  addition  to  these,  several  hundred 
runaway  and  kidnapped  slaves  were  armed  and  uniformed; 
but  time  and  officers  were  lacking  to  turn  them  into  effi- 
cient troops,  and  we  are  told  that  the  British  regulars 
greatly  disliked  serving  alongside  them.1  Dunmore  offered 
commissions  in  the  service  with  great  liberality,  but  found 
few  takers.  Among  the  handful  who  accepted  was  Josiah 
Philips,  afterwards  noted  as  a  loyalist  outlaw  operating 
in  this  district.  The  governor  also  directed  town  meetings 
to  be  held  in  Norfolk  from  time  to  time  for  the  purpose  of 
arousing  enthusiasm  for  the  British  cause,  at  one  of  which 
he  was  formally  invited  to  take  possession  of  Norfolk. 
John  Woodside,  who  seconded  this  motion  in  the  meet- 
ing, thereby  gained  the  reputation  of  being  " inimical' ' 
and  was  afterwards  refused  recompense  for  his  property 
destroyed  at  the  burning  of  Norfolk:  the  other  loyalists 
who  suffered  by  it  shared  the  same  fate.2 

While  people  of  importance  were  lured  by  flatteries  or 
coerced  by  threats  into  espousing  the  British  side,  the 
sailors  and  marines  worked  on  the  lower  classes  along  the 
shores  of  the  Bay,  endeavoring  to  wean  them  from  their 
lukewarm  allegiance  to  the  province,  or  at  least  to  keep 
them  indifferent.  The  Northampton  Committee  com- 
plained to  Congress  of  this  practice;  they  declared  that 
the  British  tenders,  plying  along  the  Eastern  Shore,  as- 
sured the  fishermen  that  nobody  had  to  fear  the  British 
except  the  committeemen  and  leading  patriots,  and  that 
the  men  who  urged  them  to  take  up  arms  were   their 

1  Miscellaneous  Papers,  1775-1776. 

2  Legislative  Petitions.  Norfolk  (B4265). 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  NORFOLK  67 

greatest  enemies.  These  advances  made  some  impression. 
While  people  of  property  were  in  the  main  well  affected 
to  the  American  cause,  many  feared  to  declare  their  sen- 
timents openly  until  a  force  arrived  to  assist  them:1  in 
southeastern  Virginia,  the  lower  classes  for  the  most  part 
remained  indifferent  or  hostile  to  the  Revolution  until  the 
end  of  the  war. 

Hostilities  may  be  said  to  have  begun  about  the  middle 
of  November.  If  the  initiative  had  devolved  on  the  reluc- 
tant Committee  of  Safety,  there  is  every  reason  to  suppose 
that  the  year  would  have  passed  without  fighting.  Such 
a  result  would  have  been  greatly  to  Dunmore's  advantage; 
even  though  the  provincial  levies  were  preparing  for  con- 
flict and  so  improving  with  time,  his  own  force  was  as  yet 
too  small  to  engage  in  a  real  struggle:  he  had  only  one 
chance  and  that  was  that  a  breeze  might  blow  through  the 
Capes  a  few  transports  carrying  a  British  regiment.  Until 
this  happened  his  cue  was  to  lie  low. 

But  Dunmore  thought  that  boldness  was  his  best  policy. 
By  this  time  he  had  succeeded  in  collecting  a  mixed  and 
untrustworthy  force  of  negroes,  Scotch  loyalists,  and  Nor- 
folk and  Princess  Anne  militiamen  who  had  absolutely 
no  stomach  for  fighting  on  either  side.  Trusting  to  this 
undisciplined  band  and  his  few  regulars,  the  governor, 
ventured  to  make  open  war  and  thus  forced  the  Commit- 
tee of  Safety  in  self-defense  to  attack  him.  Unable  to  re- 
main inactive  any  longer,  the  Williamsburg  government 
put  its  troops  into  motion  along  the  south  side  of  James 
River  in  October,  1775.  About  the  same  time  two  militia 
colonels,  Anthony  Lawson  and  Joseph  Hutchins,  gathered 
1  Virginia  Magazine  of  History  and  Biography,  xrv,  253. 


68  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

at  Kempsville  that  part  of  the  Princess  Anne  and  Norfolk 
militia  that  remained  true  to  the  colonial  cause.  Kemps- 
ville, the  county  seat  of  Princess  Anne,  is  a  village  on  the 
headwaters  of  the  East  Branch  of  the  Elizabeth  River,  a 
few  miles  southeast  of  Norfolk.  Being  at  the  intersection 
of  several  roads,  it  was  a  place  of  some  strategic  impor- 
tance in  a  country  where  roads  were  few  and  swamps 
abounded.  Dunmore,  in  turn,  sallied  forth  from  Norfolk 
on  November  14, 1775,  with  about  one  hundred  and  fifty 
grenadiers  and  fifty  or  more  loyalists  and  negroes,  and 
marched  to  Great  Bridge  on  the  South  Branch  of  the 
Elizabeth  River,  twelve  miles  due  south  of  the  town.  He 
had  been  led  to  take  this  step  by  a  report  that  a  party  of 
North  Carolina  militiamen  had  advanced  thither  for  the 
purpose  of  supporting  the  Virginia  troops,1  and  also  pos- 
sibly by  a  rumor  of  the  coming  of  the  dreaded  "  shirtmen."  2 
But  as  neither  Carolinians  nor  the  detachment  from  Wil- 
liamsburg had  reached  Great  Bridge,  Dunmore  turned 
east  along  the  edge  of  a  large  forest  to  Kempsville,  where 
he  had  learned  the  local  militia  were  gathered  in  some 
force.  The  colonial  troops,  about  three  hundred  in  all, 
had  taken  post  in  the  woods  along  the  highway,  and  were 
prepared  for  resistance.  When  the  head  of  the  marching 
column  came  in  sight  some  distance  down  the  road,  the 
militiamen  fired  a  volley,  but  without  effect.  The  regu- 
lars, returning  the  fire,  drove  their  opponents  from  cover 
into  the  river  near  by,  with  a  loss  of  several  killed,  several 
drowned,  and  fifteen  or  twenty  prisoners,  including  Law- 
son  and  Hutchins.3   The  affair  was  an'  easy  triumph  of 

1  Virginia  Gazette,  January  20,  1776. 

2  Virginia  Magazine  of  History  and  Biography,  xiv,  387. 
■  Ibid.,  xw,  256. 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  NORFOLK  69 

regulars  over  undrilled  and  half-hearted  farmers  and  fish- 
ermen, but  the  participants  on  the  British  side  made  much 
of  it  as  an  omen  of  future  success  and  a  specimen  of  Vir- 
ginia valor.  The  soldiers  jocularly  asserted  that  Hutchins 
had  been  captured  because  he  was  too  drunk  to  run  away 
with  his  followers. 

The  night  following  the  skirmish  the  grenadiers  and 
negroes  broke  into  the  houses  in  the  hamlet  and  insulted 
the  owners,  apparently  without  restraint  by  Dunmore.  A 
woman  who  had  been  frightened  by  an  armed  negro  ap- 
pealed to  the  governor  for  protection.  "Why,  madam," 
he  nonchalantly  replied,  "this  is  a  provoking  piece  of  inso- 
lence, indeed,  but  there  is  no  keeping  these  black  rascals 
within  bounds.  It  was  but  the  other  day  that  one  of  them 
undertook  to  personate  Captain  Squier,  and  actually  ex- 
torted a  sum  of  money  from  a  lady  in  his  name.  But  we 
must  expect  such  things,  whilst  this  horrid  rebellion  lasts." 
He  then  asked:  "But,  pray,  madam,  where  is  your  hus- 
band all  this  time?"  The  woman  replied  that  she  did  not 
know  and,  furthermore,  could  not  tell  when  she  would  see 
him.  "Well,  madam,  when  you  do,"  said  Dunmore,  "you 
must  be  sure  and  tell  him,  for  me,  that  this  is  no  time  for  a 
man  like  him  to  be  out  of  the  way.  His  Majesty  wants  his 
service,  and  I  will  give  him  any  place  he  will  name,  if  he 
will  come  in  and  join  us.   But  join  us  he  must."  * 

The  first  successes  in  a  war,  trifling  as  they  usually  are, 
have  an  effect  altogether  disproportionate  to  their  impor- 
tance. Dunmore  signalized  his  victory  by  erecting  the 
king's  banner  at  Kempsville  next  day  —  a  performance 
recalling  the  planting  of  the  standard  by  Charles  I  at 
1  Lower  Norfolk  County  Antiquary,  u,  135. 


70  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

Nottingham.  The  immediate  neighborhood  and  some  of 
the  poor  Pungo  fisher-folk  who  had  run  away  the  day  before 
came  in  and  took  the  oath  of  allegiance.  The  people  of  the 
county,  aware  of  their  helplessness  or  impressed  by  Dun- 
more's  success,  also  took  the  oath  in  considerable  numbers 
and  wore  on  their  breasts  the  British  badge  of  red.  The 
price  of  red  cloth  rose  in  the  Norfolk  stores,  and  the  woman 
who  had  interviewed  Dunmore  at  Kempsville  was  shocked 
to  have  her  husband  come  home  wearing  the  familiar 
scarlet.  "Oh!"  she  said,  "is  it  come  to  this?  Believe  me, 
I  would  rather  have  seen  you  dead  than  to  have  seen  you 
with  this  red  badge."  "Pshaw!"  he  answered,  "do  you 
think  it  has  changed  my  mind?  Don't  you  see  how  Dun- 
more  is  carrying  all  before  him,  and,  if  I  can  save  my  prop- 
erty by  this  step,  ought  I  not  in  common  prudence  to 
wear  it,  for  your  sake  and  the  children?"  * 

Menaces  were  mixed  with  flatteries  to  induce  the  back- 
ward to  take  the  oath.  Matthew  Phripp,  a  prominent 
merchant,  who  was  forced  into  subscribing,  was  roundly 
rated  by  Dunmore  for  not  coming  in  before.2  The  potent 
conjurer  was  fear.  The  governor,  indeed,  succeeded  so 
well  in  his  coercive  policy  that  on  November  15,  1775,  he 
took  the  step  of  declaring  martial  law,  ordering  all  loyal 
men  to  repair  to  the  standard  under  the  penalty  of  being 
considered  traitors  and  proclaiming  freedom  to  the  slaves 
and  indented  servants  of  rebels. 

The  brush  at  Kempsville,  together  with  the  proclama- 
tion of  martial  law,  had  the  immediate  effect  of  inducing  a 
large  proportion  of  the  population  of  Norfolk  and  Princess 

1  Lower  Norfolk  County  Antiquary,  h,  1S6. 
1  Miscellaneous  Papers,  xiv,  256. 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  NORFOLK  71 

Anne  to  take  the  oath.  Tories  noted  with  exultation  the 
sudden  change  of  sentiment  in  the  countryside.  It  was  even 
asserted  that  the  two  counties  had  come  in  bodily  except^ 
for  a  few  formerly  active  patriots,  to  whom  Dunmore,  by 
way  of  making  an  example,  refused  to  tender  the  oath.1 
Unquestionably  the  citizens  of  Norfolk  went  to  great 
lengths  to  show  their  loyalty  on  Dunmore's  return  to  town 
from  Kempsville.  An  entertainment  regaled  the  weary 
and  triumphant  party  and  the  British  standard  was  erected 
before  the  court-house,  while  the  timid  and  time-serving 
strove  with  each  other  to  reach  the  Bible  and  swear  alle- 
giance.2 Andrew  Sprowle,  a  conservative  witness,  stated 
that  about  five  hundred  men  had  taken  the  oath  at  Nor- 
folk.3 Probably  others  came  in  later,  for  an  optimistic 
Tory  asserted  that  "Treason  had  not  one  Abettor  in  the 
extensive  county  of  Princess  Anne."  Dunmore  himself 
declared  (with  evident  exaggeration)  that  three  thousand 
people  had  sworn,4  and  added  that  with  a  few  more  men 
he  would  march  on  Williamsburg. 

With  the  exception  of  Isle  of  Wight,  where  Dunmore's 
adherents  were  crushed,  serious  signs  of  disaffection  to  the 
patriot  cause  began  to  appear  in  the  whole  lower  country. 
Men  in  Norfolk  and  Princess  Anne  who  had  taken  a  prom- 
inent part  as  revolutionists  were  driven  into  hiding  to  es- 
cape the  visitations  of  the  British  and  negroes.  The  Isle 
of  Wight  patriots  retaliated  by  tarring  and  feathering  the 
conspicuous  loyalists,  which  frightened  others  into  taking 
refuge  with  Dunmore.5 

1  Virginia  Magazine  of  History  and  Biography,  xiv,  249. 
*  Ibid.,  xiv,  256.  s  Ibid.,  xiv,  387. 

4  Virginia  Gazette,  January  24,  1776. 
6  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  3,  92. 


n  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

The  situation  was  undeniably  one  of  danger  for  the  col- 
ony. If  at  this  time,  as  might  well  have  chanced,  a  British 
regiment  had  arrived  under  the  command  of  a  competent 
officer,  there  is  no  telling  the  result.  The  willingness  of  so 
many  under  a  little  urging  to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to 
the  king  is  evidence  that  no  great  enthusiasm  for  the  Ameri- 
can cause  animated  the  inhabitants  along  the  lower  Chesa- 
peake. The  coming  of  troops,  entailing  a  prolonged  and 
doubtful  military  struggle,  might  have  changed  indiffer- 
ence into  royalist  partisanship;  and  a  Tory  party  would 
have  arisen  in  Virginia  as  in  other  colonies.  The  energies 
of  the  Revolutionary  government  would  have  been  largely 
expended  on  the  internal  contest  at  the  very  time  when 
the  resources  of  the  colony  were  most  needed  to  maintain 
the  American  arms  in  the  North.  From  this  situation  Vir- 
ginia and  the  Confederation  were  saved  by  the  speedy  col- 
lapse of  Dunmore's  defense  —  a  collapse  due  largely  to 
want  of  support  from  the  home  government,  which  forgot 
for  some  critical  months  that  the  governor  of  Virginia 
still  existed  and  flew  the  British  flag. 

The  fall  of  the  royal  governor  was  also  owing  in  no 
small  measure  to  himself.  A  weak  and  commonplace  man 
put  in  a  position  of  extreme  difficulty,  it  is  small  wonder 
that  he  blundered  in  making  those  obviously  opportunist 
moves  which  always  seem  wisdom  to  his  kind.  By  pro- 
claiming freedom  to  the  slaves  and  indented  servants  of 
rebels,  Dunmore  probably  hoped  to  embarrass  the  planters 
with  a  servile  rising  at  the  same  time  that  he  secured  re- 
cruits for  himself.  He  may  also  have  imagined  that  many 
slave-owners  would  declare  for  him  in  order  to  preserve 
their  blacks  or  prevent  an  insurrection.  As  a  result  of  the 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  NORFOLK  73 

proclamation  a  few  hundred  runaway  slaves  joined  him, 
and  these  he  furnished  with  arms  and  attempted  to  drill 
into  soldiers.  Later  on  a  few  hundred  more  came  to  his 
support  and,  together  with  the  slaves  he  kidnapped,  sailed 
away  in  his  ships.  These  negroes,  some  of  them  savages 
almost  ignorant  of  English,  were  of  little  service.  The 
great  majority  of  slaves,  fortunately  for  themselves,  re- 
mained quietly  at  home  attending  to  their  work. 

As  the  price  of  this  paltry  accession  of  force,  Dunmore 
became  detested  throughout  the  colony.  He  completely 
demonstrated  the  fallacy  of  attempting  to  incite  slave  ris- 
ings —  a  policy  which  the  home  government  had  looked 
to  as  a  means  of  paralyzing  the  resistance  of  the  South. 
Possibly  some  of  the  negroes  were  sufficiently  intelligent 
to  doubt  the  advantages  of  freedom  gained  by  violence :  at 
all  events,  hesitation  was  wisdom  here,  since  the  majority 
of  blacks  who  joined  Dunmore,  after  being  used  as  drudges 
in  his  fleet,  died  of  smallpox  or  were  carried  off  and  never 
heard  of  again.  Runaway  negroes  who  took  arms  under 
Dunmore  were  not  put  to  death  by  the  patriots  when 
captured,  as  would  have  been  the  case  if  they  had  risen 
of  their  own  accord.  A  few  of  them  were  sold  in  the  West 
Indies;  but  the  greater  part  were  sent  to  penal  servitude 
in  the  lead-mines  in  southwestern  Virginia,  where  they 
served  the  American  cause  with  considerable  effectiveness. 

The  proclamation  of  freedom  to  slaves  destroyed  the 
last  vestige  of  influence  remaining  to  Dunmore.  It  did 
more :  it  made  him  the  best-hated  man  in  the  colony  and 
settled  all  the  colonists'  scruples  about  making  war  on 
him;  it  converted  into  active  patriots  the  large  class  which, 
having  something  to  lose,  came  to  the  conclusion  that  it 


74  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

was  better  off  under  the  Revolutionary  regime  than  under 
the  royal  administration.  In  fact,  Dunmore's  policy,  by 
displaying  the  representatives  of  Britain  in  the  character 
of  incendiaries  and  enemies  to  society,  had  the  paradoxical 
effect  of  converting  the  Revolutionists  into  the  champions 
of  law  and  order.  The  Committee  of  Safety^whicii  without 
legal  title  had  ruled  Virginia  solely  through  moral  author- 
ity, was  recognized  henceforth  by  almost  the  entire  popu- 
lation as  the  de  jure  government  of  the  colony. 

Dunmore's  performances  at  Norfolk  at  length  forced 
the  Committee  of  Safety  to  move  against  him.  Edmund 
Pendleton,  the  chairman,  was  practically  the  directing 
head  of  this  body  and  as  such  the  most  powerful  man  in 
Virginia  during  the  latter  part  of  1775.  Patrick  Henry, 
in  deserting  the  convention  to  become  colonel  of  the  First 
Virginia  Regiment,  and  Jefferson  and  Lee,  through  their 
absence  in  Philadelphia,  left  the  conservative  party  in 
power,  with  the  result  that  the  Revolution  almost  stood 
still  in  the  fall  of  1775.  The  Committee  of  Safety,  indeed, 
actively  supervised  the  work  of  the  local  committees  in 
crushing  disaffection,  but,  inconsistently  enough,  hesi- 
tated to  attack  Dunmore.  His  depredations,  however, 
left  it  no  recourse.  On  October  24,  1775,1  the  committee, 
after  a  lengthy  discussion  of  the  various  hostile  acts  he 
had  been  guilty  of,  such  as  harboring  fugitive  slaves,  seiz- 
ing a  slave  woman  and  other  private  property,  and  arrest* 
ing  and  carrying  on  board  his  ships  several  patriots,  de- 
cided to  send  the  Second  Regiment  of  the  line  and  the 
Culpeper  battalion  to  the  neighborhood  of  Norfolk  as  an 

1  Miscellaneous  Papers  of  the  Committee  of  Safety  and  the  Convention  of 
1775. 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  NORFOLK  75 

observation  force.  Even  then,  apparently,  the  committee 
had  no  definite  intention  of  precipitating  a  conflict  if  it 
could  be  avoided. 

This  decision  to  send  the  Second  Regiment  instead  of 
the  First  was  important,  inasmuch  as  it  meant  the  passing 
over  in  favor  of  a  subordinate  commander  of  Patrick 
Henry,  colonel  of  the  First  Regiment  and  ranking  officer 
of  the  Virginia  forces.  While  it  is  likely  that  Pendleton 
and  his  associates  in  the  Committee  of  Safety  naturally 
preferred  an  actual  soldier  like  William  Woodford  to  a 
politician  entirely  without  military  experience,  they  were 
also  influenced  by  other  considerations.  Pendleton,  the 
leader  and  best  representative  of  the  conservative  party, 
had  been  opposed  to  Henry  on  many  occasions  beginning 
with  1765,  so  that  the  head  of  one  faction  was  acting  as  the 
superior  and  director  of  the  head  of  the  other.  Under  the 
circumstances  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  the  popular 
orator  was  denied  the  opportunity  of  cementing  his  great- 
ness by  winning  a  military  reputation.  Thus  the  conserva- 
tives gave  him  his  final  checkmate. 

Woodford  possessed  some  ability  as  a  commander  and 
won  a  victory  over  Dunmore  that,  by  the  fame  and  popu- 
larity it  gave  him,  served  to  show  what  it  would  have 
meant  to  a  striking  personality  like  Patrick  Henry.  WThile 
Woodford  was  winning  laurels,  Henry  ingloriously  idled 
at  Williamsburg  with  a  command  put  to  no  more  serious 
labor  than  guard-mounting.  In  his  impatience  the  orator 
wondered  whether  it  would  ever  be  called  on  to  do  any- 
thing more  as  long  as  he  remained  its  commander,  for  he 
realized  that  the  conservatives  feared  his  popularity.1 
1  Henry's  Patrick  Henry,  i,  333. 


76  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

Indeed  the  committee  was  almost  openly  hostile.  Although 
Henry  was  the  superior  officer,  he  ceased  to  receive  re- 
ports from  Woodford,  who  preferred  to  report  directly 
to  the  committee.  That  body  did  not  discourage  his  in- 
subordination. The  Virginia  force  was  afterwards  joined 
by  a  North  Carolina  contingent  under  Colonel  Robert 
Howe  and  he  assumed  command  of  the  joint  army,  thereby 
completely  doing  away  with  Henry's  shadow  of  authority. 
The  latter  attempted  to  assert  himself  and  failed.  He 
then  appealed  to  the  Committee  of  Safety,  which  decided 
that  Woodford  ought  to  report  to  him,  but  receive  orders 
either  from  itself  or  the  convention.1  In  this  way  the  demo- 
cratic leader  saw  himself  quietly  negatived  in  military 
affairs  and  relegated  to  garrison  duty  in  a  place  where  a 
battle  was  little  likely  to  occur.  Distrust  of  Henry's  mili- 
tary ability  was  not  confined  to  the  Committee  of  Safety; 
Washington  shared  it  and  regretted  his  continuance  in 
the  service,  and  Congress  passed  him  over  to  appoint 
Robert  Howe  and  Andrew  Lewis  brigadier-generals.  Hurt 
by  this  treatment,  Henry  resigned  his  commission  and 
returned  to  civil  life.  It  was  a  final  choice,  for  he  never 
went  back  to  the  army.  By  leaving  it,  he  played  a  great 
part  in  the  founding  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Virginia, 
of  which  he  became  the  first  governor,  and  rendered  im- 
portant service  to  the  American  cause  in  an  administra- 
tive capacity;  but  his  chief  work  was  done  before  the  war 
began,  and  possibly  he  made  a  mistake  in  returning  to 
politics.  When  the  technical  ignorance  and  general  medi- 
ocrity of  the  American  officers  are  recollected,  there  seems 
no  reason  why  a  man  so  audacious,  determined,  and  master- 
1  Henry's  Patrick  Henry,  i,  348. 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  NORFOLK  T7 

f ul  as  Patrick  Henry  should  not  have  made  a  successful  brig- 
ade commander.  Politics  and  war  have  much  in  common. 
Woodford,  the  choice  of  the  triumphant  conservative 
faction,  slowly  made  his  way  towards  the  recreant  Nor- 
folk. On  November  25,  1775,  he  arrived  with  his  body  of 
riflemen  at  Suffolk,  in  Nansemond,  at  the  same  time  that 
his  advance,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Scott,  camped 
within  seven  miles  of  Great  Bridge  on  the  South  Branch 
of  the  Elizabeth  River.  In  this  region  a  large  part  of  the 
inhabitants  had  declared  for  the  royal  cause,  and  Scott 
arrested  several  Tories,  among  them  one  Jim  Inness,  who 
had  made  himself  prominent  in  Dunmore's  behalf.  Eight 
suspected  persons,  several  of  them  women,  were  arrested 
at  Suffolk  by  local  patriots  and  turned  over  to  Woodford 
on  his  arrival.  Scott  reported  that  most  of  the  British 
troops  had  withdrawn  from  Great  Bridge,  leaving  the  post 
garrisoned  by  negroes  and  Tories.  He  desired  leave  to 
cross  the  South  Branch  of  the  Elizabeth  River  below  Great 
Bridge  and  take  this  force  in  reverse,  but  Woodford  cau- 
tiously refused  to  run  the  risk  unless  his  subordinate  was 
certain  of  the  information.  Detained  at  Suffolk  by  the 
need  of  replenishing  his  arms,  the  Virginia  commander  sent 
forward  two  companies  under  Major  Alexander  Spotswood 
to  reinforce  Scott.  Woodford,  in  his  report  to  the  Commit- 
tee of  Safety,  repeated  the  account  so  often  given  of  the  gen- 
eral disaffection  of  the  people  of  that  section  to  the  American 
cause,  but  added  that  he  had  heard  they  had  begun  to  fall 
away  from  Dunmore  since  the  coming  of  the  colonial  troops 
and  that  it  was  believed  that  few  of  them  would  fight.1 

1  Miscellaneous  Papers,  1775-1776.  Woodford's  letter  of  November 
26,  1775.  Woodford's  letters  are  printed  in  the  Richmond  College  Histor- 
ical Papers,  no.  1. 


78  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

Undoubtedly  Woodford  carried  out  the  wishes  of  his 
superiors  in  moving  deliberately.  He  may  also  have  had 
military  reasons:  he  had  been  lately  reinforced  by  the 
Nansemond  militia  and  by  a  handful  of  gentlemen  volun- 
teers, and  a  body  of  North  Carolina  militia  was  en  route 
to  join  him.  Altogether  this  would  give  him  a  force  suffi- 
cient for  his  purposes.  The  appearance  of  a  respectable 
body  of  provincial  troops  in  the  Chesapeake  region  at  this 
time  was  of  great  importance.  Dunmore's  continued  suc- 
cess, even  in  trifles,  would  in  all  probability  have  inaugu- 
rated a  bitter  civil  war  in  the  tier  of  southeastern  counties, 
with  a  disastrous  effect  on  the  whole  colony,  but  Wood- 
ford's arrival  obviated  this  situation.  He  directed  Scott 
to  offer  protection  to  all  who  would  come  in,  including 
those  who  had  taken  Dunmore's  oath,  and  to  pledge  him- 
self to  seize  no  private  property  except  arms  and  ammuni- 
tion. With  the  colonial  troops  at  hand  and  Dunmore  in  a 
bellicose  humor,  a  collision  was  evidently  approaching. 
In  view  of  the  greatly  superior  strength  of  the  provincials, 
it  was  rather  expected  that  Dunmore  would  relinquish 
Norfolk  without  a  fight,  and  it  is  possible  that  he  would 
have  done  so  but  for  the  skirmish  at  Kemps vjlle.  That 
petty  triumph  seems  to  have  deluded  the  governor  into 
the  belief  that  he  might  be  able  to  make  a  successful  de- 
fense. Accordingly,  he  garrisoned  a  block-house  at  Great 
Bridge,  which  commanded  the  approach  to  Norfolk  from 
the  south,  and  threw  up  earthworks  for  a  space  of  a  half 
or  three  quarters  of  a  mile  immediately  behind  the  town. 
These  works  were  mere  shallow  entrenchments,  washed 
down  by  each  rain;  and  the  difficulty  of  holding  them  with 
a  few  hundred  men,  mostly  raw  recruits,  was  apparent 


THE   STRUGGLE  FOR  NORFOLK  79 

even  to  the  untrained  military  perceptions  of  the  Norfolk 
Tories,  who  gloomily  anticipated  the  approach  of  the  back- 
woods marksmen.  But  Dunmore,  assuming  his  best  air 
of  confidence,  prepared  for  battle. 

In  deciding  to  make  a  stand  at  Norfolk,  Dunmore  acted 
with  his  characteristic  unwisdom.  True,  Norfolk  was 
commanded  by  the  sea,  but  it  could  also  be  attacked  by 
land  and  a  considerable  force  was  now  converging  for  that 
purpose.  Since  the  provincial  army  could  be  indefinitely 
increased  while  the  governor  had  only  a  handful  of  trust- 
worthy troops,  the  continuance  of  the  defense  was  de- 
pendent on  the  arrival  of  reinforcements  from  England; 
and  this,  in  view  of  the  siege  of  Boston,  then  under  way, 
was  not  an  immediate  probability.  Dunmore  had  small 
chance  of  holding  the  town.  He  might  have  been  justi- 
fied, however,  in  making  the  effort  provided  he  had  no 
other  resort,  no  stronger  position.  But  he  did  have  it. 
There  was  one  part  of  the  colony  where  the  party  com- 
manding the  sea  might  hold  out  indefinitely  and  that  was 
the  Eastern  Shore,  the  peninsula  jutting  down  from 
Maryland.  This  section,  the  "Kingdom  of  Accomac," 
displayed  little  more  patriotic  enthusiasm  than  Norfolk, 
and  Dunmore,  with  his  fleet  and  his  few  regulars,  could 
have  overpowered  the  resistance  in  the  southern  end  of 
the  peninsula,  Northampton,  and  have  secured  a  base  of 
operations  from  which  it  would  have  been  difficult  to  dis- 
lodge him.  As  long  as  the  British  fleet  swept  the  Bay,  the 
Virginians  must  have  had  to  make  a  great  detour  through 
Maryland  in  order  to  reach  him. 

The  Northampton  Committee,  realizing  the  peril  of 
the  Eastern  Shore,  feared  and  expected  that  Dunmore 


80  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

would  descend  upon  it.1  But,  fortunately  for  Virginia,  the 
governor  preferred  to  gamble  on  the  chance  of  being  able 
to  thwart  the  superior  numbers  of  his  enemy  by  some 
lucky  blow.  Possibly,  too,  he  felt  that  withdrawal  from 
Norfolk  might  be  fatal  to  his  prestige.  At  all  events,  he 
decided  to  hold  his  ground. 

Great  Bridge,  where  he  hoped  to  check  the  provincials, 
was  the  most  important  strategic  point  near  Norfolk. 
The  South  Branch  of  the  Elizabeth  River,  running  in  a 
southeasterly  direction,  flows  languidly  through  a  marsh 
and  was  here  spanned  by  a  bridge,  from  which  causeways 
stretched  in  both  directions  to  firm  ground.  Two  islands 
rose  above  the  swamp  at  the  ends  of  the  bridge :  on  the  one 
to  the  north  Dunmore  had  built  his  fort;  the  other  con- 
tained only  a  few  shanties.  The  stockade  was  supplied 
with  two  four-pounders  and  several  swivels  and  wall-pieces, 
and  was  garrisoned  by  runaway  negroes  officered  by  ser- 
geants of  regulars  and  Scotch  Tories  from  Norfolk.2  Wood- 
ford, advancing  from  Suffolk  about  the  first  of  December, 
reached  Great  Bridge  and  took  position  on  the  south  side 
of  the  river.  Immediately  the  cannon  of  the  fort  opened 
on  the  provincials,  who  replied  with  rifle  fire.  One  Virginian 
was  killed;  the  loss  on  the  other  side  was  unknown,  but 
probably  greater.  Desultory  skirmishing  went  on  for  sev- 
eral days  along  the  banks  of  the  river  from  Great  Bridge 
towards  Norfolk,  and  both  parties  attempted  to  seize  and 
hold  all  the  boats  on  their  side;  the  provincials  to  secure  a 
means  of  passing  Great  Bridge,  the  loyalists  to  prevent 

1  Virginia  Magazine  of  History  and  Biography,  xiv,  250. 

2  Miscellaneous  Papers,  1775-1776.  Woodford's  letter  of  December 
4. 1775. 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  NORFOLK  81 

any  such  flank  movement.  Woodford,  who  had  cannon 
coming  up  with  the  North  Carolina  reinforcement,  was 
reluctant  to  force  the  passage  of  the  stream  in  the  face  of 
the  enemy,  and  threw  up  breastworks  near  a  church  some 
distance  back  from  his  end  of  the  causeway.  Seeing  that 
the  houses  on  the  south  island  furnished  excellent  cover 
for  riflemen  in  a  contest  with  the  fort,  some  slaves  crossed 
the  river  in  the  night  of  December  3,  1775,  and  set  fire  to 
them.  The  following  night  Woodford  retaliated  for  the 
burning  of  the  houses  by  sending  across  the  river  a  scouting 
party  which  fired  a  building,  killed  one  or  two  negroes,  and 
took  several  of  them  prisoners.  The  provincial  officers 
were  anxious  to  execute  the  slaves  by  way  of  example, 
but  the  commander  decided  to  leave  their  fate  to  the  con- 
vention.1 Two  nights  later,  on  December  6,  Woodford 
sent  another  detachment  across  the  river  to  attack  the 
enemy's  boat  guards  lower  down  stream.  The  riflemen 
surprised  a  mixed  force  of  whites  and  blacks  and  routed 
it  with  a  loss  of  five  killed  and  several  wounded  and  pris- 
oners.2 

Finally,  the  governor,  when  he  found  that  the  post  at 
Great  Bridge  was  seriously  threatened,  sent  his  regulars 
out  from  Norfolk  to  attack  the  colonial  force.  His  fortifi- 
cations back  of  the  town  were  now  pretty  well  completed 
and  mounted  about  fifteen  pieces  of  artillery.  He  had  also 
made  every  effort  to  raise  recruits:  Joshua  Whitehurst 
and  Charles  Henley,  two  prominent  Tories,  were  dis- 
patched through  the  country  with  an  armed  party,  to 
order  the  militiamen  into  Norfolk  and  to  lay  requisitions 

1  Miscellaneous  Papers,  1775-1776.  Woodford's  letter  of  December  5, 
1775.  a  Woodford's  letter  of  December  7, 1775. 


82  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

of  money  and  supplies  upon  people  of  means.  Few  men 
were  obtained,  though  probably  a  good  deal  of  plunder 
rewarded  the  raiders.1 

The  British  force  at  Great  Bridge  numbered  about  500 
men,  but  only  the  200  regulars  of  the  Fourteenth  Regi- 
ment were  trustworthy;  the  300  negroes  and  loyalists 
served  chiefly  to  swell  the  array.  Woodford's  command 
contained  about  700  men;  of  whom  430  belonged  to  the 
Second  Regiment  and  the  rest  were  minute-men.2  A  skir- 
mish-line of  provincials  occupied  earthworks  thrown  up 
along  the  edge  of  the  swamp,  about  150  yards  from  the 
bridge :  the  main  force  lay  encamped  near  the  church  sev- 
eral hundred  yards  farther  back. 

Woodford's  position,  approachable  only  by  a  narrow 
causeway,  offered  in  that  day  of  short-range  firearms  the 
best  possible  advantage  to  the  defenders  and  every  dis- 
advantage to  the  attackers,  who  had  to  advance  in  closed 
file  and  without  opportunity  to  deploy.  Nevertheless,  the 
regulars  received  orders  to  cross  the  bridge  and  take  the 
breastwork  by  storm. 

On  the  morning  of  December  9, 1775,  the  colonial  troops 
awoke  to  the  discharge  of  cannon  and  musketry  from  the 
fort.  A  lull  followed,  and  then  were  heard  the  voices  of 
the  British  officers  calling  their  men  to  arms.  Presently 
the  enemy's  force,  with  the  regulars  in  front  and  the  loy- 
alists and  negroes  in  the  rear,  crossed  the  bridge  to  the 
south  island.  A  picket  stationed  there  by  Woodford  was 
soon  driven  in  and  the  remaining  houses  set  ablaze.  Mean- 
time the  Virginians  in  the  trenches  were  keeping  up  a  brisk 

1  Miscellaneous  Papers,  1775-1776.  Titus  Meanwell's  letter  of  Decem- 
ber 7, 1775.  *  Woodford's  letter  of  December  10, 1775. 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  NORFOLK  83 

fire  and  some  little  confusion  ensued  among  the  Tories  and 
negroes.  Leaving  them  behind  on  the  island,  120  regulars 
under  command  of  Captain  Fordyce  advanced  resolutely 
along  the  causeway  leading  to  the  earthworks.  These  were 
held  by  100  riflemen,  and  the  officer  in  charge  ordered 
them  to  reserve  their  fire  until  the  enemy  came  within 
fifty  yards.  At  this  range  the  provincials  opened  with 
deadly  effect,  sweeping  the  causeway  almost  from  end  to 
end.  Fordyce,  though  wounded,  continued  to  lead  on  his 
men  until  he  went  down  struck  by  a  dozen  balls.  The  sur- 
viving British,  unable  to  face  the  withering  fire,  fell  back 
precipitately  to  the  island,  where  they  rallied  and  replied 
to  the  Americans  with  two  field-pieces  that  had  been 
hauled  across  the  bridge  from  the  fort.  As  soon  as  he  saw 
the  repulse  of  the  regulars,  Woodford  brought  up  his 
main  force  to  the  entrenchments,  and  the  British  there- 
upon retreated  over  the  bridge  into  the  fort. 

Woodford,  with  his  habitual  caution,  awaited  another 
attack,  but  the  abandonment  of  the  fort  on  the  night  after 
the  engagement  showed  the  completeness  of  his  victory. 
Although  the  action  had  been  a  mere  skirmish  as  regards 
the  numbers  engaged  and  the  losses,  it  had  important  con- 
sequences. Nearly  all  the  regulars  had  been  killed  or 
wounded,  and  the  loyalists  and  negroes  were  demoralized. 
Of  more  consequence  still,  Dunmore  himself  was  utterly 
dismayed  by  the  catastrophe  and  abandoned  all  thought 
of  further  defending  Norfolk. 

The  next  day  200  North  Carolinians  arrived,  bringing 
the  patriot  force  up  to  nearly  900  men.  On  December  12, 
another  detachment  of  North  Carolina  militia,  led  by  Colo- 
nel Robert  Howe,  joined  the  Virginia  army.  On  Decern- 


84  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

ber  11,  Woodford  had  issued  a  proclamation  to  the  people 
of  Norfolk  and  Princess  Anne  disclaiming  any  intention  of 
molesting  those  who  had  taken  the  oath  of  allegiance  to 
England,  but  at  the  same  time  he  took  care  to  send  a  force 
to  Kempsville  to  seize  all  persons  leaving  Norfolk  after 
the  action  at  Great  Bridge.1  A  number  of  Tories  and 
British  deserters  were  arrested,  among  them  a  Scotch 
loyalist  named  Hamilton,  who  had  served  at  the  fort. 
By  way  of  punishment,  Woodford  handcuffed  him  to  a 
captive  black. 

The  joint  force,  under  Woodford  and  Howe,  marched 
on  Norfolk,  something  more  than  one  thousand  strong. 
It  met  with  no  sign  of  resistance  and  entered  the  town  in 
the  night  of  December  14,  1775. 2  In  passing  through  the 
dark  streets  the  troops  were  fired  on  and  three  men  were 
wounded,  but  Dunmore,  with  his  remnant  of  regulars,  his 
runaway  slaves,  and  a  number  of  Tories,  had  fled  aboard 
the  ships,  which  still  lay  in  the  harbor.  More  than  a  hun- 
dred prisoners,  mostly  loyalists  and  negroes,  were  the 
fruits  of  the  occupation  of  Norfolk:  some  of  them  were 
sent  to  Williamsburg  by  a  court  of  inquiry  for  trial  before 
the  convention  then  sitting.  The  American  commanders 
offered  protection  to  the  townspeople  on  condition  of 
immediate  submission,  and  no  depredations  seem  to  have 
been  committed  by  their  soldiers.  Nevertheless,  the  gen- 
eral feeling  in  Norfolk  favored  the  royal  cause,  and  the 
magistrates  carried  a  copy  of  Woodford  and  Howe's  proc- 
lamation to  Dunmore  on  board  his  ship.  Meanwhile 
Woodford  made  no  effort  to  annoy  the  ships  lying  a 
little  distance   offshore,   though  the   riflemen   patrolled 

1  Woodford's  letter  of  December  10, 1775.    2  Ibid.,  December  14, 1775. 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  NORFOLK    85 

the  harbor  and  captured  a  snow  carrying  salt  to  the 
fleet.1 

For  some  days  the  ships  in  the  harbor  and  the  troops 
along  the  shore  were  satisfied  to  watch  each  other  quietly; 
the  people,  uncertain  of  the  outcome,  cautiously  refrained 
from  showing  partisanship  on  either  side.  Woodford  re- 
ported that  they  were  thoroughly  disaffected  without  hav- 
ing any  inclination  whatever  to  fight:  only  a  few  gentle- 
men received  the  provincial  troops  with  any  cordiality.2 
Meanwhile  distress  reigned  in  the  fleet,  whither  a  number 
of  loyalists  had  hurried  with  their  wives  and  children  at 
the  news  of  Woodford's  approach.  The  warships,  ill-pre- 
pared in  the  best  of  times  for  passengers,  at  this  juncture 
lacked  everything  to  make  life  comfortable;  and  the  women 
and  children  suffered  greatly.  Finally,  the  harassed  loyal- 
ists petitioned  the  American  commanders  for  leave  to 
come  on  shore.  The  latter  answered  that  the  women  and 
children  might  land  on  certain  conditions,  but  that  the  men 
would  be  held  as  prisoners  subject  to  the  judgment  of  the 
convention  in  their  cases.  Few  Tories  were  willing  to 
accept  such  terms. 

Through  the  last  days  of  the  year  the  hostile  forces 
continued  to  do  nothing  but  watch  each  other.  The  British 
ships  still  received  supplies  from  the  town  by  landing  boats 
at  a  distillery  and  ropewalk  on  the  outskirts  and  at  other 
points.  Howe  recommended  that  these  places  which 
served  as  supply  posts  be  destroyed,  but  nothing  was 
done.  Dunmore,  on  his  part,  had  the  effrontery  to  com- 
plain to  the  town  authorities  that  his  boat  crews  had  met 
with  ill-treatment.  Strange  as  it  may  seem,  a  town  meeting 
'    "  Woodford's  letter  of  December  17, 1775.     2  Ibid.,  December  16, 1775. 


86  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

discussed  this  complaint  at  length,  and  a  motion  was 
made  to  allow  boats  to  come  ashore  for  provisions,  but  it 
was  rejected.  Dunmore  can  hardly  have  been  so  foolish 
as  to  suppose  that  the  colonial  commanders  would  allow 
him  to  receive  supplies  from  Norfolk  unopposed;  it  is 
probable  that  he  merely  sought  an  excuse  for  the  action 
he  had  already  determined  on.  At  all  events,  early  in  the 
afternoon  of  January  1,  1776,  the  British  ships,  drawn  up 
in  a  line  before  the  town,  opened  fire  on  it  with  more  than 
a  hundred  guns.  Under  cover  of  the  cannonade,  which 
lasted  with  little  intermission  throughout  the  afternoon 
and  night,  sailors  landed  and  set  fire  to  houses  at  several 
places.  The  riflemen  posted  along  the  water-front  drove 
off  the  landing-parties,  but  not  before  the  wooden  build- 
ings near  the  wharves  were  blazing.  From  time  to  time, 
in  the  confusion  of  the  scene,  boat  crews  came  ashore, 
only  to  be  driven  back  immediately  to  the  water.  The 
defenders  suffered  no  greater  loss  from  the  bombardment 
than  a  few  men  wounded,  but  several  of  the  wretched  in- 
habitants, rushing  out  through  the  streets  in  the  winter 
night  to  get  beyond  the  range  of  the  guns,  were  killed  by 
cannon  balls.1 

The  fires,  begun  by  balls  or  landing-parties,  spread  with 
great  rapidity,  because  the  provincial  soldiers,  instead  of 
attempting  to  extinguish  them,  seized  the  opportunity  to 
plunder  and  destroy  on  their  own  behalf,  determined,  as 
they  said,  "to  make  hay  while  the  sun  shines."  2  Break- 
ing into  rum-shops  and  warehouses,  many  of  them  soon 
became  drunk  and  went  in  gangs  from  house  to  house, 

1  Miscellaneous  Papers,  1775-1776.  Robert  Howe's  letter  of  January 
7,  1776.  2  Legislative  Petitions.  Norfolk  (B4328). 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  NORFOLK    87 

smashing  in  doors,  dragging  out  spoils,  and  then  applying 
the  torch.  Household  goods  of  every  kind  were  sold  in 
the  streets  for  a  song  to  anybody  willing  to  buy.  The  de- 
struction caused  by  the  ships  was  confined  to  the  water- 
front, but  the  Virginia  soldiers  involved  the  whole  place 
in  the  catastrophe.  On  January  2,  1776,  when  the  firing 
had  ceased,  the  riflemen  continued  the  work  of  rapine 
without  interference  on  the  part  of  their  officers  —  appar- 
ently even  with  their  connivance.  Only  on  the  third  day  did 
Woodford  put  an  end  to  the  sack  by  forbidding  the  burn- 
ing of  houses  under  severe  penalty,  but  by  that  time  more 
than  two  thirds  of  Norfolk  was  in  ashes.  In  February, 
1776,  the  remainder  was  destroyed  by  order  of  the  conven- 
tion in  order  to  deprive  Dunmore  of  shelter. 

The  responsibility  for  the  burning  of  Norfolk  rests  upon 
both  Dunmore  and  the  provincial  troops.  Although,  ac- 
cording to  the  evidence,  the  riflemen  wrought  by  far  the 
greater  share  of  the  ruin,  the  governor  began  the  work  of 
destruction.  The  testimony,  indeed,  is  very  conflicting, 
but  the  statements  of  Woodford  and  Howe,  who  wished 
to  absolve  themselves  from  blame  in  a  discreditable  busi- 
ness, are  probably  more  completely  ex  parte  than  those  of 
the  numerous  witnesses  who  gave  detailed  accounts  of  the 
havoc  made  by  the  American  soldiers.  Furthermore,  the 
mayor  and  council  of  Norfolk  declared  to  the  assembly, 
on  November  16,  1776,  that  most  of  the  destruction  was 
the  work  of  the  troops.1  The  commissioners  appointed  by 
the  government  in  1777  to  investigate  the  matter  substan- 
tiated this  account  with  striking  figures.  They  declared 
that  Dunmore  had  burned  32  houses  on  November  30, 
1  Legislative  Petitions.  Norfolk  (B4188). 


88  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

1775,  and  only  19  on  January  1, 1776.  The  soldiers,  on  the 
other  hand,  had  destroyed  863  houses,  and  416  more  had 
been  destroyed  by  order  of  the  convention.1 

The  bombardment  of  Norfolk  was  a  crowning  piece  of 
stupidity.  Dunmore  could  not  have  hoped  to  drive  out  an 
overwhelming  and  mobile  force  by  a  mere  cannonade  and 
he  had  no  troops  to  use  in  following  up  this  act  of  aggres- 
sion. Under  such  circumstances,  his  firing  on  the  town 
was  a  mere  act  of  revenge  for  being  driven  out  of  the  col- 
ony —  the  mean  retaliation  of  a  man  unable  in  any  other 
way  to  return  fancied  injuries.  The  full  measure  of  his 
folly  may  be  seen  when  it  becomes  evident,  in  the  light  of 
the  commissioners'  report,  that  he  played  into  the  hands 
of  his  enemies.  Norfolk  was  the  one  place  in  Virginia 
where  the  king  had  supporters  and  where  the  royal  gov- 
ernor had  been  given  a  warm  reception;  and,  when  he 
turned  his  guns  against  it,  he  insured  the  ruin  of  his  own 
friends.  An  open  seaport  and  difficult  of  access  from  the 
interior,  it  could  have  been  kept  from  falling  into  British 
hands  only  by  the  constant  presence  of  a  large  force,  which 
the  colonial  government  could  not  afford  to  maintain  in 
an  isolated  position.  Sooner  or  later  a  fleet  with  troops  on 
board  was  bound  to  sail  in  and  turn  Norfolk  once  more  into 
a  busy  port  and  a  center  of  British  influence.  This  the 
Williamsburg  authorities  saw  clearly  enough,  but  it  is 
most  unlikely  that  they  would  have  ventured  in  cold  blood 
on  the  odious  course  of  destroying  the  town  as  a  precau- 
tionary measure.  That  Norfolk,  when  the  fleet  at  last  ar- 
rived, was  a  mere  heap  of  ruins  instead  of  a  convenient 
base  of  operations  on  the  Southern  coast  was  due  to  Dun- 
1  Report  of  Commissioners.  MS.  in  Virginia  State  Library. 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  NORFOLK  89 

more's  ill-considered  anger,  which  gave  his  astute  oppo- 
nents the  chance  to  do  their  work  and  cast  the  odium  on 
him.  Dunmore  was  destined  always  to  be  outwitted. 
Howe  expressed  the  sentiment  of  the  provincial  army  a 
few  days  later  in  reporting  that  his  men  had  burned  the 
obnoxious  distillery  where  the  British  landed.  The  de- 
struction of  Norfolk,  he  said,  would  be  beneficial  to  the 
public.  It  was  a  place  the  enemy  could  seize  at  any  time, 
inhabited  by  a  population  wholly  given  up  to  trade  and 
without  devotion  to  the  American  cause.  If  held  by  the 
British,  it  would  have  continued  importing  prohibited 
goods  and  thus  would  have  neutralized  the  Continental 
Association  in  two  colonies.1  There  was  general  satisfac- 
tion that  it  was  no  more. 

The  relative  position  of  the  ships  and  the  troops  re- 
mained the  same  after  the  destruction  of  the  town;  the 
fleet  rode  at  anchor  and  the  riflemen  skulked  along  the 
shore  looking  for  shots.  Occasional  brushes  between  them 
and  landing-parties  of  sailors  relieved  the  tedium.  On 
January  21,  1776,  two  of  the  men-of-war,  the  Liverpool 
and  Otter,  opened  a  heavy  fire  on  the  ruins  to  cover  a  party 
which  set  fire  to  a  few  buildings  still  standing  near  a  wharf. 
A  sharp  skirmish  followed  between  sailors  and  "shirtmen" 
in  which  both  sides  lost  a  number  killed  and  wounded.2 
At  last,  on  February  6,  1776,  the  provincials  abandoned 
Norfolk,  after  sending  away  the  poor  people  still  living 
there,  burning  all  the  remaining  houses  and  demolishing 
Dunmore's  entrenchments.  The  troops  were  quartered 
at  Kempsville,  Great  Bridge,  and  Suffolk,  points  more 

1  Robert  Howe's  letter  of  January  6, 1777. 
a  Virginia  Gazette,  January  26, 1776. 


90  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

accessible  than  Norfolk  and  easier  to  provision.1  Shortly 
afterwards  the  frigate  Roebuck  arrived  with  some  troops 
and  enabled  Dunmore  to  take  possession  of  the  village 
of  Portsmouth  across  the  Elizabeth  River  from  Norfolk.2 
From  this  place  as  a  base  he  sent  out  along  Chesapeake 
Bay  tenders  and  ships,  which  took  a  number  of  American 
vessels  as  prizes  and  occasionally  made  raids  on  the  planta- 
tions along  the  water.  In  spite  of  these  successes,  how- 
ever, Dunmore's  position  was  most  precarious,  as  provi- 
sions were  scarce  and  jail  fever  raged  in  the  fleet.  Nor  did 
the  tenders  on  their  marauding  expeditions  always  have 
it  one  way.  In  April,  1776,  a  tender  captured  a  New  Eng- 
land schooner  in  the  Rappahannock,  but  was  attacked  in 
turn  by  sailboats  manned  by  people  of  the  neighborhood 
and  escaped  with  difficulty  after  abandoning  the  prize.3 
Moreover,  two  of  the  ships,  the  Liverpool  and  Roebuck, 
suffered  rough  handling  in  an  engagement  with  row-galleys 
in  the  upper  Chesapeake. 

The  patriot  government  now  prepared  to  make  another 
effort  to  rid  the  country  of  Dunmore.  On  March  29,  1776, 
Charles  Lee,  major-general  in  the  Continental  service, 
arrived  at  Williamsburg  to  take  command  of  all  the  forces 
in  Virginia,  Continental  and  local.  He  immediately  began 
to  organize  his  troops  and  attempted  to  raise  a  cavalry 
force,  which  was  especially  needed.  When  the  organiza- 
tion was  sufficiently  complete,  he  advanced  to  Norfolk, 
and  on  May  20,  1776,  fought  a  skirmish  from  the  shore 
with  the  ships.  A  few  days  later,  Dunmore,  after  dis- 
mantling some  new  entrenchments  he  had  raised,  sailed 
away  with  his  whole  following.4    Charles  Lee  had  mean- 

1  Virginia  Gazette,  February  9,  1776.  2  Ibid.,  February  23,  1776. 

8  Ibid.,  May  3,  1776.  4  Ibid.,  May  24, 1776. 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  NORFOLK  91 

while  gone  to  Portsmouth,  where  he  busied  himself  in 
crushing  disaffection.  Washington's  eccentric  second  in 
command  excited  as  much  amusement  by  his  long  green 
trousers,  called  "  sherry- vallies,"  and  his  litter  of  dogs  1 
—  habitual  sharers  of  his  bedroom  —  as  his  supposed 
military  talents  and  experience  aroused  admiration.  One 
of  his  first  acts  on  reaching  Portsmouth  was  to  urge  the 
Committee  of  Safety  to  deport  the  inhabitants  of  Prin- 
cess Anne  in  order  to  break  communications  between  the 
countryside  and  Dunmore's  fleet.  The  committee  there- 
upon decreed  that  all  people  living  within  a  line  drawn 
from  Great  Bridge  to  Kempsville  and  thence  to  the  ocean 
should  remove  into  the  interior,  as  well  as  all  the  people 
within  the  two  counties  who  had  repaired  to  Dunmore's 
standard.  Dissatisfied  with  this  measure,  which  was  not 
carried  out  in  all  its  harshness,  Lee  ventured  to  demolish 
the  houses  of  several  well-known  loyalists  in  Portsmouth 
by  way  of  salutary  example,  as  he  reported  to  Edmund 
Pendleton  in  a  letter  of  May  4,  1776: — 

Sir: 

As  I  consider  it  my  duty  to  make  a  report  of  every  transaction 
that  is  not  merely  and  purely  military  to  the  Committee  I  hope 
They  will  excuse  my  not  having  done  it  before,  but  as  They  were 
yesterday  so  employed  in  the  busyness  of  the  Princess  Anne 
Petition,  I  thought  it  might  be  troublesome  to  enter  upon  the 
subject. 

As  I  found  that  the  Inhabitants  of  Portsmouth  had  univer- 
sally taken  the  oaths  to  Ld  Dunmore,  and  as  the  Town  was,  I 
believe  justly,  reputed  the  great  channel  through  which  his  Lord- 
ship received  the  most  exact  and  minute  intelligence  of  all  our 
actions  and  designs  I  thought  it  incumbent  on  me  and  agreeable 

1  Lower  Norfolk  County  Antiquary,  i,  99. 


92  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

to  the  spirit  of  your  instructions  to  remove  the  People  without 
exception,  for  even  the  Women  and  Children  had  learnd  the  art 
and  practic'd  with  address  the  Office  of  Spies,  —  a  considerable 
quantity  of  valuable  articles  were  found  in  the  houses  of  Mes'rs 
Sprowl,  Goodrich  and  Jemmison  as  molasses  salt  and  other  things 
were  wanted  by  the  Public  —  I  have  order'd  the  Officer  command- 
ing the  Party  to  make  out  an  inventory  of  these  articles  which 
are  to  be  laid  before  your  Board. 

As  the  Town  of  Portsmouth  will  afford  so  convenient  shelter 
and  quarters  to  the  Enemy  on  the  supposition  They  make  this 
part  of  the  world  their  object,  itwou'd  (strictly  speaking)  be  per- 
haps right  and  politick  to  destroy  it  totally  —  but  I  thought  it  a 
matter  of  too  serious  concern  for  me  to  execute  without  the  in- 
junction or  sanction  of  the  Committee  —  the  houses  indeed  of 
some  of  the  most  notorious  Traitors  I  ventur'd  to  demolish  with 
the  view  of  intimidating  the  neighborhood  from  trifling  any 
longer  or  flying  in  the  face  of  your  ordinances  —  for  unless  I  have 
been  grossly  misinformd  these  People  have  been  Encouraged 
from  no  examples  having  been  made,  into  a  most  barefaced  open 
intercourse  with  the  Enemy  —  Sprowls  Goodrich's  Jemmisons  and 
Spaddens  houses  have  on  this  principle  been  demolishd  —  the 
last  Gentleman  (Spadden)  is  now  a  Prisoner  at  Suffolk  accused 
and  I  am  told  convicted  of  having  been  on  board  Ld  Dunmore's 
fleet,  since  his  acquittal  by  the  Committee  of  Norfolk. 

As  We  had  undoubted  intelligence  that  Dunmore's  Fleet  and 
Army  were  amply  and  constantly  supplied  with  provisions  and 
refreshments  of  every  kind  from  that  tract  of  Country  lying  be- 
tween the  Southern  and  Eastern  Branches,  as  well  as  from  Tan- 
ners Creek,  and  that  the  positive  ordinance  levell'd  by  the  Con- 
vention against  this  species  of  treason  was  totally  contemn'd 
and  disregarded  and  as  it  is  a  notorious  truth  that  from  an  habit- 
ual commission  of  any  criminal  act  be  it  ever  so  heinous,  He  who 
commits  it  at  length  persuades  himself  that  there  is  no  crime  in 
it  at  all  —  These  Worthies  not  only  every  day  more  constantly 
and  openly  carried  on  this  dangerous  and  pernicious  commerce 
but  even  (as  it  is  said)  justified  it  in  their  conversation.  I  say, 
Sir,  considering  these  circumstances,  it  appear 'd  to  me  absolutely 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  NORFOLK    93 

necessary  as  it  did  to  the  other  Officers  and  the  Committee  of 
Gentlemen  from  Suffolk  to  take  some  vigorous  step  on  the  spot 
which  might  intimidate  the  whole  knot  of  these  miscreants  from 
this  pernicious  commerce  —  a  Mr.  Hopkins  infamous  for  his 
principles  and  conduct  and  who  has  a  son  now  a  soldier  in  Ld 
Dunmores  Army  was  fortunately  the  Man  detected  —  He  was 
seiz'd  in  his  return  from  the  Fleet  where  He  had  been  with  a 
supply  of  provisions  —  He  at  first  prevaricated  and  perjured  him- 
self very  handsomely,  but  at  length,  not  indeed  untill  He  was 
impeachd  by  his  Companion,  confess'd  —  the  sentiments  of  the 
Committee  and  of  the  other  officers  concurring  with  my  own  — 
We  determined  after  having  secur'd  the  furniture  to  set  his  house 
on  fire  in  his  presence  —  this  step  was  not  perhaps  consistent 
with  the  regular  mode  prescrib'd  of  proceeding  —  but  there  are 
occasions  when  the  necessity  will  excuse  a  deviation  from  the 
regular  mode  of  proceeding  —  and  this  I  hope  will  appear  to 
the  Committee  to  be  one  of  these  occasions  when  irregularity  is 
excusable  —  I  must,  here,  Gentlemen,  beg  leave  to  repeat  my 
assurances  that  if  ever  in  my  military  capacity  I  shou'd  fall  into 
any  measure  which  is  more  properly  within  the  Province  of  the 
Civil,  it  must  entirely  proceed  from  mistaken  inadvertency, 
never  from  design  —  and  that  when  this  happens,  so  far  from 
being  offended  at  the  admonitions,  or  even  reprimands  of  the 
Committee  that  I  shall  think  myself  obliged  to  them.1 

The  effects  of  this  patriotic  arson  are  not  known,  but 
Dunmore  had  ended  his  career  in  Virginia,  and  Toryism, 
never  very  strong  as  a  force,  was  now  completely  crushed. 
The  governor  found  an  opportunity  to  make  a  final  blun- 
der before  vanishing  from  the  scene.  Sailing  out  of  Nor- 
folk Harbor,  with  ships  crowded  with  runaway  and  stolen 
negroes  and  wretched  refugees,  he  cast  anchor  at  Gwynn's 
Island  off  the  Gloucester  shore.  On  this  island — suffi- 
ciently large  for  prolonged  occupation — Dunmore  landed 
1  Miscellaneous  Payers,  1775-1776. 


94  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

his  disease-stricken  crews  and  threw  up  fortifications,  for- 
getful of  the  fact  that  his  ships  lay  within  easy  cannon-range 
of  the  mainland.  The  appearance  of  Dunmore's  sails  was 
the  signal  for  a  muster  in  strength  of  the  local  militia.  It 
lacked  the  means  for  immediate  attack,  but  James  Barron, 
captain  in  the  Virginia  navy,  dealt  Dunmore  a  heavy  blow 
by  capturing  a  transport  filled  with  Highlander  troops 
bound  up  the  Bay  for  Gwynn's  Island.  This  was  the  pre- 
lude to  the  end.  By  the  beginning  of  July  a  large  num- 
ber of  militiamen  had  gathered  opposite  the  island,  com- 
manded by  Andrew  Lewis,  an  officer  of  great  experience 
in  Indian  warfare  and  of  much  natural  military  talent. 
On  July  9,  1776,  Lewis  opened  a  cannonade  on  the  fleet 
lying  off  the  island  and  on  the  entrenchments.  The  ships 
suffered  severely  from  the  fire  and  were  soon  forced  to 
slip  cables  and  hurriedly  put  out,  leaving  behind  most  of 
the  effects  that  had  been  landed.1  Want  of  boats  alone 
prevented  the  Virginians  from  pushing  over  to  the  island 
and  taking  many  prisoners.  Next  morning,  when  they  had 
gathered  enough  boats  to  visit  the  island,  they  were  horror- 
stricken  to  find  it  literally  covered  with  the  dead  and 
dying,  the  victims  of  smallpox  and  jail  fever.  The  dirty, 
crowded  ships  had  become  floating  lazarettos. 

Exiled  from  Gwynn's  Island,  Dunmore  tried  to  land 
on  St.  George's  Island  in  Maryland,  but  was  beaten  off 
by  militia.  He  plundered  and  burned  several  plantation 
houses  along  the  Potomac  and  again  attacked  St.  George's 
Island,  with  no  better  luck.  Despairing  of  finding  a  refuge 
in  the  Chesapeake,  he  stood  down  the  Bay  with  all  his 
fleet  and  sailed  out  of  the  Capes  and  American  history. 
1  Virginia  Gazette,  July  12, 1776. 


THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  NORFOLK  95 

So  intense  was  the  dislike  Dunmore  inspired  that  he 
remained  for  several  generations  under  the  calumny  of 
legend.  Although  he  enjoyed  considerable  popularity 
before  1775  and  entertained  at  the  "Palace"  in  Williams- 
burg, where  the  local  gentry  loved  to  meet  his  charming 
wife  and  swains  to  worship  his  young  daughters,  he  had  by 
1776  become  an  enemy  to  society,  the  instigator  of  slave 
insurrection  and  the  robber  and  plunderer.  As  usual  in 
such  cases,  his  sufficiently  numerous  errors  and  sins  did 
not  satisfy.  Tradition  made  him  out  the  secret  betrayer 
of  the  colony  in  the  Indian  war  of  1774,  who  incited  the 
savage  to  lay  waste  the  frontier  in  order  to  weaken  resist- 
ance to  the  imperial  authority.  And  in  this  guise  of  an- 
archist and  assassin  the  last  English  governor  has  come 
down  almost  to  our  own  times. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE   COUNTY   COMMITTEES 

The  easy  triumph  of  the  Revolution  in  Virginia  was 
primarily  due  to  thorough  organization.  The  sentiment 
of  the  colony  was,  beyond  doubt,  overwhelmingly  patri- 
otic, but  it  is  conceivable  that  a  considerable  loyalist,  or 
neutral,  faction  might  have  existed  if  public  opinion  had 
been  less  forcefully  translated  into  action.  The  county 
committees,  composed  of  prominent  and  experienced  men 
working  with  a  perfectly  definite  aim,  crushed  disaffection 
in  the  beginning  with  a  ruthless  efficiency  that  left  British 
sympathizers  no  alternative  but  exile  or  quiet  submission. 

Local  committees  of  correspondence  sprang  up  in  Vir- 
ginia in  1774.  Late  in  the  year,  in  conformity  with  the 
recommendation  of  Congress,  county  committees  were  or- 
ganized to  carry  into  effect  the  Continental  Association, 
that  boycott  designed  to  force  the  English  government  to 
terms  by  loss  of  trade.  The  earliest  of  these  local  commit- 
tees arose  in  the  eastern  counties,  showing  that  no  class 
was  so  eager  to  support  Congress  as  the  large  landowners. 
Reluctant  as  they  were  a  year  later  to  go  to  war,  they  were 
now  foremost  in  the  boycott,  because  to  their  minds  it  was 
legal  and  entirely  consistent  with  attachment  to  the  crown. 
These  tidewater  planters,  men  trained  in  politics  and 
affairs,  inaugurated  the  committee  system  and  the  com- 
mercial resistance  to  Britain  and  thus  inadvertently  led 
the  colony  into  the  very  thing  they  dreaded.  The  local 


THE  COUNTY  COMMITTEES  97 

committees  played  an  important  part  in  the  life  of  the  com- 
munity from  the  very  start.  Their  authority,  if  not  legal, 
was  yielded  by  general  consent  and  was  extensive  in  scope. 
They  were  chosen  by  the  freeholders  of  the  counties  as- 
sembled at  the  court-houses,  virtually  in  the  same  way 
that  the  Burgesses  were  elected;  and  these  mass  meetings 
seem  to  have  passed  off  usually  without  incident  —  much 
more  like  the  routine  pollings  for  members  of  the  assembly 
than  incipient  rebellion.  The  committees,  consisting  for 
the  most  part  of  prominent  and  trusted  men,  stood  for  law 
and  order  even  though  they  themselves  were  untrammeled 
by  ordinary  legal  restraints.  The  selections  generally  rep- 
resented spontaneous  popular  choice,  but  sometimes  they 
were  arranged  after  practical  political  methods  with  which 
the  present  generation  is  only  too  familiar.  Thus,  some 
of  the  people  of  Chesterfield  in  August,  1775,  complained 
to  the  convention  that  the  county  committee  had  been 
elected  by  a  mere  handful  of  voters,  who  did  not  clearly 
understand  its  importance,  and  that  as  a  consequence 
several  unworthy  members  had  been  chosen.  They  there- 
fore requested  another  election.1  Similarly,  in  Hanover 
the  complaint  arose  that  tellers  of  the  ballots  at  the  elec- 
tion took  it  upon  themselves  to  exclude  persons  actually 
elected  in  favor  of  others  not  receiving  a  majority.2  Usu- 
ally in  the  eastern  counties  men  of  the  conservative  faction 
that  had  so  long  ruled  Virginia  predominated  in  the  com- 
mittees. This  was  fortunate  for  the  Revolution.  Begun 
under  the  auspices  of  the  upper  classes,  the  body  of  the 
people  came  into  it  as  a  matter  of  course,  and  with  few 

1  Legislative  Petitions.  Chesterfield  (A4072). 

2  Journal  of  the  May  Convention  of  1776,  24. 


98  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

misgivings.  Furthermore,  the  local  rulers  were  able  to 
employ  ostracism  —  at  first  their  only  weapon  —  with 
far  greater  restraint  and  success  than  men  without  posi- 
tion could  possibly  have  done.  In  their  hands  it  proved  a 
formidable  instrument  in  the  early  stages  of  the  Revolu- 
tion for  suppressing  faint-hearted  royalists  and  bringing 
about  at  least  a  show  of  harmony. 

The  committees  began  their  work  with  great  energy  and 
admirable  system.  Counties  were  divided  into  districts 
and  each  district  was  assigned  to  a  subcommittee  of  the 
county  committee.  Owing  to  the  care  for  detail  observed, 
practically  the  whole  population  of  the  colony  was  sub- 
jected to  an  espionage,  which,  though  it  employed  no 
regular  spies,  was  exceedingly  efficient.  Not  only  viola- 
tions of  the  Continental  Association,  but  disaffection  of 
any  kind,  even  careless  words,  met  with  prompt  investi- 
gation. The  only  alternative  for  the  offender,  besides  sub- 
mission, was  exile;  for  exile  naturally  followed  as  the  result 
of  the  odium  cast  on  those  openly  published  as  hostile.  In 
the  vacation  of  regular  tribunals,  closed  by  the  Revolution, 
the  committees  not  only  exercised  the  functions  of  a  court 
of  wide  jurisdiction,  but  enjoyed  executive  powers  as  well. 
Since  they  ordinarily  included  a  considerable  proportion 
of  justices  of  the  peace,  the  suspension  of  courts  had  very 
little  effect  on  good  order.  Seldom  has  a  great  political 
revolution  been  attended  with  less  violence  than  the  close 
of  the  British  administration  in  Virginia  and  the  opening 
of  the  republican  era. 

The  first  case  of  disaffection  acted  on  by  a  committee, 
so  far  as  known,  was  not  a  prosecution  for  a  violation  of 
the  Continental  Association,  but  for  an  expression  of  opin- 


THE  COUNTY  COMMITTEES  99 

ion.  On  November  8,  1774,  the  Westmoreland  Commit- 
tee, including  some  of  the  most  prominent  persons  in  the 
colony,  sat  in  judgment  on  David  Wardrobe,  a  Scotch 
school-teacher,  who  had  written  home  rather  indiscreetly 
about  local  conditions.  Through  inadvertence  or  a  mis- 
understanding, the  letter  was  published,  and  was  now 
laid  before  the  committee  as  a  contribution  to  the  columns 
of  a  Glasgow  newspaper.  Wardrobe  had  charged  the 
planters  with  taking  the  lead  in  one  of  those  effigy-burn- 
ings so  dear  to  the  heart  of  the  eighteenth  century,  and 
had  described  the  common  people  as  showing  no  enthusi- 
asm for  the  roasting  of  Lord  North.  There  was  sufficient 
truth  in  the  charge  to  exasperate  the  committee,  which 
summoned  the  school-teacher  to  appear  before  it.  He 
admitted  that  the  letter  was  partly  his,  whereupon  the 
committee,  preserving  that  euphemistic  form  so  character- 
istic of  the  leaders  of  the  Revolution,  "expressed  a  desire" 
that  the  vestry  of  Cople  Parish  should  deprive  Wardrobe 
of  the  use  of  the  vestry-house  as  a  schoolroom  and  that 
parents  should  withdraw  their  children  from  his  school. 
Wardrobe  was  further  ordered  to  write  a  retraction  of  his 
letter  and  to  appear  again  before  the  committee  at  a  later 
date.  He  wrote  the  apology,  but  not  in  terms  satisfactory 
to  the  committee,  and  failed  to  make  his  appearance  at 
the  appointed  time;  so  that  the  gazettes  presently  recom- 
mended that  the  poor  pedagogue  be  "regarded  as  a  wicked 
enemy  of  America  and  be  treated  as  such."  * 

The  ruin  of  this  Scotchman  was  sufficient  evidence  of  thfc 

1  American  Archives,  i,  970.  Another  early  case  was  that  of  Paul 
Thilman,  a  notice  concerning  which,  dated  November  12, 1774,  was  pub- 
lished in  the  Virginia  Gazette. 


100        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

^unpleasant  results  likely  to  attend  a  free  expression  of 
opinion,  even  in  a  private  letter.  The  committees,  so 
prompt  to  punish  unkind  criticism  of  Revolutionary  meth- 
ods, were  of  course  not  behindhand  in  enforcing  the  boy- 
cott provisions  of  the  Continental  Association.  The  slight- 
est violation  of  any  of  the  articles  brought  an  immediate 
summons  to  the  offender  to  appear  before  the  commit- 
tee and  explain  his  conduct.  Those  summoned  seldom 
failed  to  come  and  defend  themselves  as  in  a  court  of  law, 
for  failure  to  appear  or  to  show  proper  contrition  meant 
being  published  in  the  newspapers  as  "inimical  to  the 
liberties  of  America"  —  a  serious  penalty.  The  great  ma- 
jority of  people  acquiesced  in  the  repressive  methods  of 
^the  committees,  or  at  least  complied  outwardly  with  their 
demands.  Country  gentlemen  enforced  the  Association; 
but  its  burdens  fell  chiefly  on  the  merchants,  a  small  but 
fairly  prosperous  class  beginning  to  be  of  some  importance 
in  the  colony.  The  latter  could  not  be  expected  to  show 
any  great  enthusiasm  for  a  measure  so  ruinous  to  them  as 
the  Association;  yet  they  were  powerless  to  resist  in  the 
face  of  the  numbers  and  organization  of  the  planters,  who 
were  bent  on  worsting  the  English  government  by  means 
of  3  commercial  war  and  at  any  cost.  The  great  majority 
of  Virginia  merchants  were  attached  to  Great  Britain,  no 
less  by  interest  than  by  their  Scottish  birth  and  training. 
They  had  come  to  America  to  make  their  fortunes,  and 
had  settled  in  Norfolk,  or  in  some  of  the  other  small  towns 
scattered  through  the  colony,  or  ran  stores  at  cross-roads 
and  endured  the  condescension  of  the  planters,  who  looked 
on  trade  much  as  did  their  squire  brethren  in  old  England. 
These  traders  faced  with  a  natural  lack  of  ardor  the  pros- 


THE  COUNTY  COMMITTEES  W,: 

pect  of  indefinite  suspension  of  business  and  probable  ruin. 
The  political  thinkers  were  the  planters.  Living  a  life  of 
comparative  leisure  and  educated  chiefly  in  the  direction 
of  law  and  politics,  they  drew  from  the  pages  of  Locke  and 
Sidney  theories  of  republicanism  and  precedents  for  rev- 
olutionary activity.  This  all-powerful  agricultural  inter- 
est was  able  to  overawe  the  merchants,  who  were  quite  as 
hostile  to  the  Revolution  as  the  commercial  classes  in  the 
Northern  colonies,  but  had  no  large^  towns  like  Philadel- 
phia or  New  York  to  serve  as  centers  of  influence. 

The  attempts  of  merchants  to  evade  or  resist  the  Asso- 
ciation were  promptly  punished,  as  the  scanty  notices  in 
the  gazettes  grimly  show.  It  was  practically  impossible  to 
escape  the  minute  inspection  of  the  subcommittees,  which 
were  kept  well  informed  of  the  conduct  and  sentiments  of 
every  individual  in  their  bailiwicks.  Nor  did  they  hesitate 
at  the  most  intrusive  pryings  in  order  to  enforce  the  Asso- 
ciation. To  prevent  any  advance  in  the  price  of  goods  — 
a  cardinal  sin  in  the  Association  catechism  —  the  com- 
mitteemen rode  from  store  to  store  examining  ledgers: 
increase  in  prices  or  refusal  to  open  books  they  punished 
by  warning  people  to  have  no  further  dealings  with  the 
offenders.  Thus  in  Caroline,  on  December  16,  1774,  the 
subcommittees  appointed  to  inspect  merchants'  books 
reported  that  some  of  the  merchants  had  willingly  shown 
their  accounts  and  had  been  found  to  observe  the  Associa- 
tion, while  others  had  refused  to  allow  their  books  to  be 
seen  and  were  suspected  of  disobedience.  The  county  com- 
mittee then  warned  the  people,  "as  they  would  avoid  being 
considered  the  Enemies  to  American  Liberty,  not  to  have 
any  Dealings  with  these  merchants  until  they  shall  give 


1W      ,  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

the  Satisfaction  required."  l  Under  this  threat  the  obsti- 
nate merchants  allowed  their  books  to  be  examined  and 
were  found  to  have  obeyed  the  Association.2  In  Char- 
lotte a  merchant  who  refused  to  open  his  books  for  exami- 
nation was  punished  by  having  his  customers  warned 
against  him.  Tea,  of  course,  was  anathema,  both  to  the 
Association  and  to  patriotic  citizens.  In  Northampton  the 
committee  assigned  Littleton  Savage  to  receive  such  tea 
as  remained  in  the  county,  which  the  people  surrendered  to 
the  amount  of  four  hundred  pounds.  Some  gentlemen,  in 
their  enthusiasm,  brought  their  tea  to  the  court-house, 
requesting  that  it  be  publicly  burned,  "in  which  reason- 
able request,"  the  narrator  states,  "they  were  instantly 
gratified."  3 

A  great  and  often  involuntary  violation  of  the  Associa- 
tion was  the  reception  of  goods  after  the  date  fixed  as  the 
limit  for  importation.  There  were  many  such  cases.  In 
Henrico,  Robert  Pleasants  informed  the  committee  that 
he  had  received  imported  goods  after  the  time  expiration, 
whereupon  the  committee  ordered  that  his  goods,  together 
with  other  lots,  be  sold  as  directed  by  the  Association.4 
The  same  thing  happened  at  Hampton,  where  George 
Graham  delivered  up  goods  recently  come  to  him.5  Goods 
were  also  sold  in  Norfolk.  Indeed,  in  the  early  part  of  1775 
the  Association  seems  to  have  been  faithfully  enforced 
in  the  last-named  place  and  to  have  so  continued  as  long 
as  the  local  committee  exercised  supervision.  In  deference 
to  the  strong  patriotic  feeling  Captain  Howard  Esten, 
about  to  put  to  sea,  applied  for  a  certificate  that  he  had 

1  Virginia  Gazette,  January  14,  1775.  2  Ibid.,  February  4,  1775. 

3  Ibid.  4  Ibid.,  February  11, 1775.  6  Ibid.,  January  28,  1775. 


THE  COUNTY  COMMITTEES  103 

taken  nothing  on  board  his  ship  except  a  ballast  of  lumber.1 
Sales  of  condemned  goods  seldom  brought  more  than  cost 
and  often  less,  but  occasionally  they  yielded  a  profit, 
which  was  devoted  to  the  Boston  sufferers.  The  profit  on 
the  sale  in  January,  1775,  of  Andrew  Woodrow's  imports 
into  King  George  amounted  to  £19  145. 2  The  case  of  Dr. 
Alexander  Gordon,  of  Norfolk,  attracted  much  attention. 
He  had  received  a  consignment  of  medicines  that  he  refused 
to  turn  over  to  the  local  committee  for  sale,  insisting  on 
keeping  it  for  himself.  The  Norfolk  Committee  conse- 
quently advertised  him  as  a  violator  of  the  Association.  It 
meted  out  even  more  severe  condemnation  to  John  Brown, 
a  Norfolk  merchant,  who  —  strange  namesake  of  him  of 
Ossawatomie  —  violated  the  Association  most  flagrantly 
by  importing  slaves  and  concealing  their  arrival.  Upon 
the  discovery  of  this  importation  Brown  denied  having 
given  the  order  for  the  purchase,  a  statement  subsequently 
proved  false  by  his  letter-book.  The  committee  then  de- 
clared that  he  had  "willfully  and  perversely  violated  the 
Continental  Association." 3  Captain  Sampson,  of  the 
snow  Elizabeth,  was  likewise  advertised  for  violating  the 
non-importation  regulation.  He  had  brought  in  a  cargo 
of  salt,  and  the  Association  required  that  cargoes  should 
be  carried  back  whence  they  came :  instead,  the  captain  at- 
tempted to  carry  away  a  shipload  of  lumber,  and,  on  being 
summoned  by  the  committee,  appealed  for  protection  to 
a  British  warship  in  the  harbor.  The  committee  imme- 
diately denounced  him  as  an  enemy  to  American  liberty.4 
Exportation  was  watched  as  carefully  as  importation. 

1  Virginia  Gazette,  January  14,  1775.  2  Ibid.,  January  28,  1775. 

8  Ibid.,  March  25, 1775.  4  Ibid.,  April  15, 1775. 


104        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

The  Nansemond  committee  in  August,  1775,  tried  two 
merchants  of  Suffolk,  Donaldson  and  Hamilton,  on  the 
charge  of  shipping  provisions  to  Boston  contrary  to  a  non- 
exportation  resolution  of  the  New  York  Committee  of 
Correspondence  which  had  been  acceded  to  by  several 
other  provinces.  The  merchants  proved  that  their  ship- 
ment was  intended  for  Antigua,  but  that  the  brig  carrying 
it  had  been  taken  into  Boston  Harbor  by  a  British  cruiser. 
The  same  men  were  tried  on  a  second  charge  of  shipping 
butter  and  hemp  to  Boston  in  April,  1775,  and  again  ac- 
quitted, as  they  showed  that  the  New  York  importation 
resolution  had  not  been  passed  at  that  date.1  Prices  of 
commodities  were  also  watched  with  jealous  eyes.  In 
Surry  a  complaint  was  lodged  against  Robert  Kennan  for 
selling  salt,  a  necessity  difficult  to  obtain,  at  an  advanced 
price.  Upon  Kennan's  acknowledgment  of  his  fault  the 
committee  recommended  people  not  to  deal  with  him.2 

Merciless  as  the  committees  were  in  enforcing  the  Asso- 
ciation, it  does  not  appear  that  they  were  often  unjust. 
On  the  contrary,  they  sometimes  acted  in  defense  of  the 
accused  whom  they  believed  innocent.  The  case  of  John 
Parsons  was  not  singular:  he  was  a  shipbuilder,  and  was 
reputed  to  have  landed  and  stored  goods  at  Urbanna  in 
Middlesex.  The  Middlesex  Committee  on  examination 
found  the  tale  to  be  false  and  published  a  statement  in  the 
gazettes  exonerating  Parsons.3 

If  the  offenses  taken  cognizance  of  by  the  county  com- 
mittees had  been  limited  to  those  set  forth  in  the  Conti- 
nental Association,  little  more  could  be  said  in  criticism  of 

1  Virginia  Gazette,  August  26, 1775. 

2  Ibid.,  August  22, 1775.  3  Ibid.,  June  19, 1775. 


THE  COUNTY  COMMITTEES  105 

these  bodies  than  that  they  discharged  their  duties  some- 
what over-zealously.  Even  this  criticism  would  have  to 
be  qualified,  for  revolution  by  its  very  nature  cannot  toler- 
ate differences  of  opinion:  it  means  the  victory  of  a  part 
of  the  population  over  another  part  —  a  triumph  of  or- 
ganization no  less  than  of  arms.  The  local  committees  in 
Virginia,  as  well  as  in  other  colonies  where  political  dis- 
sent was  potentially  dangerous  from  a  military  point  of 
view,  were  driven  to  suppress  loyalist  opinion.  Commit- 
tees summoned  offenders  for  intemperate  speeches  and 
punished  them  as  ruthlessly  as  for  actual  violations  of  the 
Association,  which  in  time  came  to  be  regarded  as  a  law 
rather  than  a  boycott.  Examinations  of  persons  for  po- 
litical opinions  occurred  in  all  parts  of  the  colony,  proving 
that  there  were  everywhere  people  attached  to  Great  Brit- 
ain. Social  position  and  wealth  —  in  all  other  ways  a  very 
great  power  in  Virginia  —  failed  usually  to  protect  such  of- 
fenders, who  long  before  the  Declaration  of  Independence 
were  regarded  as  traitors.  The  first  test  of  Revolutionary 
politics  hinges  on  the  Continental  Association.  It  was  not 
enough  to  obey  that  promulgation;  strict  patriotism  de- 
manded a  willingness  to  sign  it  and  the  use  of  respectful 
language  regarding  its  often  vexatious  demands.  Austin 
Brockenbrough,  who  hastily  put  his  name  to  the  Associa- 
tion and  afterwards  repented  at  leisure,  was  summoned  for 
the  offense  of  attempting  to  prejudice  people  against  it. 
Losing  his  temper,  he  defied  the  committee  and  was  or- 
dered to  appear  before  it  next  court  day.  When  he  failed 
to  come,  he  was  published  as  an  enemy.1  In  Middlesex, 
Thomas  Haddon  was  advertised  as  "inimical"  for  refusing 
1  American  Archives,  i,  337. 


106        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

to  sign  the  Association  and  casting  reflections  on  it.1  John 
Saunders,  a  law  student,  who  was  either  aloof  in  spirit 
or  a  victim  of  a  legal  conscience,  refused  to  sign  patriotic 
resolutions  drawn  up  by  the  Princess  Anne  meeting  of 
July,  1774,  called  to  choose  delegates  to  the  August  con- 
vention. Later,  when  the  Virginia  Association  was  read 
to  the  people,  he  again  refused  to  conform.  As  a  last  test, 
the  Continental  Association  was  tendered  him,  and  this 
he  likewise  declined,  alleging  "that  the  way  of  procedure 
was  illegal. "  This  led  the  county  committee  to  appoint  a 
delegation  to  wait  on  Saunders  and  urge  him  to  retract  his 
statement :  on  account  of  his  youth,  the  committee  averred, 
it  "desired  to  deal  gently  with  him."  Asked  if  his  words 
had  not  been  inadvertently  spoken,  he  replied  that  they 
had  not.  A  friend  then  persuaded  the  obstinate  loyalist  to 
put  his  name  to  the  Association,  but  he  immediately  added 
a  big  "No";  and  the  committee,  worn  out,  branded  him 
as  a  public  enemy.  Benjamin  Dingly  Gray,  another  non- 
associator,  and  Mitchell  Phillips,  a  militia  captain  who 
had  exerted  his  influence  to  prevent  men  from  signing  the 
Association,  shared  his  fate.2  Allan  Love,  brought  before 
the  Brunswick  Committee  on  the  charge  of  "uttering  in- 
jurious and  reproachful  expressions,"  was  acquitted.  The 
Pittsylvania  Committee,  in  May,  1776,  summoned  one 
John  Pigg  before  it  on  the  complaint  that  he  had  drunk 
tea  and  exclaimed  against  the  measures  of  Congress.  Pigg 
did  not  come  and  was  declared  "a  traitor  to  his  country 
and  inimical  to  American  liberty."  3 

The  clergy  of  the  Anglican  establishment  generally  sym- 

■ 
1  American  Archives,  I,  668.  2  Ibid.,  1, 76. 

*  Virginia  Gazette,  June  1, 1775. 


THE  COUNTY  COMMITTEES  107 

pathized  with  the  colonists,  but  were  vexed  somewhat 
by  dread  of  rebellion  against  the  head  of  the  Church. 
Occasionally  they  came  into  conflict  with  Revolutionary 
sentiment.  The  most  noted  case  was  that  of  John  Agnew, 
minister  of,  Suffolk  Parish,  Nansemond,  who  treated  his 
congregation  to  a  sermon  from  that  text  so  dear  to  consti- 
tuted authority,  "Render  unto  Caesar  the  things  that  are 
Caesar's."1  He  was  expelled  in  consequence  by  his  pa- 
rishioners, who  doubtless  remembered  that  Caesar  had  his 
Brutus  —  and  very  properly,  according  to  Patrick  Henry. 
The  Nansemond  Committee  published  Agnew  as  "  inim- 
ical "  and  his  conduct  was  judged  so  serious  as  to  be  re- 
ferred to  the  Committee  of  Safety,  which  ordered  him  to 
provide  security  for  his  good  behavior.  Not  being  able  to 
do  this  in  any  other  way,  the  minister  offered  to  turn  over 
his  land  and  slaves,  an  offer  the  committee  accepted  with  a 
benediction:  "Tis  hoped  all  remembrance  of  his  former 
conduct  be  forgotten,  and  that  his  future  will  be  such  as 
to  recommend  him  to  ye  enjoyment  of  peace  and  harmony 
with  the  society."  Somewhat  different  was  the  case  of 
John  Wingate,  an  Orange  minister,  who  suffered  from  a 
tyrannical  use  of  the  inquisitorial  power  of  the  county  com- 
mittee. Wingate  had  in  his  possession  certain  pamphlets 
reflecting  on  Congress,  which  the  committee,  "desirous  to 
manifest  their  contempt  and  resentment  of  such  writings 
and  their  authors,"  requested  him  to  surrender.  He  refused 
on  the  ground  that  the  pamphlets  did  not  belong  to  him. 
The  committee  promised  to  make  good  the  loss  to  the 
owner  and  burned  them.2 

1  Virginia  Gazette,  March  25,  1776,  and  J.  B.  Dunn's  History  of  Nanse- 
mond County.  2  Virginia  Gazette,  April  15, 1775. 


108        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

Passing  beyond  expressions  of  opinion,  committees  at- 
tempted to  regulate  the  lives  of  people  to  an  extraordinary 
degree,  and  even  went  to  the  point  of  trying  to  enforce  lit- 
erally the  article  of  the  Association  forbidding  gambling. 
What  is  stranger  still,  a  community  given  up  to  horse- 
racing  and  passionately  devoted  to  card-playing,  actually 
endured  this  puritanical  interference  in  private  affairs. 
Committees  published  a  number  of  men  for  gambling,  but 
inclined  graciously  to  pardon  those  who  expressed  contri- 
tion. The  committees  not  only  regulated  the  opinions  of 
their  respective  counties,  but  cooperated  with  other  bodies 
in  cases  involving  several  jurisdictions.  Such  cooperation 
was  made  necessary  by  the  absence  in  the  spring  and  sum- 
mer of  1775  of  any  regularly  constituted  officials  with 
general  powers;  the  local  committees  were  the  only  act- 
ing official  bodies.  By  mutual  understanding  committees 
confined  themselves  strictly  to  their  own  territories  and 
carefully  observed  the  rights  of  other  localities.  The  Nor- 
folk Committee,  in  May,  1775,  communicated  to  the 
Prince  George  Committee  the  facts  in  the  case  of  James 
Marsden,  charged  with  bringing  in  a  puncheon  of  linen 
after  the  expiration  of  the  time  allowed  for  importation  and 
with  furnishing  ship-captain  Fazakerly  with  pork  by  order 
of  Captain  Charles  Alexander.  The  last-named  person  ap- 
peared before  the  Prince  George  Committee  and  apologized 
for  his  conduct.  He  confessed  he  had  brought  in  the  linen 
and  pork  inadvertently,  claiming  he  had  given  the  order 
on  Marsden  to  pay  Fazakerly  conditionally  on  the  con- 
vention's consent  to  the  exportation  of  food.  This  exami- 
nation was  sent  to  the  Norfolk  Committee,  which  referred 
the  case  back  to  Prince  George  on  jurisdictional  grounds. 


THE  COUNTY  COMMITTEES  109 

The  Prince  George  Committee  then  decided  that  Alexander 
had  violated  the  Association  and  declared  him  an  enemy.1 
In  the  same  way  the  Essex  organization,  in  April,  1776, 
considered  a  case  of  importation  that  had  already  been 
tried  by  the  Gloucester  Committee,  and,  accepting  the 
latter's  verdict,  published  the  offenders,  John  and  George 
Fowler,  as  enemies  of  America.2 

Local  committees  in  December,  1774,  and  the  early  part 
of  1775,  acted  wholly  on  their  own  responsibility,  with  no 
other  guide  or  authority  than  the  Continental  Association. 
The  king's  governor  still  lived  in  his  official  residence  in 
Williamsburg  and  still  went  through  the  form  of  conduct- 
ing the  administration  with  the  aid  of  his  council.  The 
assembly,  which  alone  could  have  directed  the  committees, 
had  not  sat  for  some  time  and  Dunmore  showed  no  hurry 
to  summon  it.  Apparently  he  shared  the  view  of  James  II 
that  revolutions  can  be  impeded  by  legal  obstacles.  James 
II  had  thrown  the  Great  Seal  into  the  Thames :  Dunmore 
refused  to  call  the  assembly.  The  county  committees  con- 
sequently enjoyed  unlimited  authority  in  their  districts. 
Dunmore,  much  alarmed,  wrote  to  Lord  Dartmouth  that 
the  committees  overhauled  merchants'  accounts  and  even 
went  so  far  as  to  swear  the  men  of  the  independent  mili- 
tary companies  to  take  all  orders  from  them.  The  Norfolk 
Committee,  in  May,  1775,  published  an  indignant  denial 
of  the  charge  of  inquisition,  but  Dunmore  had  told  nothing 
but  the  truth.  The  committees  did  take  it  upon  themselves 
to  investigate  everything  and  they  were  backed  by  armed 
force.  The  militia  system,  fallen  into  decay  since  the  French- 
and-Indian  War,  was  replaced  by  volunteer  companies  of 
1  Virginia  Gazette,  October  28, 1775.         2  Ibid.,  June  14, 1776. 


110        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

minute-men,  the  first  of  which  seems  to  have  been  raised 
in  Prince  William.  Several  of  them  were  organized  before 
the  end  of  1774,  and  by  the  summer  of  1775  thirty  or  more 
existed.1  This  force  was  in  complete  sympathy  with  the 
local  committees  and  if  necessary  would  have  used  arms 
in  their  support:  a  number  of  these  companies  mustered 
to  march  to  Williamsburg  at  the  time  of  Dunmore's  theft 
of  the  powder.  Modeled  on  the  old  militia  system,  the 
minute-men  no  more  disturbed  the  sedate  character  typi- 
cal of  the  Revolution  in  Virginia  than  did  the  committees 
composed  of  justices  and  other  unmelodramatic  revolu- 
tionists. 

It  has  been  observed  that  the  county  and  borough  com- 
mittees in  their  first  months  of  activity  worked  as  entirely 
independent  bodies,  though  with  a  harmonious  purpose. 
The  convention  of  March,  1775,  took  the  first  step  towards 
the  formation  of  a  new  government  by  recommending  the 
adoption  of  a  military  organization  based  on  the  unob- 
served militia  law  of  1738. 2  It  also  somewhat  hastened  the 
crisis  by  practically  closing  the  courts;  but  the  colony  con- 
tinued under  the  rule  of  committees  until  August  17,  1775, 
when  the  convention  elected  a  Revolutionary  executive, 
the  Committee  of  Safety.  This  body,  under  the  powers 
granted  J>y  the  convention  and  assumed  by  itself,  became 
the  central  authority,  occupying  much  the  same  place  for 
the  whole  colony  that  the  committees  did  for  the  coun- 
ties. It  gave  orders  to  committees  and  armed  forces  and 
settled  questions  that  were  referred  to  it  from  the  local 
bodies.  The  latter  were  glad  to  shift  responsibility  to  a 
higher  tribunal  and  rendered  implicit  obedience  to  its  de- 
1  Lingley,  106-07.  2  Ibid.,  129. 


THE  COUNTY  COMMITTEES  111 

cisions.  Under  the  control  of  the  Committee  of  Safety, 
the  county  committees  grew  even  more  pertinacious  and 
effective  in  rooting  out  and  suppressing  disaffection  and 
still  more  drastic  in  their  methods.  Sternness  was  prob-  - 
ably  inevitable.  The  actual  break  with  England  had  come 
and  was  attended  by  a  sudden  change  in  the  attitude  of/ 
many  people,  who  were  zealous  enough  in  opposing  Par- 
liamentary taxation,  but  shrank  from  a  military  struggle. 
The  convention,  by  a  necessary  war  measure,  now  of- 
fended this  element.  The  trading  interest  in  Virginia  cen- 
tered largely  at  Norfolk,  Hampton,  and  Suffolk.  Hitherto 
it  had  patiently  and  loyally  borne  the  hardships  of  non- 
importation, partly  solaced  by  the  privilege  of  exporting 
Virginia  products  to  British  markets.  The  merchants, 
mostly  Scotchmen,  at  first  displayed  genuine  sympathy 
for  the  American  cause,  and  the  Norfolk  Committee  was 
behind  none  in  activity  in  enforcing  the  Association.  But 
when  war  actually  broke  out  in  1775  the  views  of  many  of 
these  men  changed.  While  believing  that  the  colonies  had 
grievances,  they  preferred  to  swallow  them  rather  than 
to  come  into  open  conflict  with  Great  Britain.  To  add 
further  to  their  embarrassment,  the  convention,  on  July 
24,  1775,  struck  a  heavy  blow  at  commerce.  By  the  terms 
of  the  Continental  Association  exportation  to  Great 
Britain  and  her  dependencies  was  to  cease  on  September 
10, 1775,  unless  the  British  government  acceded  to  colonial 
demands.  The  Virginia  merchants,  with  this  limit  in  view, 
had  made  extensive  contracts  for  products,  chiefly  provi- 
sions. To  their  consternation  the  convention  ordered  that 
no  provisions  be  sent  out  of  the  colony  after  August  5, 1775, 
that  no  quantities  of  necessaries  be  stored  in  towns  near 


.     112         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

navigable  waters,  and  that  all  contracts  for  exportation  be 
considered  null  and  void.  The  local  committees  were  com- 
missioned to  carry  this  order  into  effect.1 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  war  had  begun  and  battles  were 
being  fought  in  the  North,  this  procedure  was  eminently 
wise.  It  was  rank  folly  to  supply  the  enemy  with  food  or 
to  store  it  in  quantity  within  easy  reach  of  his  cruisers. 
At  the  same  time  the  prohibition  put  a  quietus  on  the 
colony's  expiring  trade  and  moved  the  Norfolk  merchants 
to  protest.  Their  petition,  which  was  read  in  convention 
on  August  1,  1775,  recited  their  extensive  contracts  with 
planters  for  grain  and  the  number  of  foreign  ships  chartered 
to  carry  it  —  all  based  on  the  limit,  September  10, 1775,  ex- 
pressly set  forth  in  the  Continental  Association.  The  con- 
vention, in  stopping  exportation,  had  acted  with  great  haste, 
and  "without  allowing  time  or  opportunity  for  the  trading 
interest  of  the  colony  to  know  that  such  a  measure  was 
in  agitation,  much  less  to  lay  their  objections  before  this 
Convention."  Large  quantities  of  grain  and  provisions 
would  be  thrown  on  their  hands  and  their  vessels,  on  arrival, 
must  remain  idle.  Furthermore,  the  embargo  gave  a  trade 
advantage  to  other  colonies  which  had  not  stopped  expor- 
tation. The  appeal  ended  with  these  frank  words:  "If 
provincial  Conventions  undertake  the  regulation  of  con- 
tinental concerns  and  that  during  a  Session  of  the  Congress 
itself,  the  only  choice  we  have  left  us  is  to  lament  the  vio- 
lation of  public  faith  and  order,  and  flattered  as  we  have 
been  into  deceitful  expectations,  to  sit  down  the  melan- 
choly spectators  of  our  own  destruction."  2  Twenty-eight 

1  Journal  of  the  July  Convention  of  1775,  6. 

2  Legislative  Petitions.  Norfolk  (B4186). 


THE  COUNTY  COMMITTERS  113 

firms  signed  this  document,  and  it  doubtless  expressed  the 
sentiments  of  others  too  cautious  to  sign.  In  addition  to 
this,  the  committee  of  Norfolk  Borough  instructed  those  of 
its  members  who  were  also  delegates  in  the  convention  to 
secure  a  reconsideration  of  the  prohibitory  resolution.  The 
committee,  arguing  that  the  prohibition  allowed  no  time  for 
business  adjustment,  warned  the  convention  that  it  was 
"under  some  apprehension  that  so  cheerful  an  obedience 
will  not  be  paid  to  this  distressing  injunction,  as  our  con- 
stituents are  ever  desirous  to  pay  to  all  the  decisions  of 
that  honorable  body;  and  that  we  humbly  request  that  the 
said  Resolution  will  be  repeald,  at  least  so  far  as  to  give 
time  for  vessels  that  are  now  loading  to  take  in  their 
cargoes.' '  *  The  convention  sternly  rebuked  the  petition- 
ers. It  declared  that  the  merchants'  petition  reflected  on 
the  convention  and  tended  to  destroy  the  confidence  of 
the  people  of  the  colony  in  their  representatives;  that  the 
resolution  had  not  been  passed  in  haste,  and  that  the  mer- 
chants of  Norfolk  and  Portsmouth  could  not  expect  meas- 
ures of  vital  concern  to  the  colony  to  be  suspended  until 
they  had  been  consulted. 

The  committee  of  Northampton  County  had  also  pleaded 
against  the  stoppage  of  imports,  although  its  language  was 
less  expostulatory  and  it  limited  its  requests  to  a  modi- 
fication of  the  resolution.  The  Northampton  people,  ac- 
cording to  the  committee,  had  made  contracts  to  deliver 
large  quantities  of  maize,  and  reasonably  wished  exporta- 
tion to  the  West  Indies  to  continue.2  This  petition  and  that 
of  the  Norfolk  Committee,  in  contradistinction  to  that  of 

1  Miscellaneous  Papers  of  the  Committee  of  Safety  and  the  Convention  of 
1775.  2  Legislative  Petitions.  Northampton  (B4853). 


114         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

the  merchants,  were  approved  as  "decent  and  respectful," 
and,  in  deference  to  them,  the  convention  allowed  exporta- 
tion of  maize  of  the  last  year's  crop  to  continue  until  Sep- 
tember 10,  provided  security  was  given  the  county  com- 
mittees not  to  ship  the  grain  north.1 

This  dispute,  apparently  disposed  of  by  the  convention, 
marks  the  beginning  of  the  detachment  of  the  mercantile 
interest  from  the  colonial  cause.  For  the  remainder  of  the 
Revolution  the  Norfolk  region  never  showed  anything  of 
its  early  patriotism  and  spirit  of  cooperation  with  the  rest 
of  the  colony.  It  was  a  defection  that  might  have  been 
fraught  with  serious  consequences  but  for  the  incompe- 
tence and  tactlessness  of  the  man  in  whose  hands  fate  had 
placed  the  charge  of  British  authority. 

Through  the  early  part  of  the  Revolution  the  convention 
exercised  supreme  power.  When  not  in  session  it  was  rep- 
resented by  the  Committee  of  Safety,  which  acted  as  the 
executive.  Among  the  latter's  functions  was  that  of  court 
of  appeals  for  the  county  committees,  though  the  conven- 
tion remained  as  a  kind  of  final  tribunal  in  exceptional 
cases.  Spurred  on  by  the  Committee  of  Safety,  the  county 
committees  worked  with  even  greater  vigor  and  efficiency 
than  before.  With  the  beginning  of  war  the  inquisitorial 
methods  necessarily  became  more  severe  in  the  passage 
from  the  economic  to  the  military  stage  of  resistance,  and 
disaffection  was  suppressed  by  law  in  place  of  merely  being 
banned  by  public  opinion.  In  the  lower  counties  especially, 
the  danger  of  Dunmore's  presence  led  the  committees  to 
employ  means  that  at  other  times  would  have  seemed 
unworthy.  Not  only  were  speeches  of  disaffected  persons 
1  Journal  of  the  July  Convention  of  1775,  10. 


THE  COUNTY  COMMITTEES  115 

regarded  as  sufficient  grounds  for  trial,  but  mails  were 
tampered  with  in  the  search  for  evidence.  Walter  Hatton, 
of  Accomac,  was  brought  before  the  county  committee  for 
writing  a  seditious  letter,  and,  at  his  own  request,  was  sent 
on  to  the  Committee  of  Safety  for  examination.  On  his 
tendering  an  apology  for  the  letter,  the  committee  dropped 
the  case  against  him.1  In  this  letter  Hatton  had  made  the 
following  statement:  — 

It  is  now,  and  has  been  for  some  time  past,  an  established  rule 
to  break  open  all  letters  either  going  from  or  directed  to  any  offi- 
cer in  the  service  of  the  Crown.  It  was  with  difficulty,  I  will  assure 
you,  that  now  I  am  able  to  transmit  them,  as  my  going  from 
Accomac  to  this  place  [Norfolk]  was  opposed  by  upwards  of  300 
people  of  the  county,  who  will  not  allow  any  vessel  to  come  to 
this  place,  for  fear  of  supplying  the  ships  of  war,  and  other  troops, 
with  provision;  and  I  will  assure  you,  that  I  am  doubtful  whether 
I  may  not  be  obliged  to  take  a  shelter  on  some  of  the  ships,  or  at 
least  on  this  side  the  bay,  during  the  confused  usurpation  of 
power  that  an  officer  of  the  customs,  if  only  he  acts  with  spirit, 
or  as  his  duty  and  oath  bind  him,  that  he  will  immediately  fall 
under  the  lash  of  the  damn'd  committees,  et  cet.,  who  on  such 
occasions  will  show  them  as  little  mercy  as  they  themselves  may 
expect  in  the  future  world. 

The  Caroline  Committee  seized  suspected  letters  sent 
from  Port  Royal,2  and  the  Nansemond  Committee,  not 
even  sparing  women,  summoned  Betsey  Hunter,  on  Novem- 
ber 22,  1775,  to  answer  the  charge  of  having  written  letters 
to  her  brother  in  Norfolk  informing  him  of  military  prep- 
arations at  Suffolk  and  Smithfield.  The  woman  denied  that 
she  had  intended  to  give  intelligence,  but  the  committee 
decided  otherwise  and  published  her,  along  with  Mary  and 

1  Virginia  Gazette,  February  26, 1776.  2  Ibid.,  March  1,  1776. 


116        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

Martha  Wilkinson,  who  were  privy  to  the  letters,  as  "ene- 
mies to  America."  The  Accomac  Committee  tried  Captain 
Custis  Kellam  for  using  improper  language  concerning  the 
people  of  Boston,  but  let  him  off  on  his  apologizing.1  So 
close  was  the  scrutiny  to  which  everybody  was  subjected 
and  so  injurious  the  suspicion  of  disaffection,  that  we  find 
one  Watkins,  of  Halifax,  publishing  a  statement  in  the 
newspapers  that  he  had  gone  on  board  Dunmore's  ship 
solely  on  private  business  and  had  resisted  the  governor's 
efforts  to  seduce  him  from  the  patriot  cause.2  Such  an  in- 
cident was  sufficiently  absurd,  but  surely  the  climax  of  rev- 
olutionary effervescence  was  reached  in  the  case  of  Richard 
Harrison,  of  Petersburg,  who  was  haled  before  his  commit- 
tee for  the  high  crime  and  misdemeanor  of  feasting  bounti- 
fully on  May  17, 1776,  which  had  been  proclaimed  a  solemn 
fast  day.  Harrison  expressed  his  regret  and  declared  he  had 
forgotten  it  was  a  fast:  he,  and  five  others  who  had  dined 
with  him,  were  thereupon  forgiven.3 

Towards  the  end  of  1775  and  in  the  early  months  of 
1776,  the  committees  along  the  Chesapeake  shore  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Hampton  attempted  to  blockade  Norfolk 
and  adopted  measures  strangely  like  those  used  by  local 
committees  in  the  French  Revolution.  Persons  going  to 
!  and  from  Norfolk  were  required  to  show  passes,  failing 
which  they  were  liable  to  be  locked  up  in  jail  or  sent  to 
Williamsburg  as  suspected  loyalists.  Passports  were  re- 
quired of  all  travelers  through  the  tidewater  region.  "It 
is  not  now  possible,"  wrote  an  Englishman  from  Ports- 
mouth, on  November  10,  1775,  "for  any  of  our  Country 

1  Virginia  Gazette,  March  1, 1776.  2  Ibid.,  March  22,  1776. 

8  Ibid.,  June  7, 1776. 


THE  COUNTY  COMMITTEES  117 

men  to  travel  the  country,  without  a  pass  from  the  Com- 
mittees or  Commanding  officers,  which  none  of  them  can 
procure."  1  Another  Tory  tells  of  a  trip  he  made  to  Hamp- 
ton, where  he  was  kept  a  prisoner  by  the  local  committee 
all  night  and  examined  in  the  morning. 

The  punishment  of  holding  convicted  loyalists  up  to  pub- 
lic condemnation  in  the  gazettes,  at  one  time  exceedingly 
efficient,  was  superseded  in  December,  1775,  by  an  ordi- 
nance of  convention  "establishing  a  mode  of  punishment 
for  the  enemies  of  America  in  this  colony." 2  This  ordi- 
nance provided  that  all  white  men  who  had  been  in  arms 
against  the  colony  and  failed  to  surrender  themselves  in 
two  months,  or  any  who  might  thereafter  assist  the  enemy, 
should  be  imprisoned  at  the  discretion  of  the  Committee  of 
Safety,  which  was  also  empowered  to  seize  their  estates  and 
apply  the  income  to  the  public  service.  Slaves  taken  in 
arms  against  the  colony  or  voluntarily  attending  the  enemy 
were  threatened  with  the  dire  punishment  of  being  sold  in 
the  West  Indies,  or  otherwise  disposed  of  for  the  benefit 
of  the  colony.  The  Continental  Association  was  continued 
in  force  and  strengthened  by  a  clause  forfeiting  imported 
goods  and  the  ships  employed.  An  admiralty  court  of 
three  judges  was  established  to  carry  these  forfeitures  into 
effect;  and  the  Committee  of  Safety  received  directions  to 
name  five  members  of  each  local  committee  as  commis- 
sioners to  conduct  jury  trials  of  offenders  against  the 
Association.  The  Committee  of  Safety  constituted  the 
appellate  court,  and  further  was  given  the  pardoning 
power. 

In  May,  1776,  the  convention  increased  the  penalties 
1  Miscellaneous  Papers,  1775-1776.         *  Eening's  Statutes,  ix,  101. 


118        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

for  Toryism  to  forfeiture  of  estate  and  indefinite  imprison- 
ment, although  a  part  of  the  sequestrated  property  was  to 
be  applied  to  the  support  of  the  families  of  the  owners.1 
The  convention  also  adopted,  on  May  27,  1776,  a  test  oath 
to,  be  offered  by  local  committees  to  all  suspects.  This  oath 
bound  the  subscriber  to  aid  the  government  of  Virginia  in 
the  war,  not  to  assist  the  enemy  in  any  way,  and  to  reveal 
conspiracies  and  plots.  Refusal  to  take  this  oath  was 
punished  by  seizure  of  arms  and  ammunition.2  Following 
the  establishment  of  the  test,  the  Halifax  Committee,  on 
June  20,  1776,  offered  the  oath  to  six  men,  who  refused  to 
take  it  and  were  waited  on  for  their  arms.3  A  number  of 
Fredericksburg  merchants  and  other  disaffected  persons 
were  ordered  disarmed  at  the  same  time.4  In  Northumber- 
land several  men  rejected  the  oath  and  suffered  disarma- 
ment,5 and  in  Pittsylvania  seven  or  eight  persons  declined 
the  test.  The  Caroline  Committee  offered  the  oath  to  James 
Miller  and  a  dozen  other  suspects,  who  refused  and  were 
advertised  as  inimical. 

There  is  no  doubt  [the  committee  said]  but  these  monsters  of 
ingratitude  will  be  pleased  with  this  notification  of  their  attach- 
ment to  the  jurisdiction  of  Great  Britain,  serving  to  recommend 
them  as  fit  instruments  to  enslave  their  American  benefactors; 
and  consequently  proper  objects  of  royal  munificence;  a  large 
portion  of  which,  perhaps,  will  fall  to  the  man  whose  name  stands 
foremost  in  this  black  list,  as  a  reward  for  his  disapprobation 
of  and  opposition  to  publick  measures,  sufficiently  manifest,  we 
think,  in  his  refusing  to  qualify  as  a  justice  of  the  peace,  in  not 
complying  with  a  requisition  of  Convention  to  contribute  to  the 

1  Hening's  Statutes,  rx,  130. 

2  Journal  of  the  May  Convention  of  1776,  26. 
1  Virginia  Gazette,  July  5, 1776. 

4  Ibid.,  August  23, 1776.  B  Ibid.,  September  27, 1776. 


THE  COUNTY  COMMITTEES  119 

purchase  of  arms  and  ammunition,  and  in  not  voting  at  elections 
of  delegates  and  committees.1 

This  bitter  arraignment  shows  how  the  irritation  of  pa- 
triots against  the  disaffected  was  growing  with  the  prog- 
ress of  the  war.  The  man  who  heads  the  "black  list"  is 
denounced  for  refusing  to  accept  office,  failing  to  contribute 
to  the  fund  for  supplies,  and  absenting  himself  from  elec- 
tions. No  overt  act  of  any  sort  is  charged  against  him.  At 
Falmouth  the  King  George  Committee  disarmed  a  few 
non-jurors. 

So  much  for  examples.  The  same  process  must  have  been 
repeated  in  nearly  every  trading  community  in  Virginia, 
although  the  records  have  not  come  down  to  us.  In  each 
case  a  little  group  of  men,  suspected  of  lukewarmness  or 
hostility  towards  the  patriot  cause,  but  usually  not  asser- 
tive in  expressing  opinions,  was  brought  to  the  surface  as 
"inknicar'  by  the  net  of  the  test  oath.  Few  open  enemies 
of  the  Revolution  remained  in  Virginia  after  the  spring  of 
1776.  Most  of  them  had  left  in  1775,  despairing  of  the  royal 
cause  or  fearing  to  be  involved  in  the  struggle;  the  gazettes 
of  that  year  are  full  of  the  "  I-intend-f or-England "  of 
merchants  appealing  for  the  settlement  of  debts.  Later,  in 
1776,  when  the  patriot  party  passed  from  suppression  of 
disaffection  to  refusal  to  tolerate  dissent,  the  remainder  of 
the  trading  class  went  into  exile.  A  few  who  persisted  in 
lingering  were  forcibly  expelled. 

The  merchants  and  planters  of  British  sympathies  who 

left  Virginia  in  1775  and  1776  probably  may  be  counted 

by  hundreds.    They  were  men  of  character  and  property, 

and  in  many  instances  of  considerable   education,  and 

1  Virginia  Gazette,  December  6, 1776. 


120        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

altogether  formed  the  most  energetic  element  in  the  colony. 
Their  loss  was  irreparable;  and  it  was  many  years  before 
Virginia  again  possessed  an  active  and  enterprising  com- 
mercial class.  This  was  part  of  the  price  paid  for  the 
Revolution  and  was  inevitable.  In  a  revolutionary  state 
no  room  existed  for  serious  difference  of  political  opinion; 
there  was  the  alternative  of  submission  or  exile.  The  com- 
mercial Tories,  scattered  far  and  wide  through  an  agrarian 
population,  remained  helpless  in  the  face  of  the  patriot 
majority;  in  Norfolk  alone  they  dared  strike  a  blow  for  the 
king.  If  there  had  been  towns  of  any  size  in  Virginia,  with 
royal  forces  to  occupy  them,  or  if  there  had  been  at  Nor- 
folk a  fifth  part  of  the  army  Howe  wasted  in  idleness  at 
Boston  in  the  winter  of  1775-76,  the  history  of  the  Revo- 
lution in  Virginia  and  of  the  Revolution  in  general  might 
have  been  different.  But  the  home  government,  apparently 
interested  only  in  the  Boston  situation,  allowed  its  parti- 
sans in  Virginia  to  be  crushed  or  driven  into  exile  with- 
out an  effort  to  defend  them,  thus  enabling  the  planters 
thoroughly  to  organize  the  colony  for  the  Revolution  and 
to  render  the  most  essential  aid  to  the  insurgent  army  in 
the  North.  Arnold,  with  a  small  command,  did  incalculable 
damage  in  Virginia  in  1781 ;  and  Cornwallis,  in  his  invasion, 
seriously,  if  ephemerally,  affected  the  sentiment  of  eastern 
Virginia.  Two  or  three  regiments  under  a  capable  officer 
might  have  accomplished  far  more  in  the  closing  days  of 
1775,  when  the  large  latent  opposition  to  the  Revolution 
would  have  grown  into  a  Tory  party  if  the  king  had  shown 
his  ability  to  protect  his  own.  In  the  absence  of  protection, 
the  disaffected  were  forced  either  to  leave  Virginia  or  to 
become  lukewarm  revolutionists,  giving  a  perfunctory  sup- 


THE   COUNTY  COMMITTEES  121 

port  to  the  patriot  cause.  The  patriot  party,  composed  of 
the  great  majority  of  planters  and  the  piedmont  and  west- 
ern farmers  and  hunters  and  led  by  men  trained  in  admin- 
istration, allowed  the  loyalists  no  chance  to  concentrate 
at  any  point.  The  means  employed  to  accomplish  this 
end  were  the  local  committees,  which  exercised  an  almost 
despotic  power  from  December,  1774,  to  the  summer  of 
1776.  They  acted  with  an  intelligence  and  thoroughness 
that  modern  political  organization  cannot  surpass,  and 
they  succeeded  so  well  in  their  task  that  surface  observers 
are  tempted  to  believe  that  in  Virginia  alone  of  the  colonies 
British  sentiment  hardly  existed.  This  is  a  mistake.  The 
truth  is  that  the  committees  did  not  allow  British  senti- 
ment a  chance  to  develop,  and  hardly  even  to  exist.1 

It  will  be  observed  from  the  foregoing  account  that  the 
Revolution  was  hardly  a  popular  movement  in  its  incep- 
tion. The  body  of  the  people  were  not  greatly  aroused, 
when,  in  the  last  weeks  of  1774,  the  committees  began  their 
work  of  enforcing  the  observance  of  the  Continental  Asso- 
ciation. That  boycott  was  distinctly  the  weapon  of  the 
planters,  and  the  cooperation  of  the  other  classes  of  the 
community  in  the  regulating  proceedings  of  the  commit- 
tees was  secondary. 

The  poor  people  of  eastern  Virginia  —  small  farmers  and 
others  —  began  to  take  fire  in  the  spring  of  1775  as  the 
result  of  Patrick  Henry's  activities.  To  them,  unlike  the 
planter  class,  the  Revolution  meant  something  more  than 
resistance  to  England;  it  awakened  feelings  of  antagonism 
to  the  order  of  society  itself  —  feelings  which  have  always 

1  One  committee  journal,  that  of  Cumberland,  is  extant,  though  muti- 
lated, in  the  Virginia  State  Library. 


im        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

existed  among  men,  but  which  largely  remained  inarticulate 
until  the  coming  of  the  French  philosophers  of  the  eight- 
eenth century.  The  poor  in  Virginia  usually  enjoyed  a  fair 
abundance  of  food,  but  they  were  housed  in  hovels  and 
were  utterly  illiterate  and  to  a, large  extent  sunk  in  bru- 
tal dissipation.  With  resistance  to  the  authority  of  England 
in  progress  and  with  the  new  French  idea  of  equality  in  the 
air,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  poorer  classes  began  to  hope 
for  a  rise  in  their  condition  and  a  larger  share  in  the  govern- 
ment. Their  participation  in  the  Revolution  marks  the  end 
of  the  first  act  in  the  great  revolt,  which  had  been  distin- 
guished by  the  labors  of  the  committees  directed  wholly 
to  the  conservative  end  of  abating  British  encroachments 
on  colonial  liberty. 


CHAPTER  V 

CONVENTION   AND   COMMITTEE   OF   SAFETY 

The  convention  which  met  in  July,  1775,  found  itself 
faced  by  the  necessity  of  raising  troops  and  preparing  for 
war.  By  this  time  many  companies  of  minute-men  existed 
in  Virginia,  but  the  militia  expected  to  serve  only  in  emer- 
gencies. To  meet  the  need  of  a  permanent  force,  the  con- 
vention passed  an  ordinance  for  raising  two  regiments  of 
regulars  and  a  number  of  companies  of  riflemen  for  border 
defense.  There  was  no  money  in  the  Virginia  treasury, 
however,  and  regular  taxation  was  in  abeyance  during  the 
Revolutionary  crisis.  An  untrained  assembly  might  have 
hesitated  in  finding  ways  and  means,  but  this  convention 
of  experienced  legislators  went  on  to  assert  its  sovereignty 
by  laying  a  special  levy.  Carriages,  tithables,  land,  ordi- 
nary licenses,  marriage  licenses,  and  legal  writs  were  taxed 
to  provide  the  money  for  arming,  equipping,  and  paying  the 
troops  and  paying  the  delegates  in  the  Continental  Con- 
gress. As  some  time  must  elapse  before  such  taxes  would 
come  in,  while  money  was  immediately  needed,  the  con- 
vention voted  an  issue  of  £350,000  of  treasury  notes.  These 
were  secured  in  the  first  place  by  the  special  taxes  and 
finally  by  the  whole  property  of  the  colony  solemnly 
pledged  by  the  convention. 

The  keynote  of  Revolutionary  finance  was  thus  struck  at 
the  beginning.  The  first  paper  money  commanded  a  good 
exchange  value  for  some  time,  but  subsequent  issues  caused 


124        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

rapid  depreciation  until  the  nadir  was  reached  in  1782, 
when  Virginia  paper  was  worth  about  one  to  one  thousand 
in  specie.  The  English  government,  probably  with  wisdom, 
had  opposed  colonial  paper  money,  and  this  issue  of  1775 
is  one  of  the  evidences  of  open  revolution. 

The  convention  met  the  need  for  an  executive  when, 
on  August  17,  1775,  it  elected  a  Committee  of  Safety, 
endowed  with  considerable  powers.  The  break  with  the 
colonial  regime  was  now  complete,  for  the  royal  governor, 
regarded  up  to  this  time  as  head  of  the  state,  gave  way  to 
another  and  frankly  revolutionary  executive.  The  conven- 
tion itself  was  only  the  House  of  Burgesses  acting  in  an  un- 
precedented capacity,  but  the  administrative  junta  called 
into  being  had  no  association  with  the  past.  It  was  born 
of  a  necessity  completely  beyond  the  scope  of  constitu- 
tional limitations. 

The  Committee  of  Safety,  in  its  political  complexion, 
represented  the  conservative  wing  of  the  patriot  party  as 
against  the  progressives  led  by  Henry  and  Jefferson.  As 
has  been  stated  before,  the  use  of  party  appellatives  in 
describing  the  factions  existing  in  Virginia  before  the  rise 
of  definite  political  organizations  is  not  entirely  accurate, 
but  genuine  divergencies  require  the  employment  of  names. 
In  the  convention  of  July,  1775,  conservatives  and  progres- 
sives were  in  strong  conflict,  —  the  one  side  pressing  for 
sweeping  measures  and  open  war,  the  other  endeavoring  to 
stave  off  the  inevitable  struggle  to  the  last  moment.  The 
revolutionary  party,  which  was  about  equal  in  strength  to 
its  opponents,  put  forward  Patrick  Henry  for  colonel  of  the 
First  Virginia  Regiment,  and,  as  such,  ranking  officer  of  the 
Virginia  forces.  Although  Hugh  Mercer,  afterwards  killed 


COMMITTEE  OF  SAFETY  125 

at  Princeton,  led  him  on  the  first  ballot,  Henry's  friends 
managed  to  elect  him;  but  his  antagonists,  foiled  in  their 
effort  to  prevent  his  election,  consistently  hampered  his 
action  through  the  administrative  power  of  the  Committee 
of  Safety. 

This  body  without  exception  was  composed  of  men  of 
substance  and  position.  Six  members  came  from  the  tide- 
water counties,  three  from  the  south  side,  one  from  the 
piedmont,  and  one  from  the  west.  A  glance  thus  shows 
that  the  preponderant  eastern  element  secured  the  success 
of  its  policies  by  electing  a  majority  of  the  committee  from 
its  own  ranks.  Seven  of  the  eleven  members,  Pendleton, 
Bland,  John  Page,  Paul  Carrington,  Dudley  Digges, 
Carter  Braxton,  and  John  Tabb,  may  be  classed  as  con- 
servatives, leaving  as  progressive  representatives  George 
Mason,  Thomas  Ludwell  Lee,  William  Cabell,  and  James 
Mercer.  Mason,  probably  the  foremost  member  in  point 
of  ability,  seldom  attended  meetings  and  the  direction  of 
affairs  fell  into  the  hands  of  Edmund  Pendleton,  the  con- 
servative leader.  Bland,  who  might  have  disputed  the 
primacy  with  him,  was  old  and  in  declining  health.  Pendle- 
ton, as  both  president  of  the  convention  and  chairman  of 
the  Committee  of  Safety,  occupied  a  unique  position. 
With  Jefferson,  Henry,  and  Richard  Henry  Lee  out  of  Vir- 
ginia politics  for  the  time  being,  he  was  the  most  influential 
man  in  the  government.  Because  of  his  ascendancy,  the 
Williamsburg  administration  held  off  from  war  long  after 
hostilities  had  begun  elsewhere;  they  still  hoped  against 
hope  for  a  reconciliation  with  England.  Such  an  event 
would  have  been  welcome  to  Pendleton  provided  it  could 
be  had  on  terms  honorable  to  America.   As  this  could  not 


126         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

be,  he  bravely  played  his  part  in  the  Revolution.  Pendleton 
is  a  figure  in  many  ways  resembling  Disraeli.  Like  Dis- 
raeli he  had  to  make  his  way  from  obscure  beginnings;  like 
Disraeli  he  became  the  ardent  defender  of  the  ruling  class 
which  accepted  him.  He  was  of  fine  presence  and  polished 
manners,  an  able  lawyer,  an  honorable  and  capable  public 
man.  He  believed  in  government  by  gentlemen  and  had 
no  sympathy  for  the  great  democratic  movement  which 
Henry  had  first  led  and  which  Jefferson  was  later  to  guide 
to  a  mighty  destiny.  He  spent  much  of  his  career  in  resist- 
ing attacks  on  the  crumbling  social  order  of  the  colonial 
age  and  died  at  the  threshold  of  the  nineteenth  century 
just  as  he  was  about  to  deliver  a  final  blow  in  behalf  of  that 
most  conservative  of  institutions,  the  Anglican  Church. 

The  convention  entrusted  the  Committee  of  Safety 
with  the  powers  needed  by  a  vigorous  executive  in  time  of 
war.  It  was  given  control  of  troops  in  the  field  and  the 
militia  and  had  authority  to  secure  arms  and  ammunition 
wherever  they  could  be  found.  It  might  enter  into  nego- 
tiations with  other  colonies  for  military  support  and  was 
to  carry  on  a  correspondence  with  the  various  county  com- 
mittees. This  last-named  duty  developed  into  a  general 
supervision  of  these  committees.  The  convention  imposed 
on  loyalists  the  penalties  of  imprisonment  and  seizure  of 
estates  at  the  discretion  of  the  Committee  of  Safety.  Serv- 
ice in  the  militia  was  required  of  all  able-bodied  men  of  mil- 
itary age  except  Britons  born,  who  might  remain  neutral. 

Owing  to  the  influence  of  Edmund  Pendleton,  the  Com- 
mittee of  Safety  used  its  powers  with  extreme  caution  in 
the  summer  of  1775.  To  him  Dunmore  was  still  the  lawful 
governor,  to  be  respected  as  such.  Besides  taking  no  steps 


COMMITTEE  OF  SAFETY  127 

against  Dunmore,  the  committee  largely  left  the  loyalists 
alone  in  September,  October,  and  November,  1775.  It 
found  abundant  employment  in  organizing,  equipping,  and 
feeding  the  troops  raised  by  the  convention  and  in  getting 
into  the  field  a  part  of  the  militia. 

Unquestionably  the  Williamsburg  junta  displayed  en- 
ergy and  intelligence,  but  it  also  allowed  time  for  Dun- 
more  to  get  reinforcements  and  recruits  and  begin  to  harass 
the  Chesapeake  shores.  The  committee  was  forced  at 
length  by  Dunmore 's  depredations  on  property  and  arrests 
of  patriots  to  make  a  demonstration;  and,  on  October  24, 
1775,  decided  to  send  troops  to  Norfolk.  Dunmore  mean- 
time worked  energetically  to  raise  a  force.  He  had  ample 
leisure  to  do  this,  for  so  slowly  did  the  colonial  troops  move 
that  they  reached  the  vicinity  of  Norfolk  only  about 
December  1,  1775;  and  if  the  governor  had  not  taken  the 
initiative  by  attacking  the  militia  at  Kempsville  and  pro- 
claiming freedom  to  slaves,  it  is  probable  that  hostilities 
might  have  been  postponed  for  a  considerably  longer  pe- 
riod. In  fact  the  Committee  of  Safety,  zealous  as  it  was  in 
purely  administrative  work,  preferred  to  leave  large  ques- 
tions of  policy  to  the  convention;  it  probably  felt  that  it 
possessed  anomalous  powers  which  should  not  be  asserted 
too  vigorously. 

When  the  convention  met,  on  December  1,  1775,  a 
whole  host  of  complaints  and  appeals  awaited  it;  a  wide- 
spread feeling  existed  that  the  convention  was  the  sole 
authority  able  to  deal  with  the  novel  and  confusing  cir- 
cumstances attending  the  overthrow  of  the  old  regime  and 
the  beginning  of  war.  Thus  the  Accomac  Committee  on 
November  30  reported  that  the  county  delegates  could  not 


128        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

attend  the  convention  for  fear  of  being  taken  by  English 
ships  cruising  in  Chesapeake  Bay  and  complained  of  the 
exposed  situation  of  the  Eastern  Shore  and  the  general  dis- 
inclination of  the  people  for  militia  service :  it  asked  for  a 
detachment  of  regulars  to  take  the  place  of  militia  for 
guard  duty.1  The  Elizabeth  City  patriots  stated,  on  De- 
cember 2,  that  some  of  the  people  of  that  county  had 
boarded  a  schooner  and  brought  supplies  ashore  from  her, 
and  that  another  vessel,  laden  with  provisions,  might  have 
been  taken  if  they  had  had  "powder  and  orders."  They 
accordingly  requested  directions  from  the  convention  or 
Committee  of  Safety  as  to  future  action  in  regard  to 
seizing  British  ships.2  Warwick  complained  that  it  could 
raise  only  one  hundred  militia,  a  force  too  small  to  protect 
the  county  from  the  enemy,  who  had  already  begun  to 
ravage  it:  the  committee  asked  for  an  additional  force  of 
125  men.3  War  had  evidently  begun  and  war  measures 
were  necessary,  among  others  the  adoption  of  a  definite 
policy  towards  the  Tories.  County  committees  had  merci- 
lessly suppressed  these  unfortunates  by  such  means  as  iso- 
lated communities  are  able  to  employ,  but  the  work  of 
repression  could  no  longer  be  left  to  local  bodies.  Still,  the 
Committee  of  Safety  had  refrained,  save  in  a  few  aggra- 
vated cases,  from  using  the  license  granted  to  it  of  impris- 
oning loyalists  and  taking  possession  of  their  estates.  Under 
these  circumstances  action  by  the  convention  was  neces- 
sary and  unavoidable.  Citations  of  names  go  to  prove  that 
in  spite  of  the  extreme  disadvantages  they  were  under  there 

1  Petitions  to  the  Convention  and  Committee  of  Safety,  March  to 
December,  1775.  2  Legislative  Petitions.  Elizabeth  City  (A5238). 

8  Ibid.  Warwick. 

/ 


COMMITTEE  OF  SAFETY  129 

were  a  good  many  loyalists  in  Virginia,  including  men  of 
position  and  influence :  if  they  had  been  shown  toleration 
their  numbers  would  have  increased  with  every  reverse  of 
the  American  arms  until  a  genuine  party  might  have  come 
into  existence. 

The  chief  men  of  Tory  inclinations  in  Virginia  were  John 
Randolph,  attorney-general  of  the  colony  and  father  of 
Edmund  Randolph,  Secretary  of  State  in  Washington's 
Cabinet,  who  resigned  his  office  and  went  to  England;  Wil- 
liam Byrd,  of  Westover,  perhaps  the  first  gentleman  of  Vir- 
ginia, colonel  of  a  regiment  in  the  French-and-Indian  War 
and  member  of  the  council,  who  was  approached  in  regard 
to  accepting  a  command  in  the  Revolutionary  army,  but 
refused  to  entertain  the  offer  and  remained  quietly  at  his 
fine  estate  of  "Westover"  until  his  death  in  1777;  Ralph 
Wormeley,  member  of  the  council  and  of  one  of  the  most 
prominent  colonial  families;  Richard  Corbin,  receiver- 
general  of  Virginia,  and  his  sons,  Francis  and  Thomas; 
Reverend  John  Agnew,  of  Suffolk,  who  became  chaplain  of 
the  Queen's  Rangers  and  finally  settled  in  New  Brunswick; 
Reverend  Jonathan  Boucher,  rector  of  Hanover  and  later 
of  St.  Mary's  Parish;  Bryan  Fairfax,  of  Alexandria,  who  at- 
tended and  withdrew  from  the  Fairfax  meeting  of  July  18, 
1774,  where  a  county  committee  was  appointed  and  strong 
resolutions  were  adopted;  Lord  Thomas  Fairfax,  the  friend 
of  Washington  and  one  of  the  very  few  noblemen  residing 
in  America,  the  owner  of  a  vast  estate  in  western  Virginia 
on  which  he  continued  to  live  undisturbed  all  through  the 
Revolution;  Reverend  John  Camm,  president  of  William 
and  Mary  College  and  commissary,  who  committed  no 
overt  act  and  went  unmolested;  Andrew  Sprowle,  of  Nor-' 


ISO        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

folk,  the  leading  merchant  in  Virginia,  who  died  in  exile  in 
1776;  Archibald  Ritchie,  of  Middlesex,  father  of  the  noted 
editor;  Philip  Rootes,  of  "Rosewall";  Jacob  Ellegood, 
held  as  a  prisoner  and  repeatedly  asked  for  in  exchange  by 
the  British;  Matthew  Phripp,  of  Norfolk,  merchant;  John 
Tayloe  Corbin,  a  large  landowner's  son;  and  John  Grymes, 
another  prominent  planter.  Many  men  of  less  importance 
shared  their  opinions  and  usually  suffered  a  harder  fate. 

Not  only  were  the  loyalists  a  menace  by  reason  of  their 
numbers  and  prominence,  but  Dunmore,  through  his  dep- 
redations and  finally  by  his  proclamation  of  martial  law, 
forced  the  provincial  government  to  proceed  vigorously 
against  them  as  his  adherents.  After  considering  Dunmore's 
proclamation,  the  convention,  on  December  13,  1775,  is- 
sued a  counter-declaration  framed  in  the  style  of  Jeffer- 
sonian  rhetoric.  Dunmore's  tyranny  is  arraigned  and  Vir- 
ginians are  exhorted  to  show  zeal  in  resisting  it.  The 
people  of  Norfolk  receive  warning  not  to  be  led  by  the 
governor  into  opposing  the  colony,  although  the  conven- 
tion admits  the  practical  difficulty  of  refusing  his  demands. 
But  neutrality  is  the  least  that  can  be  accepted.  "If  any 
of  our  people,  in  violation  of  their  faith  plighted  to  this 
colony,  and  the  duty  they  owe  to  society,  shall  be  found 
in  arms,  or  continue  to  give  assistance  to  our  enemies,  we 
shall  think  ourselves  justified,  by  the  necessity  we  are 
under,  of  executing  upon  them  the  law  of  retaliation."  1 
On  the  next  day  the  convention  directed  Woodford  to  send 
to  Williamsburg  Tories  taken  in  arms  against  the  colony, 
and,  pending  orders  from  the  convention  or  Committee  of 
Safety,  to  detain  other  persons  appearing  unfriendly.  The 
1  Journal  of  the  Convention  of  December,  1775,  64. 


COMMITTEE  OF  SAFETY  131 

convention  further  proclaimed  the  death  penalty  for  slaves 
engaged  in  conspiracy  or  rebellion,  and  other  punishments 
for  slaves  seduced  into  joining  Dunmore  by  hi<invitation, 
but  offered  pardon  to  those  who  had  already  taken  arms 
and  were  willing  to  surrender  themselves.1  It  also  entered 
on  the  task  of  considering  the  cases  of  individual  loyalists. 
There  was  actual  treason  as  well  as  disaffection.  Deposi- 
tions made  concerning  John  Dew,  a  shipmaster,  recently 
arrested  in  the  Rappahannock  River,  showed  that  he  had 
attempted  to  corrupt  a  patriot  force  at  Fredericksburg  by 
picturing  the  superior  comforts  enjoyed  by  troops  in  the 
British  service.  "The  King,"  he  said,  "found  his  soldiers 
four  new  shirts  &  a  good  suit  of  cloaths,  paid  for  their 
washing,  &  3/6  shillings  per  week  day,  free  Quarters  & 
advised  them  to  goe  to  the  Governor."  2 

On  December  16,  1775,  the  convention  reappointed  the 
Committee  of  Safety,  with  two  changes,  Joseph  Jones  and 
Thomas  Walker  replacing  George  Mason  and  Carter  Brax- 
ton. Though  the  vote  for  him  fell  off  greatly,  Edmund 
Pendleton  remained  the  head  of  the  committee.  At  the 
same  time  the  convention  heard  Dr.  Archibald  Campbell, 
of  Norfolk,  who  complained  that  he  had  been  charged 
with  aiding  Dunmore  against  the  colony,  but  had  done 
nothing  except  under  compulsion.  The  convention  re- 
ferred his  petition  to  a  special  committee  and  ordered  him 
back  to  his  room  in  Williamsburg  under  guard.  A  few 
days  later  Woodford  sent  to  the  convention  three  other  sus- 
pected loyalists,  Matthew  Phripp,  Edward  Hack  Moseley, 

1  Journal  of  the  Convention  of  December,  1775,  66. 

2  Petitions  to  the  Convention  and  Committee  of  Safety,  March  to 
December,  1775. 


132        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

and  the  latter 's  son:  they  were  ordered  into  confinement 
waiting  examination.  The  Caroline  Committee  reported 
that  it  had  seized  the  effects  of  another  Norfolk  Tory, 
Thomas  Hepburn,  then  in  arms  against  the  colony.  Yet, 
in  spite  of  the  widespread  disaffection  in  the  Norfolk  dis- 
trict and  the  number  of  Tories  sent  to  Williamsburg  for 
trial,  the  convention  acted  with  commendable  modera- 
tion. While  county  committees  crushed  British  sympa- 
thizers without  mercy,  the  convention,  like  the  Committee 
of  Safety,  proceeded  cautiously  in  inflicting  severe  punish- 
ments. As  has  been  stated,  the  greater  number  of  irrec- 
oncilable royalists  left  Virginia  before  the  end  of  1775, 
but  a  part  of  this  non-native  mercantile  class  was  willing 
neither  to  submit  quietly  to  the  Revolution  nor  to  go  into 
exile;  they  were  hostile  to  the  patriot  party  and  openly  in 
sympathy  with  Dunmore.  Some  of  these  men  had  gone 
further  at  Norfolk  in  the  king's  behalf  than  could  be  easily 
explained  on  the  ground  of  constraint;  and  the  convention, 
in  view  of  this  fact,  withdrew  the  consent  granted  by  the 
July  Convention  for  British-born  residents  to  remain  neu- 
tral. It  charged  them  with  violating  the  Continental  Asso- 
ciation, giving  intelligence  to  the  enemy  and  furnishing 
him  with  provisions,  propagating  falsehoods  injurious  to  the 
patriot  cause,  inciting  slaves  to  rebellion  and  leading  them 
in  arms  against  the  colony.  No  citizens  were  any  longer 
to  be  exempt  from  the  burdens  and  dangers  of  defending  the 
country.  Able-bodied  men  declining  so  necessary  a  duty 
were  to  be  permitted  (at  the  pleasure  of  the  Committee 
of  Safety)  to  leave:  1  those  who  had  taken  arms  against 
the  American  cause,  or  otherwise  compromised  themselves, 
1  Journal  of  the  Convention  of  December,  1775,  70. 


COMMITTEE  OF  SAFETY  133 

were  denied  this  privilege.  The  colony  thus  laid  down  the 
principle  that  all  citizens  must  range  themselves  frankly  on 
its  side  or  depart;  there  was  no  longer  room  in  Virginia  for 
neutrals.  A  few  individuals  of  influence,  like  William  Byrd, 
continued  to  live  unmolested  while  remaining  quiet,  but 
the  measure  resulted  in  the  expulsion  of  most  of  the  British 
merchants  and  clerks  who  still  lingered. 

A  special  committee  investigated  the  loyalists  sent  to 
Williamsburg  by  Woodford.  Archibald  Campbell,  accord- 
ing to  the  report,  had  been  opposed  to  violence  in  resisting 
England  because  he  thought  that  "  a  strict  adherence  to  the 
commercial  opposition  would  produce  a  redress  of  griev- 
ances." His  chief  offense  was  in  taking  Dunmore's  oath :  he 
had  sent  his  family  to  Bermuda,  whither  he  intended  to  fol- 
low shortly.  John  Willoughby,  former  county  lieutenant  of 
Norfolk  and  chairman  of  the  local  committee,  had  also  been 
forced  to  take  Dunmore's  oath,  and  had  ordered  out  the 
Norfolk  militia  in  Dunmore's  interest.  As  for  Cary  Mitch- 
ell, l  Woodford  had  been  notified  to  send  on  the  evidence, 
but  had  failed  to  do  so.  The  committee  found  that  "Archi- 
bald Campbell  does  not  appear  to  have  been  inimical  to  the 
rights  and  liberties  of  America,"  that  John  Willoughby  had 
acted  under  compulsion,  and  that  Cary  Mitchell  did  not 
appear  to  be  unfriendly.  The  three  men  were  then  dis- 
charged on  parole  not  to  give  assistance  or  intelligence  to 
the  enemy.2  The  two  Moseleys  had  likewise  taken  the 
British  oath,  but  had  not  aided  Dunmore  actively,  and 
were  discharged.  Matthew  Phripp  was  reported  to  have 
played  an  important  part  in  the  patriot  councils  at  Nor- 
folk before  Dunmore's  occupation  of  that  place,  at  which 

1  Journal  of  the  Convention  of  December,  1775,  75.  *  Ibid.,  82. 


134        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

time  he  also  had  been  compelled  to  subscribe  to  the  oath. 
"Falling  into  the  power  of  Lord  Dunmore,"  the  report 
stated,  "he  had  only  the  alternative  of  submitting,  or  ex- 
posing his  life  and  fortune  to  his  lordship's  resentment; 
in  his  extremity  he  yielded,  and  took  the  oath;  but  as  the 
said  Matthew  Phripp  soon  after  manifested  his  willingness 
to  support  the  common  cause,  we  think,  upon  the  whole, 
he  ought  to  be  restored  to  the  confidence  of  his  country- 
men." 1 

The  convention,  in  dealing  with  these  first  cases  of  loyal- 
ists, showed  mildness,  for  the  war  had  not  as  yet  progressed 
far  enough  to  produce  much  bitterness  and,  furthermore, 
the  Norfolk  patriots  had  been  put  in  a  difficult  position 
by  Dunmore.  This  moderation  was  so  marked  that  at  the 
beginning  of  1776  several  Tories  who  had  gone  on  board  the 
fleet  in  Norfolk  Harbor  with  their  families  ventured  to  ask 
Woodford  and  Howe  for  permission  to  return  home.  The 
commanders  replied  that  they  would  receive  and  protect 
the  women  and  children  and  hold  the  men  as  prisoners. 
Their  action  was  approved.2 

At-the  first  of  the  year  the  line  had  not  yet  been  strictly 
drawn  between  enemies  and  friends  and  the  colony  was  not 
exactly  in  a  state  of  war.  Practically  speaking,  war  existed, 
but  not  legally.  Commerce  still  continued  under  the  re- 
strictions of  the  Continental  Association,  which  was  an 
embargo  and  not  a  war  measure;  and  the  convention  was 
somewhat  at  a  loss  as  to  the  proper  procedure  in  the  case 
of  the  vessels  that  county  committees  and  militia  were 
now  seizing  in  Chesapeake  Bay.  Open  war  had  put  an  end 
to  any  usefulness  the  Association  might  have  had  as  a  pro- 
1  Journal  of  the  Convention  of  December,  1775,  85.  2  Ibid.,  80. 


COMMITTEE  OF  SAFETY  135 

test,  or  means  of  gaining  concessions,  but  it  remained  in 
force  because  the  Revolution  was  a  civil  war  and  not  an  in- 
ternational conflict  begun  under  proper  forms  —  commerce 
had  not  been  placed  on  a  war  footing.  Necessity,  however, 
was  righting  this  artificiality,  as  is  shown  in  the  case  of 
a  shipmaster,  Stephen  Pierce,  held  for  carrying  salt  from 
Antigua  to  Maryland  in  violation  of  the  Association.  He 
was  allowed  to  proceed  on  his  way  because  Maryland  prob- 
ably needed  the  salt.1 

Captured  ships  and  cargoes  were  another  war  feature 
the  convention  was  forced  to  deal  with.  Several  vessels 
had  been  seized  in  Hampton  Roads  on  the  charge  of  vio- 
lating the  Association,  or  being  the  property  of  enemies  of 
America.  The  committee  recommended  the  forfeiture  of 
the  sloop  Agatha  freighted  with  a  quantity  of  rum,  —  not 
because  the  rum  had  been  improperly  imported,  but  on 
account  of  the  hostile  conduct  of  the  owners.  Again,  the 
sloop  Swallow,  bringing  in  salt,  had  not  violated  the  Asso- 
ciation, but  the  attitude  of  Hector  McAllister,2  the  owner, 
towards  the  colony  required  investigation.  The  brig  Cor- 
let,  engaged  in  importing  contrary  to  the  Association, 
should  be  sold  at  auction.  The  convention  laid  this  report 
on  the  table  and  ordered  that  the  cargo  of  the  Agatha, 
except  the  rum,  be  delivered  to  the  owners. 

Captain  Richard  Barron,  in  April,  1776,  seized  two 
vessels  at  Fredericksburg  and  one  at  Port  Royal  under  the 
resolutions  of  Congress  making  all  British  property  on 
the  water  liable  to  capture.  Two  of  the  ships  belonged  to 
British  firms  having  agents  on  the  Rappahannock;  half  of 

1  Journal  of  the  Convention  of  December,  1775,  84. 

8  Executive  communications,  1776  (Virginia  State  Library). 


136         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

the  third  was  claimed  by  an  agent  as  his  personal  prop- 
erty and  so  not  subject  to  confiscation.  This  awkward 
question  of  divided  ownership  —  which  meant  that  the 
government  could  only  claim  a  part  of  a  property  —  re- 
peatedly came  up  in  connection  with  estates  belonging  to 
business  firms  composed  both  of  citizens  and  alien  enemies. 
Seizures  under  Congressional  recommendation,  which  were 
limited  at  first  to  effects  captured  at  sea,  later  included 
every  form  of  property. 

Before  adjournment  the  convention's  attitude  towards 
loyalists  changed  greatly.  When  it  met  the  body  had  no 
very  definite  mode  of  punishment  in  mind;  when  it  ad- 
journed it  had  passed  severely  repressive  measures.  This 
transformation  resulted  largely  from  the  obnoxious  activ- 
ity of  the  loyalists  around  Norfolk  during  their  brief  sea- 
son of  ascendancy.  Norfolk  and  Princess  Anne  patriots,  in 
their  bitterness,  requested  that  the  British  sympathizers 
of  the  neighborhood  be  moved  to  a  distant  part  of  the 
colony  to  prevent  further  mischief.  They  declared  that 
,  the.  Tories  had  raided  their  plantations,  robbed  them  of 
plate,  money,  and  other  valuables,  stripped  their  wives 
and  daughters  almost  to  nakedness,  burned  their  houses, 
and  ended  by  dragging  some  of  them  into  captivity.  These 
various  alleged  misdoings  led  to  the  passage  of  an  ordinance 
"for  establishing  a  mode  of  punishment  for  the  enemies 
to  America  in  this  colony.' ' 1  All  white  men  who  had  been 
in  arms  against  the  colony  and  who  should  refuse  to  sur- 
render themselves  within  two  months,  or  who  might  there- 
after aid  the  enemy,  were  to  be  imprisoned  at  the  discre- 

1  Letters  to  the  Committee  of  Safety,  1776  (Virginia  State  Library). 
Hening,  ix,  101. 


COMMITTEE  OF  SAFETY  137 

tion  of  the  Committee  of  Safety,  which  should  also  seize 
their  estates  and  apply  the  revenues  to  the  use  of  the 
colony.  The  committee,  now  wielding  the  power  of  im- 
prisoning and  pardoning  Tories,  became  an  extra-judicial 
court.  This  ordinance,  however,  did  not  prove  sufficiently 
definite;  it  left  the  treatment  of  loyalists  still  a  matter 
rather  of  policy  than  of  law.  The  May,  1776,  Convention 
accordingly  increased  the  penalties  for  disaffection  to  for- 
feiture of  estates  and  imprisonment,  although  such  part  of 
the  property  of  imprisoned  loyalists  as  was  judged  proper 
should  be  applied  to  the  support  of  their  families.1  Com- 
missioners appointed  by  the  county  courts  were  to  admin- 
ister the  forfeited  estates  for  the  benefit  of  the  public.  To 
settle  the  question  of  allegiance,  the  convention  adopted  a 
test  oath.  The  arms  and  ammunition  of  all  persons  refus- 
ing it  were  to  be  taken  for  the  state.2  A  good  many  non- 
jurors in  various  parts  of  the  colony  were  disarmed  under 
this  provision,  yet  not  without  compensation,  at  least 
ordinarily.  Thus  Philip  Rootes  was  allowed  six  pounds 
for  a  rifle  seized  at  his  house.3 

Many  Norfolk  cases  came  before  the  convention  in  the 
last  days  of  the  session.  Alexander  Gordon,  who  had  borne 
arms  against  the  colony  and  had  been  active  in  Dunmore's 
behalf;  Joshua  Whitehurst,  who  had  attempted  to  raise 
recruits  for  him;  Dr.  Thomas  Hall,  ensign  in  Dunmore's 
army;  a  dozen  Tories  who  had  fought  at  Great  Bridge;  the 
commander  of  one  of  Dunmore's  tenders ;  nine  others  who 
had  been  pressed  into  military  service  by  the  British  were 
held  as  prisoners.    Five  men  who  had  "in  some  measure 

1  Hening,  ix,  130.  2  Journal  of  the  Convention  of  May,  1776,  26. 

8  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  vin,  213. 


138         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

aided  Lord  Dunmore,"  but  had  not  taken  arms  or  shown 
especial  zeal,  were  released  on  parole  to  do  nothing  un- 
friendly in  the  future.1  Forty  negroes,  most  of  them  cap- 
tured at  Great  Bridge,  were  condemned  to  sale  in  the 
West  Indies  or  restored  to  owners.2 

The  convention  also  examined  the  man  who  —  inex- 
plicably enough  —  seems  to  have  been  the  most  dreaded 
Tory  produced  by  Virginia  in  the  Revolution.  John  Good- 
rich, a  Nansemond  planter  and  shipowner,  had  rendered 
the  colony  conspicuous  service  in  the  early  stages  of  the 
struggle  by  bringing  in  from  the  West  Indies  a  quantity 
of  that  sorely-needed  article,  powder.3  This  performance 
drew  down  Dunmore's  resentment  and  he  was  arrested 
and  put  on  a  sort  of  parole,  being  required  to  visit  the 
governor's  ship  once  every  ten  days.  Apparently  Goodrich 
was  a  subject  of  intimidation  —  an  art  in  which  Dunmore 
excelled.  At  all  events,  after  a  little  while  he  began  to 
act  definitely  on  the  British  side.  In  command  of  an  armed 
sloop  he  captured  a  ship  in  Ocracoke  Inlet,  North  Carolina, 
and  is  said  to  have  taken  another  in  Chesapeake  Bay. 
His  career  as  a  privateer  was  cut  short  when  his  sloop  was 
boarded  in  Ocracoke  Inlet  by  North  Carolina  patriots, 
who  sent  him  a  prisoner  to  Williamsburg.  The  govern- 
ment there  signified  its  belief  that  he  was  a  dangerous 
character  by  putting  him  in  close  confinement.  After  a 
careful  examination  the  convention  found  him  guilty  of 
bearing  arms  against  the  colony  and  aiding  the  enemy; 
he  was  ordered  to  be  sent  to  the  interior  and  his  estate 
was  seized  and  administered  by  commissioners. 

1  Journal  of  the  Convention  of  May,  1776,  97.         2  Ibid.,  100. 
*  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  vm,  144, 151. 


COMMITTEE  OF  SAFETY  139 

Other  charges  against  loyalists  came  to  the  convention 
from  zealous  county  committees.  The  Dinwiddie  Com- 
mittee, informing  the  convention  that  Thomas  Irving,  a 
deputy  postmaster  in  that  county,  was  also  agent  for 
Neil  Jameson,  a  Tory,  asked  for  advice  in  regard  to  remov- 
ing him.  "  The  committee  would  not  chuse  to  be  officious 
in  acting  without  authority  from  the  Convention — but  are 
clearly  of  opinion  it  is  highly  improper  and  may  be  of  great 
prejudice  to  suffer  the  said  Irving  to  continue  post-master 

—  which  may  give  him  an  opportunity  of  opening  letters 

—  of  conveying  intelligence  of  the  most  dangerous  nature 
to  the  welfare  of  this  colony,  .  .  .  yet  we  are  anxious  not 
to  exceed  the  line  of  our  duty  and  therefore  beg,  Sir,  you 
would  be  pleased  to  point  it  out  to  us."  1  This  letter  is  a 
fair  sample  of  the  spirit  of  obedience  and  desire  for  guid- 
ance inspiring  the  local  committees  in  their  dealings  with 
the  convention.  Recommendations  and  orders  from  the 
latter  body  usually  received  prompt  obedience,  even  when 
contrary  to  the  wishes  of  committees.  Thus,  Wilson  Curie, 
chairman  of  the  Elizabeth  City  Committee,  reported  to 
Pendleton  that  that  body  had  delivered  a  ship  it  had 
seized  to  the  owner  according  to  the  orders  of  the  con- 
vention. The  Northampton  Committee,  which  had  sent 
several  loyalist  prisoners  to  Williamsburg,  was  highly 
gratified  because  the  convention  approved  its  conduct 
towards  "those  deluded  people."  2  In  general  the  rela- 
tions of  the  convention  and  Committee  of  Safety  with 
the  county  committees  were  strikingly  harmonious. 

In  the  interval  between  the  March  and  May  Conven- 
tions of  1776,  the  Committee  of  Safety  once  more  became 
1  Executive  communications,  1776.  2  Ibid. 


140         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

the  central  power  in  the  colony.  Now  that  the  die  was 
cast,  and  open  war  was  being  waged  in  Virginia,  and  the 
convention  itself  had  decided  the  treatment  of  loyalists, 
the  junta  acted  more  vigorously  and  definitely  than  in  its 
earlier  career.  The  committee's  former  wide  discretionary 
powers  were  outlined  in  positive  ordinances.  Besides,  the 
conservatives  in  the  early  months  of  1776  had  begun  to 
lose  hope  of  a  reconciliation  with  England  and  anticipated 
an  independent  government. 

Norfolk  continued  to  be  the  chief  internal  problem  of 
the  Revolutionary  administration.  The  destruction  of  this 
center  of  disaffection  in  January,  1776,  somewhat  simplified 
the  question,  but  the  country  people  of  the  region  had  been 
considerably  tainted  by  Tory  associations  and  Dunmore 
still  found  sympathizers  and  intelligence-givers  ready  to 
serve  him.  All  this  section  lay  open  to  raids  by  the  British 
naval  force,  which  continued  to  depredate  with  increasing 
severity.  So  constant  were  these  raids  and  of  such  benefit 
to  the  raiders  that  the  Committee  of  Safety  as  early  as 
March,  1776,  pondered  the  question  of  advising  the  people 
of  the  lower  country  to  remove  into  the  interior  and  leave 
their  lands  uncultivated,  in  order  to  cut  off  supplies  from 
the  British.  This  policy  naturally  failed  to  meet  the  ap- 
proval of  the  population  affected  by  the  proposal,  which 
urged,  with  obvious  reason,  that  the  removal  of  more 
than  five  thousand  people  in  spring  weather  over  bad 
roads  would  involve  much  suffering.1 

The  committee  hesitated  to  go  so  far  as  to  enforce  a 
general  depopulation  of  the  country,  but,  nevertheless,  on 
April  10,  1776,  ordered  all  persons  in  Norfolk  and  Prin- 
1  Letters  to  the  Committee  of  Safety,  1776. 


COMMITTEE  OF  SAFETY  141 

cess  Anne  Counties,  who  had  joined  Dunmore  and  taken 
his  oath,  to  move  into  the  interior  at  least  thirty  miles 
from  the  enemy.  To  insure  the  enforcement  of  this  order, 
the  slaves  of  the  evicted  loyalists  were  to  be  carried  inland 
and  returned  to  their  owners  only  when  these  had  settled 
themselves  as  directed.  A  thousand  pounds  was  voted  for 
the  relief  of  poor  people  unable  to  bear  the  expense  of 
moving.  The  committee  had  been  induced  to  take  this 
action  by  an  exaggerated  letter  from  General  Charles 
Lee,1  then  commanding  at  Norfolk,  as  well  as  by  the 
general  belief  that  Norfolk  Tories  were  engaged  in  sup- 
plying Dunmore  with  provisions  and  information.2  The 
Princess  Anne  Committee,  in  its  perturbation  over  this 
sweeping  order  of  banishment,  declared  to  the  Committee 
of  Safety  that,  while  the  Norfolk  people  were  much  given 
to  communicating  with  the  enemy,  the  Princess  Anne 
population  was  free  from  that  iniquity.  "As  to  the  inimi- 
cal dispositions  of  many  of  the  Inhabitants  of  this  County," 
the  committee  pathetically  continued,  "we  beg  leave  to 
assure  you  that  we,  who  have  lived  and  been  bred  up  with 
them,  and  have  heard  their  Sentiments  on  this  unhappy 
Dispute,  and  have  been  Witnesses  of  their  conduct,  think 
there  are  as  few  in  this  County  as  in  any  part  of  the  Colony, 
and  are  as  willing  to  join  in  any  Measure  for  the  advance- 
ment of  the  American  cause;  but  such  is  our  unhappy 
Fate  that  from  the  Manoeuvres  of  Lord  Dunmore  in  this 
County  when  it  was  almost  in  a  defenceless  state,  that  we 
have  been  thought  in  general  Inimical  and  has  been  a 
great  means  of  our  being  grossly  misrepresented."  3   The 

1  Given  in  full  above.         2  Letters  to  the  Committee  of  Safety,  1776. 
1  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Payers,  vm,  166. 


142         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

committee  asked  that  nothing  more  be  done  than  to  put 
the  live  stock  out  of  Dunmore's  way.1  The  government 
agreed  to  allow  friends  and  neutrals  to  remain  on  their 
estates  on  this  condition:  the  inimical  were  to  be  forced 
to  remove  with  their  families  and  effects.  The  Norfolk 
people  had  also  protested  against  the  removal  order;  and 
since  Dunmore  had  now  left  that  vicinity  the  convention 
rescinded  the  resolution  except  in  so  far  as  it  applied  to 
the  inimical. 

As  above  stated,  the  Committee  of  Safety  succeeded  to 
the  convention's  function  of  court  of  appeals  from  the 
counties.  Appellants  felt  that  this  tribunal  would  treat 
them  with  less  prejudice  than  local  committees,  and,  in 
fact,  the  committee  acted  with  great  lenity  in  these  ap- 
peals. The  cases  of  Joshua  Whitehurst  and  Walter  Hattori, 
of  Accomac,  have  been  mentioned.  In  the  case  of  Archi- 
bald Ritchie,2  accused  by  the  Essex  Committee  of  violat- 
ing the  Association  by  importing,  the  committee  recom- 
mended the  prosecutors  to  pass  over  the  offense  with  a 
warning.  The  imported  goods  were  not  condemned,  be- 
cause brought  in  before  the  passage  of  the  confiscatory 
ordinance.  The  convention,  however,  in  the  spring  meet- 
ing condemned  goods  seized  before  the  passage  of  the  or- 
dinance, and  left  it  to  the  option  of  local  committees  to 
confiscate  goods  or  go  on  publishing  offenders  as  before. 
,  The  committee  was  as  anxious  to  avoid  usurping  the 
power  of  the  local  organizations  as  the  latter  were  to  refer 
cases  to  it  for  decision.  When  Thomas  Mann  Randolph 
and  Thomas  Underwood  demanded  to  know  whether  the 

1  Executive  communications,  1776. 

2  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  vin,  164. 


COMMITTEE  OF  SAFETY  143 

Goochland  Committee  had  authority  to  investigate  charges 
against  Randolph,  mentioned  in  a  summons  to  Under- 
wood, the  committee  ruled  that  it  had  no  power  to  inter- 
fere with  the  Goochland  authorities  in  an  examination, 
but  expressed  a  wish  that  they  would  not  act  on  mere 
slanders  and  would  confine  themselves  to  actual  Toryism.1 
It  frequently  sent  offenders  back  to  the  local  courts  for 
trial  rather  than  seem  to  stretch  its  authority.  The  com- 
mittee, about  the  first  of  March,  1776,  adopted  the  policy 
of  confining  loyalists  on  parole  within  certain  limits.  They 
were  perhaps  led  to  take  this  action  by  appeals  like  that 
of  Jacob  Ellegood,  the  noted  Tory,  who  had  been  thrown 
into  jail  and  petitioned  to  be  allowed  to  return  to  his  plan- 
tation and  live  there  quietly.  The  committee  refused  his 
request,  but  ordered  his  removal  to  Page  Warehouse, 
Hanover,  to  remain  on  parole  not  to  go  out  of  the  town 
limits  or  hold  any  correspondence  on  political  subjects.2 
Ellegood's  conduct  proved  so  obnoxious  to  the  patriotic 
people  of  Hanovertown  that  the  committee,  on  June  1, 
1776,  transferred  him  to  Winchester.3  Later,  after  a  tedi- 
ous detention,  he  was  exchanged  as  a  prisoner  of  war. 
Mary  Ellegood,  his  wife,  appealed  to  the  convention  for 
relief  in  June,  1776,  complaining  that  she  and  her  three 
children  had  been  deprived  of  the  necessities  of  life  since 
the  seizure  of  her  husband's  estate.  The  committee,  in- 
deed, used  loyalist  property  for  the  public  service  before 
the  policy  of  actual  confiscation  began.  Slaves  of  loyalists 
were  frequently  put  to  work  for  the  government,  as  in  the 
case  of  six  of  them  confined  in  the  public  jail,  who  were 

1  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  vm,  124.  2  Ibid.,  vm,  103. 

•  Ibid.,  vm,  183. 


144         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

used  around  the  prison.  The  horses  of  George  Logan,  who 
had  joined  Dunmore,  were  sold  and  his  slaves  hired  out 
for  the  benefit  of  the  treasury.1 

Ralph  Wormeley,  Jr.,  one  of  the  few  men  of  high  stand- 
ing in  the  planter  class  openly  identified  with  the  British 
cause,  came  before  the  Committee  of  Safety,  on  April  22, 
1776.2  The  occasion  of  his  summons  was  an  indiscreet 
letter  written  to  John  Grymes,  which  happened  to  fall  into 
the  hands  of  the  patriots  and  was  forwarded  to  Williams- 
burg. The  committee  decided  that  nothing  in  Wormeley's 
conduct,  or  even  in  the  letter,  came  within  the  scope  of  the 
ordinance  establishing  penalties  for  disaffection,  but  that 
the  letter  clearly  proved  an  inimical  disposition  and  a 
readiness  to  join  the  enemy  on  occasion.  Wormeley  was 
accordingly  ordered  to  be  discharged  on  giving  bond  for 
£10,000,  not  to  correspond  with  the  British  or  aid  them, 
or  to  leave  the  colony  without  the  consent  of  the  govern- 
ment. The  unfortunate  correspondent  had  graphically 
described  the  difficulties  under  which  Tories  labored  in 
tidewater  Virginia  in  1776,  pressed  as  they  were  on  one 
side  by  Dunmore  and  on  the  other  by  the  Williamsburg 
government,  sympathizing  with  the  British  but  unable  to 
aid  them.  Wormeley  protested  in  utter  irritation  against 
Dunmore's  demand  for  an  unequivocal  stand  on  his  side, 
when  such  a  course  could  only  bring  ruin  to  the  impotent 
loyalist  without  benefiting  the  governor.  But  the  ruin  of 
his  friends  meant  nothing  to  Dunmore,  who  was  catching 
at  every  straw  in  the  vain  hope  of  securing  some  elements 
of  strength. 
Wormeley 's  complaint  was  as  follows :  — 
1  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  vm,  185.  2  Ibid.,  vni,  163. 


COMMITTEE  OF  SAFETY  145 

Ralph  Wormeley,  jim.  to  John  Grymes,  Esq. 

When  you  and  John  Nelson  returned  from  Norfolk,  you  in- 
formed me  that  Lord  Dunmore,  wished  or  expected  or  thought 
it  my  duty,  that  I  should  immediately  in  person  repair  to  his 
Lordship;  that  some  such  ostensible  mark  of  my  attachment  to 
government,  and  Loyalty  to  my  King  was  looked  for  from  me, 
and  that  notwithstanding  my  inequivocal  steady  and  invariable 
conduct,  if  I  still  continue  at  home,  I  may  be  exposed  to  the  indis- 
criminating  ravages  of  war,  without  any  Chance  of  reparation. 
Whether  this  opinion  is  founded  on  the  last  proclamation  of  the 
King's  on  the  late  advice  of  the  minister  or  from  his  Lordship's 
conjecture  I  do  not  know:  as  to  the  proclamation  and  the  late 
advices  from  the  Minister,  I  have  an  easy  answer. 

1st.  I  have  never  seen  the  proclamation;  never  heard  it  read 
or  repeated,  it  cannot  then  be  expected  of  me  to  pay  respect  to 
any  instrument  of  that  sort,  whose  contents  I  can  have  no  cog- 
nizance of:  before  they  are  submitted  to  my  senses.  2nd.  as  to 
the  advice  of  the  Minister  which  may  lead  his  Lordship  to  con- 
clude it  to  be  the  duty  of  every  man,  now,  when  the  friends  of 
government  are  in  such  a  state  of  impotency,  or  rather  are  under 
such  compleat  dominion,  to  repair  to  his  Lordship  without  proba- 
bility of  advancing  any  practical  scheme  of  utility,  of  concerting 
any  effectual  plan  of  operations,  and  without  any  regard  to  cir- 
cumstances, I  say  Sir,  such  advices  are  repugnant  to  the  words 
and  meaning  of  the  King.  In  the  true  Knowledge  of  our  present 
situation,  his  Majesty  thus  expresses  himself,  "and  although 
many  of  those  unhappy  people  may  still  retain  their  loyalty  and 
may  be  too  wise  not  to  see  the  fatal  consequences  of  this  usurpa- 
tion and  wish  to  resist,  yet  the  torrent  of  violence  has  been  strong 
enough  to  compel  their  acquiescence  till  a  sufficient  force  shall 
appear  to  support  them."  A  few  observations  in  the  aboye 
quoted  passage  will  prove  the  repugnancy,  "unhappy  people" 
in  what?  being  overpowered  by  these  usurpers,  so  overpowered 
that  they  cannot  even  hope  they  can  only  wish  to  resist  it:  this 
being  the  case,  what  are  these  unhappy  people  to  do?  What  does 
his  Majesty  expect?  not  their  fruitless  vain  endeavors  which  prej- 
udice every  cause:  he  knows  that  the  torrent  of  violence  is  strong 


146         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

enough  to  retain  them  in  their  compulsive  acquiescence  "till  a 
sufficient  force  shall  appear  to  support  them."  He  expects  then 
they  will  wait  the  event;  they  will  have,  they  have  a  right  to  pro- 
tection. Every  effort  and  endeavor  now  on  their  part  would 
only  issue  in  ruin  to  themselves  and  ruin  to  their  cause.  No  man 
bears  the  accursed  Tyranny  with  more  impatient  mortification 
than  I  do,  and  if  there  was  a  corner  on  the  face  of  the  earth,  that 
I  could  support  myself  in  and  enjoy  that  freedom  that  I  am  now 
violently  deprived  of,  I  would  for  the  gratification  of  my  happi- 
ness fly  to  it.  I  have  too  much  feeling  not  to  be  exquisitely  sen- 
sible of  my  slavish  condition.  .  .  .  But  after  all  what  beneficial 
consequences  could  my  personal  attendance  operate  in  favor  of 
that  cause,  whose  success  I  have  at  heart?  My  example  is  not 
efficacious  enough  to  influence  others  to  follow  it.  What  exer- 
tions of  mine  could  now  avail?  and  are  not  ineffectual  exertions 
Capitally  erroneous  in  policy?  would  not,  or  might  not  the  de- 
parture of  a  person  of  my  insignificance  quicken  the  jealousy  of 
'  the  present  rulers,  give  fresh  vigor  to  prosecutions,  and  make 
them  lash  our  few  party  friends,  not  with  the  rod  of  iron,  which 
we  have  experienced,  severe  enough  for  the  most  criminal  atroc- 
ity, but  with  a  red  hot  one,  fresh  from  the  infernal  forge  of 
Tyranny. 

If  tho'  the  Governor  should  think  my  presence  necessary  and 
that  I  can  in  any  degree  be  assistant  to  his  Lordship,  govern- 
ment or  my  country,  will  give  me  an  official  Summons,  and  afford 
me  proper  facilities  to  reach  him,  I  will  at  the  hazard  of  that  pre- 
carious negative  quiet  that  is  now  indulged  to  me,  I  will  to  the 
prejudice  of  my  health,  which  you  know  is  at  present  interrupted 
by  a  most  inveterate  disorder  ...  at  the  risk  of  my  life,  of  every- 
thing, obey  it.1 

Wormeley  did  not  give  the  required  bond  and  remained 

in  custody.  It  is  probable  that  his  political  separation  from 

almost  the  entire  planter  class  oppressed  him  with  a  sense 

oi  isolation  and  finally  weakened  his  fervent  devotion  to 

1  Executive  communications,  1776. 


COMMITTEE  OF  SAFETY  147 

the  royal  side.  At  any  rate,  on  May  11, 1776,  he  addressed 
the  convention  and,  expressing  regret  for  his  unfortunate 
letter,  declared  his  attachment  for  the  American  cause. 
The  only  point  in  which  he  differed  from  public  opinion, 
he  asserted,  was  in  the  means  to  be  adopted  for  obtaining 
relief  from  Parliamentary  taxation.  He  had  never  opposed 
public  measures  or  violated  the  Association  and  the  ordi- 
nances of  the  convention.  The  committee  that  examined 
his  case  reported  that  the  letter  showed  an  unfriendly  and 
dangerous  spirit  and  recommended  his  confinement  to  his 
father's  estate  in  Frederick  and  Berkeley  under  bond  of 
£10,000  not  to  leave  without  permission.  Wormeley  then 
gave  bond  and  entered  upon  exile. * 

As  the  year  1776  advanced,  Virginia  began  to  settle 
down  into  a  more  regular  status:  the  Revolution,  in  its 
primary  and  immediate  character,  was  over.  An  unfailing 
sign  of  this,  county  committees  began  to  be  superseded  as 
tribunals  by  courts  of  inquiry  appointed  from  members  of 
committees  or  militia  officers  and  juries  were  summoned 
as  in  ordinary  courts  of  law.  The  large,  unwieldy  com- 
mittees gave  place  to  these  small  commissions.  The  courts 
of  inquiry  were  later  succeeded,  upon  the  establishment 
of  a  permanent  government,  by  the  old-style  county-court 
system.  The  courts  of  inquiry  conducted  themselves  much 
as  the  committees  had  done  and  retained  the  same  con- 
nection with  the  Committee  of  Safety,  sending  offenders 
on  to  Williamsburg  as  before.  The  Gloucester  commis- 
sioners' court,  on  April  4,  1776,  tried  John  Wilkie  on  the 
charge  of  communicating  with  the  enemy.  The  jury 
brought  in  a  verdict  of  "guilty  of  giving  intelligence  to 
1  Journal  of  the  Convention  of  May,  1776, 15. 


148         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

our  Enemies  and  going  on  board  the  man  of  war  inten- 
tionally,'' and  sent  Wilkie  to  the  Committee  of  Safety.1 
The  committee  ordered  an  inventory  to  be  taken  of  his 
estate  and  appointed  Sir  John  Peyton  commissioner  to 
sell  it.2  The  Norfolk  court  of  inquiry,  on  April  30,  1776, 
examined  Thomas  Talbott  charged  with  being  inimical. 
As  three  witnesses  testified  in  his  behalf,  he  was  discharged. 
But  at  the  same  session  the  court  ironed  John  Scott,  con- 
victed of  supplying  the  enemy  with  provisions,  and  sent 
William  Creamer  to  Williamsburg  for  the  same  offense. 
Another  court  of  inquiry  consisting  of  four  officers,  held 
in  May,  1776,  considered  cases  of  furnishing  supplies  to 
the  enemy,  desertion,  and  drunkenness;3  and  also  tried  the 
loyalist  John  Willoughby,  ordered  to  remove  inland  from 
the  coast  but  disobedient.  The  chief  evidence  against 
Willoughby  was  a  statement  he  had  made  that  the  pro- 
ceedings of  the  patriot  party  would  force  the  people  to 
become  Tories  or  form  a  third  party.  As  Willoughby 
pleaded  drunkenness  for  an  excuse  he  was  treated  leniently, 
intoxication  being  regarded  by  the  Fathers  as  a  palliating 
circumstance  in  almost  every  crime  from  failure  to  attend 
church  to  treason.  The  case  of  George  Oldener  was  more 
serious.  Oldener,  among  other  things,  had  aided  one  of  the 
witnesses  against  him  under  the  impression  that  he  was 
a  deserter  from  the  American  army  and  had  called  a 
prisoner  held  by  Dunmore  a  "damned  rebel.' '  He  was 
judged  to  be  unfriendly  to  the  patriot  cause,  but  as  he  had 
committed  no  overt  act  to  bring  him  within  the  ordinance 

1  Letters  to  the  Committee  of  Safety,  1776. 
8  Journal  of  the  Convention  of  May,  1776,  8. 
*  Letters  to  the  Committee  of  Safety,  1776. 


COMMITTEE  OF  SAFETY  149 

prescribing  imprisonment  for  "enemies  of  America"  he 
was  sent  into  exile  in  the  interior. 

Appeals  came  to  the  Committee  of  Safety  from  the  new 
courts  of  inquiry  just  as  from  the  former  committees.  The 
Committee  of  Safety,  on  June  8, 1776,  tried  a  case  appealed 
from  Middlesex,  that  of  Charles  Neilson,  who  was  ordered 
to  remain  within  the  limits  of  Fauquier  County  and  to  be 
kept  in  custody  until  he  gave  a  bond  of  £100  not  to  leave 
the  county.1  He  was  released  from  confinement  on  giving 
bond  and  went  away  to  Fauquier,  while  five  commissioners 
took  possession  of  his  Middlesex  estate  and  his  other 
property  in  Gloucester.2 

The  Committee  of  Safety,  on  June  21,  1776,  sat  on  John 
Goodrich,  Jr.,  son  of  the  noted  Goodrich,  who  had  created 
such  a  stir  in  the  colony.  John  Goodrich,  the  younger, 
with  his  brother  Bartlett,  in  assisting  his  father  to  bring 
in  the  powder,  had  imported  forbidden  goods  and  falsified 
the  invoices,  changing  the  nationality  of  articles  from 
Scotch  and  Irish  to  Dutch,  —  a  not  infrequent  transfor- 
mation in  those  days  of  the  Continental  Association.  They 
had  ingeniously  pleaded  in  defense  that  they  were  forced 
to  take  other  British  goods  in  order  to  get  the  powder,  but 
the  convention  confiscated  the  goods  and  branded  the 
importers  as  inimical.  John  Goodrich,  Jr.,  further  found 
himself  in  the  custody  of  William  Harwood,  bound  not  to 
correspond  with  Dunmore  or  go  more  than  three  miles 
from  Harwood's  place  without  permission.  When  no  wit- 
nesses appeared  against  him  at  the  date  set  for  his  regular 
trial  before  the  Committee  of  Safety,  he  was  discharged 
on  giving  bond  of  £2000  for  good  behavior,  which  William 
1  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  vm,  194.  2  Ibid.,  vni,  207. 


150        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

Harwood  furnished.  Goodrich  refused,  however,  to  take 
the  oath  prescribed  for  suspects  and  suffered  disarming  — 
proof  positive  of  a  hostile  spirit.  Both  he  and  Bartlett 
Goodrich  received  rather  lenient  treatment,  which  the  au- 
thorities no  doubt  often  regretted  later.  For  the  Goodrich 
sons  became  a  thorn  in  the  side  of  Virginia  before  the 
war  ended.  Managing  to  get  away  to  New  York,  they 
fitted  out  privateers  and  waged  warfare  on  Virginia  com- 
merce with  energy  and  luck;  they  dashed  in  through  the 
Capes  and  cut  out  ships  time  and  again.  Of  all  the  Brit- 
ish privateers  swarming  in  these  waters  they  were  the 
most  noted. 

The  Revolutionary  Convention  met  for  the  last  session 
on  May  6,  1776.  Edmund  Pendleton,  chairman  of  the 
Committee  of  Safety  and  president  of  the  December,  1775, 
Convention,  was  again  elected  president.  Pendleton,  on 
assuming  the  gavel,  made  a  brief  speech  in  which  he  called 
the  attention  of  the  convention  to  the  necessities  of  the 
situation:  he  reminded  the  delegates  that  the  courts  had 
been  closed  for  two  years  and  that  many  criminals  were 
waiting  trial,  and  that  the  ordinance  "prescribing  a  mode 
of  punishment  for  the  enemies  of  America"  required 
amendment. 

The  speech  was  the  keynote  of  a  sterner  policy  towards 
loyalists.  Two  days  later  Pendleton  laid  before  the  con- 
vention a  letter  from  John  Tayloe  Corbin  to  the  Tory, 
Charles  Neilson,  "containing  sentiments  inimical  to  Amer- 
ica," together  with  the  proceedings  of  the  King  and  Queen 
Committee  upon  the  same.1  Corbin  was  committed  to 
custody  and  his  letter  referred  to  a  committee,  which 
1  Executive  communications,  1776. 


COMMITTEE  OF  SAFETY  151 

reported  that  it  showed  "a  disposition  unfriendly  and 
dangerous  to  the  rights  of  his  country  "  and  recommended 
his  confinement  on  parole.  Corbin  had  quite  a  tale  of 
hardship  to  tell  in  his  behalf.  He  stated  that  he  had  writ- 
ten the  letter  in  October,  1775,  to  Neilson,  who  was  about 
to  go  to  Norfolk  with  a  passport  from  the  Middlesex 
Committee,  but  that  he  had  not  violated  the  colonial 
regulations  in  any  way.  In  spite  of  this,  the  commander 
of  the  local  minute-men  had  arrested  him,  taken  him  from 
his  family,  and,  after  keeping  him  a  prisoner  for  four  days, 
finally  brought  him  before  the  county  committee,  which 
had  discharged  him  as  not  coming  within  its  jurisdiction. 
Anxious  for  a  vindication,  he  had  come  to  Williamsburg 
with  the  suspected  letter,  when,  on  his  arrival,  he  had  been 
again  arrested  under  a  military  warrant  and  confined  in 
the  common  guardhouse.  No  open  act  was  charged  against 
Corbin,  but  nevertheless  the  convention  demanded  a  bond 
of  £10,000  and  paroled  him  to  stay  in  Caroline  County. 
His  case,  like  Wormeley's,  attracted  great  attention,  as  he 
was  one  of  the  wealthiest  and  most  prominent  men  in  the 
colony  and  one  of  the  few  rash  enough  to  protest,  even  in 
a  private  letter,  against  the  Revolution. 

In  spite  of  such  occasional  severity,  the  convention  con- 
ducted its  investigations  with  strict  justice  and  dismissed 
a  number  of  suspects.1  The  public  temper,  however,  was 
gradually  hardening  under  the  stress  of  war.  Not  only 
was  disaffection  becoming  a  more  serious  offense  as  the 
gap  between  the  colonies  and  England  widened,  but  prop- 
erty rights  were  less  carefully  guarded.  The  convention 
directed  the  Caroline  and  Spotsylvania  Committees  to 
1  Journal  of  the  Convention  of  May,  1776,  27,  31. 


152        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

determine  the  ownership  of  four  vessels  seized  as  British 
property  by  the  colonial  naval  commander  in  the  Rappa- 
hannock. Significantly  enough,  the  convention  placed  the 
burden  of  proving  ownership  on  the  claimants.  It  was  not 
now  for  the  colony  to  prove  that  suspected  ships  were 
British  property,  but  for  the  owners  to  prove  that  they 
were  not.  The  convention  continued  the  policy  of  the 
Committee  of  Safety  in  sending  prisoners  for  trial  to  the 
commissioners'  courts  in  the  counties  where  the  offenses 
had  been  committed,  except  in  appeals  or 'cases  of  excep- 
tional difficulty.  Joshua  Hopkins,  held  on  the  charge  of 
carrying  provisions  to  Dunmore,  was  sent  to  Princess  Anne 
for  trial.1  It  had  required  some  trouble  to  secure  proof 
against  this  cunning  fellow,  but  he  was  caught  at  last  com- 
ing from  Dunmore's  ship  by  a  party  that  had  lain  in  wait 
for  him  two  days.  Likewise,  Thomas  Mitchell,  arrested  on 
suspicion  of  being  inimical,  was  sent  to  the  York  court.  A 
very  sad  appeal  came  to  the  convention  from  eighteen 
ruined  merchants  and  clerks  who  wished  to  leave  the 
country.  They  had  been  given  permission  to  leave  on 
finding  themselves  unable  to  go  on  doing  business,  and 
actually  boarded  a  vessel,  but  it  had  been  seized  for  the 
use  of  the  colony.  As  they  had  canceled  their  contracts 
and  sold  their  effects  before  leaving,  they  were  now  home- 
less and  destitute.2  The  convention  granted  them  permis- 
sion to  go  away  —  a  permission  seldom  withheld  from 
British-born  merchants  seeking  to  leave  Virginia.  It  was 
a  solution  of  the  difficulty  much  more  palatable  to  the 
government  than  confinement.  Finally,  Britons  who  were 

1  Journal  of  the  Convention  of  May,  1776,  27. 

2  Executive  communications,  1776. 


COMMITTEE  OF  SAFETY  153 

so  lacking  in  tact  as  to  wish  to  remain  in  an  impossible 
position  were  forcibly  expelled;  yet  such  measures  were 
never  adopted  during  the  administration  of  the  Committee 
of  Safety,  which  always  treated  these  unfortunates  with 
consideration. 

When  the  May,  1776,  Convention  adjourned,  after  pro- 
viding a  constitution,  the  Revolution  proper  was  at  an 
end.  It  was  carried  through  in  Virginia  with  far  less  effort 
than  in  most  of  the  other  colonies.  Little  blood  was  shed 
even  in  battle;  no  Tories  had  been  put  to  death,  legally  or 
by  mobs,  and  few  had  been  tarred  and  feathered.  At  the 
same  time  the  Revolution  in  Virginia,  as  elsewhere,  had 
only  been  accomplished  at  the  price  of  great  loss  and  suf- 
fering, and  hundreds  of  exiles  had  fled  forth  from  the  once 
easy-going  and  hospitable  province  into  an  unfamiliar 
world. 

By  far  the  greater  number  of  loyalists  went  quietly 
abroad  and  little  record  is  left  of  them.  Those  remaining 
behind  fared  hard.  In  May,  1776,  at  the  time  of  the  meet- 
ing of  the  convention,  a  dozen  Tories  lay  in  the  public  jail 
in  Williamsburg,  together  with  several  prisoners  of  war 
and  a  number  of  negroes  belonging  to  the  former.  These 
wretches,  confined  in  the  unspeakable  eighteenth-century 
jail  and  obliged  for  the  most  part  to  provide  their  own  food, 
suffered  terribly.  Under  the  impulse  of  distress  one  or 
another  of  the  prisoners  from  time  to  time  would  plead 
for  trial,  sometimes  in  vain.  Robert  Shedden,  in  a  letter 
to  John  Page,  declared  that  he  had  done  nothing  hostile 
to  America  and  asked  for  an  opportunity  to  clear  him- 
self. John  Carmont  stated  that  he  had  been  arrested  four 
months  before  for  boarding  a  vessel  in  Norfolk  Harbor 


154         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

and  sent  to  Williamsburg  without  a  hearing  before  the  local 
committee.  Three  months  later  he  had  been  brought  be- 
fore the  Committee  of  Safety  and  ordered  back  to  Nor- 
folk for  trial;  but,  nevertheless,  had  continued  in  prison  in 
Williamsburg  without  a  change  of  linen,  money,  or  other 
necessaries.  WTiat  the  condition  of  the  prisoner  in  the 
public  jail  at  Williamsburg  was  may  be  seen  by  the  report 
of  a  committee  appointed  by  the  convention  to  investigate. 
This  jail,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind,  was  no  worse  than 
other  prisons  of  that  period  in  which  men  starved,  died  of 
infectious  diseases,  or  froze  to  death  for  lack  of  fire  and 
clothing;  in  fact,  it  was  far  better  than  the  prisons  pro- 
vided by  the  British  for  the  American  soldiers  in  New 
York. 

The  said  jail  [the  committee  reported],  being  badly  planned 
and  situated  for  the  purpose  of  admitting  a  free  air,  all  the  pris- 
oners are  more  or  less  distressed  on  that  account;  this  inconven- 
ience is  greatly  increased,  as  well  by  a  large  number  of  persons 
being  under  confinement  in  the  same  small  apartment  as  the  heat 
of  the  weather;  altho'  most  of  the  rooms  seem  to  have  been  prop- 
erly attended  to,  and  kept  in  tolerable  decency,  an  offensive  smell, 
which  they  think  would  be  injurious  to  the  most  robust  health, 
prevails  in  them  all,  but  which  they  think  might  be  in  a  great 
measure  removed  by  burning  tar  in  and  frequently  purifying  the 
rooms  with  vinegar.  The  rooms  in  which  the  negroes  are  confined 
abound  with  filth,  a  circumstance,  as  they  are  informed,  owing 
to  the  want  of  necessary  hands  to  assist  in  providing  for  so  large 
and  unusual  a  number  of  prisoners;  several  windows  may,  with 
safety,  be  cut  in  the  walls  of  the  jail;  ventilators,  if  properly  fixed, 
would  be  of  infinite  service:  Some  complaints  were  made  by  the 
prisoners  against  the  unwholesomeness  of  their  diet,  which,  upon 
inquiry,  were  found  to  be  groundless.  John  Goodrich,  the  elder, 
is  at  present,  and  hath  been  for  three  days  past,  indisposed  with 


COMMITTEE   OF   SAFETY  155 

a  slight  fever,  proceeding,  as  they  imagine,  from  a  restlessness  and 
peevishness  under  his  chain;  two  gentlemen  of  the  faculty  have 
advised  his  removal  to  some  other  place,  lest  that  disorder,  which 
at  present  is  but  slight,  might  in  a  short  time,  for  want  of  fresh 
air,  terminate  in  a  putrid  fever.1 

It  is  pleasing  to  note  that  the  convention  ordered  the 
ameliorations  recommended  to  be  immediately  carried  into 
effect  and  directed  the  removal  of  John  Goodrich,  minus 
his  chain  but  under  a  strong  guard,  to  some  place  where 
he  might  recover  his  health. 

As  the  spirit  of  this  report  goes  to  show,  the  Revolution 
in  Virginia  was  accomplished  without  any  unnecessary 
cruelty  and,  so  far  as  possible,  under  forms  approaching 
those  of  law.  Local  committees  suppressed  the  disaffected, 
but  in  a  struggle  which  was,  in  effect,  a  civil  war,  self- 
preservation  demanded  the  sacrifice.  Many  hard  things 
were  done,  many  men  suffered  imprisonment,  and  many 
more  were  ruined,  but  suffering  and  loss  are  the  inevitable 
accompaniments  of  revolution.  County  committees,  in- 
deed, sometimes  showed  a  small  intolerance,  an  inquisito- 
rial, and  perhaps  tyrannical,  spirit  J  but  'small  men  will  not 
work  with  enthusiasm  otherwise.  The  central  authority, 
the  convention  and  the  Committee  of  Safety,  with  the  suc- 
ceeding council,  were  always  broad-minded  and  inclined 
towards  tolerance.  Mob  violence,  as  has  been  noted,  was 
rare. 

Nothing  is  more  characteristic  of  the  elevated  ideals  of 
the  convention  than  its  release,  on  June  12,  1776,  of  two 
criminals  in  the  public  jail  on  the  ground  that  no  legitimate 
court  existed  to  try  them.2 
%  *  Journal  of  the  Convention  of  May,  1776,  37.  2  Ibid.,  44. 


156         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

Whereas  [it  declared],  Samuel  Flanagan  and  Manasses  Mc- 
Gahey  have  been  severally  committed  to  the  public  jail  in  the 
city  of  Williamsburg,  charged  with  capital  offenses,  for  which 
they  ought,  in  the  regular  course,  to  have  been  brought  to  trial, 
at  a  court  of  Oyer  and  terminer  and  jail  delivery,  on  the  Second 
Tuesday  in  this  month,  which  could  not  be  held  by  reason  of  the 
present  convulsions,  and  for  want  of  a  commission  from  the  late 
executive  power;  and  whereas  no  method  is  yet  adopted  for  the 
trial  of  criminals,  and  it  might  be  thought  inconsistent  with  the 
liberty  we  are  endeavoring  to  secure,  in  the  most  permanent  man- 
ner, to  keep  men  charged  with  criminal  offenses  in  long  confine- 
ment without  bringing  them  to  their  trials,  the  Committee  thinks 
it  best  to  grant  a  pardon  to  the  said  criminals  respectively,  hop- 
ing that  this  lenity,  together  with  the  imprisonment  they  have 
undergone,  will  produce  a  sincere  contrition  and  reformation  of 
their  manners,  and  that  they  may  hereafter  prove  useful  mem- 
bers to  society.  ) 

So  it  will  be  seen  that  the  Revolution  had  begun  to 
show  its  humanitarian  side,  that  side  of  social  progress 
and  development  destined  to  be  of  great  importance,  and 
of  far-reaching  influence  on  the  present  age. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE   DEMOCRATIC   REPUBLIC 

The  war  and  the  Declaration  of  Independence  were  not 
precisely  welcome  events  to  the  conservative  planters, 
who  nevertheless  shared  both  in  waging  the  war  and 
bringing  about  the  Declaration.  They  were  active  patri- 
ots, it  should  be  understood,  but  with  regrets:  history, 
which  is  to  a  certain  extent  obscured  by  the  necessary  use 
of  party  names,  has  no  exact  term  that  fits  them  —  Henry 
is  so  distinct  a  figure;  Pendleton  so  difficult  to  label  defi- 
nitely. The  obscurity  is  due  in  part  to  the  fact  that  the 
different  elements  of  the  great  patriot  party  have  not  been 
studied  discriminatingly ;  we  have  been  too  much  given  to 
dividing  the  people  of  the  colonies  into  sheep  and  goats, 
patriots  and  Tories;  when,  in  fact,  the  line  of  demarcation 
was  frequently  slight  and  rather  a  tendency  than  a  prin- 
ciple; —  at  least,  in  the  beginning  and  before  the  realities 
of  war  definitely  hardened  the  division  into  friends  and 
enemies. 

War  was  depressing  to  the  conservatives  because  it 
meant  the  failure  of  their  own  particular  form  of  resistance 
to  England.  They  had  placed  great  faith  in  the  Continental 
Association  and  enforced  it  with  vigor  and  intelligence  in 
their  stronghold  in  eastern  Virginia,  in  the  hope  that  the 
British  government  would  be  so  impressed  by  a  united 
colonial  resistance  as  to  give  up  its  efforts  to  extend  im- 
perial jurisdiction  in  America.    Even  when  this  boycott 


158        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

policy  proved  ineffective,  the  conservatives,  as  we  have 
seen,  struggled  through  nearly  all  of  1775  in  an  attempt 
to  avert  war  in  Virginia  and  to  secure  an  understanding 
with  Dunmore.  Nor  did  they  abandon  hope  of  reconcilia- 
tion with  England  for  some  time  after  the  beginning  of 
hostilities  in  the  colony  itself.  The  planter  class,  which 
largely  controlled  the  assembly,  entered  on  the  struggle 
without  a  thought  of  independence.  Only  when  the  vigor- 
ous military  policy  of  the  British  government  left  no  doubt 
of  its  intention  to  conquer  the  colonies  did  the  conserva- 
tives realize  that  separation  was  inevitable.  The  rebellion 
had  developed  into  a  prolonged  contest  between  what  were 
practically  separate  nations,  to  be  fought  out  in  regular 
campaigns.  Then,  with  reconciliation  a  vanishing  dream 
and  a  parting  of  the  ways  a  present  necessity,  the  planter 
class,  instead  of  splitting  into  American  and  loyalist  parties 
as  in  some  other  colonies,  cast  its  decision  unitedly  for  in- 
dependence and  ruthlessly  overrode  the  scattered  individ- 
uals who  demurred.  For  while  the  tidewater  country 
gentlemen  were  proud  of  their  Anglican  connection,  they 
were  also  prepared  to  go  any  lengths  in  asserting  the  rights 
of  Englishmen,  as  they  conceived  them,  and  they  had  now 
lost  all  illusions  as  to  the  possibility  of  coercing  the  British 
government  into  compliance  with  colonial  demands.  There 
was  small  opposition  in  Virginia  to  the  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence :  Robert  Carter  Nicholas,  alone  of  important  men, 
opposed  it.  At  the  same  time  to  Pendleton,  Bland,  and  their 
confreres ,  who  had  rejoiced  over  Wolfe's  victory  at  Quebec, 
independence  was  not  a  thing  so  desirable  in  itself  as  it  was 
to  young  radicals  like  Henry  and  Jefferson,  who  had  lost  all 
English  feeling  and  become  Americans.  It  should  never  be 


THE  DEMOCRATIC  REPUBLIC  159 

forgotten  that  in  the  eyes  of  the  older  men  the  Revolution 
was  a  conservative  movement,  an  effort  to  uphold  their 
liberties  against  the  encroachments  of  imperialism. 

Eighteenth-century  liberalism  had  little  touched  this 
older  generation.  Their  ideal  state  was  no  borrowed  vision 
from  Rousseau,  but  the  colony  as  they  knew  it,  unham- 
pered by  a  governor's  meddling  and  a  royal  veto;  they 
would  have  been  well  content  with  a  governor  whom  they 
could  keep  browbeaten  and  a  home  administration  con- 
siderate enough  to  ignore  them.  Revolution  was  not  their 
fancy.  They  wanted  the  gods  to  nod  on  Parnassus  —  or 
even  to  snore  —  but  they  wanted  the  gods.  They  thought 
English  thoughts  and  upheld  English  institutions  and  con- 
descendingly looked  down  on  dissenters  and  democrats  as 
not  of  themselves.  Therefore,  separation  from  Great  Brit- 
ain, carrying  with  it  the  necessity  for  a  readjustment  of 
the  constitution,  was  a  sad  necessity  to  the  conservatives 
and  an  embarrassment  besides.  So  long  as  the  patriots 
continued  to  fight  within  the  British  Empire,  tlie  issues  re- 
mained political  and  chiefly  external ;  but  independence  at 
once  raised  the  question  of  institutions  and  let  into  the 
arena  the  tribe  of  discontented,  religious  dissenters  and 
social  reformers,  who  wished  to  alter  the  structure  of  the 
state.  The  whole  character  of  the  Revolution  underwent 
a  change;  no  taxation  without  representation  was  super- 
seded by  other  denials.  In  fact,  the  motives  of  the  plant- 
ers in  embarking  on  the  struggle  with  England  and  the 
political  and  social  developments  that  followed  bear  a  cer- 
tain resemblance  to  the  course  of  the  French  Revolution. 
That  great  movement  was  not  social  in  its  inception,  but 
rather  economic:  it  was  brought  on  by  the  government's 


160        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

financial  difficulties  and  by  efforts  at  remedy,  and  ended 
in  anarchy;  from  1789  to  1794  is  a  far  cry.  Similarly,  the 
Revolution  in  Virginia  began  with  the  colony's  resistance 
to  the  aggressive  policy  of  the  Tory  ministry,  and  the 
men  who  led  the  revolt,  and  in  whose  hands  political  power 
mainly  lay,  had  little  thought  of  the  betterment  of  society. 
But  it  is  the  history  of  revolutions  that  they  seldom  keep 
to  the  issue  at  stake,  broadening  out  from  a  contest  over  a 
constitutional  point  into  some  large  assertion  of  liberty. 
In  several  of  the  American  colonies,  where  society  was  on  a 
more  simple  and  equal  footing,  this  development  was  not 
marked,  but  in  Virginia,  with  its  fairly  definite  class  dis- 
tinctions, an  attack  on  existing  customs  and  institutions 
was  inevitable.  The  Revolution  in  Virginia  began  with  the 
rights  of  America  and  ended  with  the  rights  of  man.  In 
Virginia  the  social  side  of  the  Revolution  was  incomparably 
more  important  than  in  any  of  the  other  colonies,  because 
there  alone  the  upper  class  was  numerous,  powerful,  and 
united  in  the  patriot  party,  while  the  democratic  opposition 
was  also  strong  and  ably  led  —  in  a  word,  the  elements 
existed  for  a  genuine  and  long-lasting  political  struggle. 

The  rise  of  democracy  had  been  foreshadowed  by  the 
rapid  spread  of  dissent  in  the  decade  preceding  the  Revolu- 
tion and  by  Patrick  Henry's  career  as  an  agitator,  but  no 
legal  reforms  were  secured  before  1776,  and  the  conserva- 
tives prevailed  over  Henry  in  the  opening  months  of  the 
Revolution.  Separation  from"  England  proved  fatal  to  their 
party;  for,  though  it  was  nearly  equal  in  number  to  the  pro- 
gressives in  the  Convention  of  March,  1775,  and  controlled 
the  Committee  of  Safety,  it  formed  a  decided  minority  in 
the  May,  1776,  Convention,  which  had  as  its  chief  duty 


THE  DEMOCRATIC  REPUBLIC  161 

the  organization  of  an  independent  government.  Out- 
numbered as  they  were  and  put  on  the  defensive  by  the 
untoward  development  of  the  Revolution,  the  conserva- 
tives nevertheless  struggled  hard  for  the  mastery  of  the 
convention,  and,  when  their  own  efforts  at  initiative  hope- 
lessly failed,  used  obstructive  tactics  with  skill  and  obsti- 
nacy. The  differences  between  conservatives  and  progres- 
sives were  fundamental.  The  former  wished  the  Revolution 
to  end  with  separation  from  the  British  Empire,  without 
touching  the  framework  of  colonial  law  and  society;  they 
hoped  to  continue  the  colonial  constitution  and  the  colonial 
church  minus  the  British  interference.  The  progressives, 
on  the  other  hand,  sought  to  establish  a  government  of 
equal  rights,  a  democratic  state.  Both  sides  had  represen- 
tatives of  weight  and  ability  in  the  constitution-making 
May  Convention.  Among  the  progressives  were  Patrick 
Henry,  disappointed  in  his  military  ambition  and  back  in 
his  old  place;  Mason,  full  of  generous  political  theories;  and 
the  young  James  Madison,  now  displaying  his  great  abili- 
ties for  the  first  time.  Pendleton's  prestige,  notwithstand- 
ing, still  stood  so  high  that  he  was  once  more  elected  presi- 
dent of  the  convention  over  the  progressive  candidate, 
Thomas  Ludwell  Lee,  and  he  could  still  count  on  the  wide 
influence  of  Nicholas  and  Bland. 

The  debate  over  the  question  of  independence  was  brief, 
but  not  altogether  uneventful.  Henry  proposed  radical 
resolutions  of  separation,  leaving  to  the  Continental  Con- 
gress the  duty  of  providing  a  new  form  of  government  for 
the  colonies.  The  conservatives,  however,  supported  Pen- 
dleton's resolutions,  which  simply  declared  Virginia  free 
and  independent.    Henry,  thereupon,  in  the  interests  of 


162        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

,  harmony,  abandoned  his  own  plan  and  aided  in  passing  the 
conservative  declaration  of  independence.  Thus,  Virginia, 
first  of  the  American  States,  broke  the  connection  with 
England,  acting  on  her  own  initiative  and  without  refer- 
ence to  Congress.  The  convention  then  went  on  to  the 
work  of  framing  a  constitution  —  the  first  written  constitu- 
tion given  to  the  world. 

The  all-important  committee  appointed  to  propose  a 
plan  of  a  constitution  included  Henry,  Bland,  Nicholas, 
Mason,  Madison,  Archibald  Cary,  Edmund  Randolph,  and 

yPaul  Carrington  —  a  marvelously  gifted  group  of  men. 
Patrick  Henry,  the  man  of  the  people,  naturally  led  the 
democrats,  Nicholas  the  conservatives,  while  Pendleton 
was  the  main  opposition  leader  in  the  committee  of  the 
whole.  Henry  reported  to  his  colleague,  Richard  Henry 
Lee,  then  in  Congress,  on  May  20,  1776:  — 

The  grand  work  of  framing  a  constitution  for  Virginia  is  now 
before  the  Convention.  .  .  .  Perhaps  I  am  mistaken,  but  I  fear 
too  great  a  bias  to  Aristocracy  prevails  among  the  opulent.  I 
own  myself  a  Democrat  on  the  plan  of  our  admired  friend, 
J.  Adams,  whose  pamphlet  I  read  with  great  pleasure.1 

And  to  John  Adams  himself  he  wrote :  — 

Our  convention  is  now  employed  in  the  great  work  of  forming 
a  constitution.  My  most  esteemed  republican  form  has  many 
and  powerful  enemies.  A  silly  thing,  published,  in  Philadelphia, 
by  a  native  of  Virginia,  has  just  made  its  appearance  here  strongly 
recommended,  't  is  said,  by  one  of  our  delegates  now  with  you  — 
Braxton.  His  reasons  upon  and  distinctions  between  private 
and  public  virtue  are  weak,  shallow  and  evasive,  and  the  whole 
performance  an  affront  and  disgrace  to  this  Country;  and,  by 
one  expression,  I  suspect  his  whiggism.  2 

1  Henry's  Patrick  Henry,  i,  411;  The  Nation,  51,  107-09. 

2  Henry's  Patrick  Henry,  i,  413. 


THE  DEMOCRATIC  REPUBLIC  16S 

The  conservatives  tentatively  put  forward  this  consti- 
tution advocated  by  Carter  Braxton  and  supposed  to  be 
written  by  him.  It  was  rather  closely  modeled  on  the 
colonial  constitution,  providing  a  house  of  representatives 
elected  by  the  people,  which,  in  turn,  chose  a  council  to 
hold  office  for  life  and  sit  as  the  upper  house  in  place  of 
the  colonial  council  appointed  by  the  king.  The  assembly 
elected  the  governor  and  a  privy  council  to  assist  him;  the 
governor  appointed  judges  and  military  officers,  and  the 
lower  house  the  other  chief  officials  of  the  State. 

The  progressive  majority,  scarcely  considering  this  old 
and  illiberal  model,  quickly  took  up  George  Mason's  plan 
of  government,  beginning  with  the  Bill  of  Rights.  The 
conservatives,  though  too  few  in  number  to  prevent  the 
passage  of  this  declaration,  filibustered  on  every  clause. 
Thomas  Ludwell  Lee  indignantly  wrote  Richard  Henry 
Lee  on  June  1,  1776:  — 

A  certain  set  of  Aristocrats  —  for  we  have  such  monsters  here 
—  finding  that  their  execrable  system  cannot  be  reared  on  such 
foundations,  have  to  this  time  kept  us  at  bay  on  the  first  line, 
which  declares  all  men  to  be  born  free  and  independent.  A 
number  of  absurd  or  unmeaning  alterations  have  been  proposed. 
The  words  as  they  stand  are  approved  by  a  very  great  majority, 
yet  by  a  thousand  masterly  fetches  and  stratagems  the  business 
has  been  so  delayed,  that  the  first  clause  stands  yet  unassented 
to  by  the  Convention.  l 

And  Randolph  adds :  — 

The  declaration  in  the  first  article  of  the  bill  of  rights,  that  all 
men  are  by  nature  equally  free  and  independent,  was  opposed  by 
Robert  Carter  Nicholas,  as  being  the  forerunner  or  pretext  of 
civil  convulsion. 

1  Henry's  Patrick  Henry,  i,  425. 


164        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

In  spite  of  conservative  opposition  to  liberal  political 
philosophy,  which  was  now  finding  place  in  practice,  the 
progressives  succeeded  in  passing  George  Mason's  pream- 
ble to  a  constitution.  The  Virginia  Bill  of  Rights  is  one 
of  the  noblest  of  political  documents.  Based  primarily  on 
the  Petition  of  Rights  and  the  Bill  of  Rights  of  1689,  it 
included  much  of  eighteenth-century  theory  besides  those 
guarantees  of  freedom  incorporated  in  the  British  constitu- 
tion. The  opening  statement  of  the  equal  right  of  all  men 
by  nature  to  freedom,  independence,  and  enjoyment  of 
life,  liberty,  and  happiness  was  destined  to  become  im- 
mortal when  touched  by  Jefferson's  pen  in  the  Declaration 
of  Independence.  Other  sections  affirm  the  sovereignty  of 
the  people  and  the  rule  of  the  majority;  separate  the  legis- 
lative branch  of  government  from  the  executive  and  ju- 
dicial; provide  against  continuous  occupation  of  office;  con- 
firm suffrage  rights,  trial  by  jury,  and  the  freedom  of  the 
press;  and  declare  the  subordination  of  the  military  to  the 
civil  power.  The  most  important  section  made  a  full  grant 
of  religious  freedom.  This  clause  was  attributed  by  Ed- 
mund Randolph  to  Henry,  and  was  altered  by  Madison, 
who  struck  out  the  word  "  toleration  "  in  order  to  broaden 
the  assertion  of  liberty.  The  conservatives  made  a  strong 
stand  against  it,  for  they  feared,  not  without  reason,  that 
it  premised  an  attack  on  the  established  church.1  After  a 
sharp  contest,  Henry  and  the  progressives  succeeded  in 
carrying  it. 

After  the  Bill  of  Rights  came  the  constitution,  also 
written  by  Mason,  but  less  completely  his  work.  It  is 
probable  that  Jefferson's  ideas,  as  communicated  to  the 

1  Henry's  Patrick  Henry,  i,  431. 


THE  DEMOCRATIC  REPUBLIC  165 

constitution-makers  by  his  personal  representative  in  the 
convention,  Edmund  Randolph,  had  some  weight.  The 
new  organ  of  government  mainly  followed  the  lines  of  the 
colonial  constitution  and  was  strongly  influenced  by  John 
Adams's  "Thoughts  on  Government,"  which  was  Henry's 
guide.  It  provided  a  lower  house  and  a  senate  elected  by 
freeholders  and  a  governor  elected  by  the  two  houses, 
which  also  elected  most  of  the  other  officers.  Representa- 
tion continued,  as  in  the  colonial  past,  to  be  of  counties  in- 
stead of  population,  a  feature  peculiarly  objectionable  to 
Jefferson  and  one  destined  to  excite  many  murmurings  of 
discontent  in  the  west,  which  was  the  under-represented 
section.  Small  counties  like  Warwick  with  only  a  few 
hundred  voters  elected  two  delegates  just  as  did  large 
counties  with  several  thousand  voters.  In  the  senate,  how- 
ever, representation  was  more  nearly  equal.  The  suffrage 
limitation  to  freeholders  owning  fifty  acres  of  land  was  not 
illiberal  in  a  country  where  land  was  cheap.  All  in  all,  the 
constitution  was  less  advanced  than  the  Bill  of  Rights,  and 
left  the  laws  and  machinery  of  government  much  as  before, 
except  that  the  lower  house,  freed  from  the  restraining  veto 
of  the  colonial  governor  and  not  yet  adjusted  to  the  limita- 
tions of  the  new  constitution,  had  greater  power  than  the 
old  House  of  Burgesses.  The  constitution,  in  fact,  was 
somewhat  negative;  it  outlined  what  could  not  be  done 
rather  than  what  could,  and,  under  its  forms,  the  future 
government  of  Virginia  might  be  the  same  oligarchy  of 
planters  it  had  been  in  the  past,  or  genuinely  democratic; 
everything  depended  on  the  political  complexion  of  the 
majority  in  the  House  of  Delegates. 
/  After  the  adoption  of  the  constitution,  the  convention 


106        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

to  sign  the  Association  and  casting  reflections  on  it.1  John 
Saunders,  a  law  student,  who  was  either  aloof  in  spirit 
or  a  victim  of  a  legal  conscience,  refused  to  sign  patriotic 
resolutions  drawn  up  by  the  Princess  Anne  meeting  of 
July,  1774,  called  to  choose  delegates  to  the  August  con- 
vention. Later,  when  the  Virginia  Association  was  read 
to  the  people,  he  again  refused  to  conform.  As  a  last  test, 
the  Continental  Association  was  tendered  him,  and  this 
he  likewise  declined,  alleging  "that  the  way  of  procedure 
was  illegal. "  This  led  the  county  committee  to  appoint  a 
delegation  to  wait  on  Saunders  and  urge  him  to  retract  his 
statement:  on  account  of  his  youth,  the  committee  averred, 
it  "desired  to  deal  gently  with  him."  Asked  if  his  words 
had  not  been  inadvertently  spoken,  he  replied  that  they 
had  not.  A  friend  then  persuaded  the  obstinate  loyalist  to 
put  his  name  to  the  Association,  but  he  immediately  added 
a  big  "No";  and  the  committee,  worn  out,  branded  him 
as  a  public  enemy.  Benjamin  Dingly  Gray,  another  non- 
associator,  and  Mitchell  Phillips,  a  militia  captain  who 
had  exerted  his  influence  to  prevent  men  from  signing  the 
Association,  shared  his  fate.2  Allan  Love,  brought  before 
the  Brunswick  Committee  on  the  charge  of  "uttering  in- 
jurious and  reproachful  expressions,"  was  acquitted.  The 
Pittsylvania  Committee,  in  May,  1776,  summoned  one 
John  Pigg  before  it  on  the  complaint  that  he  had  drunk 
tea  and  exclaimed  against  the  measures  of  Congress.  Pigg 
did  not  come  and  was  declared  "a  traitor  to  his  country 
and  inimical  to  American  liberty."3 
The  clergy  of  the  Anglican  establishment  generally  sym- 

1  American  Archives,  I,  668.  2  Ibid.,  1, 76. 

*  Virginia  Gazette,  June  1, 1775. 


THE  COUNTY  COMMITTEES  107 

pathized  with  the  colonists,  but  were  vexed  somewhat 
by  dread  of  rebellion  against  the  head  of  the  Church. 
Occasionally  they  came  into  conflict  with  Revolutionary 
sentiment.  The  most  noted  case  was  that  of  John  Agnew, 
minister  of,  Suffolk  Parish,  Nansemond,  who  treated  his 
congregation  to  a  sermon  from  that  text  so  dear  to  consti- 
tuted authority,  "Render  unto  Caesar  the  things  that  are 
Csesar's." *  He  was  expelled  in  consequence  by  his  pa- 
rishioners, who  doubtless  remembered  that  Csesar  had  his 
Brutus  —  and  very  properly,  according  to  Patrick  Henry. 
The  Nansemond  Committee  published  Agnew  as  "inim- 
ical" and  his  conduct  was  judged  so  serious  as  to  be  re- 
ferred to  the  Committee  of  Safety,  which  ordered  him  to 
provide  security  for  his  good  behavior.  Not  being  able  to 
do  this  in  any  other  way,  the  minister  offered  to  turn  over 
his  land  and  slaves,  an  offer  the  committee  accepted  with  a 
benediction:  "Tis  hoped  all  remembrance  of  his  former 
conduct  be  forgotten,  and  that  his  future  will  be  such  as 
to  recommend  him  to  ye  enjoyment  of  peace  and  harmony 
with  the  society."  Somewhat  different  was  the  case  of 
John  Wingate,  an  Orange  minister,  who  suffered  from  a 
tyrannical  use  of  the  inquisitorial  power  of  the  county  com- 
mittee. Wingate  had  in  his  possession  certain  pamphlets 
reflecting  on  Congress,  which  the  committee,  "desirous  to 
manifest  their  contempt  and  resentment  of  such  writings 
and  their  authors,"  requested  him  to  surrender.  He  refused 
on  the  ground  that  the  pamphlets  did  not  belong  to  him. 
The  committee  promised  to  make  good  the  loss  to  the 
owner  and  burned  them.2 

1  Virginia  Gazette,  March  25,  1776,  and  J.  B.  Dunn's  History  of  Nanse- 
mond County.  2  Virginia  Gazette,  April  15, 1775. 


168         THE  EEVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

head  of  his  party  in  Virginia  and  in  occupying  the  position 
which  should  have  been  his  by  historical  development,  that 
of  founder  of  the  national  Democratic-Republican  Party 
and  President  of  the  United  States.  Jefferson,  in  all  proba- 
bility, would  have  eventually  replaced  Henry  even  if  the 
latter  had  remained  in  the  assembly  instead  of  retiring 
into  the  governorship,  for  the  orator  was  a  political  radical 
rather  than  a  social  reformer  and  much  of  a  conservative 
at  bottom.  He  was  too  acute  to  become  a  Rousseauan  doc- 
trinaire like  his  rival,  mistrusting  human  nature  because 
he  knew  it  so  well.  More  than  that,  deep  down  in  him  he 
was  a  localist;  he  loved  the  old  ways,  the  ancient  land- 
marks, and  had  no  wish  to  live  in  an  un- Virginian  Virginia 
given  over  to  the  strange  gods  of  liberal  philosophy.  The 
Revolution  for  him  had  ended  with  the  establishment  of 
a  commonwealth  under  a  constitution  of  equal  political 
rights;  he  wanted  no  further  egalitarian  advances.  In  some 
way,  too,  hard  to  explain,  the  man  had  changed  since  his 
disappointment  in  military  command.  Up  to  that  time  he 
had  been  a  Boanerges;  after  his  return  to  civil  life  he 
settled  down  from  fiery  action  into  the  humdrum  round  of 
office  routine  for  which  he  was  so  unsuited;  his  ambition 
narrowed,  his  imagination  failed.  Few  psychological  stud- 
ies are  more  interesting  than  the  transformation  of  the 
radical,  prepared  in  1775  for  any  bold  advance  upon  the 
future,  into  the  obstructionist  fighting  his  last  great  fight 
against  the  adoption  of  the  Federal  Constitution  and  mag- 
nificently losing. 

P  For  Jefferson,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Revolution  only 
began  with  the  Declaration  of  Independence.  That  was 
necessary  in  order  that  other  things  might  follow  —  that 


THE  DEMOCRATIC  REPUBLIC  169 

wrongs  might  be  redressed,  inequalities  leveled,  and  the 
State  brought  to  the  Utopian  perfection  all  generous 
thinkers  demanded;  freedom  from  England  was  only  the 
condition  of  political  and  social  development.  For  this 
reason,  Jefferson,  with  his  definite  reforms,  must  have  sup- 
planted Henry,  who  had  no  programme  at  all  to  offer, 
especially  in  an  age  of  dreams  when  prophets  often  pre- 
vailed over  men  of  action.  As  for  the  reformer  himself,  he 
was  a  curious  mixture  of  prophet  and  practical  politician, 
a  sort  of  common-sense  Robespierre,  devoid  of  Robes- 
pierre's fanaticism  and  essential  madness;  what  he  could  do 
to  advance  the  rights  of  man  he  did,  and  for  the  rest  —  the 
more  he  could  not  do  —  was  satisfied  to  leave  to  another 
age.  That  he  was  sincere  need  not  be  questioned;  his 
enthusiasm  began  in  youth  and  continued  through  life. 
Democracy  was  a  religion  to  Jefferson,  and,  with  all  his 
tortuous  politician's  soul,  he  held  fast  to  the  faith,  even 
amidst  the  disillusionment  of  the  French  Revolution;  it  was 
to  him  the  miracle  that  makes  dry  bones  men,  the  power 
destined  in  time  to  heal  the  sorrows  of  the  world. 

Needless  to  say,  the  constitution  of  Virginia  did  not 
meet  with  Jefferson's  full  approval,  because  representation 
remained  on  its  old  undemocratic  basis  and  other  abuses  of 
the  colonial  era  continued  to  exist.  But  as  the  assembly 
wielded  great  powers,  in  spite  of  the  limitations  of  a  written 
constitution,  society  might  be  transformed  by  legislative 
enactment.  The  member  from  Albemarle-  consequently 
brought  forward  his  measures  at  the  first  session  of  the 
assembly  of  the  Commonwealth,  in  October,  1776.  Most 
noted  of  these  reforms  was  the  abolition  of  entail,  which 
Jefferson  carried  in  the  face  of  a  passionately  resisting 


170        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

minority  led  by  Pendleton;  but  even  more  important  was 
his  work  in  humanizing  the  Virginia  criminal  code,  which 
he  eventually  managed  to  accomplish.  Primogeniture  was 
the  pet  Virginian  imitation  of  the  English  aristocracy,  and 
Jefferson  proved  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  democratic 
majority  in  the  House  of  Delegates  the  injustice  of  the 
system  by  unanswerable  if  somewhat  shallow  logic.  Entail 
had  been  of  small  importance  in  the  rough  early  days  when 
land  was  too  abundant  and  cheap  to  need  such  safeguard- 
ing, but  it  became  one  of  the  bases  of  colonial  society  in 
eastern  Virginia  in  the  eighteenth  century,  when  all  the 
good  lands  in  that  section  had  been  patented  and  extension 
into  the  western  hinterland  was  attended  by  the  discom- 
forts of  border  life  and  the  occasional  risk  of  Indian  forays. 
The  conservatives,  rightly  feeling  its  importance  to  the 
aristocracy  that  had  grown  up  partly  by  its  aid  and  was 
now  staggering  under  the  Revolutionary  blast,  struggled 
hard  in  its  defense,  but  vainly.  Jefferson  cut  away  this 
great  anomaly  in  the  democratic  republic,  which  the  con- 
stitution had  left  untouched. 

The  successful  innovator  immediately  proceeded  to  at- 
tack the  social  order  in  another  vital  spot,  the  established 
church.  What  was  the  full  meaning  of  the  religious  liberty 
clause  in  the  Bill  of  Rights  nobody  knew.  Beyond  doubt  it 
removed  restrictions  on  worship,  such  as  the  requirement 
to  take  out  licenses  for  dissenter  meeting-houses  and  the 
prohibition  of  itinerant  preaching,  but  whether  it  cut  all 
connection  between  dissenters  and  the  state  church  — 
whether  it  continued  the  state  church,  in  fact  —  remained 
uncertain.  Should  the  whole  population,  or  only  professed 
Anglicans,  or  anybody  at  all  pay  tithes?  Dissenters  held 


THE  DEMOCRATIC  REPUBLIC  171 

that  the  Bill  of  Rights  ended  all  involuntary  religious  rela- 
tions whatever,  whether  of  opinion  or  money  contribution. 
Conservative  Anglicans  just  as  positively  maintained  that 
it  merely  intended  the  ease  of  tender  consciences  and  not 
the  curtailment  of  the  establishment.  Public  opinion  was 
divided,  but  probably  a  majority  of  the  people  opposed 
the  overthrow  of  the  church  they  had  been  raised  in  and 
undoubtedly  a  majority  of  the  assembly  did.  Jefferson 
worked  round  the  problem  with  characteristic  shrewdness. 
A  direct  attack  on  the  establishment  would  have  failed, 
and,  indeed,  only  after  a  struggle  Jefferson  describes  as  the 
severest  he  ever  engaged  in  did  the  progressives  succeed  in 
repealing  the  existing  acts  on  the  statute  books  concerning 
religious  worship,  clearly  incompatible  as  these  were  with 
the  Bill  of  Rights.  The  repealing  act,  besides  sweeping 
away  the  whole  English  system  of  religious  restraint,  ex- 
empted dissenters  from  contributing  to  the  support  of  the 
establishment  and  suspended  the  salaries  of  all  ministers 
until  the  next  meeting  of  the  assembly.  This  last,  appar- 
ently rather  innocent  stipulation,  proved  fatal.  In  revolu- 
tionary times,  with  the  spirit  of  liberalism  rapidly  growing, 
it  was  not  likely  that  state  support  would  be  renewed,  once 
discontinued.  A  number  of  brief  suspensions  postponed  the 
settlement  of  the  matter  of  tithes  from  1776  to  1779,  each 
one  lessening  the  church's  chances  of  rehabilitation.1 

Jefferson,  in  his  career  in  the  Virginia  assembly,  struck 
the  old  order  other  and  almost  heavier  blows.  He  revised 
the  laws  in  the  interests  of  humanity,  abolished  the  general 
death  penalty  for  felony,  —  that  relic  of  common-law  bar- 
barism which  had  cost  so  many  thieving  blacks  their  lives, 
1  Separation  of  Church  and  State  in  Virginia,  54-55. 


172         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

—  and  attempted  to  secure  universal  education.  He  even 
drafted  a  bill  for  the  gradual  emancipation  of  slaves,  but 
never  introduced  it.  His  was  the  chief  part  in  the  removal 
of  the  capital  from  Williamsburg,  the  center  of  tidewater 
social  life,  to  the  village  of  Richmond,  a  move  engineered 
ostensibly  to  secure  safety  from  British  raids,  but  in  reality 
to  weaken  the  conservative  faction.  Richmond,  indeed, 
proved  rather  more  accessible  to  invaders  than  Williams- 
burg. The  early  part  of  1777  saw  Jefferson  in  the  ascend- 
ant, and  he  remained  so  until  1779.  At  the  May,  1777, 
session  of  the  assembly,  he  nominated  George  Wythe  for 
speaker  of  the  House  of  Delegates  against  the  conserva- 
tive candidates,  Robert  Carter  Nicholas  and  Benjamin 
Harrison,  and  secured  his  election.1  This  was  an  important 
event  in  party  progress,  for  hitherto  the  office  of  speaker, 
occupied  by  Edmund  Pendleton,  had  been  a  conservative 
stronghold.  With  its  acquisition  the  democrats  held  con- 
trol of  all  the  governmental  machinery. 

But  the  conservatives,  weak  as  they  were  in  the  fervid 
year  of  1776  and  for  some  time  thereafter,  began  to  gain 
strength  with  the  long  continuance  of  the  war.  They  al- 
ways had  a  solid  corps  of  tidewater  delegates  to  count  on, 
and  they  became  sufficiently  emboldened  by  June,  1779, 
when  Jefferson  was  elected  governor  to  succeed  Henry,  to 
make  a  bid  for  the  reestablishment  of  religion  on  the  basis 
of  a  common  state  support  for  all  churches.  This  project 
was  offered  in  opposition  to  Jefferson's  Bill  for  Religious 
Freedom,  introduced  at  the  same  session  and  intended 
wholly  to  sever  religion  from  political  and  legal  connection. 
At  the  same  time,  that  moderate  democrat,  George  Mason, 
1  Randall's  Life  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  I,  209. 


THE  DEMOCRATIC  REPUBLIC  173 

brought  forward  a  compromise  scheme  to  preserve  the 
property  of  the  colonial  church  to  the  Anglicans  without 
establishment,  but  this  failed  along  with  the  Bill  for  Reli- 
gious Freedom  and  the  conservative  bill  for  aiding  all 
religions.  The  only  result  of  a  long  debate  was  the  final 
repeal  of  the  old  act  of  1748  providing  salaries  for  minis- 
ters, the  act  suspended  from  session  to  session  since  1776. 
By  the  mid-Revolutionary  year  of  1779  the  Common- 
wealth bore  all  the  marks  of  a  permanent  state,  and  loyal- 
ism,  except  around  Norfolk,  had  been  pretty  generally 
repressed.  The  Scotch  merchants  and  clerks  who  had 
bargained  at  every  village  and  crossroads  were  now  ban- 
ished refugees,  as  well  as  the  few  native  Virginians  devoted 
enough  to  cling  to  the  imperial  cause  in  spite  of  all.  But 
the  political  and  social  ideals  of  democracy  had  not  yet 
prevailed;  the  conservatives,  who  saw  what  the  progress 
of  the  Revolution  meant,  continued  to  oppose  it  and  only 
waited  a  favorable  opportunity  to  make  their  opposition 
effective.  They  needed  two  things  —  a  means  of  dis- 
crediting their  opponents  and  relief  from  the  pressure  of 
war,  which  concentrated  attention  on  military  affairs  and 
tended  to  break  down  social  distinctions.  The  first  want 
was  supplied  by  the  failure  of  Jefferson's  administration; 
the  second  came  a  little  later  with  the  treaty  of  peace 
in  1783. 


CHAPTER  VII 

RULE   OF   THE   COUNCIL 

Politically  speaking,  there  were  two  phases  in  the 
Revolution  in  Virginia  —  the  external  and  the  internal 
conflict.  In  the  first  place,  all  patriots  saw  that  suppression 
of  pro-English  feeling  was  a  policy  essential  to  the  success 
of  the  Revolution;  toleration  of  loyalism  was  impossible. 
They  were,  therefore,  entirely  united  on  the  question  of  the 
war  and  treated  British  sympathizers  as  alien  enemies, 
while  at  the  same  time  they  were  themselves  divided  into 
conservative  and  liberal  factions  on  the  issue  of  the  Revo- 
lution as  a  political  and  social  development.  There  was 
always  a  large  latent  element  of  opposition  to  the  Revo- 
lution, which  failed  to  become  formidable  because  of  un- 
favorable circumstances.  The  county  committees  early  in 
the  contest  had  prevented  the  formation  of  a  Tory  party 
by  promptly  repressing  loyalists  and  driving  them  from  the 
country.  The  convention  and  Committee  of  Safety  more 
or  less  warmly  cooperated  in  this  work,  and  the  executive 
created  by  the  new  constitution,  the  council,  found  that 
the  enforcement  of  the  laws  against  Toryism  was  one  of  its 
most  important  labors.  In  fact,  the  government  had  to 
contend  with  discontent,  malingering,  and  actual  disaffec- 
tion until  the  very  end  of  the  war. 

The  executive  council  took  up  its  task  on  July  22,  1776. 
Its  duties  were  much  the  same  as  those  of  the  Committee 
of  Safety,  though  its  powers  were  circumscribed  by  the 


RULE  OF  THE  COUNCIL  175 

written  constitution.  The  council,  indeed,  was  the  succes- 
sor of  the  colonial  council  in  administration  without  the 
judicial  and  legislative  functions  of  that  body.  Theoreti- 
cally the  council  advised,  actually  it  ruled  through  the 
Revolutionary  period;  the  governor  acted  as  the  presiding 
head  of  a  board  rather  than  as  an  independent  function- 
ary. When  Patrick  Henry  was  absent,  John  Page,  the 
lieutenant-governor,  took  his  place  without  any  apparent 
difference  in  the  running  of  the  governmental  machine. 

Page  and  the  other  councilors  formed  an  experienced 
and  cautious  group  of  advisers,  with  whom,  at  first  thought, 
it  might  have  seemed  somewhat  difficult  for  Henry  to 
work  in  harmony.  But  the  fast-taming  radical  managed 
to  go  well  in  harness  with  his  associates  and  gave  Vir- 
ginia a  fairly  capable  if  uninspired  administration.  It  is 
needless  to  go  into  the  general  work  of  the  council  in  any 
detail,  because  that  was  just  what  ordinarily  falls  to  the 
lot  of  an  ill-regulated  government  in  war-time.  The  colo- 
nial administration  was  singularly  inefficient  and  slovenly 
and  the  constitution  had  done  nothing  to  improve  matters. 
The  council  at  first  handled  military  and  naval  affairs, 
but  later  war  and  navy  boards  were  created  by  the  legisla- 
ture to  relieve  the  pressure.  The  only  result  was  that  ad- 
ministration became  thoroughly  disjointed  and  conflicting. 

Among  the  first  problems  that  faced  the  councilors  on 
assuming  office  were  the  loyalist  cases  handed  on  by  the 
Committee  of  Safety.  They  heard  the  appeal  of  a  Tory, 
Maurice  Wheler,  from  the  verdict  of  Lancaster  court, 
which  had  pronounced  him  as  "being  inimical. "  They 
concluded  that  there  was  "no  reason  to  approve  of  the 
Verdict  given,"  but  in  the  absence  of  part  of  the  evidence 


176        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

referred  the  case  back  to  Lancaster  for  retrial.1  Like  the 
Committee  of  Safety,  the  council  was  moderate  in  its 
policy  towards  Tories.2 

In  fact,  the  council  rather  liberally  interpreted  the  laws 
intended  to  rid  the  country  of  loyalists  or  keep  them  in 
proper  subjection;  it  preferred  mild  measures.  In  some 
cases  suspects  confined  in  prison  were  given  their  freedom 
on  condition  of  leaving  the  State.  In  other  cases,  like  that 
of  Edward  Murfield,  who  had  been  sent  from  Norfolk  to 
Williamsburg  under  suspicion  of  disaffection,  the  accused 
were  discharged  on  taking  a  pledge  not  to  assist  the  enemy.3 
James  Walker,  Joshua  Hopkins,  and  John  Carmont,  im- 
prisoned in  the  public  jail  at  Williamsburg,  were  released 
on  giving  security  to  stand  trial  in  their  respective  local 
courts.4  Hopkins's  trial  by  the  Princess  Anne  court  re- 
sulted in  a  conviction  of  disaffection,  and  the  council  con- 
firmed this  decision,  but  because  of  the  prisoner's  age  and 
infirmity  allowed  him  his  liberty  on  giving  security  for 
good  behavior.5  It  extended  protection  to  the  unfortunate 
Tory,  Ralph  Wormeley,  Jr.,  who  claimed  that  he  had  been 
disturbed  by  a  mob  while  living  on  parole  on  his  father's 
estate  in  Frederick.  The  council  offered  him  a  guard,  and 
finally  the  assembly,  in  May,  1778,  released  Wormeley 
from  his  bond  and  allowed  him  to  go  home.6 

More  serious  cases  of  disaffection  also  frequently  re- 
ceived lenient  treatment.  John  Goodrich,  who  was  rightly 
considered  dangerous,  was  sent  to  jail  in  the  inland  village 
of  Charlottesville  in  the  company  of  another  loyalist, 

1  Council  Journal  (1776-77),  23. 

5  Ibid.,  140.        ■  Ibid.,  61.         4  Ibid.,  36.        «  Ibid.,  97. 

6  Journal,  House  of  Delegates  (May,  1778),  29. 


RULE  OF  THE  COUNCIL  177 

Andrew  McCann,  but  three  other  prisoners  sent  at  the 
same  time  to  Charlottesville  were  allowed  the  range  of  the 
town  limits,  as  were  George  Oldener  and  Charles  Henley,1 
convicted  of  giving  intelligence  to  the  enemy  and  confined 
at  first  in  the  New  London  jail.2  The  council,  in  general, 
preferred  to  relieve  Tories  from  actual  confinement  and 
allowed  the  Augusta  county-lieutenant  to  use  his  discre- 
tion in  paroling  prisoners  at  Staunton. 

That  some  degree  of  rigor  was  necessary  in  guarding  the 
more  dangerous  loyalists  was  illustrated  by  the  Good- 
riches.  Bartlett  Goodrich  and  John  Cunningham  had  been 
convicted  by  the  Northampton  court  of  violation  of  the 
Association;  on  their  appeal  the  council  confirmed  the 
decision  and  put  the  prisoners  on  parole  at  New  London. 
Goodrich  and  Cunningham  broke  their  pledge  not  to  go 
beyond  the  town  limits  and  were  sent  to  Amherst  jail,  to- 
gether with  James  Parker,  who  refused  to  give  parole.  In 
August,  1777,  John  Goodrich,  the  elder,  escaped  from 
Albemarle  jail  in  the  company  of  three  other  Tory  fellow 
prisoners.  The  council  offered  rewards  for  them  and  they 
were  soon  captured,  owing  to  the  difficulty  of  reaching  the 
seaboard  from  the  far  interior.  The  council  sent  Goodrich 
to  confinement  in  Bedford  and  the  others  to  Williamsburg.3 
Goodrich  complained  to  the  council  in  October,  1777,  that 
he  had  been  kept  in  rigid  imprisonment  for  eighteen  months, 
"loaded  with  irons  too  heavy  for  mortal  to  bear,  and  ex- 
posed to  daily  insults  and  reproaches  from  a  people,  that  he 
is  forced  to  say  are  insensible  to  the  feelings  of  humanity  or 

1  Council  Journal  (1776-77),  27. 

*  Legislative  Petitions.  Princess  Anne. 

•  Council  Journal  (1777-78),  123.  M 


178         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

delicacy.  However  reprehensible  the  conduct  of  your  pe- 
titioner may  be,  yet  he  begs  leave  to  affirm  that  it  has  been 
greatly  aggravated  by  popular  report  and  prejudice."  He 
asked  to  be  permitted  to  live  on  parole  on  one  of  the  plan- 
tations allotted  for  the  support  of  his  family.1 

This  Tory  family  suffered  great  hardships.  The  com- 
missioners appointed  to  manage  John  Goodrich's  estate 
allowed  Margaret  Goodrich,  in  July,  1775,  one  hundred  and 
fifty  acres  of  land  in  Nansemond  and  five  hundred  acres  in 
Isle  of  Wight,  with  the  growing  crops  and  forty  pounds  for 
slave  hire.2  In  October,  1778,  Margaret  Goodrich  reported 
to  the  assembly  that  her  allowance  was  entirely  insufficient, 
since  her  slaves  had  been  sent  to  the  lead  mines  and  the 
money  granted  her  was  barely  sufficient  to  hire  one  slave, 
making  it  necessary  for  her  to  borrow  money  in  order  to 
clothe  her  children.  In  the  latter  years  of  the  war,  the 
Goodriches,  as  we  have  seen,  were  able  to  retaliate  for  their 
sufferings;  Bartlett  Goodrich  proved  especially  annoying 
as  a  privateer.  In  July,  1778,  the  council  directed  the  navy 
board  to  assist  several  persons  anxious  to  fit  out  vessels  to 
cruise  against  the  Goodriches,  and  Congress  sent  two  ships 
to  lie  in  wait  for  them  off  the  Virginia  Capes. 

Many  loyalists  underwent  examination  by  the  council  in 
the  summer  of  1776,  but  thereafter  their  number  lessened, 
as  most  persons  at  all  openly  disaffected  passed  into  exile  in 
some  distant  part  of  the  State  or  left  the  country.  The 
penalties  attending  indiscretion  taught  caution  to  remain- 
ing malcontents.  At  the  same  time  the  attitude  of  the 
government  towards  loyalists  grew  harsher:  it  had  acted 

1  Journal,  House  of  Delegates  (October,  1777),  23. 

2  Council  Journal  (1776-77),  96. 


RULE  OF  THE  COUNCIL  179 

hitherto  with  comparative  mildness,  but  a  change  came  in 
the  latter  part  of  1776  with  the  great  reverses  suffered  by 
the  American  army  in  the  North.  It  had  become  evident 
that  the  States  were  engaged  in  a  long  and  exceedingly 
doubtful  struggle,  and  no  place  remained  for  the  openly 
disloyal  or  passively  disaffected.  The  time  had  come  for 
forcing  all  men  to  make  a  definite  choice  of  sides.  The 
first  session  of  the  general  assembly,  in  October,  1776, 
witnessed  the  increase  of  penalties  for  disaffection  and  the 
passage  of  an  act  against  treason,  which  was  defined  as 
levying  war  against  the  Commonwealth  and  aiding  and 
comforting  its  enemies.1  The  penalty  was  death  without 
benefit  of  clergy  and  forfeiture  of  property;  the  general 
assembly  alone  had  the  pardoning  power.  The  law  went 
on  to  provide  heavy  punishments  for  lesser  degrees  of  dis- 
loyalty. Maintenance  by  publication,  word  or  act  of  the 
authority  of  king  or  Parliament,  was  forbidden  under  pain 
of  fine  and  imprisonment,  not  to  exceed  £20,000  and  the 
term  of  five  years. 

The  government  also  aimed  a  final  blow  at  the  one  gen- 
uine class  of  loyalists  in  the  community,  now  greatly  re- 
duced in  number,  it  is  true,  but  not  yet  entirely  weeded  out. 
The  House  of  Delegates,  on  December  18,  1776,  passed  a 
resolution  for  the  expulsion  of  the  remaining  British  mer- 
chants and  directed  the  council  to  carry  the  order  into 
effect.  The  banished  included  all  natives  of  Great  Britain 
who  had  been  in  partnership  with  British  merchants  or 
acting  as  their  agents  at  the  time  Parliament  passed  the 
act  restraining  American  trade,  with  the  exception  of  those 
who  had  shown  attachment  to  America  or  had  families  in 
1  Hening,  ix,  168. 


180        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

the  country.  Exiles  found  in  the  State  after  a  certain  time 
were  to  be  considered  prisoners  of  war;  county  courts  were 
required  to  furnish  lists  of  British  subjects  within  their 
jurisdictions.1  The  council  enforced  this  drastic  measure 
with  moderation;  the  county  courts  reported  names  and 
it  decided  whether  the  resolution  applied  in  their  cases. 
Reports  began  to  come  in  from  the  counties  in  March,  1777. 
Sometimes  the  council  was  stern,  as  in  the  cases  of  James 
Sterling  and  James  Dunlop,  whom  it  decided  were  "within 
the  description  of  persons  who  are  to  depart  the  State 
unless  they  can  make  appear  their  uniform  attachment  to 
the  American  cause."  2  But  Archibald  Gowan  and  John 
Dyer,  two  unfortunates  presented  by  Hanover  court  as 
Britons,  asked  for  an  extension  of  time  to  make  prepa- 
rations for  departure  and  received  ample  space.3  Again, 
when  Halifax  court  presented  several  men  for  expulsion, 
the  council  decided  that  they  had  not  been  British  agents 
on  January  1, 1776,  and  so  were  not  subject  to  exile.4  The 
Henrico  court  examined  James  Buchanan  as  one  of  the 
proscribed,  but  the  council  overlooked  his  partnership  with 
British  merchants  and  adjudged  him  friendly  to  the  Ameri- 
can cause.  Yet  it  was  careful  to  see  that  orders  of  expulsion 
were  carried  out.  It  advised  the  governor,  on  March  26, 
1777,  to  issue  a  proclamation  to  the  county-lieutenants 
ordering  them  to  arrest  "denounced"  loyalists  whose  time 
for  removal  had  expired  and  send  them  to  the  two  deten- 
tion places  for  the  disaffected  decided  on.5  Thereupon 
some  of  the  remaining  Britons  were  carried  to  these  points, 

1  Journal,  House  of  Delegates  (October,  1776),  103. 

2  Council  Journal  (1776-77),  355. 

•  Ibid.,  342,  399.        4  Ibid.,  384.        6  Ibid.,  384. 


RULE  OF  THE  COUNCIL  181 

though  the  government  did  not  incline  to  act  rigorously, 
for  it  allowed  John  Miller  to  go  from  one  town  to  another 
and  finally  to  the  Augusta  Warm  Springs  for  medical  treat- 
ment. Another  prisoner  in  a  detention  point,  Archibald 
Bryce,  received  permission  to  live  in  Chesterfield  on  parole 
not  to  leave  the  county.1 

Banishment  of  persons  for  such  technical  reasons  as 
those  set  forth  in  the  December  resolution  naturally  worked 
a  good  deal  of  hardship,  sometimes  affecting  people  inno- 
cent enough  in  spirit  if  guilty  by  the  letter.  A  case  of  this 
kind  was  that  of  John  Fisher,  of  Halifax,2  who  had  lived  in 
Virginia  for  more  than  twenty  years,  and  who,  while  not 
engaged  in  business  after  1775,  the  Halifax  court,  never- 
theless, considered  an  exile  because  of  debts  due  his  firm 
from  a  time  as  far  back  as  1765.  The  council  allowed  him  to 
live  at  home  on  parole  and  the  assembly  agreed  to  his  be- 
coming a  citizen.  It  is  evident  from  the  records  that  a 
considerable  number  of  individuals  suffered  banishment  at 
this  time.  In  one  instance  more  than  eighty  Britons,  under 
the  leadership  of  Andrew  Johnson,  appealed  to  the  council 
for  leave  to  buy  a  ship  and  sail  to  England.  The  govern- 
ment willingly  acceded  and  Johnson  and  his  associates 
secured  the  vessel,  which  proved  to  be  slow  in  arriving. 
When  the  Albion  was  finally  ready  to  go,  in  May,  1777,  the 
British  fleet  in  the  Chesapeake  objected  to  her  sailing 
from  a  Virginia  port.  After  further  delay,  the  assembly, 
in  June,  1777,  granted  the  Albion  passengers  permission 
to  leave  in  British  warships  or  any  other  craft.3 

Public  opinion  was  less  lenient  to  loyalists  than  the 

1  Council  Journal  (1777-78),  256.       2  Legislative  Petitions.  Halifax. 
8  Council  Journal  (1776-77),  356,  415. 


182        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

council.  A  petition  came  to  the  assembly  from  Mecklen- 
berg  asking  for  the  expulsion  of  all  British  merchants  and 
agents,  married  or  unmarried,  and  for  severe  punishments 
for  refusal  to  take  the  paper  currency  in  payment  of  debts.1 
The  assembly,  at  the  May,  1777,  session,  took  a  further 
step  for  weeding  out  loyalism  by  requiring  males  over  six- 
teen years  of  age  to  take  an  oath  of  allegiance  to  "the 
Commonwealth  of  Virginia  as  a  free  and  independent 
state."  It  became  the  duty  of  county  courts  under  this  act 
to  tender  the  oath  and  keep  accounts  of  persons  swearing 
and  refusing.  Non-jurors  were  to  suffer  disarming,  the  loss 
of  the  rights  of  office-holding,  voting,  serving  on  juries, 
suing  for  debts  and  acquiring  land,  and  besides  were  to  pay 
double  taxes.  The  oath  was  generally  administered  and 
.taken  throughout  the  State,  though  with  exceptions,  and 
innocent  people  frequently  got  into  trouble  on  that  ac- 
count. All  through  1778  there  was  complaint  from  unfor- 
tunates who  had  inadvertently  failed  to  take  the  oath  and 
found  themselves  mulcted  in  double  taxes.  The  law  was  so 
inefficiently  advertised  in  thinly  settled  communities  that 
many  individuals  did  not  take  the  oath  in  time  because 
they  had  never  heard  of  it.  Apparently  few  refused  to 
swear  because  of  actual  disaffection. 

The  case  of  Joshua  Tinsley  is  fairly  typical  of  the  hard- 
ships caused  by  the  law.  An  old  man,  keeping  close  at 
home,  he  had  failed  to  take  the  oath  because  of  an  impres- 
sion that  the  magistrates  who  tendered  it  would  visit  each 
man's  house  for  that  purpose,  instead  of  merely  attending 
militia  musters,  as  they  did.  On  account  of  this  mistake, 
Tinsley  found  his  tax  bill  multiplied  from  £3. 10.9 J  to 
1  Legislative  Petitions.  Mecklenberg  (B2721). 


RULE  OF  THE  COUNCIL  183 

£7.1.7.1  In  some  counties  where  justices  were  scarce,  the 
inhabitants  occasionally  had  difficulty  in  finding  means  to 
take  the  oath,  and  there  were  accidental  non-jurors  every- 
where. So  many  people  incurred  the  penalty  of  double 
taxation  from  ignorance  of  the  law  that  a  supplementary 
act  was  passed  extending  the  time  limit  for  swearing,  but 
even  this  did  not  remedy  the  trouble.2  Generally  speaking, 
the  magistrates  seem  to  have  been  careless  in  enforcing  the 
law  and  in  some  cases  actually  negligent  of  duty.  The 
assembly  afterwards  increased  the  punishment  for  non- 
juring  to  triple  taxation,  with  the  date,  May  1, 1779,  as  the 
final  day  of  grace.  This  provision  increased  the  distress  of 
innocent  non-jurors  without  reaching  the  few  remaining 
Tories,  who  managed  to  evade  the  oath  despite  every 
effort  of  the  government. 

Many  patriots  suffered  for  purely  technical  reasons. 
Joseph  Holt,  of  Charlotte,  was  fined  triple  taxes,  though  he 
had  served  in  the  Continental  army;  he  had  taken  the  oath 
a  few  days  after  the  time  expired.3  John  Nelson,  of  Char- 
lotte, came  to  take  the  oath  before  a  magistrate,  who  had 
no  form,  but  told  him  that  willingness  to  subscribe  was 
sufficient.  Nelson  accordingly  went  home  satisfied,  only  to 
discover  later  that  he  was  subject  to  triple  taxation.  In  the 
fall  of  1779  the  assembly  found  it  expedient  to  grant  relief 
to  the  large  number  of  accidental  non-jurors  writhing 
under  their  fines.  The  extra  tax  penalty  was  repealed,  and 
people  who  had  paid  it  and  who  were  also  good  Americans 
were  to  be  reimbursed  out  of  their  future  taxes.4 

While  the  assembly  by  various  acts  and  tests  drove  out 

1  Legislative  Petitions.  Essex  (A5349).  2  Ibid.  Prince  William. 

8  Ibid.   Charlotte  (A3993).  «  Hening,  x,  194. 


184         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

of  Virginia  the  class  not  in  sympathy  with  revolution,  it  by 
no  means  succeeded  in  suppressing  the  spirit  of  disaffection. 
It  was,  indeed,  wise  mercilessness  to  expel  the  Scotchmen 
who  might  have  acted  otherwise  as  the  nucleus  of  a  hostile 
faction,  but  such  a  policy  could  not  prevent  the  spread 
of  discontent  among  the  native  population,  part  of  which, 
though  nominally  patriotic,  had  no  enthusiasm  for  the 
cause.  By  the  summer  of  1777  the  early  zeal  had  pretty 
well  cooled  everywhere,  and  the  length  and  expense  of  the 
war  were  having  their  effect  on  the  faint-hearted,  who  mur- 
mured against  the  heavy  taxes.  In  July  it  was  reported  to 
the  council  that  emissaries  of  the  enemy,  sometimes  in  the 
guise  of  commissary  officers,  were  going  around  offering 
extravagant  prices  for  commodities,  in  order  to  depreciate 
the  currency,  and  discouraging  the  people  by  injurious 
reports  of  the  condition  of  Washington's  army.1  On  the 
Eastern  Shore,  cut  off  from  the  mainland  and  open  to 
British  raids,  many  of  the  negroes  had  run  away  to  the 
enemy  and  some  of  the  white  inhabitants  were  suspected 
of  treasonably  aiding  them.  To  remedy  this  the  council 
advised  the  removal  of  suspects  from  the  Eastern  Shore  to 
the  interior  of  the  State,  and  it  further  directed  the  Norfolk 
and  Princess  Anne  authorities  to  send  the  disaffected  from 
those  counties  to  Williamsburg  except  such  as  might  be 
prosecuted  at  home  under  the  treason  law.  Disaffected  or 
criminal  inhabitants  assisted  the  enemy's  privateers  in 
plundering  along  the  Chesapeake  shores.  In  September, 
1777,  Captain  Barron,  of  the  Virginia  navy,  captured  one 
Dunbar,  of  Gloucester,  who  had  made  himself  notorious  as 
a  freebooter.2 

i  Council  Journal  (1777-78),  37.      2  Virginia  Gazette,  October  3,  1777. 


RULE  OF  THE  COUNCIL  185 

The  council  was  driven  in  August,  1777,  under  the  im- 
mediate fear  of  an  English  invasion,  to  take  further  steps 
against  the  disaffected.  It  issued  an  order  to  militia  com- 
manders at  all  stations  to  require  persons  refusing  to  take 
the  oath  of  allegiance,  or  "suspected  of  evil  designs,"  to 
remove  ten  miles  from  any  camp,  garrison,  or  place  where 
the  enemy  might  be.  The  order  affected  a  good  many 
people,  and  the  assembly,  at  its  meeting  in  the  fall,  fearing 
that  the  executive  had  acted  unconstitutionally,  passed  a 
special  act  of  immunity.  As  the  expected  invasion  failed 
to  materialize,  the  council  rescinded  the  order  and  per- 
mitted those  who  had  been  driven  from  their  homes  to 
return  on  giving  parole.  At  the  same  time  a  number  of 
persons  arrested  on  the  Eastern  Shore  and  sent  to  Williams- 
burg were  released  on  taking  the  oath. 

Cases  of  disaffection  continued  to  be  fairly  numerous  in 
1778.  Edward  Ker,  a  justice  of  Accomac  County,  was  re- 
moved from  his  office  on  the  charge  of  being  inimical,  and 
William  Montague,  of  Lancaster,  was  refused  a  commission 
as  justice  on  similar  grounds.1  One  Yerby,  a  Lancaster 
militia  captain,  had  the  audacity  to  deliver  a  French  vessel 
to  British  warships  in  the  Rappahannock,  though  his  com- 
pany had  been  mustered  for  its  protection.  The  council 
ordered  the  arrest  of  the  offenders  and  reimbursed  the  ship- 
master. Traitors  like  Yerby  occasionally  ran  the  risk  of 
violence.  Robert  Parker,  in  May,  1778,  complained  to  the 
assembly  that  on  account  of  an  unjust  suspicion  of  his  be- 
ing inimical  the  militia  had  burned  his  house  and  a  court- 
martial  had  sentenced  him  to  five  years'  imprisonment.2 

1  Council  Journal  (1777-78),  217. 

2  Journal,  House  of  Delegates  (May,  1778),  10. 


186         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

The  government  pardoned  him.  The  council,  indeed, 
continued  to  treat  offenders  with  considerable  leniency. 
Prisoners,  instead  of  being  confined  in  jail  or  forced  to  leave 
the  State,  were  frequently  paroled  within  certain  limits. 
The  assembly,  more  susceptible  to  popular  opinion,  was 
more  inclined  to  rigor.  As  if  the  laws  were  not  already 
severe  enough,  the  House  of  Delegates,  in  October,  1778, 
considered  a  bill  "to  expel  from  the  Commonwealth,  and 
to  prevent  in  future  the  return  of  persons  who  have  shewn 
themselves  inimical  to  America."  1  This  measure  had  been 
immediately  suggested  by  protests  from  Norfolk  and  the 
neighboring  counties  declaring  that  there  were  still  people 
living  in  the  State  who  considered  themselves  subjects  of 
the  king  and  asking  for  their  expulsion.  The  bill  passed  a 
second  reading  and  then  failed. 

The  House  of  Delegates  heard  the  appeal  for  admission 
to  the  State  of  a  number  of  persons  who  had  come  from 
New  York  to  Hampton  in  a  flag-of-truce  vessel.  Most  of 
them  had  been  abroad  and  now  wished  to  return  to  Vir- 
ginia. Charles  Mortimer,  who  had  gone  to  England  in  1775 
and  who  claimed  to  have  befriended  American  prisoners 
there,  was  allowed  to  enter  the  State  on  taking  the  oath  of 
allegiance.  Alexander  Trent,  returned  from  being  educated 
abroad,  and  Elizabeth  Muir  were  also  admitted.  Other 
immigrants  or  returning  Virginians  who  were  considered 
"unfriendly  to  the  rights  and  liberties  of  America"  failed 
to  secure  the  same  privilege.2  Such  exclusion  may  seem 
harsh,  but  the  policy  of  banishing  and  keeping  out  loyalists 
was  pursued  more  rigorously  in  other  States.  Massachu- 
setts even  wished  to  cooperate  with  Virginia  in  the  exclu- 

1  Journal,  House  of  Delegates  (October,  1778),  9.  2  Ibid.,  40. 


RULE  OF  THE  COUNCIL  187 

sion  of  each  other's  loyalist  exiles,  but  the  scheme  came 
to  nothing. 

The  year  1779  saw  the  beginning  of  the  saddest,  and  to 
us,  after  the  long  lapse  of  time,  the  most  regrettable  feature 
of  the  Revolution  —  general  confiscation.  Hundreds  of 
estates  in  all  parts  of  Virginia,  comprising  many  thousands 
of  acres,  had  been  left  vacant  by  their  refugee  owners,  who 
in  most  cases  were  Britons  that  had  left  the  country  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  war,  or  were  Virginians  living  abroad  and 
represented  by  relations  or  agents.  These  estates  were  now 
condemned  by  escheators  and  sold  for  amounts  of  depre- 
ciated currency  representing  a  very  small  value  in  specie. 
The  forfeitures,  as  in  the  case  of  almost  all  similar  seizures, 
brought  in  little  to  the  State,  but  greatly  benefited  pur- 
chasers, and  there  can  be  small  doubt  that  much  corruption 
and  injustice  were  practiced  and  that  many  estates  were 
wrongfully  condemned  and  sold.  Occasionally  confiscation 
had  occurred  early  in  the  Revolution.  Thus,  Dunmore's 
property  was  sold  in  1776,  and  the  council,  on  November 
16, 1776,  heard  the  appeal  of  James  Parker  from  a  decision 
of  the  Accomac  commissioners'  court  directing  the  sale  of 
his  estate  and  condemning  him  to  imprisonment  during  the 
war,  an  unusually  severe  sentence.  The  council  confirmed 
the  decision  and  sent  Parker  to  New  London  on  parole,  as 
he  had  accepted  a  commission  from  Dunmore.1  Property 
seized  before  this  time  had  been  chiefly  marine,  taken  under 
direction  of  Congress,  though  ordinances  of  the  convention 
sanctioned  the  forfeiture  of  estates  of  persons  aiding  the 
enemy.  Few  estates,  however,  were  confiscated  under  this 
authority,  and  forfeiture  was  not  immediately  adopted  by 
1  Council  Journal  (1776-77)  233. 


188         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

the  permanent  government  when  it  came  into  power  late  in 
1776.  An  act  of  1777  put  the  lands,  slaves,  stock,  and  other 
property  of  British  subjects,  including  debts,  into  the  hands 
of  commissioners  to  manage  in  the  interest  of  the  State.1 
Debts  due  British  subjects  might  be  paid  into  the  treasury 
and  the  government  would  give  discharge.  This  act  affected 
hundreds  of  people,  especially  the  debt  clause.  Planters 
stood  indebted  to  British  firms  for  great  amounts,  and 
many  of  them  took  advantage  of  the  opportunity  to  rid 
themselves  of  their  obligations  in  depreciated  paper.  The 
government  made  little  by  these  transactions  and  at  the 
same  time  laid  up  trouble  for  itself  against  the  time  when 
England  demanded  a  reckoning  for  its  merchants.  After- 
wards the  act  was  repealed,  probably  because  it  was  seen 
to  be  little  better  than  repudiation. 

The  assembly,  in  May,  1779,  passed  from  guardianship 
to  confiscation.  The  act  "concerning  escheats  and  forfei- 
tures" 2  voided  the  titles  of  all  property  of  aliens  held  by 
commissioners  and  directed  the  government  to  institute 
forfeiture  proceedings.  One  month  was  allowed  native 
claimants  of  such  estates  to  file  their  pleas,  after  which 
limit  the  old  titles  were  forever  barred,  though  claims 
might  be  advanced  on  the  money  proceeding  from  the 
property  sales.  The  act  also  defined  British  subjects,  who 
were  all  Britons  living  outside  the  United  States  on  April  19, 
1775,  —  the  date  of  Lexington,  —  and  who  had  not  since 
then  proved  their  allegiance  to  the  United  States;  all 
persons  residing  in  the  country  at  that  time  who  had  ad- 
hered to  the  enemy  or  who  had  joined  them.  Immediately 
after  the  confiscation  measure,  the  assembly  aimed  what 
1  Hening,  ix,  377.  8  Ibid.,  x,  67. 


RULE  OF  THE  COUNCIL  189 

was  intended  as  a  finishing  stroke  at  the  few  loyalists  who 
continued  to  linger  in  Virginia.  The  House  of  Delegates,  in 
June,  1779,  passed  a  resolution  directing  the  governor  to 
banish  all  Tory  refugees  and  take  means  to  prevent  the 
return  of  persons  designated  as  British  subjects.1  The 
House  further  considered,  but  failed  to  pass,  a  resolution 
for  disarming  "all  persons  inimical  or  disaffected  to  the 
liberties  of  America,"  which  directed  local  committees  to 
search  for  suspects  and  tender  them  a  stringent  oath.2 

The  essential  injustice  of  confiscation  as  a  policy  and  its 
cruel  hardships  soon  became  apparent.  As  long  as  commis- 
sioners held  estates  in  trust,  owners  might  hope  to  get 
them  back  some  day,  even  though  sadly  plundered  and 
depreciated,  but  with  the  condemnation  and  sale  of  prop- 
erty all  chance  of  recompense  practically  disappeared;  the 
needy  State  would  not  be  able  for  years  to  pay  to  own- 
ers accidentally  sold  out  the  money  obtained  from  sales, 
which  were  beggarly  amounts  at  best.  Escheators  took 
great  license  in  their  proceedings;  every  estate  deserted  by 
its  owner  for  any  reason  whatever  was  liable  to  seizure  and 
forfeiture,  and  many  innocent  persons  suffered  loss.  One 
case  illustrates  a  number.  Lucy  Ludwell,  a  Virginia 
woman,  while  in  England,  had  married  John  Paradise,  a 
Greek.  The  couple  continued  to  live  in  England  and  con- 
fided the  care  of  Mrs.  Paradise's  Virginia  estate  to  an 
agent.  Paradise,  not  having  been  naturalized  in  England, 
was  not  a  Briton,  but  nevertheless  his  property  in  Surry 
and  York  Counties,  Virginia,  was  condemned,  though  the 
court  had  not  found  him  a  British  subject.3  An  inquisition 

1  Journal,  House  of  Delegates  (May,  1779),  68. 

2  Executive  communications,  1779.        ■  Legislative  Petitions.    Surry. 


190         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

in  James  City  found  both  husband  and  wife  to  be  British 
subjects  and  condemned  their  property  in  that  county. 

Notwithstanding  many  confiscation  proceedings  and 
many  sales,  the  State  derived  small  profit,  partly  because 
land  auctions  conducted  in  war-time  in  a  country  without 
currency  could  hardly  bring  in  a  large  return,  and  partly  be- 
cause the  government  allowed  obstacles  to  be  put  in  the  way 
of  forfeiture  *  and  seemingly  made  little  effort  to  prevent 
fraud  in  the  conduct  of  the  sales.  The  chief  effect  of  con- 
fiscation, so  futile  as  far  as  the  State  was  concerned,  was  to 
pass  over  to  astute  neighbors  abandoned  lands  and  lands 
of  uncertain  ownership  at  purely  nominal  prices;  it  is  doubt- 
ful whether  the  returns  in  badly  depreciated  paper  were 
worth  the  trouble  of  conducting  sales.  If  the  government 
had  required  payment  in  articles  of  value,  like  tobacco  and 
provisions,  some  good  would  have  resulted;  as  it  was,  many 
people,  hardly  a  handful  of  whom  were  active  enemies,  lost 
their  Virginia  lands  and  thereby  paved  the  way  for  the  rise 
of  numerous  small  farmers  to  affluence.  This  was  one  of 
the  most  important  social  results  of  the  Revolution. 

In  the  early  years  of  the  war  the  Virginia  government 
was  actively  engaged  in  suppressing  loyalism,  but  it  was 
not  called  on  to  deal  with  insurrection.  The  State  was  in 
no  great  danger  of  internal  disturbance  so  long  as  it  re- 
mained uninvaded  by  the  British.  From  the  fall  of  Dun- 
more  to  1780  the  council  was  disturbed  by  only  one  instance 
of  disaffection  serious  enough  to  threaten  any  military 
results.  This  was  in  the  celebrated  case  of  Josiah  Philips.2 

There  was  little  noteworthy  about  the  man.  He  was  a 

1  Executive  communications,  1779. 

2  American  Historical  Review,  i,  445,  et  seq. 


RULE  OF  THE  COUNCIL  191 

laborer  living  in  Lynhaven  Parish,  Princess  Anne,  the  one 
really  Tory  county.  Philips  himself  had  little  concern  with 
political  issues;  he  was  an  ignorant  and  brutal  man  who 
took  advantage  of  the  opportunity  offered  by  disturbed 
conditions  to  plunder  his  neighborhood,  and  if  it  were  not 
for  the  fact  that  the  government  regularly  attainted  him 
of  treason  he  might  be  passed  over  with  a  few  words. 

Philips  accepted  a  commission  from  Dunmore  early  in 
the  war,  because  British  commissions  were  going  begging 
and  might  serve  as  warrants  for  miscellaneous  acts  of 
violence.  He  gathered  a  small  band  of  followers,  whites 
and  runaway  slaves,  and  began  to  plunder  the  isolated 
and  swamp-covered  country  on  the  border  of  Virginia  and 
North  Carolina.  By  the  summer  of  1777  he  had  become 
so  notorious  that  John  Wilson,  the  much-tried  Norfolk 
county-lieutenant,  reported  that  he  and  a  dozen  others 
were  threatening  people  and  doing  mischief.1  The  council 
thereupon,  on  June  20,  1777,  advised  the  governor  to  offer 
a  reward  for  his  capture.  Philips  was  arrested  and  the 
government  paid  the  reward. 

But  he  either  escaped  or  was  released  and  soon  made 
himself  a  genuine  nuisance.  His  band  now  included  about 
fifty  men,  a  force  of  sufficient  size  for  plundering  a  thinly 
settled  community.  The  council,  on  May  1,  1778,  directed 
the  authorities  and  militia  in  Princess  Anne,  Norfolk,  and 
Nansemond  to  cooperate  for  his  capture.  Militia  was  or- 
dered out  but  failed  to  arrest  the  criminals,  and  Wilson 
advised  the  removal  of  certain  families  in  league  with  them. 
The  Philips  gang  was  accused  of  committing  robbery, 
arson,  and  murder.  The  council  sent  Wilson's  letter  to  the 

1  Council  Journal  (1777-78),  19. 


192         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

assembly  and  ordered  a  company  of  regular  troops  to  the 
scene  of  disturbance.1  The  House  of  Delegates  was  so 
moved  by  the  letter  that  it  feared  that  an  insurrection  was 
about  to  break  out  in  the  Norfolk  region,  known  to  be  luke- 
warm or  hostile  towards  the  Revolution.  Consequently,  it 
decided,  on  May  28,  1778,  that  Philips  and  his  followers 
were  guilty  of  treason  and  should  be  attainted  if  they  did 
not  surrender  before  a  certain  date.  Jefferson  undoubtedly 
inspired  these  proceedings,  the  precedent  for  which,  like 
so  many  other  Revolutionary  precedents,  came  from  the 
English  Civil  War.  The  bill  of  attainder  passed  the  House 
and  Senate  without  opposition;  it  named  June  30, 1778,  as 
the  last  day  of  grace.2 

Philips  did  not  surrender,  but  was  hunted  down  by  the 
State  troops.  Several  of  his  band  were  captured  and  several 
others  killed,3  among  the  latter  one  Will,  a  negro,  who  had 
distinguished  himself  for  ferocity.  Will  was  shot  under 
the  attainder,  which,  of  course,  made  the  attainted  out- 
laws, but  Philips,  when  captured,  was  not  immediately 
executed  as  might  have  been  expected,  since  no  trial  was 
necessary.  Instead  of  proceeding  under  the  attainder,  the 
government  indicted  him  in  the  general  court,  on  October 
23,  1778,  for  robbery  of  twine  and  hats;  two  of  his  asso- 
ciates were  tried  with  him  for  the  same  offense.  All  three 
were  found  guilty  of  felony,  condemned  to  death,  and 
executed  on  December  4,  1778. 

There  was  nothing  very  remarkable  about  Philips's  at- 
tainder. The  assembly  claimed  and  exercised  wide  powers, 
and  the  treason  laws  allowed  large  scope.    Probably  when 

1  Council  Journal  (1777-78),  260.  2  Hening,  x,  463. 

8  Council  Journal  (1777-78),  310. 


RULE  OF  THE  COUNCIL  193 

the  government  recovered  from  its  fright  and  realized  that 
Philips  was  only  an  ordinary  robber  instead  of  a  traitor 
seeking  to  light  the  torch  of  loyalist  revolt,  it  preferred 
to  use  ordinary  legal  measures  in  place  of  the  attainder.1 
The  point  about  the  case  that  has  excited  comment  is 
its  curious  sequel.  In  1788,  when  the  Virginia  Convention 
was  debating  the  adoption  of  the  Federal  Constitution, 
Edmund  Randolph  arose  one  day  and  declared  that  Josiah 
Philips  had  been  the  victim  of  an  act  of  attainder,  under 
which  he  had  actually  suffered  death.2  This  astounding 
statement  came  from  no  less  a  person  than  the  former 
attorney-general,  who  had  conducted  the  prosecution  of 
Philips  in  the  general  court  on  the  charge  of  robbery. 
Stranger  still,  Patrick  Henry  next  day  defended  the  ex- 
ecution of  Philips  under  the  attainder,  forgetting  the  reg- 
ular trial.  Randolph's  motive  in  making  his  statement 
is  evident,  for  he  was  endeavoring  to  discredit  the  Revo- 
lutionary government  of  Virginia  in  the  interest  of  the 
new  Federal  plan  by  displaying  its  tyranny  and  arbitrary 
methods.  He  probably  counted  on  Henry's  forgetfulness  of 
the  facts,  and  if  so  he  calculated  well.  The  former  gover- 
nor's memory  had  failed  him  as  to  the  trial,  but  it  was  less 
at  fault  than  might  appear.  Many  irregularities  had  oc- 
curred in  connection  with  Philips.  Will  had  been  hunted 
down  like  a  mad  dog  under  the  attainder  and  several  others 
suffered  a  like  fate.  A  slave  named  Bob,  belonging  to  the 
estate  of  James  Wilson,  had  been  tried  in  Norfolk  court  in 
August,  1778,  convicted  of  treason  and  robbery  and  exe- 
cuted; he  was  in  all  probability  a  member  of  the  Philips 

1  Tucker's  Blackstone,  i,  appendix,  293. 

2  American  Historical  Review,  I,  449. 


194         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

gang.1   It  may  well  be  that  Henry  confused  these  cases 
with  that  of  Philips  himself. 

The  destruction  of  this  band  quieted  the  uneasy  south- 
east for  a  time.  The  sternness  of  the  government  and  its 
evident  intention  to  proceed  to  extremities  in  the  case  of 
actual  insurrection  overawed  any  malcontents  who  might 
have  been  disposed  to  raise  the  British  standard. 

At  the  close  of  Patrick  Henry's  administration,  the  gov- 
ernment under  the  new  constitution  was  firmly  established. 
While  the  law  was  undergoing  radical  change  at  the  hands 
of  Jefferson,  administration  did  not  differ  much  from  the 
colonial  period.  This  continuance  of  tradition  was  due  to 
the  council,  which  conducted  the  routine  business  conserva- 
tively and  intelligently.  Unfortunately,  it  did  not  realize 
that  a  reorganization  of  the  whole  administrative  system 
was  essential  for  a  government  engaged  in  carrying  on  a 
long  and  exhausting  war. 

1  Legislative  Petitions,  Norfolk  (B4223). 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE   FALL   OP   JEFFERSON 

No  man  was  ever  more  successful  in  moving  with  the 
spirit  of  his  age  than  Jefferson,  who,  by  way  of  reward, 
received  all  the  honors  his  country  could  bestow  and  the 
veneration  of  successive  generations  of  his  countrymen.  It 
seems  hard  to  realize,  then,  that  the  great  exemplar  of 
democracy  in  the  mid-channel  of  his  career  narrowly  es- 
caped shipwreck  complete  and  utter.  That  he  did  escape 
and  finally  triumphed  was  due  not  to  dexterity  or  power  of 
will,  but  to  his  capacity  for  expressing  the  ideals  of  the  age 
in  which  he  lived.  He  survived,  not  so  much  because  he 
was  a  skillful  politician  as  because  he  was  a  vivid  writer. 

Thomas  Jefferson  was  elected  governor  of  Virginia  on 
June  12, 1779,  succeeding  Patrick  Henry,  the  first  governor 
under  the  Commonwealth,  who  retired  to  the  country  in 
broken  health.  Jefferson  had  already  succeeded  Henry 
in  something  more  important  than  the  office  itself  —  the 
leadership  of  the  progressive  or  democratic  party  in  Vir- 
ginia. He  had  changed  the  Revolution  from  a  struggle  for 
external  political  liberty  into  a  movement  for  social  re- 
form, and  in  so  doing  displaced  Henry  from  his  chieftain- 
ship. The  orator  had  sunk  into  a  secondary  place,  while 
Jefferson  had  grown  to  be  the  leading  figure  in  the  State. 
His  election  to  the  governorship  was  a  tribute  to  his  activ- 
ity as  a  revolutionist  and  reformer,  as  well  as  his  natural 
reward  as  the  head  of  the  victorious  democratic  party. 


196         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

At  the  moment  of  his  election  Jefferson  wielded  an  in- 
fluence such  as  no  Virginian  had  ever  possessed.  He  had 
carried  out  great  reforms  in  spite  of  conservative  opposi- 
tion and  had  won  the  confidence  and  support  of  the  great 
mass  of  poor  and  obscure  men  throughout  Virginia.  It  is 
likely  that  the  conservatives,  who  nominated  John  Page  to 
oppose  him,  apprehended  that  his  tenure  of  the  executive 
chair  would  result  in  a  further  extension  of  his  (to  them) 
pernicious  influence.  "In  a  virtuous  and  free  State," 
Jefferson  said  in  his  speech  of  acceptance,  "  no  rewards  can 
be  so  pleasing  to  sensible  minds,  as  those  which  include  the 
approbation  of  our  fellow  citizens.  My  great  pain  is,  lest 
my  poor  endeavors  should  fall  short  of  the  kind  expecta- 
tions of  my  country."  '  If  there  is  a  power  which  some- 
times playfully  inspires  merely  formal  utterances,  turning 
them  into  prophetic,  that  power  lay  behind  these  words. 
Never  were  the  flattering  apprehensions  of  a  successful 
candidate  on  assuming  office  better  justified.  Within  the 
short  space  of  two  years  Jefferson,  in  the  judgment  of  a 
majority  of  the  people,  had  fallen  signally  short  of  their 
expectations  and  an  investigation  of  his  administration  was 
formally  proposed  in  the  assembly. 

This  complete  reversal  of  public  opinion,  which  tumbled 
the  democratic  chieftain  from  his  great  position  to  the 
depths  of  apparent  ruin,  with  impeachment  in  sight,  re- 
sulted from  the  easy  triumphs  of  the  British  arms  in  Vir- 
ginia in  the  latter  period  of  the  war.  In  what  measure  the 
patriot  disasters  were  due  to  circumstances  that  Jefferson 
could  not  be  expected  to  control  and  to  what  extent  to  his 
own  mistakes  and  weakness  cannot  be  exactly  estimated, 
1  Journal,  House  of  Delegates  (May,  1779),  31. 


THE  FALL  OF  JEFFERSON  197 

but  an  examination  of  the  evidence  shows  that  he  was  cer- 
tainly not  free  from  blame.  Jefferson  was  bitterly  censured 
at  the  time.  Hostile  critics,  both  conservatives  and  pro- 
gressives, did  not  hesitate  to  charge  him  with  incapacity 
and  neglect,  leading  us  to  believe  that  his  own  faults  were 
at  the  bottom  of  the  military  collapse  in  Virginia  in  1781. 
On  the  other  hand,  his  worshipful  admirers,  such  as  his 
biographer,  Randall,  looking  back  at  these  events  from  the 
period  of  final  triumph  and  apotheosis,  insist  that  he  was 
wholly  the  victim  of  circumstances,  and  not,  in  the  least 
degree,  at  fault.  And  his  conduct  was  viewed  in  a  third 
light.  In  the  later  years  of  Jefferson's  career,  when  the 
unsatisf  actoriness  of  his  administration  in  Virginia  was  re- 
membered but  remembered  vaguely,  party  writers,  seeking 
ammunition  to  fire  at  him  from  their  failing  guns,  invented 
the  legend  of  his  cowardice,  because  of  his  enforced  flight 
before  the  British  army,  a  legend  which  that  writer  so 
skilled  in  misrepresentation,  Goldwin  Smith,  was  glad  to 
rake  up  against  his  memory.  "As  governor  of  Virginia  in 
the  war  he  had  shown  lack  of  nerve  if  not  of  courage."  * 
The  accusation  of  cowardice  was  hardly  contemporary  and 
may  be  dismissed,  but  the  charge  of  incompetence  and  neg- 
lect was  so  strongly  urged  and  generally  accepted  in  those 
dark  days  when  Virginia  lay  at  the  mercy  of  every  invasion 
of  the  enemy,  that  Jefferson  came  within  a  measurable 
distance  of  the  end  of  his  political  career,  since  impressions 
gained  in  a  moment  of  crisis,  however  unjust,  are  likely  to 
be  lasting.  The  question  put  is  whether  this  criticism, 
that  the  governor  failed  to  provide  for  the  defense  of  the 
Commonwealth  and  allowed  himself  to  be  caught  without 
1  The  United  States,  135. 


198         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

means  of  resistance,  was  just  in  the  main,  or  whether  he  had 
done  all  that  a  man  could  be  reasonably  expected  to  do, 
as  his  defenders  allege,  and  merely  earned  the  inevitable 
blame  poured  out  on  the  ruling  powers  when  a  state  suffers 
military  disaster. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  necessary  to  note  that  the  governor 
in  the  last  years  of  the  war  had  an  exceptionally  difficult 
position  to  fill.  After  three  years  of  constant  warfare,  the 
resources  of  the  State,  which  had  been  expended  without 
reserve  for  Washington's  army,  the  Southern  department, 
and  other  military  purposes,  were  greatly  diminished. 
Specie  was  gone,  paper  almost  worthless,  and  taxation  bore 
heavily  on  the  people,  who  by  this  time  had  lost  most  of 
their  enthusiasm  for  liberty.  The  conditions  for  making  a 
successful  resistance  to  the  British  arms  were,  therefore, 
much  less  favorable  in  1780  and  1781  than  earlier,  when  it 
is  probable  that  an  advance  on  Williamsburg  would  have 
met  with  stout  opposition.  Besides,  the  government  of 
Virginia,  unaccustomed  before  the  Revolution  to  violent 
strains,  was  so  imperfectly  organized  that  administration 
in  all  departments,  and  particularly  in  the  military,  was 
exceedingly  inefficient.  Furthermore,  the  constitutional 
limitations  of  the  governor's  authority  greatly  hampered 
his  action  in  all  crises  which  might  happen  to  coincide  with 
a  vacation  of  the  assembly,  the  one  powerful  branch  of 
government.  The  constitution-makers,  in  providing  safe- 
guards against  a  tyranny,  succeeded  in  furnishing  the 
State  with  a  weak  executive  to  carry  it  through  a  doubtful 
and  protracted  war.  Still  another  cause  contributed  to  the 
helplessness  of  the  State,  giving  the  enemy  a  chance  to 
march  and  plunder  from  one  end  to  another  absolutely 


THE  FALL  OF  JEFFERSON  199 

undisturbed.  In  the  earlier  years  of  the  war  a  respectable 
force  of  semi-regulars  had  been  maintained  in  Virginia  for 
local  defense,  but  in  1778,  owing  to  the  losses  sustained  by 
the  Virginia  regiments  in  the  Continental  line,  and  also, 
possibly,  to  economy,  the  two  State  regiments  were  sent 
northward  to  complete  the  Continental  quota;  home  de- 
fense was  left  largely  to  the  militia. 

When  these  potent  facts  are  taken  into  consideration  and 
given  their  full  weight,  it  still  certainly  appears  that  Jeffer- 
son did  not  do  all  that  an  able  and  practical  man  might 
have  done  to  prepare  for  invasion,  for  that  was  a  calamity 
which  might  have  been  seen  to  be  inevitable  once  the 
British  began  to  operate  on  a  large  scale  in  the  South.  An 
earnest  effort  to  conquer  the  South  sooner  or  later  must 
lead  to  an  attack  on  the  great  Southern  Commonwealth; 
the  warning  was  ample  and  should  have  been  heeded. 
When  the  enemy  did  come  at  last,  they  met  no  opposition 
worthy  of  the  name.  The  whole  country  lay  at  their  mercy. 

Right  here  it  is  just  to  acquit  Jefferson  of  neglect  of  duty. 
Few  more  conscientious  and  industrious  executives  ever 
lived;  he  was  always  engrossed  in  the  details  of  his  office, 
and  if  he  erred,  as  it  clearly  seems  he  did,  he  erred  from 
want  of  judgment  and  driving  power  rather  than  from  any 
lack  of  zeal  or  labor.  His  failure  to  arrange  an  adequate 
defense  of  the  State  was  apparently  due  in  large  part  to 
two  causes.  Foremost  came  Jefferson's  penchant  for  strict 
constitutionalism,  for  strict  construction  ideas  did  not 
originate  with  the  Federal  Constitution,  but  descended 
from  the  colonial  period.  The  Revolutionary  War  was 
mainly  a  war  of  strict  construction  patriots  against  broad 
construction  imperialists.  It  was  this  exaggerated  respect 


200         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

for  the  Virginia  constitution  which  prevented  Jefferson 
from  using  strong  means  of  doubtful  legality  at  times  when 
it  is  more  expedient  to  go  than  to  reflect  upon  the  exact 
order  of  the  going.  The  other  reason  for  his  failure  to  do 
his  full  duty  lay  in  his  inability  to  grasp  the  principles  on 
which  military  operations  are  successfully  conducted;  to 
the  last  Jefferson  was  a  man  quite  without  military  under- 
standing, a  deficiency  even  more  unfortunate  when  he  be- 
came President  of  the  United  States  than  it  had  been  when 
he  was  governor  of  Virginia.  Both  of  these  failings  arose 
from  the  fact  that  he  was  a  doctrinaire  and  not  a  man  of 
action;  he  was  a  shrewd  and  successful  practical  politician 
and  political  leader,  but  he  was  anything  but  a  good  ad- 
ministrator. In  agitation  the  doctrinaire  need  not  be  a 
man  of  action,  for  doctrinaires  keep  the  world  alive,  but  in 
war,  which  is  the  conflict  of  brute  force,  the  man  of  action 
is  demanded.  But  as  it  happens  Moses  frequently  occupies 
the  place  of  Joshua. 

Jefferson  owed  a  great  part  of  his  success  to  his  limita- 
tions, which,  however,  inevitably  hampered  him  in  other 
ways.  His  mind  was  exceedingly  alert  in  the  realm  of 
special  observation,  but  he  formed  his  opinions  on  general 
questions  early  in  life  and  seldom  changed  them.  Thus, 
it  is  unlikely  that  the  French  Revolution  shocked  his 
serene  faith  in  the  ultimate  truth  of  his  political  principles. 
Likewise,  he  came  early  to  the  belief  that  the  proper  defense 
of  a  free  and  virtuous  people  is  in  its  militia  rather  than  in 
trained  soliders,  an  idea  which  was  somewhat  shaken  by  his 
unhappy  Revolutionary  experience,  but  which  seems  to 
have  survived  in  him  until  the  time  of  his  Presidency.  The 
ideal  of  a  people  rising  spontaneously  to  defend  its  hearth- 


THE  FALL  OF  JEFFERSON  201 

stones  is  one  thing;  the  reality  of  a  mob  of  untrained,  half- 
armed  farmers  attempting  to  oppose  regulars  is  sadly 
different.  Jefferson  never  understood  that  efficiency  in 
war,  like  efficiency  in  everything  else,  is  only  secured  by 
preparation. 

For  the  first  year  of  his  governorship  the  democratic 
chief  had  no  very  serious  problem  to  face.  He  discharged 
the  duties  of  his  office  faithfully,  working  with  great  zeal 
to  support  the  American  armies,  North  and  South.  The 
fragmentary  records  show  him  busy  over  the  many  matters 
within  his  sphere.  They  also  illustrate  his  fundamental  in- 
capacity as  an  administrator  in  stormy  times.  The  chief 
difficulty  confronting  the  State  in  1779  was  that  of  raising 
money  to  meet  the  Continental  requisitions  and  the  ex- 
penses of  the  State  government;  heavy  taxation  was  re- 
quired. A  scientifically  managed  government  might  have 
handled  the  agricultural  resources  at  its  disposal  so  as  to 
remain  in  a  more  or  less  sound  condition,  though  the  feat 
would  have  been  difficult.  The  Virginia  treasury  was  in 
great  confusion,  and  administration  while  honest  was  un- 
economical; Virginia  paper  depreciated  much  more  than 
was  necessary,  for  the  amount  was  not  very  great  in  com- 
parison with  the  wealth  of  the  State.  In  order  to  meet  the 
emergency,  various  financial  expedients  were  tried,  among 
them  the  confiscation  of  the  estates  of  royalists  and  the 
debts  due  British  merchants.  But  in  order  to  enforce  land 
sales,  vigorous  governmental  action  was  imperative.  This 
was  not  forthcoming,  as  Jefferson's  letter  to  the  assembly 
in  October,  1779,  shows:  — 

It  becomes  my  duty  to  guard  the  Assembly  against  relying 
in  their  calculations  for  any  great  &  immediate  supplies  from 


202        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

hence,  facts  have  come  to  our  notice  which  give  great  reason  to 
believe  that  the  traverse  and  other  pleadings  justly  allowed  by 
the  law  for  saving  the  rights  of  those  who  have  real  or  probable 
appearance  of  right  is  perverted  to  frustrate  or  delay  the  effects, 
by  being  put  in  on  grounds  either  frivolous  or  false  and  by  that 
means  throwing  the  subject  into  a  course  of  legal  contestation 
which  under  the  load  of  business  now  in  the  doquet  of  the  general 
court,  may  not  be  terminated  in  the  present  age,  in  one  instance 
we  are  certified  by  the  clerk  of  the  general  Court  that  the  estate 
is  claimed  by  the  Steward:  tho'  this  very  man  undertook  to  act 
as  Commissioner  of  the  Estate  under  the  sequestration  law  by 
our  appointment,  &  has  himself  personally  rendered  annual  ac- 
counts to  us  of  the  proceeds  of  the  estate  as  the  estate  of  a 
British  subject;  yet  his  claim,  palpably  false  as  it  is,  in  order  to 
obtain  the  ceremony  of  being  adjudged  so,  is  to  go  through  all 
the  formalities  of  regular  litigation,  before  the  estate  can  be  ex- 
posed to  sale.  ...  I  thought  it  my  duty  to  guard  the  General 
Assembly  against  any  deception  in  their  expectations  from  these 
funds.1 

This  letter  is  honorable  to  Jefferson  in  that  it  shows  the 
republican  magistrate  determined  to  act  with  strict  legality 
under  all  circumstances,  but  at  the  same  time  this  fear  of 
taking  the  initiative,  this  dependence  upon  the  legislature 
for  vigorous  action  in  war-time  had  serious  drawbacks.  The 
governor  could  not  or  would  not  put  pressure  on  the  courts 
to  proceed  rapidly  with  the  confiscation  cases,  and  mean- 
time the  State  went  lacking  a  fund  which  must  come  to  it 
eventually  and  which  was  badly  needed  at  the  moment. 
Nothing  could  better  show  Jefferson's  passion  for  legality 
and  his  incapacity  for  swift  and  direct  means. 

The  finances  of  the  State  were  in  bad  condition.  On 
May  20,  1780,  sixteen  counties  of  the  sixty-odd  had  not 

1  Executive  communications,  1779. 


THE  FALL  OF  JEFFERSON  203 

paid  the  taxes  due  in  the  fall  of  1779,  and  nine  others  had 
returned  no  assessments,  but  had  paid  in  part,  while  eight 
more  had  neither  returned  assessments  nor  paid  anything. 
In  other  words,  thirty-three  of  the  counties  —  half  the 
State  —  had  failed  to  meet  their  obligations,  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  the  demands  made  on  Virginia  for  the  support 
of  the  Northern  army  were  now  supplemented  by  calls 
to  aid  the  South.  So  bad  was  the  financial  situation  that 
the  committee  of  ways  and  means  of  the  House  of  Dele- 
gates, on  November  27,  1779,  proposed  radical  retrench- 
ment:— 

The  deranged  state  of  the  army,  and  the  ruinous  situation  of 
the  navy,  hath  greatly  enhanced  the  expense  of  maintaining  the 
one,  &  subtracted  from  that  little  defence  which  was  expected 
to  be  derived  from  the  other;  whilst  the  accumulated  charge  of 
both,  creates  an  article  of  expenditure  which  hath  already  re- 
duced your  finances  to  difficulty,  and  is  too  enormous  to  be 
supported. 

The  committee  recommended  a  reduction  of  the  number 
of  ships  in  the  navy,  of  commands  in  the  army  and  of 
officers,  without  a  reduction  in  the  number  of  privates. 
Recruiting  was  to  cease  and  the  existing  force  was  to  con- 
tinue at  the  least  possible  expense.1 

Jefferson  was  thus  forced  to  struggle  with  an  economiz- 
ing legislature  if  he  wished  to  increase  or  even  save  the 
Virginia  military  establishment.  If  he  had  so  struggled 
and  failed,  the  blame  would  not  have  been  his,  but  the 
assembly's;  as  a  matter  of  fact,  he  made  no  opposition,  at 
least  no  recorded  opposition,  to  this  niggardly  and  suicidal 
folly.  He  either  bowed  before  the  assembly's  will,  or,  as  is 
1  Executive  communications,  1779. 


204        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

likely,  failed  to  realize  the  importance  of  building  up  the 
Virginia  forces;  or,  as  is  possible,  he  believed  that  the 
American  armies  could  not  be  supported  while  the  local 
defense  was  strengthened.  If  so,  he  paid  a  great  price  for 
his  mistake. 

Yet  it  must  be  noted  in  justice  to  him  that  he  did  what 
he  could  without  taking  any  action  vigorous  or  aggressive 
enough  to  produce  genuine  results.  He  worked  to  raise  and 
equip  recruits  for  the  South,  now  seriously  threatened  by 
the  British,  and  also  attempted  to  establish  a  gun-factory 
on  the  James  River  of  a  size  sufficient  to  supply  the  great 
demand  for  arms.  He  proposed  to  the  governors  of  North 
and  South  Carolina  to  divide  the  great  Cherokee  hinter- 
land into  three  jurisdictions,  in  order  effectually  to  suppress 
those  troublesome  Indians,  a  much  more  practical  solution 
of  frontier  difficulties  than  the  sending  of  expeditions  by 
the  individual  States  against  the  whole  scattered  nation. 
He  wrote  to  the  French  minister  assuring  him  that  prepara- 
tion would  be  made  to  receive  and  support  a  French  de- 
tachment in  Virginia.  In  a  letter  to  Samuel  Huntingdon 
he  enumerated  the  difficulties  of  providing  an  adequate 
force  even  for  the  guarding  of  the  Saratoga  prisoners :  — 

We  have  hitherto  been  unable  to  raise  more  than  about  the 
half  of  a  Battalion  of  infantry  for  guarding  the  Convention 
Troops  at  the  same  Post.  The  deficiencies  have  been  endeavored 
to  be  supplied  with  Militia.  Congress  have  had  too  much  experi- 
ence of  the  radical  defects  and  inconveniences  of  militia  service 
to  need  any  enumerating  them.  Our  assembly,  now  sitting,  have 
in  contemplation  to  put  the  garrison  regiment  on  such  a  footing 
as  gives  us  hopes  of  filling  it  by  the  next  summer.  In  the  mean- 
time a  Battalion  which  we  are  raising  for  our  immediate  defence 
may  be  spared  to  do  garrison  duty  this  winter,  and  as  but  a  small 


THE  FALL  OF  JEFFERSON  205 

part  of  it  is  raised  as  yet,  and  not  probable  that  it  will  be  com- 
pleted within  any  short  time,  we  suppose  that  with  Colo.  Taylor's 
regiment  it  will  not  exceed  the  number  required  to  guard  the 
Troops.1 

Furthermore,  Jefferson,  on  November  30,  1779,  antici- 
pated his  famous  policy  of  later  days  by  laying  an  embargo 
on  provisions  in  order  to  avoid  supplying  the  enemy  and  to 
secure  food  for  the  American  armies.2  This  proclamation 
was  in  no  wise  a  stretching  of  the  gubernatorial  authority, 
since  the  governor  enjoyed  a  warrant  from  the  assembly. 
In  a  letter  to  Congress  about  the  same  time  he  laid  bare 
the  pressing  need  of  means  of  defense  and  apologized  for 
retaining  five  thousand  stands  of  arms  intended  for  Con- 
gress, on  the  ground  that  they  were  sorely  needed  in  Vir- 
ginia, where  the  arsenal  had  no  more  than  three  thousand 
muskets  on  hand. 

From  this  evidence  it  is  apparent  that  Virginia  was  in  a 
serious  condition  in  1779,  both  financially  and  from  the 
point  of  view  of  military  equipment,  and  while  Jefferson 
zealously  grappled  with  the  great  task  to  which  he  had  been 
called,  we  lack  in  him  any  urgent  realization  of  the  dangers 
of  the  situation  or  knowledge  of  remedies.  His  messages  to 
the  assembly  dealt  with  details,  failing  to  convey  what  they 
should  have  accurately  and  forcefully  done  —  an  account 
of  the  weakness  and  unpreparedness  of  the  State  and  pro- 
posals for  drastic  military  measures.  Jefferson  enjoyed 
great  influence  with  the  legislature,  which  had  elected  him 
governor  and  looked  to  him  for  advice,  and  it  probably 
would  have  extended  his  powers  to  meet  the  occasion  or 
adopted  effective  means  of  raising  money  and  supplies. 
1  Writings  of  Jefferson  (Ford),  n,  277.  2  Ibid.,  n,  281. 


206        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

Anyway,  he  should  have  pleaded  for  a  stronger  policy,  and 
he  did  not  do  so. 

Not  only  did  the  governor  fail  to  understand  the  State's 
danger;  he  also  failed  to  introduce  order  into  the  adminis- 
tration. It  is  true  that  the  colonial  system  had  been  slack 
and  that  Patrick  Henry  had  done  nothing  to  inaugurate 
better  accounting  and  administrative  methods,  but  Henry 
was  an  orator  and  Jefferson  a  man  of  affairs  with  a  liking  for 
details.  Confusion  reigned  in  the  government.  Accounts 
were  badly  kept,  taxes  went  unpaid  if  pressure  were  needed 
to  secure  payment  and  were  clumsily  and  expensively  col- 
lected at  best,  the  currency  was  hopelessly  depreciated,  the 
troops  and  the  navy  ate  large  quantities  of  provisions  and 
drank  hogsheads  of  taffia  without  being  of  much  service; 
an  army  of  commissaries  and  recruiting  officers  supported 
themselves  on  the  State  by  sheer  plunder.  Perhaps  the 
evils  were  too  great  to  be  remedied;  perhaps  Jefferson  be- 
lieved that  he  lacked  the  legal  right  to  bring  order  out  of 
this  chaos;  at  all  events,  he  found  out  later  to  his  cost  that 
the  people  hold  the  executive  responsible,  however  power- 
less the  constitution  may  have  endeavored  to  make  him. 
It  would  have  been  a  great,  perhaps  an  impossible,  task  to 
provide  an  adequate  defense  for  the  State,  but  Jefferson 
seems  not  to  have  made  the  effort.  A  situation  is  bad  when 
all  men  feel  it  to  be  so  and  all  men  felt  the  situation  to 
be  bad  in  1780.  For  one  thing,  efficiency  in  the  military 
department  was  made  impossible  by  the  division  of  ad- 
ministration among  several  branches  of  government  —  the 
governor  and  council,  the  board  of  war  and  the  assembly, 
which  last  alone  had  the  power  to  do  anything  effective. 
The  board  of  war,  although  entrusted  with  important 


THE  FALL  OF  JEFFERSON  207 

executive  functions,  consisted  of  an  unpaid  commission  of 
three  men.  This  body,  aware  of  the  growing  criticism  of 
military  management,  asked  the  House  of  Delegates  in 
December,  1779,  for  pay  and  authority.  Thereupon  the 
legislature  voted  the  board  of  war  salaries  and  ordered  it 
to  report  to  the  governor,  which  it  had  not  done  formerly. 
These  changes  do  not  seem  to  have  resulted  in  any  improve- 
ment, and  the  board  was  abolished  at  the  most  critical 
period  of  1781.  Finally,  military  affairs  were  turned  over 
to  an  ex-line  officer,  William  Davies,  who  conducted  them 
with  much  more  ability  than  had  been  the  case  before. 

Board  of  war  and  governor  were  incapable  alike  in  war 
administration.  It  never  seems  to  have  occurred  to 
Jefferson  that  a  small,  well-drilled  force  would  have  been 
less  expensive  and  also  much  more  useful  than  militia;  cer- 
tainly he  did  not  suggest  the  raising  of  such  a  body.  He 
complained,  indeed,  of  the  difficulty  of  securing  recruits, 
but  made  no  mention  in  1779  of  draughting,  a  power  which 
the  assembly  had  every  right  to  exercise  if  the  governor 
did  not.  He  seems  to  have  thought  no  other  military  system 
possible  except  the  old  one  of  calling  out  crowds  of  the 
rawest  militia  when  some  action  was  imperative,  supplying 
them  with  arms,  which  they  usually  failed  to  return,  and 
supporting  them  by  wasteful  requisitioning.  The  militia 
called  out  for  every  alarm  devoured  quantities  of  food  and 
rum  which  would  have  kept  a  small  force  permanently  fed 
and  in  good-humor. 

Jefferson's  action  in  December,  1779,  when  a  rumor  of  a 
projected  British  invasion  reached  him,  explains  both  his 
weakness  as  an  executive  and  the  reason  for  the  total  sur- 
prise he  suffered  just  a  year  later  at  the  time  of  Arnold's 


208        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

descent.    Speaking  of  the  rumored  raid  he  wrote  to  the 
Speaker  of  the  House :  — 

It  is  our  duty  to  provide  against  every  event  and  the  Executive 
are  accordingly  engaged  in  concerting  proper  means  of  defence. 
Among  others  we  think  an  immediate  force  from  the  militia  to 
defend  the  post  at  York,  and  to  take  a  proper  post  on  the  South 
side  of  James  river,  but  the  expence,  the  difficulties  which  attend 
a  general  call  of  militia  into  the  field,  the  disgust  it  gives  them 
more  especially  when  they  find  no  enemy  in  place,  and  the  ex- 
treme rigor  of  the  season,  induce  us  to  refer  to  the  decision  of  the 
general  assembly,  whether  we  shall  on  the  intelligence  already 
received  &  now  communicated  to  them,  call  a  competent  force  of 
militia  to  oppose  the  numbers  of  the  enemy  spoken  of;  or  whether 
we  shall  make  ready  all  orders  &  prepare  other  circumstances, 
but  omit  actually  issuing  these  orders  till  the  enemy  appear  or 
we  have  further  proof  of  their  intentions?  The  Assembly  will 
also  please  to  determine  whether,  in  case  the  enemy  should  make 
a  lodgment  in  the  country,  it  would  be  expedient  to  avail  our- 
selves of  the  laudable  zeal  which  may  prevail  on  their  first  land- 
ing and  inlist  a  sufficient  number  to  oppose  them  &  continue  in 
service  during  the  invasion  or  for  any  other  term.  Perhaps  it  may 
not  be  amiss  to  suggest  to  the  assembly  the  tardiness  of  collect- 
ing even  small  numbers  of  men  by  divisions,  that  if  any  better 
method  should  occur  to  them  they  may  prescribe  it.  The  present 
state  of  the  Treasury  in  more  points  than  one,  will  no  doubt  be 
thought  an  absolute  obstacle  to  every  endeavor  which  may  be 
necessary.1 

Here  we  have  the  executive  asking  the  advice  of  the  legis- 
lature as  to  proper  war  measures;  it  was  a  subject  on  which 
a  body  of  politicians  without  military  knowledge  or  ex- 
perience was  not  likely  to  prove  illuminating.  In  April, 
1780,  he  wrote  to  Washington:  — 

1  Ford,  ii,  289.  ' 


THE  FALL  OF  JEFFERSON  209 

The  state  of  the  recruiting  business  in  this  Country  is  as 
follows :  There  are  some  draughted  soldiers  in  the  different  parts 
of  the  Country,  but  they  are  so  far,  so  disposed,  &  enlisted  for  so 
short  a  time  that  we  have  not  thought  them  worth  the  expense 
of  gathering  up.1 

This  defenseless  and  hopeless  condition  would  have  been 
excusable  if  inescapable.  But  in  1779-80,  Virginia,  while 
much  reduced  by  the  war,  still  possessed  large  resources, 
as  the  immense  damage  soon  after  inflicted  by  the  British 
showed.  There  was  still  much  tobacco,  flour,  and  beef  in 
the  country,  which  the  legislature,  in  the  absence  of  money, 
might  have  requisitioned  and  sent  to  France  in  payment 
for  arms;  the  enemy  maintained  no  very  effective  blockade, 
and  intercourse  between  Virginia  and  Europe  was  fairly 
safe.  Certainly  it  was  suicidal  to  await  events  without 
making  the  effort  to  secure  men  and  arms.  The  fall  of 
Charleston  brought  the  menace  of  invasion  nearer  and  cost 
the  State  her  only  efficient  troops,  surrendered  with  the 
garrison.  The  assembly,  realizing  at  last  the  critical  con- 
dition of  Virginia,  passed  vigorous  acts;  the  cavalry  regi- 
ments and  the  Continental  quota  were  ordered  filled  by 
militia  draughts,  and  the  governor  was  given  authority  to 
call  twenty  thousand  militia  into  the  field  —  one  half  of 
the  available  number  —  in  case  the  State  should  be  in- 
vaded. He  was  also  empowered  to  impress  provisions  and 
other  articles,  to  lay  an  embargo  and  provide  magazines 
and  public  stores  —  in  short,  his  powers  were  increased  to 
such  an  extent  that  efficiency  in  the  government  might  be 
hoped  for.  The  assembly  exacted  still  heavier  taxes  and 
ground  out  new  emissions  of  paper  money  to  swell  the  mass 
1  Ford,  n,  301. 


210        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

of  worthless  currency.  For  the  encouraging  of  these  ef- 
forts Washington  sent  one  of  his  subordinates,  Muhlen- 
berg, from  the  Continental  army.  This  officer,  a  man  of 
some  energy,  exerted  himself  to  collect  recruits  and  is  said 
to  have  first  suggested  a  conscription  law  to  the  Virginia 
government,1  which  later  adopted  it.  Chesterfield  Court- 
House,  the  training-camp,  soon  contained  a  number  of 
recruits  of  fairly  good  quality,  though  lacking  supplies  and 
clothing.  The  assembly  decided  to  draught  three  thousand 
men,  who  were  sorely  needed  after  the  fall  of  Charleston 
and  the  loss  of  the  Virginia  line. 

Jefferson's  correspondence  through  this  period  shows  him 
to  have  been  hard-working,  zealous,  and  generally  sensible, 
and  his  eagerness  to  pay  Congressional  requisitions  was 
noteworthy.  But  his  strict  constitutionalism  hampered  his 
whole  course.  In  spite  of  his  enlarged  powers,  he  thought 
that  every  measure  of  importance  must  have  the  sanction 
of  the  assembly,  and  the  assembly  could  not  be  summoned 
every  few  weeks  in  special  session  in  order  to  legalize  his 
acts.  "The  time  necessary  for  convening  the  legislature 
of  such  a  State,"  he  wrote,  "adds  to  the  tardiness  of  the 
remedy,  and  the  measure  itself  is  so  oppressive  on  the 
members  as  to  discourage  the  attempting  it,  but  in  the  last 
emergencies."  Untiring  and  honest  as  Jefferson  was,  he 
lacked  the  quality  of  assuming  responsibility  in  a  crisis;  he 
needed  outside  initiative  and  bolstering  up. 

Gates's  defeat  at  Camden  in  September,  1780,  came  as  a 
heavy  blow  to  the  government;  the  Virginia  militia  was 
scattered  to  the  winds  with  great  loss  of  arms  and  equip- 
ment. The  militia  exhibited  such  agility  in  getting  off  the 

1  H.  A.  Muhlenberg's  Life  of  Major-General  Peter  Muhlenberg,  187. 


THE  FALL  OF  JEFFERSON  211 

field  that  few  of  them,  unfortunately,  were  killed.  The 
Virginia  magazine  was  practically  stripped  at  this  time,  but 
Congress  stepped  into  the  breach  with  a  loan  of  three  thou- 
sand muskets.  Shortly  after  the  battle  Jefferson  wrote  to 
Gates:  "We  shall  exert  every  nerve  to  assist  you  in  every 
way  in  our  power,  being  as  we  are  without  any  money  in  ye 
Treasury,  or  any  prospect  of  more  till  the  Assembly  meets 
in  Octr."  *  Under  such  circumstances  a  called  session  might 
have  been  advisable,  for  the  danger  was  pressing.  Indeed, 
the  government  of  Jefferson  to  be  efficient  demanded  either 
a  continuous  session  of  the  assembly,  or  a  very  great  and 
definite  increase  in  the  governor's  authority.  A  born  execu- 
tive would  have  demanded  or  assumed  power,  but  Jefferson 
could  not  bring  himself  to  this  aggression.  His  constitu- 
tional scruples  or  a  certain  indecision  of  character  pre- 
vented him. 

In  the  middle  of  October,  1780,  Virginia  became  a  scene 
of  invasion,  when  a  British  force  landed  at  Portsmouth 
and  advanced  tentatively  inland.  Muhlenberg,  with  such 
recruits  as  he  was  able  to  collect,  together  with  a  militia 
command  of  about  one  thousand  men  under  Thomas 
Nelson,  Jr.,  headed  the  only  defense  of  the  State.  The 
preacher-general,  however,  by  energetic  efforts  succeeded 
at  last  in  getting  together  a  tolerably  respectable  array 
of  several  thousand  men,  sufficiently  imposing  in  size  to 
check  the  enemy,  who  appeared  reluctant  to  leave  their 
base  very  far  in  the  rear.  The  moral  of  Muhlenberg's  suc- 
cessful levy  is  that  the  people  of  Virginia,  despite  the  dis- 
illusioning effects  of  prolonged  war  and  the  government's 
lack  of  force  and  character,  were  not  actually  averse  from 
1  Ford,  n,  333. 


212        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

military'  service  and  could  still  be  rallied  to  the  standards 
in  considerable  numbers  by  popular  and  energetic  officers, 
provided  they  were  allowed  abundance  of  time.  But  it  was 
even  more  apparent  that  the  Virginia  militia  could  not  be 
got  into  the  field  in  time  to  check  a  quickly  conducted  raid 
into  the  interior.  This  lesson  the  British  put  into  practice 
the  following  year. 

The  invader  Leslie  finally  sailed  away,  giving  the  State  a 
brief  breathing-spell.  Breathing-spell  it  could  only  be,  for 
the  intention  of  carrying  the  war  into  Virginia  was  so  ap- 
parent that  William  Lee,  writing  from  Europe,  had  warned 
Jefferson  of  it.  But  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  a  return 
of  the  enemy  was  practically  assured  and  might  be  looked 
for  at  any  moment,  nothing  was  done  to  provide  a  per- 
manent force  of  troops;  the  whole  militia  gathering  was 
allowed  to  go  home.  It  must  be  added,  though,  that  the 
difficulty  of  keeping  militia  in  the  field  more  than  a  few 
weeks  was  very  great.  This  was  largely  due  to  an  absolute 
want  of  understanding  of  war.  Men  called  into  the  army 
nowadays  go  expecting  to  serve  for  some  time;  men  in  the 
Revolutionary  days  went  out  to  shoot  their  blunderbusses 
and  rifles  at  the  enemy  if  there  chanced  to  be  an  enemy  and 
then  expected  to  return  home  to  get  in  the  hay.  Having  no 
knowledge  of  war,  they  could  not  understand  that  it  might 
be  well  to  stay  in  service  and  learn  something  about  it.  As 
the  militia  could  only  be  brought  out  with  difficulty  and 
after  some  time,  and  as  the  government  had  absolutely 
nothing  else  to  depend  on  in  case  of  need,  a  speedy  courier 
service  was  essential;  it  must  get  intelligence  of  a  raid  at 
the  earliest  possible  hour.  This  courier  service  was  needed 
in  only  one  line,  from  Hampton  Roads  to  Richmond,  be- 


THE  FALL  OF  JEFFERSON  213 

cause  the  enemy  could  not  make  a  sudden  descent  except 
by  Chesapeake  Bay.  A  partial  and  imperfect  intelligence 
system  had  existed  earlier,  but  Jefferson  discontinued  it,  so 
that  the  government  had  no  other  means  of  gaining  infor- 
mation than  what  private  patriotism  might  supply.  The 
governor's  attention  was  drawn,  in  the  closing  weeks  of 
1780,  to  a  distant  and,  under  the  circumstances,  imprac- 
tical operation  —  George  Rogers  Clark's  proposed  expedi- 
tion against  Detroit.  This  was  designed  primarily  as  a 
defensive  measure  for  the  frontier,  but  the  frontier,  while 
harassed  by  the  Indians,  was  in  nothing  like  so  much 
danger  as  the  east,  where  an  English  army  might  appear 
at  any  moment. 

The  blow  fell  at  last,  taking  Jefferson,  as  might  have  been 
expected,  quite  unawares.  He  received  information  that  a 
fleet  had  been  seen  off  Willoughby  Point  two  days  before.1 
The  news  did  not  come  directly  to  the  governor,  but  to 
Thomas  Nelson,  who  intermittently  commanded  the  mili- 
tia when  it  was  in  the  field  and  lived  quietly  at  home  in 
the  intervals.  Jefferson,  uncertain  whether  the  fleet  was 
French  or  British,  procrastinated  several  days  and  failed  to 
issue  a  militia  call  until  January  2,  when  he  got  definite 
intelligence  that  the  ships  were  hostile.  If,  as  in  October, 
1780,  the  British  had  waited  in  the  vicinity  of  Norfolk  for 
a  week  or  two  and  engaged  in  robbing  near-by  plantations, 
—  which  was  probably  what  Jefferson  expected,  —  there 
would  have  been  time  enough  to  raise  a  force  of  militia  and 
give  it  a  crude  organization.  But  Benedict  Arnold,  who 
commanded  the  detachment,  upset  all  calculations  by  mov- 
ing up  the  James  River  with  such  celerity  as  to  reveal  the 
1  Ford,  ii,  392. 


214'       THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

utter  unpreparedness  of  Virginia.  On  January  4,  1781,  the 
enemy  neared  Richmond,  and  now  that  it  was  too  late 
Jefferson  made  hurried  demands  for  the  militia  of  whole 
counties,  besides  working  hard  to  save  the  stores  in  town. 
He  even  had  a  horse  fall  under  him  from  fatigue.  The  next 
day,  January  5,  the  British  reached  the  capital  of  Virginia, 
which  they  plundered  for  two  days;  when  they  had  finished, 
they  fell  back  down  the  James.  Several  thousand  militia 
had  at  length  gathered,  a  force  which  might  have  saved 
Richmond  if  raised  a  few  days  earlier,  as  Arnold's  com- 
mand was  small  and  composed  of  inferior  troops.  The 
enemy,  without  meeting  molestation,  slowly  withdrew  to 
Portsmouth,  where  they  encamped.  They  left  behind  them 
not  only  ruin,  but  bitter  humiliation.  Jefferson  had,  with- 
out doubt,  done  his  best,  but  that  was  not  all  that  a  clear- 
headed man  of  action  might  have  done.  "For  want  of  in- 
telligence," he  wrote,  "may  be  ascribed  a  great  part  of,  if 
not  the  whole  of  the  Enemy's  late  successful  incursions  to 
this  place."  *  But,  obviously,  the  government  was  at  fault 
in  not  securing  the  means  of  gaining  intelligence.  In  war 
the  enemy  does  not  come  with  letters  of  introduction. 

To  provide  for  the  invasion  the  governor  had  ordered  out 
militia  from  twenty-three  counties,  amounting  on  paper  to 
nearly  five  thousand  men,  though  arms  were  lacking  for  a 
large  number.  Baron  Steuben  had  now  superseded  Muh- 
lenberg as  Continental  commander  in  the  State,  but  this 
was  not  an  especially  fortunate  change;  the  foreign  soldier 
did  not  understand  the  peculiarities  of  the  native  Virginian 
and  was  more  of  a  drillmaster  than  general  or  administra- 
tor. Arnold  had  established  himself  at  Portsmouth  and  was 
*  Ford,  ii,  417. 


THE  FALL  OF  JEFFERSON  215 

always  to  be  feared;  fortunately  for  the  Americans,  the 
British  commander-in-chief  preferred  an  arrogant,  thick- 
headed regulation  officer  like  Phillips  to  the  brilliant 
traitor.  Notwithstanding  the  grave  danger  threatening 
the  State  and  the  chaotic  condition  of  things  in  Virginia, 
Jefferson  wrote,  on  January  16,  1781:  "It  shall  be  my  en- 
deavor to  suffer  this  invasion  to  divert  as  little  as  possible 
of  our  Supplies  for  the  Southern  Army."  1  This  sentiment 
was  eminently  patriotic,  but  not  equally  practical.  Indeed, 
one  of  the  most  trenchant  criticisms  passed  on  Jefferson  was 
that  he  sacrificed  the  State  for  the  sake  of  the  Southern 
army,  which  was  so  far  true  that  Virginia,  after  the  junc- 
tion of  Arnold  and  Cornwallis,  was  in  greater  immediate 
danger  than  the  South.  The  conquest  of  Virginia  in  1781, 
with  her  resources,  would  probably  have  meant  the  down- 
fall of  the  American  cause.  Overmastering  circumstances 
compelled  Jefferson  to  give  first  place  to  home  needs,  and 
on  January  19  he  directed  the  manager  of  the  lead  mines  to 
send  all  the  lead  on  hand  to  Richmond  instead  of  one  half 
to  the  South  as  he  had  previously  ordered.2  Even  in  the 
crisis  Jefferson  the  legalist  showed  forth.  The  assembly  had 
passed  an  act  for  requisitioning  food,  clothing,  and  wagons 
within  a  certain  time  limit.  This  limit  had  expired  when 
the  governor,  in  disregard,  wrote  to  the  leading  magistrates 
in  the  various  counties  directing  the  levying  of  the  requisi- 
tion in  case  the  supplies  had  not  yet  been  procured:  — 

Could  any  legal  scruples  arise  as  to  this  there  would  be  no 

doubt  that  the  ensuing  Assembly  influenced  by  the  necessity  that 

induced  them  to  press  the  Act  would  give  their  Sanction  to  its 

Execution  though  at  a  later  Date  than  is  prescribed.  .  .  .  The 

1  Governor's  Letter-Book  (1781),  26.  2  Ibid.,  43. 


216        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

Time  of  doing  this  is  a  Circumstance  only  and  the  Principle  is 
sound  both  in  Law  and  Policy.  Substance  and  Circumstance  is 
to  be  regarded  while  we  have  so  many  Foes  in  our  bowels  and 
environing  us  on  every  Side.  He  is  a  bad  citizen  who  can  enter- 
tain a  doubt  whether  the  law  will  justify  him  in  saving  his  Coun- 
try or  who  will  Scruple  to  risk  himself  in  support  of  the  spirit 
of  a  Law  where  unavoidable  Accidents  have  prevented  a  literal 
compliance  with  it. 

So  far  Jefferson  would  go  in  illegality,  but  no  farther.  On 
January  23,  1781,  he  ordered  a  meeting  of  the  assembly  for 
March  1,  1781,  instead  of  the  date  to  which  it  stood  ad- 
journed, with  an  explanation  of  the  critical  condition  of 
affairs  and  the  desperate  need  of  money  and  troops.1  Some 
legislative  aid,  he  declared,  was  necessary  for  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  acts  for  securing  recruits  and  supplies.  Acts 
upon  acts  needed  to  enforce  anything  do  not  bespeak  a 
strong  administration. 

He  presently  gave  another  illustration  of  his  dependence 
on  the  assembly,  which  was  more  commendable  in  peace 
than  in  the  midst  of  a  war  ever  growing  more  doubtful 
and  dangerous.  The  State's  crying  need  was  a  regular  mili- 
tary force,  and  efforts  to  fill  this  want,  including  conscrip- 
tion, had  failed,  partially  because  the  government  would 
do  nothing  harsh.  A  former  officer  in  the  Continental  line, 
Alexander  Spotswood,  now  came  forward  with  a  plan  for 
raising  a  mixed  command  of  infantry  and  cavalry  for  the 
State  service  under  Continental  regulations.  This  legion 
was  to  be  called  into  the  field  for  an  indefinite  period  for  in- 
struction and  in  case  of  actual  invasion,  but  should  remain 
at  home  on  furlough  when  not  needed.2  The  plan  might  not 
have  worked,  but  it  offered  a  great  advantage  over  the 
1  Ford,  ii,  434.  2  Executive  communications,  1781. 


THE  FALL  OF  JEFFERSON  217 

militia  system  by  providing  a  well-equipped  force  prepared 
to  remain  in  service  for  a  considerable  length  of  time,  and 
at  least  it  deserved  a  trial  in  the  absence  of  better  sugges- 
tions. But  Jefferson  wrote  Spotswood:  — 

I  received  your  favour  containing  a  proposition  for  raising  a 
Legion  for  the  defence  of  the  State :  as  there  are  several  parts  of 
it  which  are  beyond  the  powers  of  the  executive  to  stipulate  I 
shall  do  myself  the  pleasure  of  laying  it  before  the  Genl.  Assembly 
whom  we  have  been  obliged  to  convene  on  the  first  of  March 
next.1 

Thus  was  cold  water  thrown  on  a  plan  which  might  have 
furnished  the  State  an  organization  of  some  value  in  the 
trying  times  soon  to  follow.  Apparently  Jefferson  did  not 
understand  that  a  delay  of  a  month  or  two  in  war-time  may 
be  a  serious  matter;  he  could  not  be  unconstitutional  in 
any  emergency. 

The  following  weeks  were  full  of  labor  for  him.  Greene 
and  Cornwallis  steadily  moved  towards  Virginia  and  it  was 
evident  that  another  and  much  more  serious  invasion  was 
imminent.  Jefferson  made  every  exertion  to  strengthen 
Greene;  he  summoned  the  militia  in  great  numbers  to  join 
the  latter  and  abandoned  conscription  for  the  Continental 
army  in  the  mean  while.  The  government  supplied  the 
levies  with  necessaries  under  an  act  imposing  a  tax  levied  in 
tobacco  and  provisions.  At  the  same  time  the  militia  of  the 
eastern  counties  was  called  to  Williamsburg  to  cooperate 
with  the  French,  who  had  put  in  their  appearance  in 
Chesapeake  Bay.  The  executive  message  to  the  assembly 
when  it  met  in  March,  1781,  outlined  the  situation,  but 
made  no  pressing  recommendations.  The  legislature  quite 
1  Letter-Book  (1781),  61. 


218        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

failed  to  rise  to  the  need,  merely  ordering  the  raising  of  two 
legions  on  Spotswood's  plan  and  creating  more  paper 
money.  Jefferson,  who  realized  the  danger  little  better  than 
the  lawmakers,  seems  to  have  been  satisfied  with  this 
entirely  inadequate  provision.  On  March  3,  1781,  he 
showed  that  he  had  failed  to  grasp  the  situation  in  a  letter 
he  wrote  to  the  North  Carolina  assembly:  — 

I  assure  you  that  we  have  been  so  very  far  from  entertaining 
an  idea  of  witholding  succours  from  you  on  account  of  the  invasion 
of  our  State  that  it  had  been  determined  that  the  regular  Troops 
raised  &  not  at  that  time  marched  should  nevertheless  proceed 
to  your  assistance  &  that  we  would  oppose  the  Army  in  our  own 
country  with  militia.1 

This  policy,  wise  enough  as  long  as  Greene  stood  between 
Virginia  and  Cornwallis,  became  highly  disadvantageous 
when  Greene  elected  to  march  South  and  leave  Virginia  to 
the  defense  of  the  militia,  which  even  Jefferson  by  this  time 
had  somewhat  lost  faith  in. 

The  governor,  aware  that  affairs  were  anything  but 
right,  did  not  know  how  to  better  them.  He  himself  ex- 
plained to  Lafayette  the  weakness  of  his  government  when 
the  latter  was  ordered  to  Virginia  as  the  Continental  com- 
mander there:  — 

Mild  Laws,  a  People  not  used  to  prompt  obedience,  a  want  of 
provisions  of  War  &  means  of  procuring  them  render  our  orders 
often  ineffectual,  oblige  us  to  temporize  &  when  we  cannot 
accomplish  our  object  in  one  way  to  attempt  it  in  another.2 

"Oblige  us  to  temporize!"    This  is  a  picture  of  the 
democratic  leader  afraid  of  sternness  rather  than  of  the 
strong  executive  who  uses  severe  remedies  for  desperate 
1  Ford,  n,  479.  *  Ibid.,  n,  493. 


THE  FALL  OF  JEFFERSON  219 

diseases.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  temper  of  the  people  until 
the  beginning  of  1781  was  generally  loyal,  and  sacrifices 
were  often  willingly  made.  Illustrating  this  is  a  statement 
of  Jefferson's,  made  to  Richard  Henry  Lee  in  connection 
with  the  power  of  requisitioning  horses  given  a  certain 
quartermaster:  — 

He  applied  for  militia  to  aid  him  in  the  execution  of  the  powers. 
We  knew  that  an  armed  force  to  impress  horses  was  unnecessary 
as  it  was  new.  The  fact  has  been,  that  our  citizens,  so  far  from 
requiring  an  armed  force  for  this  purpose,  have  parted  from  their 
horses  too  easily,  by  delivering  them  to  every  man  who  said  he 
was  riding  on  public  business,  and  assumed  a  right  of  impressing.1 

And  several  months  later,  on  May  30,  1781,  Major  John 
Nelson  wrote  Jefferson:  — 

When  in  Carolina,  I  did  myself  the  honor  to  write  to  you 
respecting  the  4th  Troop  of  Horse  which  was  originally  voted  to 
be  raised  for  my  Corps,  &  afterwards  disbanded;  the  Want  of 
Cavalry  at  present  induces  me,  once  more,  to  request  that  it  may 
now  be  recruited;  which  I  will  undertake  to  do  in  a  little  Time; 
as  there  never  was  a  Period,  since  the  Commencement  of  the  War, 
that  Men  might  be  got  with  so  much  Ease.2 

The  fact  seems  to  be  that  the  Virginia  government  might 
have  raised  a  small  force  for  indefinite  service  despite  its 
straits  for  money,  if  it  had  gone  about  the  thing  system- 
atically and  energetically. 

But  the  brief  calm  before  the  storm  of  genuine  invasion 
was  not  utilized  for  any  material  strengthening  of  the  de- 
fense, which  continued  to  be  the  old  hand-to-mouth,  happy- 
go-lucky  method,  effective  only  against  a  weak  and  inactive 
enemy.  The  custom  was  to  call  out  a  force  of  militia  on  the 
1  Ford,  ii,  495.  2  Executive  communications,  1781. 


220        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA      ^ 

news  of  any  movement  of  the  British,  supply  them  with 
arms  and  equipment,  which  were  usually  carried  off  at  the 
end  of  the  service  and  never  seen  again,  pay  them  at  the 
rate  of  Continental  troops  in  treasury  certificates,  feed 
them  by  requisitioning  provisions,  and  furnish  transporta- 
tion by  impressing  wagons  and  horses.  When  the  enemy 
relapsed  into  quiescence,  the  militia  went  home  and  the 
horses  and  wagons  returned  to  their  owners.  Any  thought 
of  keeping  the  militia  in  the  field  beyond  the  need  of  the 
moment  and  until  they  might  become  sufficiently  trained 
to  be  of  use  for  some  known  military  purpose  apparently 
never  entered  Jefferson's  head.  The  militia  system,  which 
was  bad  enough  at  best,  but  defensible  on  the  plea  of  neces- 
sity, was  made  more  ineffective  by  want  of  intelligence  on 
the  part  of  the  government  in  handling  it.  At  times  when  a 
raid  developed  into  an  invasion,  requiring  the  presence  of 
soldiers  in  the  field  for  a  campaign,  the  levies  first  called  out 
and  becoming  somewhat  seasoned  were  discharged  and  re- 
placed by  raw  recruits  fresh  from  the  plough.  "The  great 
length  of  Time  which  the  Militia  had  been  in  the  Field," 
Jefferson  wrote  on  March  31,  1781,  "who  were  first  called 
on  induced  us  in  the  Discontinuance  of  the  Enterprize 
against  Portsmouth  immediately  to  call  so  many  Militia 
as  .  .  .  with  those  lately  called  might  make  up  a  proper 
opposing  Force.  I  state  the  whole  in  the  Margin  who  are 
to  be  considered  as  Reliefs  to  the  former  Militia."  * 
Jefferson  fluctuated  at  this  juncture  between  calling  out 
large  portions  of  the  militia  of  certain  counties,  or  requir- 
ing small  draughts  from  the  militia  of  all  the  counties  to 
form  a  more  permanent  body.  He  should  not  have  hesi- 
1  Letter-Book  (1781),  223. 


THE  FALL  OF  JEFFERSON  221 

tated  a  moment;  the  superior  efficiency  of  even  small 
numbers  of  men  having  the  character  of  a  regular  military 
force  over  hosts  of  militia  is  one  of  the  commonest  lessons 
of  war,  and  the  custom  of  calling  out  the  militia  of  various 
counties  in  turn  for  short  period  service,  called  "tours  of 
duty,"  was  the  worst  that  could  be  devised.  Yet  Jefferson 
clung  to  this  mode  of  warfare,  writing  Muhlenberg,  on 
April  3,  1781:  — 

The  Men  under  your  Command  who  have  been  in  the  field  from 
the  beginning  of  the  Invasion,  having  served  a  Tour  of  Duty 
unusually  long,  I  am  anxious  to  have  them  satisfied  of  the  Acci- 
dents which  have  as  yet  prevented  their  relief.  ...  I  think  myself 
particularly  obliged  to  acknowledge  the  patient  Service  of  those 
who  have  been  so  long  from  Home,  and  am  anxious  that  they 
should  know  that  this  has  not  proceeded  from  any  previous 
Intention  of  Government,  but  from  the  Circumstances  before 
explained. 

In  spite  of  this  unenlightened  attitude  of  the  government, 
which  could  not  afford  to  be  considerate  in  such  a  crisis, 
Steuben  collected  a  considerable  body  of  militia  and  con- 
scripts and  endeavored  with  much  labor  and  many  robust 
German  oaths  to  beat  them  into  some  kind  of  shape.  They 
were  soon  needed,  for  in  the  latter  part  of  April,  1781, 
Phillips  and  Arnold,  ascending  the  James  River,  took 
Petersburg  and  threatened  Richmond.  Steuben's  impos- 
ing show  of  force  along  the  Henrico  Heights,  aided  by  La- 
fayette's small  command  of  Continentals  just  arrived,  so 
impressed  the  British  that  they  fell  back  down  the  river 
without  making  an  attack.  The  relief  was  momentary. 
The  full  storm  of  invasion  was  about  to  burst  on  Virginia, 
for  Cornwallis,  who  had  advanced  from  North  Carolina, 


222        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

marched  on  Petersburg,  where  the  minor  army  joined  him. 
The  united  body  then  turned  towards  Richmond,  and 
the  assembly  adjourned  on  May  10, 1781,  to  meet  in  Char- 
lottesville on  May  24.  Lafayette,  who  now  commanded 
in  Virginia,  was  obliged  to  retreat  with  his  motley  force  of 
Continentals  and  militia  before  Cornwallis.  He  continually 
applied  to  Jefferson  for  reinforcements,  but  the  governor 
could  no  longer  supply  them.  The  latter  demanded  troops 
from  the  counties  in  vain;  the  men  would  not  respond.  "If 
the  calls  on  the  latter,"  he  wrote  Lafayette,  "do  not  pro- 
duce Sufficient  Reinforcements  to  you  I  shall  candidly  ac- 
knowledge that  it  is  not  in  my  power  to  do  any  Thing  more 
than  to  represent  to  the  General  Assembly  that  unless  they 
can  provide  more  effectually  for  the  Execution  of  the  Laws 
it  will  be  vain  to  call  on  Militia."  * 

True  enough,  the  temper  of  the  people,  under  the  aggra- 
vation of  invasion  and  the  helplessness  of  the  government 
to  offer  resistance,  was  becoming  dangerous,  and  in  Rock- 
bridge there  was  a  mutiny,  which  seems  to  have  partly 
resulted  from  Jefferson's  hesitation  to  enforce  the  con- 
scription law.  Samuel  McDowell,  the  county-lieutenant, 
reported  to  the  governor  on  May  9,  1781 :  — 

The  Act  of  October  last,  for  raising  this  States  quota  of  troops 
for  the  Continental  Army,  came  to  this  County  in  due  time  the 
Districts  were  laid  off,  two  or  three  of  the  Districts  Procured  their 
men  for  the  War,  a  day  was  appointed  for  the  Draft,  but  before 
the  day  came,  your  Excellencys  letter  allowing  a  suspension  of 
that  Act,  in  this  County,  came  to  hand,  and  before  your  Excel- 
lencys letter  arrived,  for  taking  off  that  Suspension,  the  day  ap- 
pointed for  the  Draft  was  Past.  On  Receiving  your  last  letter, 
Some  of  the  field  officers  were  of  opinion  that  Districts  ought  to 
1  Ford,  m,  38. 


THE  FALL  OF  JEFFERSON  223 

be  laid  off  a  new,  for  some  reasons;  and  a  Day  was  appointed 
to  meet  to  lay  them  off  it  was  (in  consideration)  found  necessary, 
the  People  in  this  Country,  (hearing  that  they  of  Augusta  had 
Prevented  laying  off  the  Districts  there)  met  (to-wit)  almost  a 
hundred  of  them,  and  Seeing  Colo  Bowyer  getting  the  lists  from 
the  Capts;  of  the  Strength  of  their  Companies,  and  Supposing  it 
was  to  lay  off  the  Districts  anew,  got  into  the  Court  House 
Seased  the  table,  carried  it  off  in  a  Riotous  manner;  and  said  no 
Districts  should  be  laid  off  there,  for  that  they  would  Serve  as 
militia  for  three  months  and  make  up  the  Eighteen  months  that 
way,  but  would  not  be  Drafted  for  Eighteen  months  and  be 
regulars  .  .  .  they  tore  the  Papers  and  after  some  time  began  to 
go  off.1 

Similar  outbreaks  in  other  counties,  west  and  east, 
showed  that  the  spirit  of  obedience  to  authority  was  rapidly 
weakening  throughout  Virginia.  The  people  had  become 
more  disheartened  than  at  any  period  of  the  war  and 
Jefferson's  administration  had  lost  all  the  influence  and 
popularity  it  once  possessed. 

Apparently  he  was  conscious  that  his  management  had 
proved  a  failure.  Writing  to  Washington,  on  May  28, 1781, 
shortly  before  the  expiration  of  his  term  of  office,  he  said:  — 

A  few  days  will  bring  me  that  relief  which  the  constitution  has 
prepared  for  those  oppressed  with  the  labours  of  my  office  and  a 
long  declared  resolution  of  relinquishing  it  to  abler  hands  has 
prepared  my  way  for  retirement  to  a  private  station.2 

He  had  been  zealous,  conscientious,  and  exceedingly 
industrious,  and  so  far  was  the  picture  of  the  republican 
magistrate  as  he  loved  to  dream  it,  but  still  he  had  not  suc- 
ceeded in  the  difficult  position  of  war  executive,  with  its 
demands  of  clear  insight  and  forcible  action,  and  the  weight 
1  Executive  communications,  1781.  2  Ford,  m,  43. 


224        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

of  public  opinion  was  against  him.  Or,  as  Jefferson  put  it 
in  his  memoirs:  — 

From  a  belief  that  under  the  pressure  of  the  invasion  under 
which  we  were  then  laboring,  the  public  would  have  more  con- 
fidence in  a  military  chief,  and  that  the  military  commander, 
being  invested  with  civil  power  also,  both  might  be  wielded  with 
more  energy,  promptitude  and  effect  for  the  defence  of  the  State, 
I  resigned  the  administration  at  the  end  of  my  second  year.1 

It  was  a  confession  of  defeat.  Jefferson  retired  at  the 
height  of  invasion  and  in  the  face  of  a  perfect  storm  of 
hostile  contention;  for  the  time  being  his  influence  was 
dead.  The  assembly,  driven  from  Richmond  by  Corn- 
wallis  and  from  Charlottesville  by  Tarleton,  hastened  over 
the  mountains  to  Staunton,  endeavoring  to  find  some  way 
to  save  the  State.  The  natural  and  obvious  means  sug- 
gesting itself  was  to  strengthen  the  powers  of  the  governor 
at  the  expense  of  the  constitution,  or  to  appoint  a  dictator, 
as  some  preferred  to  call  it.  Jefferson  bitterly  opposed  this 
plan. 

The  very  thought  alone  [he  wrote]  was  treason  against  the 
people;  was  treason  against  mankind  in  general:  as  rivetting  for- 
ever the  chains  which  bow  down  their  necks  by  giving  to  their 
oppressors  a  proof,  which  they  would  have  trumpeted  through 
the  universe,  of  the  imbecility  of  republican  government,  in 
times  of  pressing  danger,  to  shield  them  from  harm.2 

But  the  weakness  of  republican  government  in  a  crisis 
had  already  been  displayed,  or,  more  properly,  the  weak- 
ness of  the  Virginia  constitution,  and  a  temporary  dicta- 
torship was  rather  in  the  nature  of  a  remedy  than  of  a 
reversion.    Henry  was  suggested  as  dictator,  along  with 

1  Randall,  i,  346.  2  Ford,  m,  234. 


THE  FALL  OF  JEFFERSON  225 

Washington  and  Greene  and  perhaps  others,  but  the 
scheme  failed.  Jefferson  states  that  it  "wanted  a  few  votes 
only  of  being  passed,"  though  the  Journal  shows  no  record 
of  any  kind  on  the  subject.  Possibly  Jefferson  was  thinking 
of  the  committee  of  the  whole  rather  than  of  the  official 
action  of  the  House  of  Delegates.  It  was  to  this  dictator- 
ship party  that  Randall  credits  the  criticisms  of  Jefferson 
nearly  ending  in  his  impeachment:  the  biographer  would 
have  us  believe  that  these  criticisms  were  designed  for  the 
purpose  of  getting  rid  of  Jefferson  and  making  way  for  the 
dictator.  Such  a  statement  carries  its  own  refutation.  The 
fact  that  Virginia  had  been  mercilessly  raided  by  the  enemy 
for  a  year  without  being  able  to  make  the  least  retaliation 
and  was  now  in  actual  danger  of  subjugation  amply  ex- 
plains the  criticisms  of  the  executive;  it  would  have  been 
extraordinary  if  he  had  not  come  in  for  wholesale  condem- 
nation. 

To  give  point  and  shape  to  the  attack  on  Mr.  Jefferson 
[Randall  goes  on  to  say]  to  give  it  popular  effect,  charges  were 
thrown  out  against  his  official  conduct,  on  the  floor,  at  the  legis- 
lative meeting  at  Staunton,  and  an  inquiry  into  his  conduct  was 
demanded.  George  Nicholas,  one  of  the  members  from  Mr. 
Jefferson's  own  county,  a  very  honest,  but  at  that  time  a  very 
young  and  impulsive  man,  was  the  spokesman  on  this  occasion.1 

Nicholas,  it  should  be  noted,  was  not  a  conservative,  but 
a  man  of  democratic  leanings,  who  later  became  one  of  the 
principal  followers  of  Jefferson  and  Madison.  What  could 
be  a  stronger  proof  of  the  intense  dissatisfaction  with 
Jefferson's  rule  existing  at  the  moment  than  that  such  a 
man  should  move  an  investigation?  On  June  12, 1781,  the 

1  Randall,  I,  351. 


226        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

House  of  Delegates  "Resolved,  That  at  the  next  session 
of  Assembly  an  inquiry  be  made  into  the  conduct  of  the 
Executive  of  this  State  for  the  last  twelve  months." 1  This 
extract  from  the  Journal  sounds  brief  and  bald,  but  it  is  in 
reality  of  high  importance.  Jefferson  then  commanded  in 
Virginia  something  of  that  idolatrous  regard  which  he  later 
received  from  the  nation  as  a  whole.  The  vote  of  censure, 
therefore,  was  vastly  more  significant  in  his  case  than  it 
would  have  been  in  that  of  an  ordinary  official;  it  was  the 
people  turning  against  their  tribune. 

This  was  the  low-water  mark  of  Jefferson's  career.  With 
his  admirers  turning  against  him  what  might  he  hope  for 
in  the  future  ?  For  the  moment  he  was  saved  by  a  combi- 
nation of  circumstances.  Few  of  the  conservatives  were 
present  in  this  House  of  Delegates  of  less  than  sixty  mem- 
bers; they  were  mostly  at  home  in  the  east  where  the  in- 
vasion raged.  Again,  the  pressure  of  war  made  a  lengthy 
investigation  impossible  just  then  and  it  was  postponed  to 
what  was  hoped  would  prove  a  more  leisured  season.  Be- 
sides, Jefferson  still  had  followers  who  were  faithful  to  the 
death  and  they  worked  for  him.  Thus,  the  democratic 
chieftain  escaped  the  danger  immediately  threatening  him, 
but  with  prestige  quite  gone;  for  the  time  being  the  man 
who  had  been  revered  because  he  expressed  the  ideals  of  his 
age  better  than  any  other  man  suffered  the  imputation  of 
lacking  ordinary  capacity  in  affairs.  On  the  same  day  of 
the  investigation  motion,  June  12,  1781,  Jefferson's  suc- 
cessor was  elected.  Randall  and  Girardin,  both  writing 
under  Jefferson's  inspiration  years  afterwards  when  the 
democrat  had  fully  come  into  his  own,  labor  to  show  that  he 
1  Journal,  House  of  Delegates  (May,  1781),  15. 


THE  FALL  OF  JEFFERSON  227 

might  have  been  elected  governor  by  the  assembly  for  the 
third  successive  year  allowed  by  the  constitution  if  he  had 
so  desired  —  nay,  more,  that  he  was  actually  obliged  to  per- 
suade delegates  to  vote  against  himself  in  order  to  obtain 
a  majority  for  Thomas  Nelson.  Says  Randall:  — 

Jefferson's  friends  insisted  on  reelecting  him.  His  confidential 
friends  (those  who  understood  his  feelings  and  unalterable  de- 
terminations) strenuously  opposed  this  on  the  ground  that  he  had 
patriotically  divested  himself  of  his  office  to  heal  divisions  in  the 
Legislature,  and  that  he  ought  to  be  allowed  to  carry  out  his 
wishes;  and  that  now,  accusations  having  been  brought  against 
him  and  a  hearing  agreed  upon,  his  honor  required  him  to  meet 
his  assailants  without  the  advantage  of  official  position.  These 
considerations  induced  a  considerable  body  of  his  friends  to  vote 
for  General  Nelson,  and  it  required  their  votes,  in  addition  to 
those  of  the  recent  advocates  of  another  man,  to  elect  Mr. 
Jefferson's  candidate  over  himself.1 

This  may  be  a  partially  truthful  statement  of  the  case, 
for  no  man  ever  inspired  deeper  devotion  than  Jefferson, 
but  at  best  it  is  highly  colored,  It  seems  probable  that  the 
governor  did  not  desire  reelection;  but  it  also  appears  al- 
most certain  that  he  could  not  have  been  reelected  if  he  had. 
His  open  candidacy  in  all  likelihood  would  have  brought  to 
a  head  the  threatened  investigation  of  his  administration, 
from  which,  in  the  irritated  and  unjust  state  of  the  public 
mind,  he  must  have  emerged  with  small  credit.  With  his 
customary  adroitness  he  made  the  most  of  a  trying  situa- 
tion by  declaring  that  he  gave  way,  or  "resigned,"  as  he 
afterwards  expressed  it,  in  favor  of  a  man  conversant  with 
military  affairs.  Nevertheless,  Jefferson  received  some 
votes  in  the  senate,  although  Thomas  Nelson,  Jr.,  was 
1  Randall,  I,  352. 


228         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

easily  elected  governor  to  succeed  him.  Nelson's  election 
was  something  in  the  nature  of  a  revolution;  for  the  first 
time  since  the  establishment  of  the  Commonwealth  a  con- 
servative held  the  chief  place.  First  Patrick  Henry,  then 
Jefferson,  —  and  after  him  his  favorites  might  have  been 
expected  to  succeed,  as  later  in  the  presidential  succession, 
but  his  failure  as  an  executive  changed  the  course  of  politics. 
In  the  emergency  the  assembly  chose  an  amateur  soldier 
believed  to  be  able  to  cope  with  the  emergency  without 
regard  to  his  views  on  the  rights  of  man.  That  Jefferson 
should  have  been  replaced  by  one  not  his  follower  is  the  best 
evidence  of  the  magnitude  of  his  defeat.  The  leader  retired 
to  one  of  his  farms,  thoroughly  discredited  for  the  time  and 
no  doubt  with  gloomy  thoughts  as  to  the  future.  Nor  was 
his  decline  a  temporary  affair,  as  the  Jeffersonian  hero- 
worshipers  maintain.  He  returned  to  Congress  the  fall 
after  and  went  abroad  as  a  minister  for  several  years,  thus 
cutting  loose  from  Virginia  politics  while  the  humiliations 
the  State  had  endured  under  his  rule  remained  a  matter  of 
fresh  remembrance. 

The  effect  of  his  removal  from  Virginia  was  remarkable. 
The  democratic  party  was  for  the  time  being  overborne 
by  the  conservatives,  now  under  the  leadership  of  Patrick 
Henry  and  Richard  Henry  Lee,  who  had  parted  company 
with  Jefferson  and  abandoned  progressive  policies.  The 
conservative  Benjamin  Harrison  was  elected  governor  to 
succeed  Nelson,  who  resigned  after  Yorktown.  Lee  and 
Henry  disputed  the  leadership  of  the  assembly  for  two 
years,  and  then  in  1784  joined  hands  in  an  attempt  to  stay 
the  progress  of  liberalism  by  establishing  state  support  of 
religion.  The  conservative  party,  which  had  revived  in  the 


THE   FALL   OF   JEFFERSON  229 

reaction  following  Jefferson's  overthrow,  gave  the  pro- 
gramme hearty  support  and  a  most  exciting  and  impor- 
tant political  struggle  followed.  It,  indeed,  proved  to  be  a 
turning-point  in  the  history  of  Virginia.  The  conservatives 
failed,  beaten  by  the  spirit  of  the  age  rather  than  by  the 
skill  of  their  opponents.  Jefferson,  whose  name  was  re- 
membered as  the  first  great  advocate  of  social  reform, 
returned  from  France  to  find  his  party  more  powerful 
than  ever  and  his  own  failure  as  an  administrator  for- 
gotten. 

Strange  —  the  logic  of  history.  Thomas  Nelson,  Jeffer- 
son's successor,  proved  to  be  the  man  for  the  crisis.  He  was 
a  commonplace  planter  of  some  small  military  knowledge, 
much  energy  and  great  devotion  to  duty,  and  further  was 
not  handicapped  by  any  especial  veneration  for  the  consti- 
tution. Although  the  assembly  at  Staunton  invested  the 
governor  with  greatly  enlarged  powers,  including  the  right 
to  call  out  the  State  forces  at  pleasure,  impress  every- 
thing necessary  for  military  purposes,  control  the  quarter- 
master's department,  banish  disaffected  persons  and  con- 
stitute special  courts,  it  was  felt  that  Nelson  had  exceeded 
his  warrant.  He  had  acted  with  rough  vigor,  getting  into 
the  field  a  large  number  of  militia,  and,  what  was  of  more 
importance,  raising  subsistence  for  the  French-American 
army  at  the  siege  of  Yorktown.  Later  in  the  fall,  when  the 
surrender  of  Cornwallis  had  removed  the  danger  threaten- 
ing the  State,  the  assembly  legalized  Nelson's  administra- 
tion, which  had  plainly  been  unconstitutional.1  He  had 
been  in  effect  what  some  people  wanted  to  make  Patrick 
Henry  in  1776  and  again  in  1781  —  a  military  dictator.  He 
1  Hening,  x,  478. 


230        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

had  seized  supplies  and  necessaries  wherever  he  found  them 
without  regard  to  that  constitutional  check,  the  council, 
which  Jefferson  had  always  so  scrupulously  consulted  in  his 
acts;  he  had,  in  short,  considered  nothing  but  the  imme- 
diate need  of  the  hour.  And  he  had  been  successful.  On 
the  other  hand,  Jefferson  was  associated  with  the  greatest 
humiliation  Virginia  has  ever  known,  and  Virginians  are 
proud.  The  State  has  suffered  invasion  and  on  a  far  greater 
scale  than  in  1781,  but  never  again  what  it  suffered  then  — 
war  without  honor.  The  people  grew  indignant  when  they 
saw  a  small  force  of  the  enemy  marching  and  plundering 
with  absolute  impunity,  and  the  government  flying  from 
place  to  place  before  a  troop  of  cavalry.  Nelson  had  come 
into  power  at  this  time  of  depression  and  within  a  few 
months  led  the  State  forces  in  person  to  the  glorious  victory 
of  Yorktown. 

Military  reputation  is  undoubtedly  one  of  the  greatest 
of  American  political  assets.  It  would  not  have  been  won- 
derful then  if  Jefferson  had  fallen  into  obscurity  and  lived 
out  his  life  in  retirement  and  Nelson  won  lasting  accession 
to  office.  Just  the  reverse  happened.  Nelson  resigned  the 
governorship  late  in  1781  and  never  appeared  in  the  politi- 
cal field  again.  Jefferson  returned  to  Virginia,  a  political 
prophet  of  unlimited^  influence,  and  it  was  his  predomi- 
nance in  Virginia  which  afterwards  enabled  him  to  become 
the  founder  of  the  Democratic  Party  and  the  third  Presi- 
dent. All  his  mistakes  and  disasters  were  forgotten,  only 
his  reforms  recalled.  He  could  afford  to  wait  in  France,  far 
from  his  native  heath,  until  the  time  came  for  him  to  return 
into  his  own.  He  had  no  need  to  fight  his  way  back  to 
power  and  popularity,  for  his  earlier  career  worked  for  him. 


THE  FALL  OF  JEFFERSON  231 

It  was  not  to  his  activity,  not  to  his  political  acuteness,  not 
to  his  services  in  Washington's  government  that  the  great 
democrat  owed  his  rehabilitation  and  mastery,  but  to  the 
"Zeitgeist."  He  was  identified  with  one  of  the  great  move- 
ments of  the  human  spirit,  and  this  being  so,  his  past  fail- 
ure, with  all  its  gall,  was  put  out  of  remembrance.  For  had 
he  not  written:  "We  hold  these  truths  to  be  self-evident, 
that  all  men  are  created  equal;  that  they  are  endowed  by 
their  Creator  with  certain  unalienable  Rights;  that  among 
these  are  Life,  Liberty  and  the  pursuit  of  Happiness"? 


CHAPTER  IX 

SPREAD   OF   DISAFFECTION 

While  loyalism  was  conspicuous  in  the  east  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  war,  it  hardly  made  an  appearance  in  the 
west  until  the  prolongation  of  the  struggle  began  to  try  the 
patience  of  the  people.  At  first  the  frontier  enthusiastically 
favored  the  Revolution  and  sent  a  large  number  of  riflemen 
to  swell  the  patriot  forces.  But  the  pressure  of  war,  the  in- 
terruption of  trade,  the  heavy  taxes  collected  from  back- 
woodsmen unaccustomed  to  pay  taxes,  the  worthlessness  of 
the  currency,  and  the  various  Tory  influences  brought  to 
bear  gradually  tainted  the  country  bordering  on  western 
North  Carolina  and  made  some  impression  on  the  whole 
mountain  region.  In  1775  and  1776  Toryism  was  practi- 
cally non-existent  in  the  west,  but  as  1777  wore  away  with- 
out bringing  success  to  the  American  arms,  the  western 
country  began  to  show  the  effects  of  doubt  and  discourage- 
ment. Hamilton's  loyalist  proclamations,  sent  out  from 
Detroit  all  along  the  frontier,  made  waverers,  and  British 
agents  carried  the  royal  oath  of  allegiance  through  the  back 
settlements  of  Virginia  and  Pennsylvania  and  found  many 
timid  subscribers. 

In  Augusta  William  Hinton  raised  a  band  of  seventy- 
five  men,  to  whom  he  administered  the  British  oath.1  On 
August  13,  1777,  Hinton  visited  the  house  of  one  David 
Harned  with  some  armed  followers  and  indulged  in  much 
1  Virginia  Gazette,  October  29,  1777. 


SPREAD  OF  DISAFFECTION  233 

treasonable  gasconade,  declaring  "himself  in  favor  of  the 
crown  of  Great  Britain  and  that  General  Howe  might  as 
well  go  home  with  his  men,  for  he  could  raise  men  enough  to 
subject  the  country  and  that  he  would  do  it  yet."  Militia 
dispersed  Hinton's  force  and  arrested  the  ringleader,  who 
was  wounded  in  the  fray,  together  with  several  followers. 
Augusta  court  sentenced  Martin  Cryder,  John  Cryder,  and 
Hinton,  the  worst  offenders,  to  fines  and  prison  terms  of 
several  years.  It  appears  the  court  did  not  enforce  these 
sentences  in  full,  but  released  the  prisoners  after  a  salutary 
term  in  jail.1  The  court  tried  several  other  cases  of  dis- 
affection. On  September  16,  1777,  John  Archer  was  made 
to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  and  bound  to  good  behavior 
for  a  year,  for  "disaffection  to  the  Commonwealth,"  and  on 
the  following  day  Alexander  Miller,  formerly  a  Presbyte- 
rian minister,  was  fined  £100  and  sentenced  to  two  years' 
imprisonment. 

About  the  same  time  loyalists  gathered  in  some  numbers 
near  Cheat  River  in  Monongalia,  but  were  dispersed  by  a 
militia  force  under  the  command  of  Zackwell  Morgan. 
After  the  skirmish  the  militia  wished  to  hang  their  prison- 
ers, but  were  prevented,  though  the  Tory  leader  Higginson 
lost  his  life  in  a  rather  obscure  way.  He  was  crossing  Cheat 
River  as  a  prisoner  in  irons  under  the  charge  of  Morgan  and 
several  others,  when  he  either  fell  out  of  the  boat,  or  was 
thrown  out,  and  drowned.2  Popular  opinion  charged 
Morgan  with  murder  and  he  was  tried;  a  probably  some- 
what partial  jury  acquitted  him.  In  December,  1777, 
Yohogania  court  arrested  and  examined  John  Campbell, 

1  Augusta  Records,  i,  509,  528. 

2  The  Revolution  on  the  Upper  Ohio,  143. 


234        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

Alexander  McKee,  and  Simon  Girty,  the  noted  Indian 
leader.  Girty  was  discharged;  McKee,  who  had  been 
put  on  parole  as  a  suspected  loyalist,  was  again  paroled. 
Farther  south,  in  Montgomery,  William  Preston,  county- 
lieutenant,  labored  to  secure  the  submission  of  Captain 
Thomas  Burk,  his  militia  company,  and  forty  others,  all  of 
whom  refused  the  Virginia  oath  of  allegiance.  Preston  com- 
plained that  the  act  of  May,  1777,  directed  against  the  dis- 
affected, carrying  penalties  of  disarmament  and  loss  of  civil 
rights,  gave  the  frontiersmen  no  concern,  since  they  did 
not  talk  treason  and  so  failed  to  come  within  the  act  of 
1776  for  "  punishing  certain  offenses." 

Indeed,  the  southwest  in  the  summer  of  1777  was  a 
greatly  disturbed  region.  Tories  from  North  Carolina  and 
others,  it  is  stated,  from  eastern  Virginia  traveled  in  bands 
through  the  mountain  settlements,  stealing  horses  and  com- 
mitting robberies  and  occasionally  murder.1  A  few  of  these 
Tory  outlaws  were  captured  and  tried;  among  them  Isaac 
Sebo,  Jeremiah  Slaughter,  and  William  Houston,  who  were 
convicted  of  being  inimical  and  suffered  confiscation  of 
property  and  imprisonment.  WTilliam  Campbell,  county- 
lieutenant  of  Washington,  arrested  a  wayfarer  Who  bore 
documents  in  his  shoes  tending  to  prove  that  he  was  a 
British  emissary  sent  to  stir  up  the  Indians,  whereupon  the 
rough-and-ready  colonel  hanged  him  on  a  near-by  tree 
without  form  of  trial.2 

Campbell  was  very  active  in  stamping  out  disaffection  in 
the  southwest,  and  largely  because  of  his  ruthless  vigor  and 
energy  Toryism  failed  to  develop  in  that  section.  The  oath 

1  L.  P.  Summers's  History  of  Southwest  Virginia,  272. 
7  Virginia  Magazine  of  History  and  Biography,  vn,  120. 


SPREAD  OF  DISAFFECTION  235 

of  allegiance  prescribed  by  act  of  assembly  was  rigorously 
administered  in  the  west  as  in  other  parts  of  the  State,  but 
it  meant  little,  for  lawlessness  rather  than  any  attachment 
to  the  royal  cause  was  the  origin  of  discontent  and  trouble 
there.  The  disturbed  conditions  inseparable  from  a  state 
of  war,  together  with  the  absence  of  many  of  the  best  men 
of  that  wild  country  in  the  army,  gave  horse-thieves  and 
counterfeiters  an  excellent  opportunity  to  ply  their  trades, 
and  such  outlaws  were  glad  to  form  connections  with 
brother  outlaws  of  loyalist  pretensions  in  North  Carolina. 
Francis  Hopkins,  a  counterfeiter  serving  a  term  in  jail,  es- 
caped and  raised  a  band  of  brigands,  which  lived  by  horse- 
stealing and  highway  robbery.  Campbell  arrested  Hopkins 
one  day  while  he  was  riding  a  stolen  horse  and  uncere- 
moniously hanged  him  on  the  roadside.  After  his  death  his 
brother,  William  Hopkins,  continued  making  depredations 
in  Washington  County  until  arrested  in  1779.  He  was  sen- 
tenced to  jail  and  confiscation  of  estate  "for  treasonable 
practices  against  the  United  States  of  America,  in  taking  up 
arms  under  the  British  standard."  l  Regulators  patroled 
Washington  County,  as  well  as  other  western  counties,  for 
several  years  and  sternly  repressed  disorder.  In  neighbor- 
ing Montgomery  County  a  condition  of  anarchy  existed 
until  militia  from  Washington  suppressed  the  lawless 
element. 

In  the  summer  of  1779  Tories  from  the  Yadkin  River  in 
North  Carolina  and  the  New  River  in  Montgomery  formed 
a  combination  for  the  purpose,  it  seems,  of  attacking  the 
State  lead  mines  in  that  county.  William  Preston,  the  * 
county-lieutenant,  unable  to  cope  with  the  situation,  called 
1  Summers,  277. 


236         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

upon  William  Campbell,  who  came  to  his  assistance  with  a 
body  of  Washington  militia.  This  small  force  overran  the 
disaffected  region,  quartering  itself  on  Tories,  plundering 
them,  and  compelling  some  of  them  to  enlist  in  the  Ameri- 
can army  or  give  security  for  good  behavior.1  The  adjacent 
region  in  North  Carolina  received  like  treatment.  Camp- 
bell then  went  on  to  break  up  a  nest  of  outlaws  in  Black 
Lick  Valley  in  what  is  now  Wythe  County;  according  to 
accounts  he  arrested  a  dozen  robbers  who  had  been  raiding 
the  settlements  and  hanged  them  on  two  great  white  oaks 
known  for  a  century  afterwards  as  the  "Tory  Trees." 
Whether  Campbell  actually  executed  so  large  a  number  of 
men  offhand  is  doubtful,  but  that  strong  means  were  em- 
ployed in  1779  to  suppress  the  lawless  and  discontented 
element  is  evident  from  an  act  of  immunity  passed  by  the 
assembly  in  the  fall  for  the  benefit  of  William  Campbell, 
Walter  Crockett,  and  their  associates.2 

Disaffection  had  spread  widely  through  western  Vir- 
ginia by  1779.  In  Augusta  a  number  of  prosecutions  are 
recorded;  a  deposition  dated  in  September,  1779,  states 
that  one  Robert  Craig  was  a  violent  Tory.3  The  next  year 
James  Anderson,  a  school-teacher,  was  summoned  to  court 
for  drinking  confusion  to  Congress;  and,  more  significant 
still,  a  writ  was  returned  in  April,  1780,  marked:  "Not 
executed  for  fear  of  the  Tories."  In  Rockingham  dis- 
affection was  greater.  Francis  McBride  was  bound  to 
appear  before  the  November,  1779,  grand  jury  to  answer 
a  charge  of  speaking  "words  disrespectful  to  the  Govern- 
ment &  present  Constitution."4  Likewise  Gerard  Erwine 

1  Summers,  292.  2  Ibid.,  292.  8  Augusta  Records,  I,  377. 

*  J.  W.  Wayland's  History  of  Rockingham  County,  75. 


SPREAD  OF  DISAFFECTION  237 

was  bailed  to  appear  in  court  because  he  had  "propagated 
some  news  tending  to  raise  Tumults  and  Sedition  in  the 
State";  and  two  others  were  convicted  of  conspiring  with 
the  enemy.  The  court,  on  June  9,  1780,  examined  John 
Davis  on  suspicion  of  treason  and  "other  misdemeanors," 
sending  him  on  to  the  general  court  for  trial. 1 

The  situation  became  actually  dangerous  in  western 
Virginia  in  1780,  with  the  predominance  of  the  British  in 
the  South.  The  troubled  New  River  was  again  the  principal 
scene  of  disturbance,  although  a  larger  territory  was  more 
or  less  involved.  William  Preston  appealed  for  help  to 
Jefferson,  then  governor,  who  directed  William  Campbell 
to  put  himself  at  the  head  of  the  Washington  and  Bote- 
tourt militia  and  take  in  hand  "those  Paracides,"  as  the 
heated  governor  styled  them.2  A  couple  of  months  later,  in 
September,  1780,  Jefferson  wrote  the  President  of  Congress 
that  disaffection  had  spread  over  Washington,  Montgom- 
ery, Henry,  and  Bedford,  and  that  many  hundreds  had 
actually  enlisted  to  serve  the  king  of  England.  This  state- 
ment was  exaggerated,  but  solid  reason  existed  for  ill-ease. 
On  October  27,  1780,  he  wrote  the  Virginia  delegates  in 
Congress :  — 

A  very  dangerous  Insurrection  in  Pittsylvania  was  prevented  a 
few  days  ago  by  being  discovered  three  days  before  it  was  to  take 
place.  The  Ringleaders  were  seized  in  their  Beds.  This  dangerous 
fire  is  only  smothered:  When  it  will  break  out  seems  to  depend 
altogether  on  events.  It  extends  from  Montgomery  County  along 
our  Southern  boundary  to  Pittsylvania  and  eastward  as  far  as  the 
James  River.  Indeed  some  suspicions  have  been  raised  of  its  hav- 
ing crept  as  far  as  Culpeper.3 

1  Way  land,  81. 

2  Executive  communications,  1780.  •  Ford,  n,  356. 


238        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

The  Montgomery  outbreak  was  serious  because  dis- 
affection there  could  count  on  the  support  of  a  district  in 
North  Carolina  where  loyalism  became  actually  predomi- 
nant following  the  Tory  uprising  in  Surry  County  in  1780. 
The  lead  mines  in  Montgomery,  the  point  aimed  at  by  the 
malcontents,  were  of  great  importance  and  a  blow  at  them 
was  a  blow  at  the  American  cause;  but  the  insurgents  were 
suppressed  before  they  had  the  chance  to  do  more  than 
threaten.  They  received  rough  treatment.  Colonel  Charles 
Lynch,  superintendent  of  the  lead  mines,  took  the  foremost 
part  in  terrorizing  them,  and  is  said  to  have  given  origin  to 
that  famous  euphemism,  "lynch  law,"  by  his  proceedings 
on  this  occasion.1  It  is  possible  that  insurgents  were  exe- 
cuted without  trial;  beyond  doubt  violent  and  illegal  means 
were  used,  because  the  assembly,  in  October,  1782,  passed 
another  immunity  act  for  William  Preston,  Charles  Lynch, 
and  all  others  engaged  in  suppressing  the  conspiracy.2  Even 
after  this  lesson,  in  April,  1781,  Preston  reported  that  the 
lead  mines  were  in  some  danger  from  the  disaffected.3 

The  whole  southern  border  of  Virginia  was  more  or  less 
in  a  state  of  disturbance  in  1780.  Volunteers  were  in  the 
field  from  a  number  of  counties,  —  and  apparently  in  some 
strength  judging  from  their  expenses,  — '-  engaged  in  over- 
awing the  conspirators  along  the  Dan  River  and  westwards. 
Companies  of  mounted  infantry  from  Montgomery  and 
Washington  ranged  through  the  borderland  between  Vir- 
ginia and  North  Carolina,  making  many  arrests;  seventy- 
five  offenders  were  taken  under  guard  to  Bedford  jail,  where 
they  remained  about  a  month.  Those  arrested  were  prob- 

1  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  in,  190.  2  Hening,  xi,  134. 

3  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  n,  36.  \ 


SPREAD  OF  DISAFFECTION  239 

ably  the  most  notorious  and  it  is  likely  that  the  troops 
quartered  themselves  upon  less  active  malcontents  and 
wasted  their  substance,  as  had  been  done  the  year  before. 
There  was  also  a  little  bloodshed.  Major  Joseph  Cloyd,  of 
Montgomery,  went  over  the  North  Carolina  line  with  three 
companies  of  mounted  volunteers,  partly  Virginians,  partly 
Carolinians,  and  attacked  a  force  of  Carolina  loyalists  at 
Shallow  Ford  on  the  Yadkin  River,  on  October  14, 1780.  A 
brisk  engagement  resulted  in  the  defeat  of  the  Tories  with 
a  loss  of  twenty  killed  and  wounded.  This  expedition,  and 
the  decisive  defeat  of  the  Carolina  Tories  at  King's  Moun- 
tain in  September,  relieved  western  Virginia  from  the 
danger  of  becoming  the  seat  of  a  loyalist  uprising  in  1780. 
Developments  in  the  west  were  but  an  acute  phase  of  the 
dissatisfaction  current  in  Virginia  at  the  time.  The  ever- 
growing burdens  of  the  war  and  the  constant  calls  on 
militia  for  field  service  had  largely  sapped  the  real  enthu- 
siasm which  the  generality  had  shown  in  1776.  Moreover, 
the  patriot  organization,  once  so  strong,  had  now  greatly 
relaxed.  County  committees  had  passed  out  of  existence 
with  the  end  of  the  political  revolution  and  the  establish- 
ment of  a  permanent  government;  ordinary  governmental 
machinery  replaced  the  much  more  acute  and  efficient 
Revolutionary  tribunals.  Expression  of  Tory  opinion  sel- 
dom met  with  punishment,  and  in  the  tidewater  counties 
correspondence  with  the  enemy  seems  to  have  been  com- 
mon. The  attitude  of  the  people  towards  military  service 
constantly  became  more  unwilling;  malingering  abounded 
and  complaints  were  frequent  and  loud.1  A  petition  from 
Caroline  County,  probably  written  by  Edmund  Pendleton, 
1  Legislative  Petitions.  Charlotte  (A3995). 


240        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

graphically  describes  the  atrocities  in  that  county  of  secret 
Tories,  who  should  be  more  properly  denominated  mal- 
contents. These  continually  charged  the  government  with 
corruption  and  perfidy,  protested  against  taxes  and  militia 
draughts  as  tyrannical  and  unconstitutional,  refused  to  give 
aid  in  times  of  danger  and  belittled  the  successes  and  mag- 
nified the  misfortunes  of  the  American  arms.1  Such  mur- 
murings  typify  the  attitude  of  certain  classes  of  every  pop- 
ulation called  on  to  undergo  a  severe  and  wearisome  strain 
like  the  Revolutionary  War,  the  classes  that  value  present 
comfort  and  welfare  more  than  political  principle  and  are 
devoid  of  military  enthusiasm  at  any  time.  Probably  a 
considerable  number  of  people  in  every  county  in  the  State 
were  of  this  persuasion  in  1780,  for  the  brave  and  ardent 
spirits  had  gone  off  to  join  the  army  and  were  for  the  most 
part  dead,  and  the  indifferent  or  faint-hearted  predomi- 
nated. Such  men,  of  course,  were  not  Tories,  but  they 
would  bend  with  the  storm  and  might  constitute  a  distinct 
danger  in  a  crisis. 

But  disaffection  in  the  east  was  not  merely  passive.  The 
militia  draughts,  the  most  onerous  imposition  of  the  govern- 
ment, met  with  open  resistance  at  Northumberland  Court- 
House,  near  the  Potomac,  where  on  September  14  and  15, 
1780,  a  great  riot  took  place  and  a  number  of  people  were 
killed  and  wounded.  On  the  second  day  the  local  militia 
which  remained  faithful  succeeded  in  putting  down  the 
rioters,  who  were  tried  by  court-martial  and  sentenced  in 
many  instances  to  serve  as  soldiers  for  eighteen  months 
or  the  war.  The  majority  of  mutineers  who  had  not  been 
captured  surrendered  on  these  terms,  but  a  few  boarded 
1  Legislative  Petitions.  Caroline  (A3740). 


SPREAD  OF  DISAFFECTION  241 

English  vessels  in  the  Bay  and  escaped.1  The  many  in- 
stances of  growing  disloyalty  to  the  American  cause 
brought  the  government  in  1780  to  take  further  measures 
against  offenders.  The  assembly  amended  the  act  "for  the 
punishment  of  certain  offenses"  so  as  to  make  it  a  misde- 
meanor after  August  1, 1780,  to  state  by  writing,  printing, 
or  speech  that  America  ought  to  be  dependent  on  Great 
Britain,  to  acknowledge  allegiance  to  the  king,  or  encourage 
submission  to  the  British.  Prosecution  should  be  made  in 
county  courts  and  penalties  were  limited  to  fines  of  one 
hundred  thousand  pounds  of  tobacco  and  imprisonment 
for  five  years.  The  act  was  limited  to  the  duration  of  the 
war.2 

This  law  made  procedure  far  more  certain  and  satis- 
factory than  before,  but  it  was  supplemented  by  still  more 
direct  measures.  An  extraordinary  act  "  for  giving  farther 
power  to  the  governor  and  council"  put  the  inhabitants  of 
sections  threatened  by  invasion  under  a  modified  martial 
law.  The  government  received  authority  to  commit  sus- 
pects to  jail  or  remove  them  to  places  of  confinement.  In 
case  of  invasion  or  insurrection,  persons  acting  as  guides 
or  spies  for  the  enemy,  giving  them  aid  or  intelligence,  or 
dissuading  militia  from  service  were  to  be  tried  by  court- 
martials  of  militia  officers.  Sentences  required  confirma- 
tion by  the  governor.  Most  of  the  trials  for  disaffection 
in  1781  were  conducted  by  court-martials,  which,  under 
this  act,  had  cognizance  of  offenses  hitherto  unnoticed  by 
the  law.  But  in  spite  of  such  legislation,  the  government 
showed  mildness  towards  the  wrongdoers  brought  to  its 
notice  in  1780.  The  assembly  at  its  October  session  par- 

1  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  i,  534.  2  Hening,  x,  268. 


242        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

doned  the  people  of  Henry,  Bedford,  Pittsylvania,  Bote- 
tourt, Montgomery,  and  Washington  who  had  taken  the 
king's  oath  or  encouraged  enlistments  in  the  British  serv- 
ice, but  had  not  committed  any  criminal  acts,  provided 
they  swore  allegiance  to  the  Commonwealth  before  the  last 
day  of  February,  1781.  The  benefits  of  this  act  were  ex- 
tended to  a  handful  of  Tories  in  the  public  jail  at  Rich- 
mond. 

Such  leniency  may  or  may  not  have  been  misplaced. 
Certainly  Jefferson's  government  was  frequently  defied 
and  nothing  like  the  vigorous  anti-loyalist  spirit  that 
marked  the  beginning  of  the  Revolution  existed  in  1781. 
When  the  British  first  seriously  assailed  Virginia  in  1779 
and  occupied  Suffolk,  destroying  enormous  quantities  of 
stores  and  meeting  with  no  resistance  from  the  ill-prepared 
militia,  they  reported  that  numerous  applications  of  sub- 
mission were  made  them  by  the  inhabitants.1  The  spirit 
of  disaffection  existing  along  Chesapeake  Bay  from  the 
first  began  to  show  itself  as  the  war  turned  against  the 
Americans.  British  cruisers  and  privateers  swarmed  in 
the  Bay,  plundered  the  whole  tidewater  section,  and  in- 
flicted immense  damage;  a  British  fleet  in  a  single  raid  in 
1779  carried  off  three  hundred  slaves  along  with  much 
other  property.  Towards  the  close  of  the  Revolution  the 
State  contained  an  increasing  number  of  passive  Tories, 
secret  traitors  who  would  take  no  overt  step,  but  watched 
the  trend  of  events  intently.  The  Virginia  delegates  in 
Congress  wrote  home,  on  April  2,  1781,  that  a  French  war- 
ship had  carried  a  number  of  Virginians  to  Newport, 
among  them  traitorous  citizens  who  might  injure  the  cause 
1  Virginia  Historical  Register,  iv,  188. 


SPREAD  OF  DISAFFECTION  243 

by  giving  information  to  the  enemy  or  sowing  disaffection.1 
The  number  of  malcontents,  already  considerable  in  1779 
and  1780,  increased  in  1781,  with  the  transfer  of  hostilities 
to  Virginia  soil.  The  inevitable  sufferings  of  war,  which  had 
been  great  from  the  first,  were  now  aggravated  by  the 
operations  of  countless  commissaries  and  quartermasters, 
State  and  Continental,  who  plundered  right  and  left,  some- 
times giving  worthless  certificates  in  return  for  what  they 
took  and  sometimes  not. 

A  good  many  Tories  were  in  prison  at  the  beginning  of 
1781.  Even  in  the  pressure  of  Arnold's  invasion,  on  Janu- 
ary 3,  1781,  the  council  examined  one  of  them,  Robert  B. 
Carre,  who  was  remanded  to  jail  for  the  period  of  the 
invasion  because  of  disaffection.2  On  February  1,  1781, 
when  the  storm  had  abated,  Jefferson  wrote  to  Governor 
Lee,  of  Maryland,  in  regard  to  one  Joseph  Shoemaker, 
who  had  been  guilty  of  violence  in  Virginia  and  was  now 
under  arrest  in  Baltimore,  declaring  that  the  government 
had  no  prison  in  Richmond  and  suggesting  that  Shoemaker 
be  tried  and  executed  in  Maryland  if  he  were  guilty  of  any 
crimes  in  that  State.  But  Lee  declined  to  act  as  Jefferson's 
hangman  and  sent  Shoemaker  to  Richmond,  where  he  was 
imprisoned  in  Henrico  jail  along  with  other  Tories.  These 
latter,  to  the  number  of  about  twenty-five,  complained  that 
they  had  been  confined  in  jail  for  six  months  without  trial 
and  asked  to  be  examined  in  any  convenient  county  court 
or  be  released  on  bail  pending  examination.3  Other  com- 
plaints came  to  the  government  in  1781  from  suspects 
imprisoned  elsewhere.    Reuben  Mitchell,   a  ship-captain 

1  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  n,  4.     2  Council  Journal  (1781),  4. 
1  Executive  Papers  (December,  1781).  Virginia  State  Library. 


244        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

confined  in  Hanover,  complained  that  he  had  been  sixteen 
days  in  the  provost  guard  without  trial  and  that  he  was 
unable  to  secure  a  copy  of  the  charges  against  him.  John 
Cabeen,  a  Carolinian  who  had  been  arrested  in  Virginia 
and  thrown  into  jail  at  Charlottesville,  declared  that  he 
was  kept  chained  among  a  gang  of  felons  and  had  been 
given  no  hearing. 

Arnold's  raid  displayed  in  striking  manner  the  military 
weakness  of  Virginia  and  the  government's  utter  unpre- 
paredness;  it  was  a  feat  as  discouraging  to  the  patriot 
population  as  it  was  encouraging  to  the  ill-disposed.  Dis- 
content with  the  government  became  general,  while  actual 
disaffection  grew  widespread.  Ordinary  suspects  could,  of 
course,  be  clapped  into  jail  and  left  to  cool  their  heels,  but 
there  were  insidious  forms  of  treason  which  it  was  difficult 
for  the  government  to  combat.  The  British,  with  an  utter 
lack  of  scruple,  sought  to  undermine  the  patriots  by  mean 
intrigue  as  persistently  as  they  attempted  open  conquest; 
they  used  every  weapon  and  advantage  of  war,  honest  and 
dishonest. 

Among  their  choice  tactics  was  the  perversion  of  flag-of  - 
truce  vessels  to  partisan  purposes.  The  British  had  sought 
and  obtained  leave  for  flag-of -truce  vessels  to  restore  kid- 
napped slaves  and  other  plunder  to  their  owners  in  return 
for  supplies.  This  was,  of  course,  an  accommodation  both 
to  the  plunderers  and  the  plundered,  but  chiefly  to  the 
former,  who  needed  the  supplies.  After  a  time  the  system 
wras  so  stretched  as  to  make  distinctions  between  the  prop- 
erty of  persons  who  had  been  active  in  the  patriot  cause 
and  of  those  who  had  remained  passive,  the  latter  being 
restored  and  the  former  kept.  Finally  a  flag-of -truce  went 


SPREAD  OF  DISAFFECTION  U5 

so  far  as  to  open  trade  with  Mrs.  Byrd,  of  Westover, 
widow  of  the  distinguished  William  Byrd,  a  loyalist,  under 
the  pretense  of  making  restitution  for  captured  property. 
The  facts  became  known,  and  the  council,  on  February  22, 
1781,  informed  Baron  Steuben,  who  had  allowed  the  Brit- 
ish ship  to  go  up  the  James,  of  its  disapproval  of  Mrs. 
Byrd's  conduct  in  receiving  goods  from  the  enemy  in  cir- 
cumstances amounting  to  actual  barter.1  Jefferson  wrote 
Mrs.  Byrd  a  few  days  later  that  her  offense  came  within 
the  act  defining  treason  and  that  the  attorney-general 
would  proceed  against  her.  The  vessel,  he  said,  had  been 
allowed  to  ascend  the  river  solely  to  return  slaves  carried 
off,  instead  of  which  it  had  begun  a  regular  commerce.2 
The  council  directed  a  warrant  to  issue  to  the  judges  of  the 
general  court  for  the  trial  of  Mrs.  Byrd  in  Richmond  on 
March  15,  1781.  But  the  trial  never  took  place,  owing 
possibly  to  Mrs.  Byrd's  sex  and  rank,  possibly  to  the  gravity 
of  the  situation  in  Virginia,  which  precluded  the  paying  of 
attention  to  such  comparative  trivialities.  So  this  woman 
escaped  the  fate  of  one  of  Washington's  old  loves,  Mary 
Philipse,  who  was  attainted  of  treason.  The  council,  how- 
ever, forbade  flags-of-truce  to  be  used  in  negotiating  the 
return  of  plundered  property.3 

Eastern  Virginia  was  more  and  more  threatened  as  the 
year  advanced;  the  defenselessness  of  the  State  encouraged 
Arnold  to  take  position  at  Portsmouth,  while  at  the  same 
time  Cornwallis  gradually  drew  near  from  the  South.  But 
in  the  southwest,  the  region  where  discontent  was  most 
acute  and  dangerous,  the  situation  was  improved  by  the 

1  Council  Journal  (1781),  61.      2  Governor's  Letter-Book  (1781),  152. 
»  Council  Journal  (1781),  68. 


246        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

chastisement  of  the  Cherokee  Indians,  who  had  begun 
to  make  themselves  troublesome  in  December,  1780.  The 
Cherokees  were  by  far  the  most  formidable  and  dangerous 
tribe  the  Southern  colonies  had  to  reckon  with.  Partly 
civilized  and  threatened  by  the  growing  frontier  of  Virginia 
and  the  Carolinas,  the  Cherokees  listened  readily  to  the 
British  agents  and  Tories  who  worked  steadily  to  raise 
them  against  the  borders.  When  at  last  they  moved,  Vir- 
ginia and  North  Carolina  militia  combined  to  make  a  force 
of  respectable  size,  invaded  the  Cherokee  country,  and 
burned  a  number  of  their  towns.1  The  Indians  prudently 
allowed  the  militia  to  return  home  unopposed.  But  though 
the  Cherokee  expedition  had  a  good  effect  on  the  far  fron- 
tier, discontent  was  too  prevalent  in  the  west  in  the  spring 
of  1781  not  to  show  itself. 

Garrett  Vanmeter,  county-lieutenant  of  Hampshire, 
wrote  to  Jefferson,  on  April  11,  1781,  informing  him  that 
the  agent  sent  to  impress  clothes  and  beef  and  draught  men 
had  been  forced  by  a  mob  to  abandon  his  work  and  that 
peaceful  methods  had  failed  to  bring  the  mutineers  to 
obedience.  At  the  same  time  William  Preston  reported 
that  he  did  not  think  the  Montgomery  quota  of  militia 
demanded  for  general  service  could  be  raised,  because 
nearly  half  of  the  militia  were  disaffected  and  any  attempt 
to  press  them  into  service  would  either  drive  them  to  the 
mountains  or  bring  on  a  riot.  The  Hampshire  mutineers, 
finding  a  leader,  had  begun  a  rather  serious  disturbance. 

A  certain  John  Claypole  said  if  all  the  men  were  of  his  mind, 
they  would  not  make  up  any  Cloathes,  Beef  or  Men,  and  all  that 
would  join  him  should  turn  out.  Upon  which  he  got  all  the  men 

1  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  i,  435. 


SPREAD  OF  DISAFFECTION  247 

present  to  five  or  six  and  Got  Liquor  and  Drank  King  George  the 
third's  health,  and  Damnation  to  Congress,  upon  which  com- 
plaint was  made  to  three  Magistrates.  Upon  which  there  was  a 
warrant  Issued  for  several  of  them,  and  Guard  of  fifty  men  with 
the  Sheriff.  When  they  came  to  the  place  they  found  sixty  or 
seventy  men  embodied,  with  arms  —  after  some  time  they 
capitulated.  The  Sheriff  served  the  precept  on  the  said  John 
Claypole,  but  he  refused  to  come  with  him  or  give  up  his  arms; 
but  agreed  to  come  such  a  time,  which  time  is  Past  —  I  was 
informed  there  are  several  Deserters  amongst  these  people, 
Some  of  them  from  the  English  Prisoners.1 

Jefferson  replied  that  the  spirit  of  mutiny  must  be 
crushed,  yet  counseled  Vanmeter  that  it  would  perhaps  be 
better  not  to  move  against  the  body  of  insurgents  and 
drive  them  into  open  rebellion,  but,  on  their  dispersal, 
"take  them  out  of  their  Beds  singly  and  without  Noise."  2 
This  advice  illustrates  Jefferson's  preference  for  finesse 
over  direct  methods.  The  insurgents,  however,  instead  of 
dispersing  as  the  governor  expected,  increased  in  numbers 
until  they  were  reported  to  be  a  thousand  strong.  Van- 
meter  finally  sent  four  companies  of  militia  to  break  up 
the  gathering,  which  was  easily  accomplished  and  without 
other  casualties  than  one  man  accidentally  killed.  The 
only  fighting  of  the  outbreak  took  place  when  insurgents 
holding  a  mill  fired  on  a  party  of  horse  without  effect. 
Arrests  followed  the  dispersion  of  the  mutineers  and  the 
county  court  immediately  examined  forty-two  prisoners, 
remanding  some  of  them  for  trial.  The  assembly,  which 
was  anxious  to  end  the  sedition  as  quickly  as  possible,  au- 
thorized the  executive  to  offer  a  pardon,  and  the  governor 
accordingly  proclaimed  it  for  the  benefit  of  those  insurgents 

1  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  n,  40.  2  Letter-Book  (1781). 


248        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

outlying  in  the  mountains.  The  council  appointed  a  special 
court  to  try  the  offenders  who  had  been  arrested.  It  met 
at  Hampshire  Court-House  for  the  trial,  in  July,  1781,  but 
as  the  judges  appointed  in  the  order  failed  to  appear,  noth- 
ing was  done.  Nevertheless,  the  threat  was  an  excellent 
corrective  for  a  turbulent  community  inclined  to  regard 
its  own  wishes  as  law.  A  number  of  excited  women  crowded 
the  court-house,  anxious  to  see  the  prisoners  and  fearing 
that  they  would  be  sentenced  to  death  and  immediately 
executed.1  The  government  was  at  last  showing  that  there 
was  a  limit  to  its  complaisance,  something  it  should  have 
done  long  before. 

No  action  was  taken,  but  the  ringleaders  remained  in 
jail.  Later  on  Claypole  and  several  of  his  associates  ap- 
pealed for  an  extension  to  themselves  of  the  act  of  pardon, 
as  in  the  case  of  the  southwestern  mutineers.  Peter  Hogg, 
the  Rockingham  county-lieutenant,  gave  the  petition  his 
support.  The  governor  replied  that  he  did  not  have  the 
constitutional  power  to  pardon  offenders  still  in  the  pos- 
session of  a  court;  only  the  assembly  could  dismiss  prosecu- 
tions. At  the  same  time  Jefferson  admitted  that  these  men 
suffered  hardship  in  being  held  for  trial  while  their  equally 
guilty  comrades  had  been  pardoned.2  Finally  the  council 
decided  to  issue  pardons  to  all  the  insurgents  except  John 
Claypole  and  four  other  ringleaders.3  One  by  one  the  last 
of  the  Hampshire  insurgents  were  taken  or  surrendered; 
they  claimed  to  have  been  misled  through  ignorance  to  op- 
pose the  taxes  and  the  draught,  which  was  an  outworn  but 
effective  plea.   Eventually  even  the  leaders  were  pardoned. 

1  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  n,  285. 

2  Letter-Book  (1781),  49.  «  Council  Journal  (1781-82),  21. 


SPREAD  OF  DISAFFECTION  249 

The  Hampshire  outbreak  was  merely  symptomatic  of 
the  discouragement  prevalent  in  western  Virginia  and  of  the 
resentment  caused  by  war  taxes  and  draughting;  what  the 
people  endured  without  murmuring  in  the  Civil  War  seemed 
an  intolerable  burden  in  the  Revolution.  The  draughts 
were  especially  resented  and  met  with  frequent  resistance. 
In  Augusta  and  Rockingham  the  people  gathered  for  the 
drawings  seized  the  lists  and  destroyed  them.  "I  don't 
know  where  this  may  stop,"  wrote  Major  Thomas  Posey, 
"if  there  is  not  a  timeous  check,  in  Hanging  a  few,  for 
examples  to  the  rest."  1  But  the  government  would  shed 
no  blood  and  offered  a  pardon  to  the  rioters  who  would 
return  to  their  duty.  The  latter  thereupon  surrendered 
the  ringleaders,  William  Ward  and  Lewis  Baker.  In  June, 
1781,  Augusta  court  found  Ward  and  Baker  guilty  of  levy- 
ing war  against  the  Commonwealth  and  held  them  for 
trial  by  a  special  committee  the  council  appointed.  In 
Bedford  also  a  number  of  men  combined  to  defeat  the 
draught.  James  Calloway,  the  county-lieutenant,  over- 
awed them  and  imprisoned  their  leaders  in  Bedford  jail. 
A  court-martial  sentenced  several  of  them  to  serve  six 
months  in  the  army,  but  they  all  managed  to  escape.2 
Reports  from  the  southwest  in  June,  1781,  stated  that 
parties  of  Tories  and  deserters  lurked  in  Montgomery  and 
Washington  Counties,3  and  in  July,  William  Preston  de- 
clared that  more  than  half  of  the  Montgomery  people  were 
disaffected  and  that  their  numbers  were  growing.  Whigs 
could  not  be  induced  to  enter  militia  service  for  fear  of  the 
Tories  and  Indians. 

1  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  n,  107. 

2  Council  Journal  (1781),  115. 

3  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  n,  184. 


250         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

In  the  east  the  situation  in  1781  was  almost  as  bad.  The 
eastern  people  suffered  as  much  as  the  west  from  taxes  and 
draughts,  and,  in  addition,  were  exposed  to  the  depreda- 
tions of  the  enemy  and  of  quartermasters  and  other  official 
and  unofficial  extorters.  Indeed,  the  east  offered  a  better 
opportunity  for  resisting  the  government  than  the  west,  for 
the  presence  of  British  troops  in  the  former  section  during 
the  greater  part  of  the  year  gave  encouragement  to  every 
kind  of  treasonable  and  seditious  practice.  There  was  much 
malingering,  much  shirking  of  duty,  much  secret  inter- 
course with  the  enemy  and  some  rioting  and  plundering, 
but  no  party  or  semblance  of  a  party  arose,  as  in  North  and 
South  Carolina,  to  advocate  the  royal  cause.  The  soli- 
darity of  the  planter  class  on  the  American  side  remained 
practically  unaffected,  even  though  the  evils  of  war  were 
bringing  out  the  weakness  or  lack  of  patriotism  of  many 
individuals  of  that  type  which  all  the  world  over  is  apt  to 
bow  the  head  to  whatever  cause  happens  to  have  the  upper 
hand  for  the  time  being.  But  such  men  do  not  found  parties. 
The  records  of  the  year  are  full  of  accusations  of  treason 
and  Toryism;  overt  acts  were  not  wanting  and  a  handful 
of  men  actually  made  war  on  their  State.  Trials  followed 
and  many  convictions  of  treason,  but  in  the  end  mercy  in- 
variably triumphed,  sometimes  at  the  expense  of  justice. 
The  government  used  great  moderation  in  these  critical 
months  in  dealing  with  those  guilty  of  treason  and  dis- 
affection. 

There  was  some  excuse  for  harshness,  too.  The  British 
commanders,  following  the  inexcusable  custom  they  had 
introduced  in  the  South,  paroled  unarmed  citizens  and 
threatened  them  with  death  if  taken  in  arms  against  Eng- 


SPREAD  OF  DISAFFECTION  251 

land  at  any  subsequent  time.  Matthews  seems  to  have 
been  the  first  British  commander  to  employ  the  system  in 
Virginia;  he  paroled  a  number  of  Nansemond  non-com- 
batants in  1779,  and  Arnold  and  Cornwallis  greatly  ex- 
tended it.  As  this  practice,  if  systematically  carried  out 
and  generally  regarded,  would  have  left  it  in  the  power  of 
a  mere  raiding  party  of  cavalry  permanently  to  neutralize 
half  a  State,  Jefferson  could  not,  of  course,  put  up  with  it. 
He  accordingly  required  persons  who  had  accepted  paroles 
and  intended  to  observe  them  to  go  within  the  British 
lines,  where  they  belonged.  Such  action  on  his  part  was 
imperative;  the  government  could  not  allow  whole  sections 
of  the  population  to  become  paralyzed  by  a  perversion  of 
military  usage.1 

The  governor's  decision  put  the  inhabitants  in  the  line 
of  march  of  the  British  army  in  a  most  distressing  quan- 
dary. Peacefulness  was  no  protection  whatever;  unarmed 
planters  and  small  farmers  engaged  in  looking  after  their 
affairs  and  offering  no  pretense  of  resistance  were  forced 
to  give  their  paroles  not  to  serve  in  the  American  army  at 
any  time  in  the  future,  or  were  liable  to  be  shipped  off  to 
New  York  to  endure  the  horrors  of  the  British  prisons,  al- 
most unparalleled  in  history.  On  the  other  hand,  if  they 
gave  parole  and  later  were  called  into  the  field  with  the 
militia,  they  might  be  executed  in  case  of  capture.  Jeffer- 
son retorted  to  this  threat  by  threatening  to  execute  an 
equal  number  of  British  prisoners  in  his  hands,  and  it 
does  not  appear  that  Cornwallis  murdered  any  citizens  of 
Virginia  under  pretext  of  breaking  parole  as  he  murdered 
unfortunate  Carolinians.   Jefferson  further  attempted  to 

1  Council  Journal  (1781),  11. 


252        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

make  paroling  difficult  by  isolating  British  posts  as  much 
as  possible.  In  May,  1781,  he  asked  the  assembly  to  pro- 
hibit citizens  from  going  within  a  certain  distance  of  en- 
campments of  the  enemy,  and  to  provide  a  method  for  the 
speedy  trial  of  persons  caught  furnishing  the  enemy  with 
supplies  or  acting  as  guides.  This  was  necessary,  he  de- 
clared, because  the  military  authorities  had  no  power  over 
civilians  and  could  not  prevent  people  from  staying  in  their 
homes  and  submitting  to  the  enemy's  demands  in  order  to 
save  their  property.1  The  assembly  thereupon  extended 
the  jurisdiction  of  court-martials  over  civilians  guilty  of 
intercourse  with  the  enemy. 

The  government  had  an  even  more  serious  embarrass- 
ment in  the  rapidily  growing  spirit  of  lawlessness  in  tide- 
water Virginia.  Jefferson  wrote  to  Colonel  Innes  in  May, 
1781,  that  people  in  James  City  and  York  had  committed 
acts  amounting  to  treason  and  misprision  of  treason,  al- 
though they  had  covered  their  tracks  so  well  as  to  leave 
no  legal  proofs.  He  directed  Innes  to  carry  suspects  before 
justices  of  the  peace  for  ordinary  legal  investigation  and 
ship  them  off  to  Richmond  if  so  ordered  by  the  court,  but 
if  evidence  was  lacking  and  there  seemed  danger  of  rescue 
simply  to  seize  them  without  investigation  and  send  them 
to  Henrico  jail.  A  dangerous  outbreak  against  authority 
occurred  on  the  Eastern  Shore  in  April,  1781.  This  section, 
isolated  and  largely  at  the  mercy  of  sea  power,  had  al- 
ways contained  many  British  sympathizers  and  lukewarm 
patriots.  Besides  the  necessary  burdens  of  the  war,  like 
taxes  and  militia  drawings,  the  people  had  suffered  from 
unceasing  ravages  of  privateers  and  plunderers,  who  were, 
1  Letter-Book  (1781),  SI. 


SPREAD  OF  DISAFFECTION  253 

for  all  practical  purposes,  simply  pirates.  In  addition  the 
government  allowed  several  successive  tax  levies  to  pile 
up  on  Accomac  and  Northampton  taxpayers  without 
warning,  and  a  militia  draught  proved  the  last  straw.  On 
April  20,  1781,  a  mob  of  several  thousand  men,  armed 
with  clubs  and  poles,  met  at  Accomac  Court-House  for  the 
purpose  of  opposing  the  draught.  George  Corbin,  the  act- 
ing county-lieutenant,  attempted  to  quiet  the  rioters,  but, 
finding  his  efforts  useless,  postponed  the  drawing  to  a  later 
date.  On  this  occasion  the  crowd  again  assembled  in  force 
and  refused  to  listen  to  Corbin's  pleading  for  obedience  to 
the  law.  Once  more  the  draught  was  not  held.1 

Thereupon  confusion  reigned  on  the  Eastern  Shore. 
Leading  citizens  advised  their  neighbors  not  to  pay  taxes; 
tax  collectors  refused  to  make  collections  or  hand  over 
money  already  received  to  the  commissioners;  others  were 
threatened  for  attempting  to  collect.  Corbin  feared  to  use 
force  to  restore  order,  but  the  ringleaders  in  the  riot  were 
tried  by  court-martial  and  sentenced  to  serve  as  soldiers 
for  the  duration  of  the  war.  The  court-martial  referred 
John  Curtis  and  William  Garrison,  the  only  men  of  posi- 
tion among  the  malcontents,  to  the  council  for  trial.  Corbin 
vividly  described  the  situation  on  the  Eastern  Shore :  — 

With  the  enemy's  barges  continually  hovering  around  over 
Sea  and  Bay  coasts,  threatening  to  burn  and  plunder  all  who 
should  oppose  their  wicked  designs.  The  disaffected  daily  in- 
creasing by  their  clandestine  trade  with  the  British  at  Portsmouth, 
their  threats  thrown  out  against  all  who  shall  fail  to  apply  for 
protection  and  accept  the  proposed  mercy,  in  the  British  proc- 
lamations, which  have  been  industriously  and  artfully  circu- 
lated and  enforced.2 

1  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  n,  99.  2  Ibid.,  n,  135. 


254        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

An  even  more  serious  occurrence  followed  this  disturb- 
ance. The  disaffected,  who  were  constantly  becoming 
bolder  because  unmolested  by  the  distracted  government, 
had  taken  to  robbing  remote  plantations  and  attempting 
to  gain  the  assistance  of  the  slaves.  A  planter  accidentally 
surprised  one  of  the  conspirators  while  engaged  in  winning 
over  some  negroes  and  was  shot  dead.  This  outrage  was 
too  much  for  the  patience  of  the  people;  they  rose  in  arms, 
forced  a  confession  from  a  slave,  and  hanged  three  of  the 
plunderers.1  The  lynching  was  revenged  by  a  descent  on 
Pungoteague  of  British  barges,  commanded  by  one  Robin- 
son and  manned  chiefly  by  negroes.  A  handful  of  local 
militia  turned  out  and  drove  off  the  raiders  after  a  brief 
skirmish.  The  latter  took  to  their  boats,  followed  by  the 
militia,  who  continued  the  pursuit  up  Chesapeake  Bay  for 
four  days  and  nights,  but  without  overtaking  them.  The 
patriots  returned  in  no  complaisant  humor  and  a  court- 
martial  proceeded  to  try  John  Lyon,  rector  of  St.  George's 
Parish,  Accomac,  for  aiding  the  enemy  and  discouraging 
the  militia  from  taking  arms  against  Robinson's  raiders. 
The  case  against  Lyon  looked  bad,  since  he  had  gone  on 
board  Robinson's  barge  at  night,  though  apparently  un- 
willingly. He  received  a  fair  trial,  and  the  sentence  of  five 
years'  imprisonment  imposed  was  strictly  within  the  law; 
there  could  be  no  doubt  of  Lyon's  open  Toryism.  Yet  the 
minister  bore  a  good  character  and  was  popular  with  his 
parishioners,  some  of  whom  petitioned  the  governor  for 
a  remission  of  his  sentence  to  exile.  John  Cropper,  the 
county -lieutenant,  however,  reported  that  Lyon  deserved 
a  halter.2  Cropper  sent  the  worst  offenders  in  the  Accomac 

1  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  n,  340,  412. 

2  Council  Journal  (1781),  250. 


SPREAD  OF  DISAFFECTION  255 

outbreak,  Lyon,  John  Curtis,  William  Garrison,  and  five 
others,  as  prisoners  to  Richmond,  with  a  recommendation 
of  leniency.  The  government  was  mild  and  changed  Lyon's 
imprisonment  to  residence  in  the  country  twenty  miles 
from  Richmond,  eventually  allowing  him  to  return  to 
Accomac. 

The  whole  tidewater  section  was  becoming  distracted, 
a  prey  to  raiders  all  along  the  shores  of  rivers  and  bays, 
honeycombed  with  intrigue  and  full  of  secret  traitors,  who 
were  too  few  in  number  in  any  one  place  or  too  fearful  of 
public  sentiment  to  act  openly.  The  New  York  privateers 
in  Chesapeake  waters  paid  no  attention  to  the  political 
views  of  their  victims,  robbing  good  loyalists  as  willingly 
as  rebels.  Ralph  Wormeley  and  Philip  Grymes  were 
among  the  former  class.  Wormeley's  splendid  estate  at 
Rosegill  was  plundered  by  privateersmen,  who  found 
guides  and  assistants  in  the  plantation  negroes.  Wormeley 
and  other  sufferers  from  this  raid  appealed  to  Leslie,  com- 
manding the  British  force  at  Portsmouth,  to  control  his 
privateers,  and  Leslie  returned  some  slaves  and  other 
stolen  property.1  The  privateersmen  on  the  British  side 
were  difficult  to  restrain,  for  they  were  pirates  in  every- 
thing but  name;  they  used  New  York  as  a  refuge  and  the 
Union  Jack  as  a  cover  for  indiscriminate  robbery  and  out- 
rage. They  were  for  the  most  part  Americans,  chiefly  from 
New  York,  but  also  from  Maryland  and  Virginia  —  fisher- 
men, coast  sailors,  marine  vagrants,  who  seized  the  un- 
rivaled opportunity  for  crime  offered  by  Chesapeake  Bay 
and  its  numberless  inlets.  In  the  early  years  of  the  war  the 
Virginia  navy  had  kept  these  water-thieves  in  check,  but 
1  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  n,  405. 


256        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

the  navy  came  to  an  end  in  the  invasion  at  the  beginning 
of  1781,  and  the  pirates  enjoyed  full  scope.  Conditions  in 
tidewater  Virginia  had  become  distressing  by  the  summer 
of  that  year  and  continued  so  throughout  1782. 

Constant  arrests  and  trials  in  1781  showed  the  extent 
of  disaffection  and  the  deep  public  discouragement.  Local 
militia  commanders,  invested  with  the  powers  of  martial 
law,  strove  to  suppress  the  discontented  whom  the  ubi- 
quitous and  energetic  county  committees  had  once  so 
effectually  terrorized.  Cases  of  disaffection  were  numer- 
ous. Archibald  Ritchie,  of  Tappahannock,  the  loyalist, 
happening  to  send  a  letter  by  the  same  messenger  used  by 
a  privateer  captain  in  Tappahannock  jail,  had  his  papers 
seized  and  sealed.1  Fauntleroy  Dye,  an  ex-tobacco-inspec- 
tor of  Richmond  County,  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of 
the  enemy  in  1779  and  returned  home  somewhat  later  with 
a  considerable  sum  of  money,  which  naturally  excited  sus- 
picion in  the  community.  Dye,  who  had  become  thoroughly 
tainted  during  his  captivity,  began  to  use  his  influence  to 
persuade  his  neighbors  to  resist  militia  calls  and  to  hold 
private  meetings  of  a  doubtful  character  at  his  house. 
Learning  this,  Major  Joel,  with  a  party  of  mounted  volun- 
teers, went  into  Richmond,  arrested  one  Tiffie,  "a  most 
notorious  promoter  of  sedition,"  and  surrounded  Dye's 
house,  where  he  took  a  few  armed  Tories,  who  had  "in 
open  contempt  of  the  laws  of  their  country,  bid  defiance 
to  the  county  lieutenant,  and  held  constant  meetings  of 
the  disaffected."  2  A  court-martial  at  Leedstown  found  Dye 
guilty  of  giving  intelligence  to  the  enemy  and  encouraging 

1  Council  Journal  (1781),  359. 

2  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  n,  155. 


SPREAD  OF  DISAFFECTION  257 

desertion,  and  sentenced  him  to  prison  for  the  period  of  the 
war. 

Caution  was  necessary  to  escape  suspicion  in  the  sum- 
mer of  1781,  so  general  were  the  reports  of  disaffection. 
Because  of  communications  carried  on  with  the  British 
at  Portsmouth  for  the  return  of  property  taken  by  priva- 
teersmen,  which  led  to  suspicions  of  a  widespread  system 
of  intelligence  among  loyalists,  the  government  ordered  the 
local  authorities  to  arrest  a  number  of  persons  along  the 
Rappahannock  and  seize  their  papers:  Ralph  Wormeley, 
Jr.,  Philip  Grymes,  and  about  twenty  others,  some  of  them 
prominent  merchants.  These  arrests  had  little  effect  in 
stemming  the  tide  of  discontent  ever  strengthening  through 
the  year.  Amos  Weeks  reported  from  Princess  Anne  that 
there  were  many  disaffected  in  the  county,  whom  he 
wished  to  bring  to  justice.  Thomas  Newton  confirmed  his 
account:  — 

The  County  of  Princess  Anne  has  neither  civil  or  military  law 
in  it  —  they  are  striving  to  collect  their  militia  —  to-morrow 
will  determine  their  numbers  to  turn  out  —  murder  is  committed 
and  no  notice  taken  of  it  for  want  of  some  support  up  the  Coun- 
try—  a  few  desperate  fellows  go  about  in  the  sea  Coasts  and 
large  Swamps  and  do  mischief  in  the  nights.  Every  one  who 
appears  active  against  them  is  the  object  of  their  fury.1 

Other  counties  in  the  neighborhood  were  as  bad.  With 
the  British  established  at  Portsmouth  and  sending  out 
detachments  into  the  surrounding  country  to  build  posts, 
the  natural  Toryism  of  southeastern  Virginia  reappeared. 
Josiah  Parker,  the  militia  commander  in  Isle  of  Wight,  re- 
ported that  some  there  visited  the  enemy  and  that  many 

1  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  u,  451. 


258         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

Norfolk,  Princess  Anne,  and  Nansemond  people  had  been 
paroled  by  the  British  on  their  own  request,  although  only 
twelve  men  in  Nansemond  had  actually  taken  arms  with 
them.  Feeling  ran  so  high  between  Tories  and  patriots  in 
this  region  that  violence  followed;  how  much  it  is  hard  to 
say;  the  records  speak  vaguely  of  murder  as  being  com- 
mon, but  specific  instances  are  not  so  easy  to  find.  One 
revolting  crime  is  recorded.  A  militia  captain  named  Nott, 
in  scouting  through  Nansemond,  fell  into  an  ambush  set 
by  some  local  Tories  and  was  mortally  wounded.  The  am- 
bushers  put  him  in  a  cart  and  were  on  their  way  to  the 
nearest  British  post  when  a  squad  of  American  dragoons 
fell  upon  them,  retook  the  dying  man,  and  captured  the 
leader  of  the  party,  Dempsey  Butler,  a  deserter  from  the 
militia  and  all-round  bad  character.1  Farther  up  the  coast, 
in  Gloucester,  Sir  John  Peyton  expressed  a  belief  that  the 
enemy  were  in  communication  with  Gwynn's  Island  and 
Middlesex  and  that  the  people  were  generally  inclined 
towards  Toryism.  Constant  accusations  of  treason  came 
to  the  council  and  many  prisoners,  some  innocent,  some 
unquestionably  guilty.  Benjamin  Bronson  and  Warwood 
Burt,  of  York,  were  bailed  to  appear  before  the  council  on 
the  charge  of  treason,  and  John  Warden,  against  whom  in- 
formation had  been  lodged,  gave  bond  of  twenty  thousand 
pounds  of  tobacco  to  appear.2  On  October  12, 1781,  during 
the  siege  of  Yorktown,  the  council  dismissed  a  number  of 
suspects  on  their  expressing  contrition  and  giving  security 
to  furnish  each  a  soldier  for  the  war. 

What  was  in  some  respects  the  most  remarkable  trial 

1  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  n,  189. 
8  Council  Journal  (1781),  212. 


SPREAD  OF  DISAFFECTION  259 

case  of  Toryism  during  the  Revolution  was  that  of  "Billy," 
a  mulatto  slave  tried  and  condemned  to  death  by  Prince 
William  court  in  May,  1781,  "for  aiding  and  abetting 
and  feloniously  and  traitorously  waging  and  levying  war 
against  the  Commonwealth,  in  conjunction  with  divers  of 
the  same,  in  an  armed  vessel."  1  Two  of  the  judges  dis- 
sented on  the  ground  that  a  slave,  not  being  a  citizen  of  the 
State,  owed  it  no  allegiance  and  so  could  not  commit  trea- 
son. This  was  a  new  doctrine,  fruit  of  Revolutionary 
humanitarianism.  Slaves  had  been  tried  and  executed  for 
treason  in  the  colonial  period;  a  notable  case  had  occurred 
in  1710,  and  a  slave  was  executed  for  robbery  and  treason 
in  Norfolk  in  1778.  Mann  Page,  the  executor  of  the  estate 
owning  "Billy,"  appealed  to  Jefferson  for  a  reprieve,  which 
was  granted,  and  later  petitioned  the  legislature  for  his 
pardon,  on  the  ground  that  his  conviction  of  treason  was 
illegal.2  The  committee  appointed  to  consider  the  appeal 
concurred,  and  it  is  probable  that  the  slave  was  pardoned, 
though  the  end  of  the  case  is  obscure. 

So  far-reaching  had  been  disaffection  in  Virginia  that  the 
public  jail  at  the  end  of  November,  1781,  was  filled  to  its 
utmost  capacity  with  persons  awaiting  trial  for  political 
offenses.  William  Rose,  the  keeper,  reported  that  seven  men 
had  been  committed  to  jail  on  the  governor's  order,  but 
that  it  would  be  impossible  to  keep  them  in  so  confined  a 
space,  along  with  the  number  already  in  prison,  without 
endangering  their  lives,  whereupon  they  were  released  on 
bail.  On  December  4,  1781,  thirty-two  loyalists  captured 
at  Yorktown  and  elsewhere  were  in  the  Richmond  jail, 

1  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  n,  90. 

2  Journal,  House  of  Delegates  (May,  1781),  11. 


260        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

besides  other  prisoners.  This  overcrowding  in  a  small  con- 
fine led  the  council  to  take  measures  for  a  jail  delivery. 
The  governor  reported  that  the  prisoners  were  so  closely 
quartered  that  their  lives  were  actually  in  danger  and  the 
council  discharged  them. 

It  could  afford  to  be  magnanimous.  The  war  was  over 
in  effect;  the  peril  past.  But  that  dangerous  discontent 
and  open  treason  were  progressing  in  1781  to  the  point  of 
threatening  the  activities  of  the  government  in  waging  the 
war  cannot  be  doubted.  There  was  no  semblance  of  a  Tory 
party,  but  everywhere  were  doubt,  dissatisfaction,  and  a 
disinclination  to  make  sacrifices.  The  victory  of  Yorktown 
rescued  Virginia  from  a  serious  situation. 


CHAPTER  X 

MILITARY   OPERATIONS 

The  later  military  movements  in  Virginia  have  been  so 
frequently  described  and  in  such  detail  that  a  further  pro- 
longed study  would  be  superfluous;  yet  a  general  account  of 
the  operations  of  the  war  cannot  well  be  excluded  from  any 
broad  narrative  of  the  Revolution.  After  Dunmore's  ex- 
pulsion the  offensive  operations  of  the  Virginia  govern- 
ment ended.  Its  military  activities  were  confined  to  fur- 
nishing supplies  and  troops  for  the  Continental  army,  and 
it  made  little  effort  to  provide  for  home  defense.  Militia 
organization  actually  became  less  efficient  as  the  war  pro- 
gressed. There  was  need,  too,  for  a  mobile  and  trained 
militia.  Virginia  was  not  invaded  for  several  years,  but  the 
Chesapeake  was  terribly  raided  by  privateers  through  the 
entire  contest  and  the  Indians  were  always  threatening  and 
occasionally  dangerous. 

The  Indian  menace  seemed  great  for  a  moment  in  1776, 
when  both  the  Creeks  and  Cherokees  were  carrying  on 
hostilities  against  the  borders  of  the  Southern  colonies. 
The  arrival  of  a  British  force  at  this  moment  would  have 
made  the  red  men's  assistance  valuable;  the  British  did 
not  come  and  the  Americans  were  able  to  put  down  the 
Indians.  South  Carolina  roughly  suppressed  the  Creeks, 
and  the  three  Southern  colonies  then  turned  in  concert 
against  the  Cherokees  who  were  raiding  Virginia  as  far 
as  the  Blue  Ridge.  Virginia  sent  out  an  expedition  under 
Colonel  Isaac  Christian  which  traversed  the  wilderness  far 


262         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

into  the  present  State  of  Tennessee  and  endured  extraor- 
dinary hardships.  It  met  with  no  resistance,  however, 
as  the  Cherokees  were  awed  by  the  size  of  the  force,  and, 
after  witnessing  the  destruction  of  some  of  their  towns, 
sued  for  peace.  Christian's  raid  made  such  an  impression 
on  these  savages  that  they  remained  comparatively  quiet 
for  the  rest  of  the  war. 

The  English,  absorbed  in  their  efforts  to  conquer  the 
North,  had  allowed  their  allies  to  be  subdued  without 
assistance.  And  so  long  as  the  towns  of  Philadelphia  and 
New  York  and  the  line  of  the  Hudson  remained  the  British 
objective,  little  heed  was  paid  to  the  South.  It  was  only 
after  Burgoyne  had  surrendered  at  Saratoga  and  Howe  had 
evacuated  Philadelphia  that  the  new  commander-in-chief, 
Sir  Henry  Clinton,  began  to  meditate  an  attack  on  the 
prosperous  and  undefended  South.  Sooner  or  later  a 
Southern  war  would  lead  to  an  invasion  of  Virginia,  the 
chief  Southern  State  and  the  natural  base  of  supplies  for 
armies  operating  in  the  Carolinas.  The  British  harassed  the 
Commonwealth  with  several  severe  raids  before  making  it 
the  scene  of  regular  campaigns.  Command  of  the  sea  gave 
them  the  option  of  selecting  any  point  along  the  coast  for 
attack,  and  no  country  could  be  more  inviting  to  water 
expeditions  than  Virginia,  with  its  deeply  indented  shore 
and  its  numerous  broad  rivers.  In  the  realization  of  these 
facts,  Clinton  sent  an  expedition  from  New  York  in  May, 
1779,  under  Admiral  Sir  George  Collier.1  The  fleet  an- 
chored in  Hampton  Roads  on  May  9,  and  Collier,  with 
Matthews,  who  commanded  the  troops  on  board,  lost 
little  time  in  attacking  Portsmouth,  where  the  patriots 
1  Campbell's  History  of  Virginia,  696. 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS  263 

had  built  a  stout  log-work  on  the  Elizabeth  River  dignified 
by  the  name  of  Fort  Nelson.  With  usual  colonial  fatuous- 
ness in  military  matters,  they  had  left  it  open  in  the  rear, 
so  that  the  British  by  landing  troops  behind  it  exposed  the 
Americans  to  attack.  The  garrison  precipitately  retreated 
and  the  enemy  occupied  Portsmouth  without  fighting. 
From  this  point  as  a  center  they  sent  out  raiding  parties 
in  various  directions,  one  of  which  captured  Suffolk,  the 
chief  depot  of  military  supplies  in  Virginia.  Apparently 
the  State  government  selected  this  exposed  town  in  the 
belief  that  Virginia  enjoyed  immunity  from  British  at- 
tempts. A  militia  force  of  two  thousand  had  gathered  at 
Suffolk,  but  it  dispersed  on  the  approach  of  the  redcoats. 
Naval  stores  in  large  quantity  and  thousands  of  barrels 
of  pork  were  destroyed,  and  then  the  expedition  returned 
to  New  York. 

The  rulers  at  Williamsburg  had  made  a  hasty  attempt 
to  meet  the  raid  by  calling  out  militia  and  holding  two 
thousand  recruits  about  to  be  sent  to  the  Continental 
army.  When  Collier  abandoned  Portsmouth,  they  were 
sufficiently  reassured  to  forward  the  recruits  to  South 
Carolina  along  with  two  troops  of  horse.  The  assembly 
passed  a  totally  ineffective  act  for  raising  forty -five  hun- 
dred volunteers  by  way  of  salving  its  conscience  and  gave 
the  question  little  further  thought.  It  did  go  so  far,  how- 
ever, as  to  ask  for  a  detachment  of  the  French  fleet  to 
guard  the  unprotected  Chesapeake  waters.  If  this  request 
had  been  granted,  the  State  would  have  escaped  losses 
from  privateers  and  organized  raids  like  Collier's  which 
finally  came  to  endanger  the  American  cause.  But  the 
French  fleet  was  kept  at  Newport,  where  it  accomplished 


264        THE  REVOLUTION  EST  VIRGINIA 

nothing,  while  Virginia  was  left  open  to  assaults  by  forces 
of  any  size. 

In  October,  1780,  a  British  expedition  of  three  thousand 
men  commanded  by  General  Leslie  landed  at  Portsmouth. 
Leslie  was  not  primarily  engaged  in  raiding,  but  in  estab- 
lishing communication  with  Cornwallis  in  the  Carolinas, 
and  his  ravages  were  not  widespread.  After  a  stay  of  about 
a  month  at  Portsmouth  and  Suffolk,  he  sailed  for  South 
Carolina  to  reinforce  Cornwallis.  Militia  in  considerable 
numbers  had  gathered  to  oppose  him,  but  according  to  the 
customary  hand-to-mouth  method  of  the  Virginia  govern- 
ment it  dispersed  on  the  disappearance  of  the  immediate 
danger.  Collier's  and  Leslie's  unopposed  occupation  of 
Virginia  ports  prepared  the  way  for  a  much  more  serious 
enterprise;  the  State's  evident  helplessness  encouraged  the 
British  to  push  raids  into  the  interior.  Clinton  chose  Bene- 
dict Arnold  to  command  the  next  expedition,  which  en- 
tered the  Virginia  Capes  on  December  30,  1780. 

Instead  of  stopping  at  Portsmouth  as  the  British  com- 
manders had  done  previously,  Arnold  boldly  stood  up  the 
James  with  his  force  of  sixteen  hundred  men.  There  was 
no  army  to  oppose  him;  the  patriots  had  thrown  up  earth- 
works at  points  along  the  river,  and  the  cannon  at  one  of 
these,  Hood's,  fired  on  the  flotilla,  but  this  feeble  resistance 
ended  when  Arnold  landed  troops.  The  traitor  reached 
Richmond  on  January  5,  1781.  When  he  had  destroyed 
the  military  stores  and  the  public  buildings  at  the  new 
Virginia  capital,  he  fell  back  down  the  James.  One  detach- 
ment of  the  expedition,  in  attempting  to  ascend  the  Ap- 
pomattox to  Petersburg,  was  so  vigorously  opposed  by 
General  Smallwood  with  a  body  of  militia  that  it  gave  up 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS  W5 

the  enterprise.  Simcoe's  cavalry  surprised  and  dispersed  a 
handful  of  militia  at  Charles  City  Court-House.  Arnold 
was  ambushed  at  Hood's  on  his  way  down  the  river  by 
George  Rogers  Clark,  the  Western  hero,  and  suffered  a 
slight  loss.  All  in  all,  however,  this  small  British  expedi- 
tion met  with  no  opposition  worthy  of  the  name. 

Arnold  established  himself  at  Portsmouth  on  January 
20, 1781.  He  had  come  for  no  flying  visit,  but  for  system- 
atic raiding;  a  reinforcement  of  two  thousand  men  made 
him  formidable.  By  this  time  the  Virginia  government 
had  managed  to  bring  four  thousand  militia  into  the  field, 
part  of  the  force  on  the  Rappahannock  under  Weedon, 
part  under  Thomas  Nelson,  Jr.,  at  Williamsburg,  and  part 
under  Baron  Steuben  at  Cabin  Point  on  the  James.1  There 
was  some  prospect  of  assistance,  too,  since  the  presence 
of  Arnold  had  called  the  attention  of  Washington  and  the 
French  to  the  Virginia  campaign.  Desire  to  capture  the 
traitor,  as  well  as  the  necessity  of  preventing  the  destruction 
of  the  State's  resources,  led  to  a  resolution  to  send  a  French 
fleet  to  the  Chesapeake  as  a  part  of  a  joint  military  and 
naval  movement.  Lafayette  was  ordered  to  the  head  of 
the  Bay  with  a  detachment  of  the  Continental  army  to 
be  employed  in  the  attempt.  The  plan  of  cooperation 
failed,  owing  largely  to  the  blundering  of  the  French.  A 
squadron  commanded  by  De  Tilly  entered  Hampton 
Roads,  but  because  of  its  small  size  the  commander  feared 
that  he  would  be  bottled  up  by  the  British  fleet.  Without 
attempting  any  maneuvers,  he  sailed  back  to  the  French 
base  of  operations,  Newport,  Rhode  Island.2 

1  F.  R.  Lassiter's  Arnold's  Invasion  of  Virginia,  16. 

2  Charlemagne  Tower's  The  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  in  the  American 
Revolution,  n,  224-25. 


266        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

All  the  same,  the  opportunity  to  capture  Arnold  was 
too  tempting  to  be  lost.  The  French  admiral  Destouches 
brought  a  second  and  larger  fleet  to  Virginia  with  eleven 
hundred  troops  on  board,  commanded  by  Baron  Viome- 
nil,  Rochambeau's  second  in  command.  Destouches's 
tardy  movements  frustrated  the  plan.  The  British  admiral 
Arbuthnot  reached  the  Capes  ahead  of  the  French  and  an 
action  between  the  two  fleets  resulted  in  the  latter's  return 
to  Newport  for  a  second  time. 

This  failure  was  attended  with  serious  consequences. 
The  militia  had  assembled  in  sufficient  numbers  to  be  of 
some  service  in  a  joint  attack  on  Portsmouth  with  the 
French  and  Lafayette's  Continentals.  Colonel  Parker  was 
at  Suffolk  with  the  Nansemond  militia  and  Lawson  at 
Smithfield  with  nine  hundred  infantry  and  a  troop  of 
horse.  Muhlenberg  occupied  Cabin  Point  with  eight  hun- 
dred infantry  and  Armand's  cavalry  legion.  On  the  north 
side  of  the  James,  Nelson  had  gathered  one  thousand  men. 
Muhlenberg,  who  commanded  all  these  forces,  aimed  to 
prevent  Arnold  from  escaping  south  to  join  Cornwallis 
by  acting  in  concert  with  the  North  Carolina  militia,  and 
he  might  have  succeeded  if  the  French  had  held  command 
of  the  sea.  As  it  was,  the  English  were  reinforced  after 
Destouches's  debacle,  and  the  American  plan  of  campaign 
completely  broke  down.  Instead  of  taking  the  offensive 
against  the  English,  the  patriots  were  not  even  able  to 
offer  a  successful  defense  to  a  new  invasion  projected  from 
Portsmouth.  The  British  fleet  had  brought  further  troops 
and  another  commander,  Major-General  Phillips.  Phillips 
was  a  rare  specimen  of  that  insolent,  overbearing  military 
type  which  had  done  so  much  to  prejudice  the  colonies 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS  267 

against  English  rule.  He  was  an  officer  of  small  ability, 
but  as  Virginia  unassisted  could  make  but  little  opposi- 
tion, he  accomplished  his  object,  which  was  to  plunder  the 
country. 

In  the  middle  of  April,  1781,  Phillips  went  up  the  James 
River  with  the  best  part  of  his  command.  The  James, 
which  divides  Virginia  into  unequal  halves,  was  the  main 
commercial  highway  and  strategic  line  of  the  State.  The 
chief  towns  were  on  it  or  near  it,  and  the  largest  tobacco 
warehouses;  to  hold  it  was  to  control  the  greater  part  of 
eastern  Virginia.  Naturally,  then,  it  was  the  center  of 
operations  for  the  campaign  of  1781,  both  for  Phillips's 
raid  and  the  more  serious  movements  of  Cornwallis  later 
in  the  year.  Phillips  turned  aside  to  occupy  Williamsburg 
and  then  proceeded  up  the  Appomattox.  Muhlenberg,  with 
his  militia,  made  some  opposition  to  the  British,  who  en- 
tered Petersburg  on  April  25,  1781,  only  after  a  lively 
brush.1  The  invaders  created  havoc,  burning  warehouses 
at  Petersburg  and  Warwick  and  the  military  supply  depot 
at  Chesterfield  Court-House. 

The  main  British  objective  was  Richmond,  where  a 
quantity  of  stores  again  had  been  collected.  Baron  Steuben 
was  now  commanding  in  Virginia  instead  of  Muhlenberg; 
he  had  only  a  handful  of  regulars  and  a  small  force  of  mili- 
tia, but  he  made  such  resistance  as  was  possible  and  suc- 
ceeded in  delaying  the  enemy's  advance.  Time  was  of  im- 
portance, for  Lafayette  was  rapidly  drawing  near  with  his 
Continentals.  Though  he  had  been  ordered  to  Virginia 
originally  for  the  attack  on  Portsmouth,  which  proved 
abortive,  he  arrived  in  season  to  be  of  great  service  in  the 
1  Tower,  n,  292. 


268        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

defensive  campaign  now  really  beginning.  The  British 
reached  Manchester  on  the  south  bank  of  the  James  op- 
posite Richmond  on  April  29,  just  as  Lafayette  entered  the 
latter  place  from  the  north.1  Phillips  had  the  larger  and 
better  force,  amounting  to  twenty-three  hundred  men,  but 
the  crossing  of  the  river  under  fire  was  a  somewhat  hazard- 
ous operation  and  the  English  general  allowed  discretion 
to  cool  his  ardor.  He  retired  down  the  James  to  Westover 
after  a  raid  of  exceptional  severity,  in  which  Virginia  suf- 
fered material  injury.  Lafayette  followed  along  the  north 
bank  of  the  river,  too  weak  to  attack,  but  strong  enough 
to  oppose  any  attempt  to  cross.  His  presence  was  of  im- 
portance, for  it  made  impossible  any  wide  dispersal  of  the 
British  force  for  plundering. 

Phillips,  who  was  ailing,  returned  to  Petersburg  and 
died  on  May  13;  Arnold  succeeded  him  in  command.  The 
generalissimo  in  the  South,  Lord  Cornwallis,  was  advancing 
from  North  Carolina  to  join  Arnold  and  inaugurate  a  cam- 
paign in  Virginia.  Lafayette,  though  he  longed  to  prevent 
the  junction,  could  do  nothing  with  his  few  troops.  He 
wrote  to  hasten  the  movements  of  Anthony  Wayne,  de- 
tached with  a  further  force  of  Continentals  to  aid  him, 
and  passed  over  the  James  towards  Petersburg.  The  rival 
artillery  carried  on  a  cannonade  across  the  Appomattox, 
but  the  Frenchman  was  in  such  a  dangerous  position  with 
the  broad  James  in  his  rear  that  he  speedily  returned  to 
Richmond.  He  still  hoped  to  be  able  to  attack  Arnold 
before  the  arrival  of  Cornwallis;  he  did  not  know  that  the 
latter  had  reached  Petersburg  before  Wayne  had  set  out 
from  York,  Pennsylvania,  on  the  march  southward. 
1  Tower,  n,  293. 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS  269 

The  situation  of  the  patriots  was  now  very  threatening. 
Nathanael  Greene,  the  American  commander  in  the  Caro- 
linas,  had  refused  to  follow  Cornwallis  into  Virginia  and 
had  taken  the  fateful  step  of  marching  South;  the  Old 
Dominion  was  left  to  such  defense  as  might  be  devised. 
Cornwallis  commanded  a  considerable  and  well-appointed 
army,  especially  strong  in  cavalry,  while  the  only  American 
force  in  the  State  of  any  consequence  was  Lafayette's  small 
detachment  of  Continentals  augmented  by  militia.  The 
English  general  began  his  movements  by  advancing  to  the 
James,  which  he  crossed  at  Westover.  He  reached  Bot- 
tom's Bridge  on  the  Chickahominy  on  May  28; l  Lafayette 
left  Richmond  on  May  27,  with  the  British  near  at  hand.2 
He  was  in  no  little  danger;  the  enemy  by  an  energetic  use 
of  their  cavalry  might  have  held  him  until  the  main  force 
could  come  up.  The  marquis,  appreciating  his  position, 
began  a  rapid  retreat  northward  to  join  Wayne,  who  was 
now  known  to  be  somewhere  near  at  hand.  Cornwallis 
wheeled  in  pursuit  and  paralleled  the  American  line  of 
march  for  several  days,  endeavoring  to  intervene  between 
Lafayette  and  Wayne  and  bring  the  former  to  battle.  On 
May  28,  Lafayette  crossed  the  South  Anna  and  on  May  30 
crossed  the  North  Anna  and  was  safe.  On  June  10,  Wayne 
met  him  on  the  Rapidan,  with  one  thousand  Continentals 
of  the  Pennsylvania  line. 

Cornwallis  had  given  up  the  pursuit  on  June  1  and  turned 
his  attention  elsewhere.  He  sent  Tarleton  on  a  cavalry  raid 
to  Charlottesville,  whither  the  Virginia  assembly  had  fled, 
and  Simcoe  to  Point  of  Fork  on  the  upper  James,  where  the 
Virginians  had  assembled  large  military  stores.  Tarleton 
1  Tower,  n,  320.  ■  Ibid.,  n,  321. 


270        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

drove  the  assembly  over  the  mountains  to  Staunton,  but 
had  no  other  success;  Simcoe  succeeded  in  frightening  off 
Steuben,  who  guarded  Point  of  Fork,  and  burned  the 
stores.  This  was  a  serious  loss  for  the  bankrupt  Virginia 
government.  Meanwhile  the  American  army,  which  had 
been  increased  by  Wayne  to  about  four  thousand  men, 
was  now  strong  enough  to  play  with  the  offensive.  La- 
fayette was  no  longer  in  danger  from  a  cavalry  attack  and 
might  even  offer  battle,  provided  he  had  exceptional  ad- 
vantages. At  least,  he  could  prevent  further  British  raids 
of  any  consequence;  Cornwallis  must  keep  his  troops  well 
in  hand  in  the  face  of  a  formidable  foe  quite  able  to  cut 
off  detachments.  Cornwallis  fell  back  to  the  James  River 
west  of  Richmond  as  Lafayette  in  turn  advanced;  on  the 
latter 's  approach  he  turned  eastward  and  passed  through 
Richmond  to  Williamsburg.  Lafayette  followed,1  at  first 
cautiously,  but  gradually  with  more  boldness.  Steuben 
joined  him  on  June  19  with  a  militia  array,  raising  his  army 
to  five  thousand  men,  of  whom  two  thousand  were  Con- 
tinentals. It  was  too  heterogeneous  and  badly  equipped 
an  army,  however,  to  be  lightly  risked  in  battle,  though  as 
a  check  and  impediment  on  Cornwallis's  movements  it  was 
invaluable.  The  conquest  of  Virginia  was  impossible  as 
long  as  it  existed. 

Lafayette's  vigorous  pursuit  brought  on  several  severe 
skirmishes  with  the  British  rear-guard.  On  one  occasion 
Muhlenberg  in  the  American  van  was  set  upon  by  Tarleton, 
but  Lafayette  threw  his  supports  briskly  forward  and  the 
dragoons  retired.  Anthony  Wayne,  who  commanded  the 
patriot  advance,  continued  to  press  the  British  closely, 
1  Tower,  n,  342. 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS  271 

fighting  a  skirmish  at  Spencer's  Ordinary  on  June  26.  On 
June  28,  Cornwallis  reached  Williamsburg,  where  orders 
from  Clinton  met  him.  He  was  directed  to  send  back  part 
of  his  army  to  New  York  for  Clinton's  reinforcement  and 
to  take  up  a  defensive  position  with  the  remainder.  He 
thereupon  moved  south  with  the  intention  of  going  to 
Portsmouth;  by  sending  his  baggage  across  the  James  in 
advance  of  his  troops  he  beguiled  the  Americans  into  be- 
lieving that  his  army  had  already  passed  over.  Intent  on 
cutting  off  the  rear-guard,  Wayne  pressed  forward  across 
a  long  causeway  through  the  swamps  which  line  the  river 
near  Jamestown.  Cornwallis  remained  perdu  until  Wayne 
entered  the  trap  and  then  confronted  him  with  the  whole 
British  army  drawn  up  for  battle.  For  a  moment  Wayne's 
danger  was  very  great.  His  force  doubtless  would  have  been 
overwhelmed,  if  Lafayette,  on  reaching  the  scene  of  action, 
had  not  promptly  brought  up  supports,  which  were  for- 
tunately near  at  hand.  Two  battalions  of  Pennsylvanians 
created  a  diversion  by  charging  the  British  center,  thus 
giving  Wayne  the  chance  to  withdraw.  The  affair  at  Green 
Spring  was  a  sharply  contested  engagement,  from  which 
the  Americans  were  exceedingly  fortunate  to  escape  with- 
out heavy  loss.  Tarleton  later  accused  Cornwallis  of  slug- 
gishness in  not  following  up  his  advantage  the  next  morn- 
ing, and  it  does  seem  that  the  English  general  let  pass  an 
opportunity  to  dispose  of  Lafayette  and  bring  his  Virginia 
venture  to  a  successful  pause. 

As  it  was,  the  campaign  had  been  a  failure  in  a  strategic 
sense,  though  Virginia's  economic  resources  had  suffered 
greatly.  Cornwallis  established  himself  at  Portsmouth, 
while  Tarleton  went  off  on  a  brief  plundering  excursion 


272         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

through  southern  Virginia  more  productive  of  outrages 
on  the  inhabitants  than  of  injury  to  the  American  cause. 
Lafayette,  with  an  army  still  intact  and  growing,  took  up 
a  position  at  Malvern  Hill,  later  famous  for  the  battle 
fought  there  in  1862.  Virginia  could  not  be  called  con- 
quered as  long  as  a  considerable  American  force  still  held 
the  field;  the  State  was  weakened  by  a  summer  of  march- 
ing and  burning,  but  its  resources  were  yet  large.  After 
a  month  of  constant  maneuvering  Cornwallis  had  failed 
to  bring  on  a  battle  and  now  held  only  the  country  at  the 
mouth  of  the  James.  Indeed,  the  campaign,  with  the  sub- 
sequent surrender,  has  drawn  much  hostile  criticism  on 
Cornwallis.  That  he  was  not  a  great  strategist  is  true,  but 
he  was  a  competent  tactician,  and  he  gave  the  Americans 
more  trouble  than  any  British  general.  He  organized  a 
disciplined  and  mobile  army  with  which  he  marched  vast 
distances  and  fought  a  number  of  engagements,  nearly  al- 
ways with  success.  His  invasion  of  Virginia  was  inevitable 
if  the  British  wished  to  secure  their  conquests  in  the  South; 
the  patriots  in  the  Carolinas  could  always  count  on  aid 
from  Virginia,  which  was  sometimes  of  prime  value,  as  in 
the  King's  Mountain  expedition.  The  occupation  of  Vir- 
ginia would  mean  the  subjection  of  North  and  South  Caro- 
lina, as  well  as  the  possession  of  an  excellent  base  for  an 
attack  on  Maryland  and  Delaware.  There  were  many  pos- 
sibilities involved,  and  the  chief  blame  for  the  British 
downfall  should  rest  with  Clinton,  who  sought  to  control 
New  York  and  the  South  simultaneously  with  a  force  en- 
tirely too  small  once  the  French  appeared  in  the  field.  The 
policy  of  sending  out  expeditions  from  New  York  to  attack 
distant  points  was  feasible  only  as  long  as  the  British 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS  273 

held  undisputed  control  of  the  sea.  Loss  of  sea  command 
would  mean  the  exposure  of  some  outlying  detachment 
to  a  French-American  concentration  of  overpowering  size, 
and  this  was  what  occurred.  Cornwallis  happened  to  com- 
mand the  smallest  and  most  vulnerable  detachment  and 
the  blow  fell  on  him. 

The  moment  was  an  anxious  one  for  the  French  and 
American  commanders;  the  play  was  theirs,  but  the  selec- 
tion of  the  proper  move  was  not  so  easy  to  determine. 
Washington  had  long  cherished  the  idea  of  an  attack  on 
New  York,  but  he  now  reluctantly  abandoned  this  design. 
New  York  was  difficult  to  approach  from  the  sea  and  was 
heavily  fortified  and  well  garrisoned.  He  therefore  turned 
towards  Cornwallis,  who  held  an  exposed  position  on 
Chesapeake  Bay  far  from  the  British  bases  at  New  York 
and  Charleston.  But  a  movement  against  Cornwallis 
would  necessitate  the  cooperation  of  the  main  French 
fleet,  then  lying  off  Haiti,  with  the  French-American  army 
on  the  Hudson,  and  furthermore  the  quiescence  of  Corn- 
wallis himself,  who  could  fall  back  on  Wilmington  unless 
cut  off  by  a  land  force. 

De  Grasse,  the  French  admiral  in  the  West  Indies,  agreed 
to  cooperate  and  sailed  from  Haiti  to  the  Chesapeake  with 
twenty-eight  ships  of  the  line  and  a  large  body  of  troops. 
In  the  mean  time  Cornwallis  had  moved  from  Portsmouth 
to  Yorktown  on  the  York-James  Peninsula,  which  he  con- 
sidered more  accessible  to  the  sea.  Lafayette  remained  at 
Malvern  Hill  until  Cornwallis's  movement  to  Yorktown 
caused  him  to  break  up  camp  and  advance  to  the  Pamun- 
key  River.  De  Grasse  sailed  through  the  Capes  on  Au- 
gust 30.  By  this  time  Washington  was  on  his  way  to 


274        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

Virginia,  but  still  distant,  and  Lafayette  was  close  at  hand, 
but  not  actually  present.  It  would  seem,  then,  that  Corn- 
wallis  erred  in  not  attacking  the  French  troops  when  De 
Grasse  landed  them  at  Jamestown,  for  his  force  was  much 
superior.  He  did  consider  an  attack  after  the  French  had 
joined  Lafayette  at  Williamsburg,  but  found  the  venture 
too  risky. 

His  fate  was  quickly  sealed  by  the  French  naval  superi- 
ority. On  September  5,  the  British  admiral  Graves  reached 
the  Capes  with  a  fleet  not  much  smaller  than  the  French. 
De  Grasse  at  once  put  out  to  sea  to  meet  him,  and  an  in- 
decisive engagement  followed,  resulting  in  the  crippling  of 
several  English  vessels.  During  the  action  a  small  French 
fleet  from  Newport  slipped  into  Hampton  Roads,  and  when 
the  French  and  English  ships  returned  to  the  Chesapeake, 
Graves  found  the  balance  of  odds  against  him;  he  therefore 
returned  to  New  York,  leaving  Cornwallis  unrelieved. 

But  the  latter  had  excellent  chances  of  escape  so  long  as 
he  was  blockaded  on  the  land  side  by  no  more  considerable 
a  force  than  Lafayette's.  His  end  drew  near  when  Wash- 
ington arrived  at  Williamsburg,  on  September  14,  and  the 
allied  army  landed  from  the  transports  which  had  brought 
them  from  the  Elk  River  at  the  head  of  Chesapeake  Bay. 
On  September  28,  Washington  moved  to  the  vicinity  of 
Yorktown  and  the  trap  had  definitely  closed  on  Cornwallis. 
The  Englishman  had  counted  on  British  sea  power  until  it 
became  too  late  to  escape  from  the  peninsula.  The  move- 
ment against  Cornwallis  was  one  of  the  most  brilliant 
strategical  combinations  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Any 
one  of  a  number  of  accidents  might  have  frustrated  the 
plan.    If  the  English  fleet  had  held  the  sea  against  De 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS  275 

Grasse,  Cornwallis  would  have  received  succor;  if  Corn- 
wallis had  scented  the  danger  and  retreated  south,  the 
campaign  would  have  ended  fruitlessly.  As  it  was,  the 
cooperation  between  fleet  and  army  was  excellently  timed 
in  spite  of  the  immense  distances  to  be  covered  and  the 
many  possible  interruptions,  such  as  a  sally  by  Clinton 
from  New  York. 

With  the  allied  army  in  position  before  Yorktown,  the 
surrender  was  a  question  of  time.  There  was  intrenching 
to  be  done  and  siege  cannon  to  be  mounted  and  redoubts 
to  be  taken  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  but  these  things 
were  parts  of  the  inevitable  military  performance  preced- 
ing a  surrender  in  those  days.  Cornwallis  finally  threw  up 
the  sponge  on  October  19,  1781.  The  war  thus  closed  in 
reality  on  Virginia  soil.  The  campaign  had  proved  a  criti- 
cal one,  and  the  French  fleet  and  army  were  the  decisive 
factors.  Owing  to  the  numerical  inferiority  of  the  British 
in  the  various  fields  of  the  war,  the  loss  of  this  small  army, 
which  would  not  have  been  greatly  felt  under  ordinary 
circumstances,  secured  the  independence  of  America.  The 
Whig  Party,  now  in  power  in  England,  would  no  longer 
support  a  struggle  which  it  had  always  opposed  and  which 
it  looked  on  as  a  hopeless  effort  to  bring  back  an  irrecon- 
cilable part  of  the  empire. 


CHAPTER  XI 

END    OF   THE  WAR 

When  the  British  arms  in  Virginia  collapsed  in  October, 
1781,  desire  of  revenge  rose  high  in  the  triumphant  pa- 
triots. This  was  a  natural  if  not  laudable  feeling.  From 
Camden  to  Yorktown  was  by  far  the  darkest  year  of  the 
war  in  the  South  and  the  long-suppressed  Tories  began  to 
raise  their  heads  in  Virginia.  The  real  loyalists  were  few 
in  comparison,  however,  with  the  time-servers  who  re- 
mained passively  resistant  to  the  government  or  carried 
on  correspondence  with  the  enemy  and  sold  supplies  at 
British  posts,  and  with  the  genuinely  criminal,  who  seized 
the  opportunity  for  counterfeiting  and  horse-stealing  af- 
forded by  the  British  invasion.  The  patriot  populace  along 
the  coast  had  suffered  greatly  from  privateers  and  Tory 
freebooters,  and  in  the  Norfolk  district  a  condition  re- 
sembling civil  war  existed.  Robbery  and  other  outrages 
were  perpetrated,  apparently  by  both  sides,  but  as  the 
lawless  and  discontented  element  was  Tory  simply  be- 
cause the  government  that  afflicted  it  with  taxes  and  en- 
forced military  service  was  Whig,  most  of  the  violence 
proceeded  from  so-called  loyalists.  Open  opposition  to  the 
government  continued  around  Norfolk  until  the  end  of  the 
war  and  the  day  of  reckoning. 

Local  patriot  leaders  recommended  strong  measures. 
Colonel  Thomas  Newton  wrote  from  Surry:  — 

The  Tories  and  Refugees  below  are  still  unpunished,  to  the 
great  dissatisfaction  of  the  well  affected.  Many  of  them  were  in 


END  OF  THE  WAR  277 

arms  plundering  and  now  live  in  affluence  while  those  who  were 
engaged  in  their  Country's  service  are  ruin'd.  I  would  not  wish 
to  persecute,  but  if  some  examples  are  not  made,  the  encourage- 
ment is  too  great  for  many  to  withstand  the  temptation.  Too 
many  of  the  justices  below  were  of  the  party  to  bring  delinquents 
to  account,  but  I  hope  some  steps  will  be  taken,  to  call  the  whole 
to  trial  by  impartial  men.  It  is  really  horrid  to  think  that  a  man 
(one  of  our  best  soldiers)  shou'd  be  taken  out  of  a  justice's  house 
and  murder'd,  the  justice  knowing  the  persons  and  they  never 
called  to  account  for  it.  This  matter  has  caused  several  other 
murders,  as  the  friends  revenge  the  death  of  their  relations  and 
acquaintances  on  both  sides.1 

In  some  places  the  Tories  were  rather  roughly  put  down. 
Colonel  Wishart  reported  from  Princess  Anne:  — 

I  should  have  troubled  your  Excellency  with  this  [resignation] 
some  Time  ago,  had  it  not  been  that  I  was  determined  to  seek 
vengeance  on  the  Refugees  and  Tories  of  this  Country  (thro' 
whose  means  many  Friends  to  the  Country,  with  myself  became 
sufferers)  which,  thank  God  with  the  assistance  of  Colo.  Dabney, 
have  pretty  well  effected.2 

A  number  of  loyalists  in  Princess  Anne  and  the  neigh- 
boring counties  suffered  arrest  and  imprisonment.  Various 
offenses  were  charged  —  bearing  arms  against  the  coun- 
try, forcing  persons  into  the  British  service,  and  other 
treasonable  practices.  In  Norfolk  County  the  patriots 
imprisoned  four  men,  "for  going  with  the  enemy";  and 
seven  others  were  each  bailed  in  one  thousand  pounds 
specie  to  appear  before  the  council  to  answer  the  charge  of 
disaffection.  Similar  measures  were  taken  in  other  coun- 
ties. Besides  arresting  Tories,  the  patriots  seem  to  have 
subjected  them  to  minor  annoyances.  The  ill-fated  Ralph 

1  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  n,  593.  2  Ibid.,  n,  611. 


278         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

Wormeley  declared  that  troops  had  been  quartered  on  his 
estate  in  King  William  over  a  year  and  had  maltreated  his 
overseer. 

The  government,  thinking  that  examples  were  needed 
in  the  southeastern  neighborhood,  issued  special  trial  com- 
missions for  Nansemond,  Isle  of  Wight,  Norfolk,  and 
Princess  Anne,  but  men  could  not  be  found  willing  to  act 
as  judges,  probably  because  of  the  danger  to  which  they 
might  be  exposed  in  a  country  still  glowing  with  the  pas- 
sions of  war.1  The  council,  on  finding  its  efforts  to  estab- 
lish a  special  court  of  large  powers  vain,  ordered  offenders 
tried  in  the  ordinary  way.  But  there  was  one  serious  objec- 
tion to  such  a  process;  capital  offenses  including  treason 
were  tried,  in  the  normal  course  of  law,  by  the  general 
court  in  Richmond  and  it  was  difficult  to  transport  a  great 
cloud  of  witnesses  thither.  Traitors  there  were  in  Norfolk, 
enough  and  to  spare,  "all  taken  up  here  and  sufficient  proof 
to  hang  many  of  them  if  the  Court  was  to  set  here,  but  the 
witnesses  have  not  money  to  bear  their  expenses  to  Rich- 
mond, and  the  most  atrocious  villians  will  escape  by  it 
(even  murderers)  if  the  public  cannot  provide  some  way 
of  carrying  the  people  up  ...  if  these  escape  adieu  to  all 
order  and  Government  in  these  parts.  Some  came  to 
Princess  Anne  court  with  clubs  a  few  days  ago,  but  by 
spirited  exertions  they  were  quel'd."  2  Difficulty  of  pro- 
cedure thus  stalled  the  efforts  at  prosecution.  Plainly,  it 
was  impossible  to  try  a  large  number  of  offenders  at  Rich- 
mond and  just  as  impossible  to  try  them  in  special  courts 
when  such  courts  could  not  be  organized.  It  is  true  that 
John  Scarborough  Wills  paroled  one  John  Harrison,  who 
1  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  in,  14,  15.         *  Ibid.,  in,  101. 


END  OF  THE   WAR  279 

had  been  in  the  hands  of  the  British,  until  the  meeting  of 
the  special  commission  for  the  southeastern  counties,  but 
this  was  simply  a  cautionary  manner  of  discharge.  Ac- 
cording to  Harrison's  account,  he  had  been  forcibly  carried 
off  by  the  British  as  a  guide,  a  plea  commonly  urged  by 
suspects  arrested  for  having  intercourse  with  the  enemy; 
there  was  just  sufficient  truth  in  the  defense  of  compulsion 
to  make  it  difficult  to  decide  whether  a  man  was  a  traitor 
or  only  a  weak-kneed  patriot.  The  council  now  abandoned 
all  thought  of  bringing  offenders  to  justice  on  a  large  scale. 
In  January,  1782,  it  even  allowed  John  Saunders,  a  con- 
victed traitor  whose  life  had  been  spared  on  condition  of 
working  two  years  in  the  lead  mines,  to  remain  on  his  own 
plantation  in  Louisa. 

Some  offenses,  however,  were  too  serious  to  be  passed 
over  without  making  the  government  seem  weakly  lenient. 
Such  cases  came  before  the  general  court,  which  began 
treason  trials  at  the  April,  1782,  session,  when  Robert 
Smith,  of  Hampshire,  and  James  Hughes,  of  Henrico,  were 
sentenced  to  death.  Smith,  if  he  may  be  believed,  was  in 
no  sense  a  loyalist,  but  took  up  arms  in  the  Hampshire 
rising  in  order  to  obtain  relief  from  oppressive  taxes.  The 
governor  pardoned  four  Hampshire  rioters,  who,  in  con- 
formity with  the  assembly's  pardoning  resolution  of  June, 

1781,  had  not  been  tried;  and  pardons  were  also  given  a 
number  of  other  Hampshire  insurgents  in  prison. 

Smith  and  Hughes,  the  condemned  traitors,  were  still  in 
jail  awaiting  execution  when  the  general  court,  in  June, 

1782,  likewise  passed  capital  sentence  on  James  Lamb, 
Joshua  Hopkins,  and  John  Ripley,  of  Henrico.  In  Lamb's 
case  the  court  advised  executive  clemency,  stating  that  he 


280        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

had  been  "convicted  upon  satisfactory  evidence  of  the 
overt  act  of  Treason  charged  in  the  Indictment;  but  it  ap- 
peared in  the  course  of  the  Evidence  that  the  Criminal  was 
actuated  in  this  Conduct,  rather  from  resentment  against 
a  party  of  men  who  belonged  to  a  Boat  called  the  Dasher 
and  who  had  committed  sundry  unwarrantable  outrages, 
on  the  persons  and  property  of  the  Citizens  of  this  State 
within  the  Enemies  lines,  than  from  a  desire  to  assist  the 
Enemy."1  Lamb  had  joined  a  party  of  refugee  loyalists 
in  taking  one  Nathaniel  Davis  prisoner.  At  his  trial  he 
attempted,  unsuccessfully,  to  show  that  he  had  been  forced 
into  the  enemy's  service,2  for  this  defense  had  become 
rather  threadbare  by  this  time.  Lamb,  Hopkins,  and  an- 
other condemned  prisoner,  one  Caton,  applied  for  pardon 
to  the  House  of  Delegates,  which  passed  a  resolution  to 
that  effect.  The  senate,  however,  failed  to  concur,  and  the 
three  traitors  remained  under  sentence  almost  to  the  date 
set  for  execution. 

The  general  court,  at  the  October,  1782,  session,  sen- 
tenced to  death  Albridgton  Holland,  John  Holland,  Levi 
Moore,  Dempsey  Butler,  and  Henry  Norfleet,  all  of  Nan- 
semond,  and  William  Hill,  of  James  City,  and  acquitted 
Benjamin  Bucktrout,  of  York.3  But  the  court  in  all  these 
treason  cases  acted  not  without  thought  of  final  clemency, 
allowing  the  condemned  an  unusually  long  time  before 
death.  The  latter  now  united  in  a  petition  for  pardon. 
They  admitted  their  guilt,  but  according  to  their  account, 
which  is  probably  true,  they  had  joined  the  enemy  because 
of  the  despondency  prevailing  in  southeastern  Virginia  in 

1  Executive  communications,  1782. 

2  Legislative  Petitions.    Princess  Anne. 

8  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  in,  361. 


END  OF  THE  WAR  281 

regard  to  the  American  cause,  especially  among  the  lower 
classes.  Later  on  they  had  left  the  British  and  taken  arms 
against  them,  but  this  circumstance  had  not  protected 
them  from  indictment  though  it  may  have  had  some  influ- 
ence on  the  success  of  their  plea  for  mercy.1 

The  case  of  William  Hill,  one  of  the  convicted,  illus- 
trates the  temptations  to  which  the  poorer  people  were 
exposed  during  the  British  invasion.  When  the  royal 
troops  left  Williamsburg,  Hill  happened  to  be  looking  for 
two  stray  cows  and  was  accosted  by  a  cavalryman,  who 
insisted  on  his  accompanying  him  and  giving  information 
as  to  the  position  of  Lafayette's  army.  Hill  refused,  but 
the  soldier  carried  him  to  a  brandy-shop,  made  him  drunk, 
and  went  home  with  him.  His  conduct  had  been  observed 
and  several  patriots  came  to  his  house  to  arrest  him;  he 
escaped  and  lay  in  hiding  in  the  woods  for  six  weeks.  Pa- 
triots came  repeatedly  to  his  home  seeking  him  and  hacked 
his  horses  with  their  swords.  Finally,  Hill,  finding  the 
chase  growing  warm,  attempted  to  pass  over  into  Isle  of 
Wight,  but  could  not  cross  the  James  at  BurwelPs  Ferry. 
He  fell  into  the  hands  of  a  party  of  British  and  was  re- 
leased, only  to  be  taken  in  turn  by  Lafayette,  who  tried 
him  and  likewise  set  him  free.  In  contradiction  of  his 
story,  however,  one  of  the  witnesses  testified  that  Hill  had 
enlisted  in  Tarleton's  legion.2 

Prosecution  for  treason  was  dying  out  with  the  war. 
The  general  court,  in  December,  1782,  tried,  but  failed  to 
convict  Adam  Levitt,  of  Princess  Anne,  and  Henry  Bur- 
gess; 3  and  in  January,  1783,  it  considered  the  case  of  Isaac 

1  Legislative  Petitions,  Nansemond  (B3813). 

2  Executive  communications,  1782.  3  Auditor's  Journal,  xvf  579. 


282        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

Riddle  apparently  the  last  treason  trial  of  the  Revolu- 
tion in  Virginia.  Mercy,  in  truth,  followed  hard  on  the 
heels  of  justice.  The  assembly,  in  the  fall  of  1782,  par- 
doned Albridgton  Holland,  Henry  Norfleet,  John  Caton, 
and  Levi  Moore  on  condition  that  they  serve  a  year  in  the 
Continental  army;  and  James  Lamb  and  Joshua  Hopkins, 
provided  they  left  the  State  within  two  months,  to  return 
no  more  during  the  war.  Dempsey  Butler,  the  murderer 
of  Nott,  was  also  pardoned  at  the  same  time.1  If  any  man 
deserved  death  it  was  Butler,  who,  though  a  citizen  of  the 
State,  had  shot  down  in  cold  blood  a  Virginia  officer  while 
in  pursuit  of  duty,  and  it  appears  that  the  assembly  acted 
over-leniently  in  letting  him  go.  But  it  probably  thought 
that  severity  in  individual  cases  was  out  of  place  where 
there  had  been  so  many  offenders,  and  that  mildness  would 
best  heal  the  wounds  of  the  war-worn  community.  In  May, 
1783,  it  pardoned  John  Holland,  seemingly  the  last  man 
under  sentence  of  death.  Edmund  Tallon  had  been  a  fel- 
low prisoner  under  the  same  sentence  to  a  late  date. 

Popular  feeling  against  Tories  did  not  die  down  as 
quickly  as  governmental  resentment;  it  long  outlasted  the 
war.  All  through  1782  patriots  were  inclined  to  retaliate 
for  injuries,  and  the  troops  continued  to  make  impress- 
ments, which  had  been  justified  before  by  the  gravity  of 
the  crisis,  but  which  were  always  a  most  vexatious  burden 
on  the  people.  Needless  to  say,  such  seizures  bore  hardest 
on  reputed  loyalists.  At  length  John  Lowry,  of  Elizabeth 
City,  ventured  to  sue  Colonel  Dabney  for  impressing  four 
cows  belonging  to  him.  The  military  promptly  retaliated. 
Lowry  was  arrested  and  tried  and  his  plantation  was 
1  Hening,  xi,  129. 


END  OF  THE  WAR  283 

plundered.  On  receiving  his  complaint,  Harrison,  the  gov- 
ernor, ordered  Dabney  to  remove  his  soldiers  from  Lowry's 
house,  declaring  his  intention  of  protecting  citizens  from 
the  violence  of  the  troops,  whose  presence  in  the  district 
was,  however,  necessary  because  some  of  the  people  con- 
tinued to  supply  the  enemy  with  cattle.1  Other  Tories  were 
likewise  annoyed  by  the  troops,  but  cases  of  violence  seem 
to  have  been  rare. 

Depredations  of  soldiers  on  the  property  of  Tories  and 
half-hearted  citizens  were  possibly  stimulated  by  the  con- 
tinuance of  hostilities  on  a  small  scale  along  Chesapeake 
Bay  throughout  the  year  1782.  Water-thieves  and  priva- 
teers swarmed  in  as  great  numbers  as  a  year  before  when 
the  chances  seemed  to  favor  the  British  cause.  The  ruin  of 
the  Virginia  navy  in  1781  permitted  this  state  of  warfare 
to  continue  long  after  it  should  have  ceased;  it  ended  only 
with  the  actual  declaration  of  peace.  Chief  among  the 
ravagers  was  a  Scotchman  who  had  adopted  the  appro- 
priate name  of  Kidd,  and  who  swept  the  Chesapeake 
waters  with  a  flotilla  of  small  craft  called  barges  and 
manned  partly  by  British  seamen  and  partly  by  Maryland 
and  Virginia  Tories,  outlaws,  and  runaway  slaves.  These 
pirates  plundered  and  burned  out-of-the-way  houses  along 
the  shore  and  committed  outrages  on  the  inhabitants.  At 
length,  in  November,  1782,  Commodore  Whaley,  of  Mary- 
land, sallied  forth  against  Kidd  with  a  fleet  of  small  craft 
similar  to  his,  but  being  short  of  hands,  put  into  Onancock 
Creek  in  Virginia  for  recruits.  It  happened  to  be  court- 
day  in  Accomac  and  a  crowd  of  people  had  gathered  at 
the  court-house,  among  them  John  Cropper,  the  county- 
1  Letter-Book  (1781-82),  251. 


284        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

lieutenant,  who  had  been  a  noted  officer  in  Washington's 
army.  This  man  raised  a  considerable  force  of  volunteers 
on  the  spot  and  added  a  boat  to  the  fleet.  The  commodore 
then  ventured  out  into  the  Bay  in  search  of  Kidd,  whom 
he  ran  across  off  Tangier  Island  just  south  of  the  line  di- 
viding Virginia  and  Maryland.  Both  fleets  were  composed 
of  barges,  boats  especially  built  for  shallow  navigation  and 
fitted  out  with  sails  and  oars  and  carrying  guns  of  fair  size. 
Whaley,  who  was  a  better  fighter  than  strategist,  sailed 
ahead  of  his  other  barges  in  the  Protector,  and  ardently 
attacked  Kidd's  whole  fleet  single-handed.  The  enemy 
concentrated  their  fire  on  this  vessel,  with  the  result  that 
she  blew  up,  but  not  until  she  had  succeeded  in  sinking 
four  British  barges.  This  accident  decided  the  engagement. 
Whaley  was  killed,  and  Cropper,  badly  wounded,  fell  into 
the  enemy's  hands  with  the  other  survivors  of  the  Pro- 
tector. The  "Battle  of  the  Barges,"  or  Cagey's  Strait,1 
ended  the  warfare  which  had  been  going  on  in  these  ac- 
cessible waters  ever  since  Dunmore's  attack  on  Hampton 
in  1775. 

The  closing  months  of  the  war  witnessed  one  of  its  sad- 
dest phases  —  the  forced  exile  of  British  subjects  still  re- 
maining in  the  State,  and  the  barring-out  of  the  poor  ref- 
ugees who  had  begun  to  return  from  New  York  and  other 
places  on  the  approach  of  peace.  Many  loyalists  with 
Cornwallis  at  Yorktown  attempted  to  remain  after  the 
surrender,  and  others  used  various  artifices  to  gain  en- 
trance to  the  State.  Business  in  one  form  or  another  served 
as  an  excuse  for  many  merchants  or  agents  anxious  to  find 

1  Southern  Literary  Messenger,  xxiv,  215-21.  Cropper  had  been  Mor- 
gan's second  in  command  and  had  won  a  great  reputation. 


END  OF  THE  WAR  285 

admittance,  and  no  doubt  some  of  them  managed  to  evade 
the  law.  Others  failed,  as  did  James  Riddell,  a  former 
Yorktown  merchant,  who  had  been  taken  prisoner  and 
allowed  to  go  to  New  York  on  parole,  but  returned  in  April, 
1782,  to  collect  debts.  On  his  arrival  in  Yorktown  he  was 
promptly  ordered  back  on  shipboard,  possibly  because  he 
was  a  loyalist,  possibly  because  he  was  a  bill-collector. 

The  government  was  much  readier  to  grant  permission 
to  leave  Virginia  than  to  enter  it,  and  a  good  many  loyal- 
ists who  had  held  out  to  the  last  seem  to  have  gone  off  to 
British  posts.  William  Andrews,  a  minister  notorious  for 
disaffection,  applied  for  a  passport  to  leave  the  State, 
"where  my  conduct  has  been  lately  obnoxious."  He  com- 
plained that  he,  as  well  as  a  colleague  named  Bruce,  had 
suffered  unjustly  in  being  accused  as  hostile,  because  the 
presence  of  the  British  at  Portsmouth  had  necessarily 
made  the  whole  population  of  the  region  appear  lukewarm 
towards  the  patriot  cause.1  Andrews  had  been  tried  for 
treason,  but  had  not  been  convicted,  and  the  council 
finally  granted  him  permission  to  leave  the  State  with  his 
family  and  several  friends  on  condition  that  they  did  not 
return.  Later  on,  however,  the  two  ministers  came  back 
to  Norfolk  and  resumed  their  professional  labors  without 
interference.  Others  also  occasionally  managed  to  return. 
The  widow  of  James  Hubbard,  who  had  been  allowed  to  go 
without  proper  authority  from  Williamsburg  to  New  York 
to  see  her  dying  husband,  asked  leave  to  come  back.  The 
council  granted  Esther  Muir  permission  to  go  to  New  York 
with  her  children, on  condition  of  never  returning.2 

1  Calendar  of  Virginia  State  Papers,  in,  139. 

2  Council  Journal  (1782-83),  4. 


286        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

Constant  attempts  at  evasion  of  the  laws  forbidding 
intercourse  with  the  enemy  and  the  residence  within  the 
State  of  British  subjects  annoyed  the  government.  Brit- 
ish shipmasters  and  merchants  were  the  chief  offenders. 
Thomas  C.  Williams,  captain  of  a  flag-of -truce  brigantine 
lying  at  Yorktown,  went  to  Richmond  without  permission 
on  pretext  of  asking  leave  to  stay  in  Virginia  to  settle 
accounts  arising  from  transactions  made  at  the  time  of 
Cornwallis's  surrender.  The  council  thereupon  ordered 
Williams  to  return  to  his  ship  and  immediately  sail  for 
New  York  on  penalty  of  having  it  seized  and  of  suffering 
imprisonment.  Exasperated  by  this  and  similar  incidents, 
Benjamin  Harrison,  the  governor,  on  February  4,  1782, 
ordered  British  merchants  remaining  in  Virginia  under  the 
terms  of  the  surrender  to  wind  up  their  affairs  and  those 
who  had  overstayed  their  leave  to  sail  for  New  York. 
Many  Britons  managed  to  escape  the  order.  Harrison,  on 
May  22,  1782,  directed  the  Surry  militia  commander  to 
require  all  British  merchants  in  his  county  to  go  without 
delay  to  Hampton  to  take  ship  for  New  York.1  The  gov- 
ernor, in  July,  1782,  sharply  reproved  William  Mitchell, 
flag-of -truce  officer  at  Yorktown,  for  allowing  the  British 
brig  Alexander  to  go  to  Norfolk  to  buy  slaves  and  refit. 

Congress  added  to  the  embarrassments  of  the  Virginia 
government  in  attempting  to  rid  the  State  of  enemies  by 
entering  into  an  agreement  with  British  merchants  in  New 
York  to  supply  them  with  tobacco.  Virginia,  of  course,  had 
to  furnish  the  commodity,  and  the  British  ships  that  were 
to  carry  it  put  into  Hampton.  Harrison  applied  to  the 
assembly  to  know  whether  an  agreement  so  dangerous  as 
1  Council  Journal  (1781-82),  70. 


END  OF  THE  WAR  287 

the  opening  of  trade  with  the  enemy  should  be  carried  out; 1 
the  government  eventually  allowed  the  tobacco  to  be  ex- 
ported under  rigid  conditions.  When  a  vessel  flying  the 
white  flag  sailed  up  the  James  River  from  Hampton,  Har- 
rison put  a  guard  of  troops  on  board  her  to  prevent  traffic 
with  the  people.  Such  precautions  were  necessary,  as  the 
State  teemed  with  Englishmen  and  refugees  in  spite  of  all 
efforts  to  drive  them  out.  Harrison  ordered  the  command- 
ing officer  at  Portsmouth,  in  September,  1782,  to  seize 
John  McLean,  a  British  subject,  and  deport  him  to  New 
York;  and  sent  out  similar  orders  to  other  commanders. 
The  smuggling-in  of  refugees  in  flag-of -truce  ships  finally 
grew  to  be  such  an  annoyance  that  Harrison  applied  to 
the  attorney-general,  Edmund  Randolph,  to  know  whether 
ship-captains  could  be  proceeded  against  for  the  offense, 
and  received  a  negative  reply. 

The  assembly  at  the  fall  session  of  1782  attempted  to 
remedy  the  evil  by  passing  an  act  prohibiting  intercourse 
with  British  subjects  and  forbidding  their  admission  to  the 
State.2  This  act  required  special  leave  from  the  governor 
before  the  opening  of  any  communication  with  a  flag-of- 
truce,  on  pain  of  fine  and  imprisonment.  British  subjects 
coming  into  the  State,  unless  shipwrecked,  and  British 
subjects  who  had  come  in  after  January  1,  1782,  and  had 
not  become  citizens,  were  to  be  held  as  prisoners.  Harrison 
had  secured  this  law  in  his  determination  to  prevent  the 
influx  of  undesirable  foreigners  and  Virginia  refugees,  who 
grew  more  and  more  insistent  in  their  efforts  to  gain  en- 
trance as  the  war  visibly  wore  away.  The  governor  wrote 
Benjamin  Grymes  in  August,  1782,  concerning  one 
1  Letter-Book  (1781-82),  137.  "  Hening,  xi,  136. 


288         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

Nicholls,  for  whom  Grymes  had  interceded,  that  he  had 
no  doubt  Nicholls  was  a  worthy  man,  but  that  even  if  the 
law  allowed  one  connected  with  the  enemy  to  become  a 
citizen  he  could  not  receive  him  because  of  the  swarm  of 
similar  applications  sure  to  follow.  The  council,  in  Sep- 
tember, 1782,  advised  the  governor  to  refuse  all  future  ap- 
plications of  British  subjects  to  be  allowed  to  stay  in  the 
State,1  and  such  appeals  were  rejected.  Dr.  Middleton,  a 
former  surgeon  in  the  American  army  who  had  accepted 
British  protection,  was  not  only  refused  leave  to  remain, 
but  was  guarded  until  he  left  Virginia.  The  governor,  on 
December  19,  1782,  issued  a  proclamation  ordering  civil 
magistrates,  county-lieutenants,  and  militia  officers  to  ar- 
rest all  British  subjects  within  their  jurisdiction.  A  num- 
ber of  such  persons,  he  declared,  continued  in  the  State 
because  of  the  mistaken  indulgence  of  local  civil  and  mili- 
tary authorities  and  might  establish  a  Tory  party  and 
alienate  the  people  from  the  government. 

When  the  war  finally  came  to  an  end  in  1783,  refugees 
fairly  plied  the  government  with  applications  for  permis- 
sion to  return.  Now  that  the  British  were  no  more  enemies, 
even  after  the  apathetic  fashion  of  1782,  the  exiles  stood 
on  a  different  footing;  they  were  no  longer  possible  spies 
and  belligerents.  Many  had  made  themselves  obnoxious 
to  the  patriot  government,  but  they  hoped  for  indulgence 
notwithstanding  this.  Among  them  were  John  Wormeley, 
of  the  well-known  loyalist  family,  Dr.  Alexander  Gordon,  of 
Norfolk,  and  John  Goodrich,  Jr.  The  government  allowed 
Mrs.  Goodrich  to  come  back  to  Virginia  with  her  children, 
but  forbade  her  husband's  landing.  He  had  sinned  too 
1  Letter-Book  (1781-82),  250. 


END  OF  THE  WAR  289 

deeply  for  forgiveness.  John  Wormeley,  who  had  served 
as  an  officer  in  the  British  army,  gained  leave  to  remain 
at  Yorktown  until  the  next  ship  sailed  for  New  York.  He 
expressed  a  desire  to  become  a  citizen,  but  the  council, 
while  admitting  that  he  was  not  literally  a  traitor,  since 
he  had  never  taken  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  State, 
viewed  him  in  another  light  than  that  of  an  ordinary 
enemy.  Dabney,  the  officer  commanding  at  Yorktown,  let 
Wormeley  go  into  the  country  for  a  visit,1  for  which  im- 
prudence the  governor  reprimanded  him.  Ralph  Worm- 
eley, the  father,  then  petitioned  the  assembly  to  admit  his 
son  to  citizenship.  The  young  man,  so  he  said,  had  been 
in  Scotland  for  a  mercantile  education  before  the  breaking- 
out  of  the  war.  Forced  by  the  cutting-off  of  home  remit- 
tances at  the  beginning  of  hostilities  to  return  to  America, 
he  entered  the  British  army  in  New  York  and  saw  service 
in  South  Carolina,  where  he  married.  The  usual  plea  of 
kindness  to  American  prisoners  in  New  York  was  advanced 
in  his  behalf.2  At  the  same  time,  Presley  Thornton,  who 
had  likewise  been  sent  to  England  for  an  education  and 
had  accepted  a  commission  in  the  British  army,  asked 
leave  to  become  a  citizen.  The  assembly  admitted  Worme- 
ley, Thornton,  and  another  applicant,  Philip  Turpin,  on 
taking  the  oath  of  allegiance,  expressly  excluding  Worme- 
ley, however,  from  holding  any  office  for  four  years. 

The  people  were  less  tolerant  of  unpopular  refugees  than 
the  government,  which  had  begun  to  relax  immediately 
at  the  end  of  the  war.  Mob  violence  occasionally  attended 
the  appearance  of  a  loyalist  venturing  back  in  the  hope 

1  Council  Journal  (1782-83),  297. 

2  Legislative  Petitions.   Westmoreland. 


290        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

\that  peace  settled  all  scores.  Thomas  Hepburn,  who  had 
left  Virginia  early  in  1776,  attempted  to  resume  his  resi- 
dence at  Port  Royal  and  was  waited  on  by  a  self -consti- 
tuted committee  of  citizens  and  informed  that  he  must 
leave  the  State.  A  meeting  in  Petersburg  in  1783  urged  the 
government  to  enforce  the  law  forbidding  refugees  and 
British  subjects  from  settling  in  Virginia,  and  a  petition 
went  to  the  assembly  from  Essex  in  May,  1783,  opposing 
the  return  of  loyalists.  Probably  some  mobbings  occurred 
of  which  we  have  no  account.  The  best-known  case  of 
violence  offered  a  returned  refugee  was  that  of  Joseph 
Williamson,  in  October,  1783.  Williamson  had  once  been 
a  merchant  at  Tappahannock,  but  went  over  to  the  Brit- 
ish, and  attempted,  it  is  said,  to  bring  tenders  up  the  Rap- 
pahannock to  burn  the  town.  After  the  war  the  council 
granted  him  permission  to  return,  and  he  brought  a  cargo 
of  goods  to  Tappahannock  for  sale,  but  in  spite  of  his 
official  sanction  a  mob  tarred  and  feathered  him  after  he 
had  ignored  a  warning  to  leave.1  The  council,  irritated  by 
this  outrage  in  defiance  of  its  authority,  ordered  a  prose- 
cution in  the  general  court.  The  participants  appealed 
in  great  alarm  to  their  representative  in  the  legislature, 
Spencer  Roane,  who  secured  for  them  an  act  of  immu- 
nity. 

Such  deeds  of  violence  as  the  mobbing  of  Williamson 
were  rare  in  Virginia,  which,  unlike  almost  all  the  other 
States,  had  been  only  to  a  slight  degree  the  scene  of  inter- 
party  warfare.  The  great  mass  of  the  population  had  no 
such  humiliations  and  injuries  to  revenge  on  Tories  as  had 
the  people  North  and  South;  in  fact,  the  loyalists  in  Vir- 

1  Council  Journal  (1782-83),  290. 


END  OF  THE  WAR  291 

ginia  were  much  more  sinned  against  than  sinning.  Con- 
sequently it  is  not  surprising  that  the  level-headed  Vir- 
ginia assembly  in  the  fall  of  1783  magnanimously  repealed 
the  laws  forbidding  Tories  to  return  to  the  State,  with  the 
exception  of  those  who  had  taken  an  active  part  in  the  war. 
Prohibition  of  intercourse  with  British  subjects  was  like- 
wise and  as  a  matter  of  course  withdrawn.  The  repeal  did 
not  pass,  however,  without  opposition.  Anti-loyalist  feel- 
ing was  strong  enough  to  array  a  considerable  part  of  the 
legislature  against  measures  of  toleration,  but  Patrick 
Henry  pleaded  the  cause  of  the  exiles  in  one  of  his  best 
speeches  and  carried  the  day.1  It  was  fitting  that  the  great 
agitator  who  had  done  so  much  to  bring  on  the  Revolu- 
tion should  close  it  with  a  plea  of  mercy  for  his  defeated 
opponents. 

A  good  many  peaceful  exiles  who  had  fled  abroad,  or  had 
been  driven  out  of  the  State  during  the  course  of  the  war, 
now  returned  in  the  hope  of  recovering  their  forfeited 
estates.  Most  of  them  were  doomed  to  disappointment, 
though  sometimes  a  child  or  other  relative  received  what 
had  been  taken  from  the  loyalist  emigre.  There  were  other 
cases  like  that  of  Alexander  McCall,  of  Essex,  who  had 
gone  abroad  in  1775  and  had  not  returned  within  the  two- 
year  limit  allowed  by  the  Virginia  government,  with  the 
result  that  his  own  estate  was  confiscated  and  that  of  his 
infant  daughter  jeopardized  by  her  absence  in  England. 
The  assembly,  when  appealed  to,  decided  that  Catherine 
McCall  might  claim  the  estate  if  she  returned  within  the 
legal  period.2   While  a  number  of  refugees  returned  and 

1  Henry's  Patrick  Henry,  n,  192-96. 
1  Legislative  Petitions.   Essex  (A5851). 


292        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

some  new  citizens  came  in  from  the  British  Isles,  the  great 
majority  of  the  hundreds  of  men  who  had  gone  away  on 
account  of  the  war  never  came  back.  In  actual  numbers 
Virginia  lost  less  heavily  than  the  other  States,  but  at 
that  she  lost  nearly  the  whole  of  her  mercantile  class.  In  a 
purely  agricultural  community,  much  exhausted  by  the  war 
and  greatly  depleted  by  emigration  to  Kentucky,  the  loss 
was  irreparable,  and  from  this  time  Virginia,  which  before 
the  Revolution  had  been  one  of  the  least  provincial  of 
colonies,  began  to  narrow  in  her  interests  and  life. 

A  last  and  most  vexatious  question  remained  as  the 
direct  heritage  of  the  Revolution.  The  Treaty  of  Paris, 
among  other  concessions,  granted  British  debtors  the  right 
to  recover  debts  in  the  United  States,  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  Great  Britain  agreed  to  assist  slave-owners  in  recover- 
ing runaway  and  kidnapped  slaves.  Immediately  after  the 
conclusion  of  peace,  several  Virginians  went  to  New  York 
to  secure  lost  slaves,  but  received  small  encouragement 
from  the  authorities,  and  this  cool  attitude  of  the  British 
was  generally  resented  by  planters.  At  the  May,  1784,  ses- 
sion of  the  assembly,  Madison  and  Richard  Henry  Lee, 
mindful  of  treaty  rights,  attempted  to  repeal  the  legisla- 
tion still  barring  the  recovery  of  British  debts.  Henry 
opposed  them,  however,  and  induced  the  legislature  to 
declare  that  it  would  not  repeal  the  prohibitory  laws  until 
England  made  reparation  for  breaking  the  treaty  in  regard 
to  runaway  slaves.  The  English  government  retaliated  by 
refusing  to  surrender  the  Lake  ports  to  the  Americans. 
When  the  Virginia  legislature  reassembled  in  October, 
1784,  the  question  came  up  again  and  a  bill  providing  for 
the  payment  of  British  debts  in  installments  was  debated, 


END  OF  THE  WAR  293 

but  failed  by  a  small  margin.1  The  matter  of  debts  had 
now  become  serious,  since  the  refusal  of  Virginia  and  other 
States  to  allow  recovery  suits  had  given  England  an  excel- 
lent pretext  for  continuing  to  hold  the  Western  posts  and 
foster  designs  upon  the  great  territory  which  is  now  the 
Middle  West.  Congress  appealed  to  the  States  to  repeal 
legislation  barring  the  treaty  fulfillment,  and  in  October, 
1787,  George  Mason  and  George  Nicholas  offered  a  repeal 
bill  in  the  Virginia  assembly,  but  Henry,  the  determined 
advocate  of  the  debtors,  again  defeated  a  measure  so  gen- 
erally obnoxious.  The  Constitution  of  1787  ended  such 
efforts  of  States  to  nullify  treaties,  and  a  number  of  suits 
were  brought  by  British  merchants  in  the  federal  court  in 
Richmond  when  it  opened  for  business  in  1790.  The  de- 
fendants employed  John  Marshall  and  Patrick  Henry,  who 
had  effectively  championed  their  cause  from  the  beginning. 
Henry,  by  his  genius  and  personal  influence,  managed  to 
hold  off  decision  in  several  cases  until  1794,  but  in  the  end 
a  number  of  suits  were  instituted  and  a  good  many  judg- 
ments secured.  The  debts  recovered  were  but  a  "drop  in 
the  bucket"  of  the  liabilities  standing  against  the  Virginia 
planters  in  1775,  and  the  end  of  procedure  found  the  British 
creditors  a  generally  defeated  class.  It  could  not  well  have 
been  otherwise.  Virginia,  after  the  terrible  drain  of  war, 
was  in  no  condition  to  discharge  claims  which  would  almost 
have  bankrupted  her  in  the  days  of  her  colonial  prosperity. 
For  many  people  the  canceling  of  debts  was  the  practical 
benefit  conferred  by  the  Revolution. 

1  Henry's  Patrick  Henry,  n,  233. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE   PEOGRESS   OF   DEMOCRACY 

The  treaty  of  peace  removed  the  external  danger  of  con- 
quest, but  it  was  the  signal  for  the  renewal  of  the  political 
contest  which  had  been  going  on  in  Virginia  ever  since  1765 
and  which  had  reached  a  climax  in  1776.  The  pressure  of 
war  and  the  necessity  of  suppressing  Toryism  had  pre- 
vented violent  party  divisions  after  that  year,  though  in 
1779  the  conservatives  took  advantage  of  Jefferson's  re- 
moval from  the  assembly  to  attempt  a  partial  restoration 
of  the  established  church,  and  in  1781  they  obtained  con- 
trol of  the  governor's  office  when  Jefferson's  failure  as  a 
war  executive  became  evident. 

The  restoration  of  peace  removed  the  restraint  which 
the  need  of  harmonious  action  in  a  time  of  crisis  had  placed 
upon  the  two  wings  of  the  patriot  party.  At  last  conserva- 
tives and  democrats  might  fight  for  the  mastery  without 
fear  of  outside  complications.  They  might  now  decide 
whether  the  social  revolution  that  had  begun  in  1776  should 
go  further,  or  whether  the  Old  Dominion  should  revert  to 
the  conditions  of  the  colonial  period.  If  Jefferson  had  re- 
tained his  popularity  and  the  active  leadership  of  the  dem- 
ocratic party,  it  is  not  likely  that  the  conservatives  would 
have  felt  themselves  strong  enough  to  attempt  reactionary 
legislation,  but  Jefferson  was  living  abroad  in  eclipse  and 
the  conservative  party,  in  his  absence,  was  stronger  than 
its  rival. 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  DEMOCRACY        293 

Several  circumstances  combined  to  brighten  the  outlook 
for  the  conservatives  in  1784,  when  the  contest  began. 
Although  a  number  of  western  counties  had  been  created 
during  the  war,  the  conservatives  still  held  control  of  the 
tier  of  small  tidewater  counties,  and  as  counties  were 
equally  represented  in  the  House  of  Delegates,  the  eastern 
section  had  as  many  members  as  the  populous  central  and 
western  districts.  Then  again,  the  conservatives  counted 
on  their  side  the  most  influential  leaders.  Some  of  them 
were  of  the  planter  type,  like  John  Tyler  and  Benjamin 
Harrison,  while  others  were  brilliant  young  lawyers  such 
as  Henry  Tazewell  and  John  Marshall,  the  future  Chief 
Justice.  Towering  above  these  stood  Patrick  Henry  and 
Richard  Henry  Lee,  who  were  now  opposing  the  Revolu- 
tionary development  as  warmly  as  they  had  advocated  the 
Revolution  itself  in  1775.  Henry  and  Lee  fought  each 
other  for  the  leadership  of  the  assembly  from  1782  to  1784 
and  then  joined  hands  in  an  effort  at  a  conservative  res- 
toration. They  were  rivals,  but  they  had  much  in  com- 
mon besides  their  hatred  of  Jefferson. 

As  it  chanced,  religion  was  the  issue  on  which  the  strug- 
gle turned.  The  Anglican  Church  had  been  well-nigh 
ruined  by  the  loss  of  tithes  and  the  upheaval  of  the  war, 
but  the  planters  were  still  mainly  Anglican  in  belief  and 
they  had  come  to  appreciate  the  value  of  the  church  as  a 
social  bulwark.  Formerly  dissenting  communions  like  the 
Presbyterians  and  Baptists  had  also  rather  lost  than  gained 
by  the  war,  while  freethinking  abounded.  Indeed,  democ- 
racy more  and  more  tended  to  be  associated  with  unbe- 
lief and  hostility  to  organized  worship.  Jefferson  himself 
shared  this  rather  superficial  skepticism,  which  flourished 


296        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

like  a  green  bay  tree  in  Virginia  in  the  last  decades  of 
the  eighteenth  century  and  then  withered  suddenly  and 
completely  early  in  the  nineteenth.  In  making  their  stand 
on  the  religious  question,  the  conservatives  were  combating 
at  a  vital  point  the  leveling  principle  now  beginning  deeply 
to  influence  the  illiterate  masses  throughout  the  State. 

At  that  time  probably  none  of  the  American  States  had 
absolutely  severed  political  and  religious  connection;  cer- 
tainly New  England  had  some  distance  to  go  before  reach- 
ing religious  liberty.  Many  serious-minded  men  felt  that 
Virginia  had  ventured  far  enough  in  the  direction  of  liberal- 
ism and  that  faith  itself  was  endangered.  Consequently, 
strong  support  arose  for  the  movement  to  reestablish  state 
patronage  of  religion  when  the  end  of  the  war  once  more 
allowed  men  to  turn  their  minds  towards  internal  matters. 
There  was  no  question  of  the  restoration  of  the  Anglican 
communion  as  the  single  state  church,  for  the  Presby- 
terians and  Baptists  were  too  numerous  to  make  such  a 
thing  possible.  But  it  was  practicable  to  lay  a  tax  on  prop- 
erty for  the  general  support  of  religion  and  to  apportion 
the  proceeds  among  the  various  churches;  and  it  was  in  this 
form  that  Henry  presented  the  question  to  the  assembly 
when  it  met  in  Richmond  for  the  May,  1784,  session. 

The  spring  debate  was  preliminary.  At  the  fall  meeting 
of  the  assembly  a  resolution  approving  an  "assessment," 
or  tax  for  religious  support,  passed  the  House  of  Delegates, 
and  a  bill  levying  such  a  tax  was  introduced  and  fiercely 
debated.1  On  this  occasion  Patrick  Henry  was  opposed  by 
James  Madison  and  George  Nicholas,  who  had  taken  the 
leadership  of  the  democratic  party.  Both  of  them  clearly 
1  Separation  of  Church  and  State  in  Virginia,  85. 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  DEMOCRACY        297 

realized  the  danger  to  individualism  involved  in  such  a 
paternal  measure  as  the  religious  assessment;  they  fought 
it  with  determination  and  energy.  Nevertheless,  Henry 
had  a  small  majority  in  both  houses,  and  the  bill  would  have 
passed  if  the  orator  had  not  accepted  another  election  to 
the  governorship  at  the  critical  moment,  November,  1784. 
We  do  not  know  the  real  reason  for  Henry's  abdication  of 
his  leadership  at  the  very  threshold  of  decisive  success.  It 
is  highly  probable  that  his  opponents  wished  to  get  rid  of 
him  by  electing  him  governor,  but  he  was  too  astute  to  be 
misled  by  an  obvious  ruse.  Henry  probably  acquiesced  in 
his  election  because  he  saw  that  any  form  of  religious  re- 
straint would  soon  prove  highly  unpopular  with  the  dem- 
ocratic majority  in  the  State,  and  by  becoming  governor 
he  was  able  to  free  himself  from  a  dubious  policy.  At  all 
events,  with  Henry  out  of  the  way,  Madison  succeeded  in 
postponing  final  action  on  the  assessment  to  the  next  meet- 
ing of  the  assembly. 

Both  sides  now  appealed  to  the  people,  and  Madison 
wrote  his  noblest  paper  in  advocacy  of  complete  separation 
of  church  and  state.  His  supporters  worked  feverishly 
through  the  central  and  southern  counties  in  the  summer  of 
1785  and  to  such  effect  that  when  the  assembly  met  in  the 
fall  religious  taxation  was  buried  beneath  a  pyramid  of 
adverse  petitions.1  Madison  took  advantage  of  the  op- 
portunity to  bring  forward  Jefferson's  Bill  for  Religious 
Freedom,  which  had  been  shelved  since  1779.  It  passed 
without  difficulty.  Virginia  thus  became  one  of  the  first 
states  in  the  world  completely  to  divorce  religion  from 
politics. 

1  Separation  of  Church  and  State  in  Virginia,  109. 


298        THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

This  victory  of  liberalism  was  quickly  followed  by  a 
wave  of  democratic  enthusiasm.  The  effort  to  halt  the 
Revolution  had  failed;  it  was  destined  to  go  forward  to  its 
logical  conclusion.  In  the  same  year,  1785,  the  first  move- 
ment for  the  abolition  of  slavery  arose  in  Virginia.  It 
proved  abortive,  of  course,  but  it  is  a  proof  of  the  progress 
of  radicalism.  In  the  following  years  democratic  social  and 
political  ideas  continued  to  grow,  although  there  was  still 
a  strong  conservative  element  in  the  tidewater. 

The  struggle  over  the  adoption  by  Virginia  in  1788  of 
the  United  States  Constitution  is  not  without  its  puzzling 
features.  The  westerners,  the  great  upholders  of  individ- 
ualism, generally  opposed  it,  while  the  tidewater  planters, 
who  imagined  they  saw  a  hope  for  themselves  in  the  cen- 
tralizing tendencies  of  the  Constitution,  favored  it.  By 
such  an  apparent  inversion  of  position  as  often  occurs  in 
politics,  Patrick  Henry  led  the  anti-Federalists  in  the  in- 
terests of  States'  Rights  and  democracy,  and  Madison  be- 
came the  successful  leader  of  the  Federalists.  Henry  made 
the  most  brilliant  fight  of  his  career  on  this  occasion,  but 
ratification  was  carried  by  a  small  majority  and  was  dis- 
tinctly a  victory  of  the  planter  reactionaries. 

The  success  of  the  Federalists  was  not  followed  by  a 
conservative  ascendency  in  Virginia  as  in  Massachusetts. 
The  principles  of  democracy  were  too  passionately  held  by 
the  great  majority  of  men  in  all  sections  of  the  State  to 
allow  a  return  to  the  rule  of  the  planter  oligarchy.  As  soon 
as  it  became  evident  that  the  new  Union  was  no  rights-of- 
man  government,  but  a  highly  conservative  political  and 
social  structure,  discontent  broke  out  among  the  Virginia 
democrats.    Thus,  when  Jefferson  retired  from  Washing- 


/ 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  DEMOCRACY        299 

ton's  Cabinet  he  found  the  material  existing  for  a  party 
opposed  to  Federalist  ideas,  and  he  spent  the  next  few 
years  in  its  organization.  In  this  manner  the  Democratic- 
Republican  Party  came  into  being. 

The  democratic  impulse  was  immensely  quickened  by 
the  French  Revolution.  Virginia,  which  had  experienced 
a  real  contest  between  the  forces  of  conservatism  and  lib- 
eralism, welcomed  with  enthusiasm  the  stimulating  Gal- 
lican  propaganda.  Indeed,  the  Old  Dominion  was  trans- 
formed thereby.  It  became  the  fashion  in  the  North  in  a 
later  age  to  sneer  at  the  inconsistency  of  the  Revolutionary 
generation  in  preserving  the  institution  of  slavery,  though 
subscribing  to  the  Declaration  of  Independence  dogma 
that  all  men  are  created  free  and  equal.  This  inconsistency 
is  more  apparent  than  real.  That  the  statement  was  meant 
to  apply  in  a  political  rather  than  a  social  sense,  we  all,  of 
course,  now  understand;  but  it  also  had  a  very  practical 
social  application.  The  Revolution  changed  the  attitude 
of  the  mass  of  Virginia  people  towards  the  negro  race  and 
the  transformation  lasted  until  the  end  of  slavery.  In  the 
colonial  era  slaves  were  looked  on  as  little  better  than  brute 
beasts  and  were  frequently  treated  with  great  cruelty. 
The  law  was  absolutely  callous,  and  a  great  number  of  poor 
blacks  suffered  execution  for  trifling  thefts  such  as  after- 
wards came  to  be  good-naturedly  looked  on  as  a  mere 
African  weakness,  or  froze  to  death  in  jail  awaiting  trial; 
others  were  outlawed  and  killed  on  sight  like  wild  animals. 
The  records  are  full  of  these  cases.  But  in  this  treatment  of 
the  blacks  the  Virginia  people  were  in  no  sense  more  cruel 
than  the  rest  of  the  world;  it  was  the  world,  we  must  re- 
member, in  which  men  were  hanged,  drawn  and  quartered, 


300         THE  REVOLUTION  IN  VIRGINIA 

broken  on  the  wheel  and  decapitated  for  comparatively- 
trivial  offenses,  with  an  iron  disregard  for  human  suffer- 
ing the  present  age  cannot  understand  —  the  antediluvian 
world  before  the  egalitarian  deluge. 

The  Revolution  changed  all  this.  After  1785  a  strong 
and  persistent  abolitionist  sentiment  existed  in  Virginia,  and 
would  probably  have  predominated  but  for  the  almost 
insuperable  practical  obstacles  to  emancipation.  Popular 
feeling  forced  the  government  to  permit  private  emancipa- 
tion, which  proceeded  on  such  a  scale  that  the  institution 
of  slavery  was  seriously  threatened.  The  assembly  inter- 
vened in  1816  to  save  it  by  requiring  freedmen  to  leave  the 
State  within  a  year  of  manumission,  and  the  practice  of 
freeing  slaves  at  the  death  of  masters  lessened.1 

Gradually  the  democratic  wave,  which  began  in  1776  and 
reached  high-water  mark  about  1795,  spent  its  force.  It 
had  wrought  great  changes,  but  it  was  not  destined  to 
achieve  a  permanent  triumph.  Democracy  in  Europe  had 
received  a  deathblow  by  the  overthrow  of  Napoleon  in 
1815  and  America  felt  the  effect  of  the  reaction.  In  Vir- 
ginia other  reasons  contributed  to  the  checking  of  liberal- 
ism. The  development  of  the  South  and  West  drew  from 
the  Old  Dominion  its  best  young  manhood  and  brought  on 
a  disastrous  economic  competition;  Virginia  lost  rank  as 
the  greatest  of  American  States  and  rapidly  sank  to  a  sec- 
ondary position.  It  was  no  longer  a  land  of  energetic  and 
forward-looking  men,  but  of  memories,  a  place  of  social 
amenities  and  soft  dreaming.  Under  the  influence  of  Sir 
Walter  Scott's  novels  glorifying  the  feudal  age,  the  new 
generation  constructed  in  imagination  a  colonial  past  of 
1  J.  H.  Russell's  The  Free  Negro  in  Virginia,  70. 


THE  PROGRESS  OF  DEMOCRACY        301 

splendor  which  had  had  small  counterpart  in  reality.  The 
old  English  and  aristocratic  spirit  revived  and  existed 
alongside  the  democratic  theories  of  government  which 
Jefferson  had  introduced.  Jefferson's  name  was  revered 
while  his  influence  dwindled.1  Much,  indeed,  of  the  hu- 
manitarian teaching  of  the  Revolution  continued  to  per- 
meate society  and  slavery  was  softened  by  this  influence  to 
the  end,  but  the  fact  remains  that  in  Virginia  the  swing- 
back  from  democracy  was  steadily  increasing  in  momen- 
tum from  the  fall  of  Napoleon  to  the  Civil  War. 
1  W.  E.  Dodd's  Statesmen  of  the  Old  South,  70. 


THE  END 


INDEX 


Accomac  Committee,  tries  Captain 
Kellam,  116;  complains  of  ex- 
posed situation  of  county,  128. 

Accomac  Court-House,  riot  there, 
253;  283. 

Agnew,  Rev.  John,  case  of,  107; 
loyalist,  129. 

Albion,  181. 

Alexander,  Captain  Charles,  108. 

American  Revolution,  movement 
with  two  aspects,  1 ;  causes  of,  in 
Virginia,  39;  begun  in  Virginia  by 
planters,  121;  its  first  stage  in 
Virginia  completed,  147;  accom- 
plished in  Virginia  without 
cruelty,  155;  its  two  phases  in 
Virginia,  174;  humanizes  Vir- 
ginia, 300. 

Andrews,  Rev.  William,  285. 

Anglican  Church,  after  war,  295. 

Arbuthnot,  Admiral,  266. 

Aristocracy,  of  Virginia,  rise  of,  5. 

Arnold,  Benedict,  threatens  Rich- 
mond, 221 ;  ascends  James  River, 
213,  264;  succeeds  Phillips  in 
command,  268. 

Assembly,  of  Virginia,  independ- 
ence of,  3;  powers  of,  4;  confis- 
cates loyalists'  estates,  188;  at- 
tempts to  raise  means  of  defense, 
209;  amends  law  against  Tories, 
241;  pardons  western  malcon- 
tents, 242. 

Assessment,  for  religion,  296. 

Attainder,  of  Josiah  Philips,  192. 

August  Convention  (1774),  elec- 
tion of  delegates  to,  34;  begin- 
ning of  Revolution  in  Virginia,  35 . 

Augusta,  draught  riot  in,  249. 


Baptists,  13,  295,  296. 

Barron,  Captain  James,  captures 
transport,  94. 

Barron,  Captain  Richard,  135. 

Bedford,  riot  in,  249. 

Bill  for  Religious  Freedom,  intro- 
duced, 172;  passes  legislature,  297. 

Bill  of  Rights,  164. 

Billy,  case  of,  259. 

Bland,  Richard,  on  rights  of  the 
subject,  8;  answers  Bishop  of 
London,  10;  sketch  of,  11;  later 
pamphlets  of,  13;  theory  of  in- 
ternal government,  14;  opposes 
Patrick  Henry  on  Stamp  Act,  18; 
inspirer  of  Henry,  22;  member  of 
Committee  of  Safety,  56. 

Boucher,  Rev.  Jonathan,  loyalist, 
129. 

Braxton,  Carter,  member  of  Com- 
mittee of  Safety,  56;  131. 

British  Army,  82,  262,  264,  265,  273. 

British  debts,  292,  293. 

British  fleet,  bombards  Norfolk,  86. 

British  Parliament,  connection  of, 
with  colonial  government,  4. 

Brunswick  Committee,  summons 
Allan  Love,  106. 

Bucktrout,  Benjamin,  280. 

Butler,  Dempsey,  258;  condemned 
to  death,  280;  282. 

Byrd,  William,  loyalist,  129. 

Byrd,  Mrs.  William,  245. 

Cabell,  William,  member  of  Com- 
mittee of  Safety,  56. 

Cagey's  Strait,  284. 

Calloway,  James,  puts  Bedford  riot- 
ers in  jail,  249. 


304 


INDEX 


Camden,  Virginia  militia  at,  210. 

Camm,  John,  in  war  of  pamphlets, 
10;  advances  unpopular  theory, 
13;  wishes  a  colonial  episcopate, 
30;  loyalist,  129. 

Campbell,  Dr.  Archibald,  131. 

Campbell,  William,  hangs  British 
spy,  234;  suppresses  Tories,  236. 

Caroline  Committee,  seizes  sus- 
pected letters,  115;  advertises 
suspects,  118;  seizes  effects  of  a 
loyalist,  132. 

Carrington,  Paul,  member  of  Com- 
mittee of  Safety,  56. 

Carter,  Landon,  answers  Bishop  of 
London,  10. 

Caton,  John,  282. 

Cheat  River,  233. 

Cherokees,  put  down  by  militia, 
246;  expedition  against,  261. 

Chesterfield  Committee,  97. 

Chesterfield  Court-House,  training 
camp,  210. 

Christian,  Colonel  Isaac,  in  Chero- 
kee expedition,  261. 

Clark,  George  Rogers,  ambushes 
Arnold,  265. 

Claypole,  John,  raises  an  insur- 
rection, 246;  asks  for  pardon, 
248. 

Clergy,  sympathize  with  American 
cause,  106. 

Clinton,  Sir  Henry,  turns  south- 
wards, 262;  to  blame  for  Corn- 
wallis's  capture,  272. 

Cloyd,  Major  Joseph,  239. 

Collier,  Admiral  Sir  George,  262. 

Colonial  system,  advantages  of,  for 
ambitious  men,  6. 

Commissioners,  report  of,  concern- 
ing burning  of  Norfolk,  88. 

Committee  of  Safety,  permits  Cor- 
bin  to  visit  Dunmore,  55;  elected 
in  July,  1775,  56;  moves  against 
Dunmore,  67;  selects  Woodford 


to  command  against  Dunmore, 
75;  central  executive,  110;  appel- 
late court  in  loyalist  cases,  117; 
represents  conservative  party, 
124;  eastern  element  preponder- 
ates in,  125;  acts  with  caution, 
126;  given  ample  powers,  126; 
decides  to  send  troops  against 
Dunmore,  127;  reappointed  on 
December  16,  1775,  131;  orders 
loyalists  to  leave  Norfolk,  140; 
becomes  appellant  court,  142. 

Confiscation,  adopted  in  Virginia, 
187;  effect  in  Virignia,  190;  in- 
sufficiently carried  out  by  Jeffer- 
son, 201. 

Congress,  embarrasses  Virginia, 
286. 

Conservative  party,  advocates 
measures  in  1774,  34;  conspicu- 
ous in  formation  of  county  com- 
mittees, 43;  in  March,  1775,  Con- 
vention, 46;  strength  of,  in 
March,  1775,  Convention,  47; 
reluctant  to  break  with  Dun- 
more, 53;  delays  Revolution,  124; 
fatally  affected  by  independence, 
160;  fundamentally  different  from 
progressive,  161;  defends  primo- 
geniture, 170;  attempts  to  re- 
establish church,  172;  comes  into 
power,  228;  beaten  by  spirit  of 
the  age,  229;  revives  at  end  of 
war,  294. 

Constitution  of  Virginia,  164. 

Continental  Association,  adopted, 
36;  rigidly  enforced  in  Virginia, 
38;  attempt  to  bulldoze  Britain, 
40;  committees  formed  to  enforce, 
41,  44;  rigorously  enforced  by 
committees,  98;  violations,  101- 
02;  first  test  of  Revolutionary 
politics,  105. 

Corbin,  George,  unable  to  quell  Ac- 
comac  riot,  253. 


INDEX 


305 


Corbin,  John  Tayloe,  loyalist,  130; 
writes  seditious  letter,  150. 

Corbin,  Richard,  goes  to  see  Dun- 
more,  55;  loyalist,  129. 

Cornwallis,  Earl  of,  invades  Vir- 
ginia, 268;  strong  in  cavalry, 
269;  falls  back  to  Williamsburg, 
270;  traps  patriots  at  Green 
Spring,  271 ;  fails  in  strategy,  272; 
errs  in  not  attacking  French,  274; 
surrenders,  275. 

Council,  begins  work,  174;  prefers 
mild  measures,  176;  moderate  in 
treatment  of  loyalists,  180;  orders 
removal  of  suspects  from  Eastern 
Shore,  184;  takes  further  steps 
against  disaffected,  185;  paroles 
loyalists,  186;  offers  reward  for 
capture  of  Philips,  191. 

County  committees,  beginning  of, 
43;  act  on  own  authority,  45; 
blockade  Norfolk,  61;  letter  con- 
cerning their  activities,  65;  con- 
trolled by  planters,  96;  how 
chosen,  97;  enforce  Continental 
Association,  98;  driven  to  sup- 
press disaffection,  105;  regulate 
life  of  communities,  108;  act  on 
own  responsibility,  109;  open 
mails,  115;  blockade  Norfolk, 
116;  allow  loyalists  no  chance  to 
concentrate,  121;  succeeded  by 
more  regular  tribunals,  147. 

Courts  of  inquiry,  supersede  county 
committees,  147. 

Creeks,  261. 

Cropper,  John,  concerning  Lyon, 
254;  joins  Commodore  Whaley, 
283. 

Curie,  Wilson,  139. 

Curtis,  John,  253,  255. 

Debts,  confiscated  by  State,  188. 
December  Convention  (1775),  met 
by  complaints,   127;  withdraws 


consent  for  native  Britons  to  re- 
main neutral,  132;  mild  towards 
loyalists,  134. 

De  Grasse,  Admiral,  sails  to  Chesa- 
peake Bay,  273;  fights  Graves, 
274. 

Democratic  Party,  real  genesis  of, 
2;  overborne  by  conservatives, 
228. 

Destouches,  Admiral,  266. 

De  Tilly,  265. 

Digges,  Dudley,  member  of  Com- 
mittee of  Safety,  56. 

Dinwiddie  Committee,  asks  advice, 
139. 

Dunmore,  Earl  of,  dissolves  as- 
sembly in  May,  1774,  33;  seizes 
the  colony's  powder,  49  et  seq.; 
pays  for  the  powder,  51;  declares 
Henry  an  outlaw,  52;  flees 
aboard  a  warship,  54;  goes  to  Gos- 
port,  59;  his  military  resources, 
61;  seizes  printing-press  in 
Norfolk,  64;  offers  commissions 
freely,  66;  opens  hostilities,  67;  at 
Kemps ville,  69;  administers  oath 
of  allegiance,  70;  effect  of  his 
emancipation  proclamation,  73; 
intrenches  at  Norfolk,  78;  unwise 
to  make  stand  at  Norfolk,  79; 
sends  regulars  against  patriots, 
81;  partly  responsible  for  de- 
struction of  Norfolk,  87;  driven 
from  Gwynn's  Island,  94;  con- 
cerning county  committees,  109. 

Dye,  Fauntleroy,  256. 

Ellegood,  Jacob,  loyalist,  130;  ap- 
peals for  relief,  143. 

Essex  Committee,  109. 

Established  church,  attacked  by 
Jefferson,  170. 

Fairfax,  Bryan,  loyalist,  129. 
Fairfax,  Lord  Thomas,  loyalist,  129. 


306 


INDEX 


Federal  Constitution,  adopted  in 
Virginia,  298. 

Finances,  202. 

Fort  Nelson,  263. 

Fredericksburg,  volunteers  meet 
there  in  1775,  50. 

French  Revolution,  bears  resem- 
blance to  American,  159;  its  in- 
fluence on  Virginia,  299. 

Garrison,  William,  253,  255. 

Gloucester  Commissioners'  Court, 
147. 

Goodrich,  Bartlett,  149;  177. 

Goodrich,  John,  sketch  of,  138; 
sent  inland,  155;  escapes  from 
jail,  177;  estate  managed  by  com- 
missioners, 178. 

Goodrich,  John,  Jr.,  149;  wishes  to 
return  to  Virginia,  288. 

Goodrich,  Margaret,  178. 

Gordon,  Dr.  Alexander,  103;  137; 
288. 

Governor,  of  Virginia,  powers  of,  4. 

Graves,  Admiral,  fails  to  relieve 
Cornwallis,  274. 

Great  Bridge,  important  strategic 
point,  80;  engagement  at,  82-83. 

Greene,  Nathanael,  marches  South, 
269. 

Green  Spring,  engagement  at,  271. 

Grymes,  Benjamin,  287. 

Grymes,  John,  loyalist,  130;  re- 
ceives letter  from  Wormeley,  144. 

Grymes,  Philip,  255,  257. 

Halifax  Committee,  administers 
test  oath,  118. 

Halifax  court,  reports  British  sub- 
jects, 180,  181. 

Hampshire  Court-House,  trial  of 
mutineers  at,  248. 

Hampton,  skirmish  at,  60. 

Hanover  Court,  reports  British 
subjects,  180. 


Harrison,  Benjamin,  candidate  for 
Speaker,  172;  elected  governor, 
228;  issues  proclamation,  286; 
wishes  to  prosecute  Tories,  287. 

Harrison,  John,  279. 

Harrison,  Richard,  summoned  for 
feasting  on  fast  day,  116. 

Hatton,  Walter,  summoned  for  se- 
ditious letter,  115. 

Henrico  Court,  reports  British  sub- 
jects, 180. 

Henry,  Patrick,  appears  in  parsons' 
cause,  12;  member  of  House  of 
Burgesses,  15 ;  takes  lead  against 
Stamp  Act,  17;  first  leader  of 
Democratic  Party,  22;  most 
striking  figure  in  Virginia  history, 
23;  in  March,  1775,  Convention, 
46,  47;  baffled  in  March,  1775, 
Convention,  48;  marches  on  Wil- 
liamsburg, 51;  passed  over  by 
Committee  of  Safety,  74;  dis- 
trusted as  soldier,  76;  stirs  poor 
people  into  activity,  121;  elected 
colonel  of  the  First  Virginia  Regi- 
ment, 124;  proposes  radical  in- 
dependence declaration,  161 ; 
letter  to  John  Adams,  162;  letter 
to  Richard  Henry  Lee,  162;  be- 
comes governor,  167;  mediocre 
administrator,  175;  on  Philips 
case,  193;  replaced  by  Jefferson, 
195;  becomes  Conservative,  228; 
pleads  cause  of  exiles,  291;  pre- 
vents repeal  of  anti-debt  laws, 
292;  defends  debtors,  293;  joins 
Lee  in  advocating  support  of  reli- 
gion, 295 ;  elected  governor  again, 
297;  leads  fight  against  Constitu- 
tion, 298. 

Hepburn,  Thomas,  driven  from 
State,  290. 

Hill,  William,  280. 

Hinton,  William,  232,  233. 

Holland,  Albridgton,  280;  282. 


INDEX 


307 


Holland,  John,  280;  282. 

Hopkins,  Joshua,  279;  282. 

House  of  Burgesses,  of  Virginia,  de- 
velopment of,  4;  western  element 
in,  7;  loan  office  bill,  16;  meets  as 
Convention,  45;  meets  in  June, 
1775,  53. 

House  of  Delegates,  expels  British 
merchants,  179;  debates  anti- 
loyalist  bill,  186;  attaints  Philips, 
192;  proposes  retrenchment,  203; 
passes  resolution  to  investigate 
Jefferson's  administration,  226; 
conservative  party  in,  295;  de- 
bates religious  assessment,  296. 

Howe,  Robert,  joins  Woodford,  83; 
issues  proclamation,  84. 

Hughes,  James,  279. 

Hunter,  Betsey,  summoned  for 
writing  letter,  115. 

Innes,  Colonel,  252. 
Isle   of   Wight,    patriots   tar   and 
feather  loyalists,  71. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  describes  Stamp 
Act  debate,  19;  influences  Bill  of 
Rights,  164;  political  beliefs,  168; 
initiates  reforms,  169;  in  religious 
controversy,  171;  revises  laws, 
171;  ascendant  in  Virginia,  172; 
elected  governor,  195 ;  industrious 
executive,  199;  ignorant  of  mili- 
tary affairs,  200;  letter  on  confis- 
cation, 201 ;  letter  to  Samuel  Hunt- 
ingdon, 204 ;  lays  an  embargo,  205 ; 
unable  to  bring  government  to 
order,  206;  letter  to  Speaker,  208; 
writes  to  Gates,  211;  caught  un- 
awares, 213;  letter  concerning 
requisitioning,  215;  letter  to 
Spotswood,  217;  assures  North 
Carolina  of  aid,  218;  letter  to 
Lafayette,  218;  letter  to  Richard 
Henry  Lee,  219;  handles  militia 


badly,  220;  letter  to  Muhlenberg, 
221 ;  unable  to  raise  more  troops, 
222;  opposes  dictator,  224;  at- 
tacks on  his  administration,  225; 
at  low  water  mark  of  career,  226; 
recovers  power,  230;  writes  about 
loyalists,  237;  concerning  Shoe- 
maker, 243;  writes  concerning 
Claypole's  rising,  247;  orders  pa- 
roled citizens  to  leave,  251 ;  orders 
suspects  sent  to  Richmond,  252; 
endeavors  to  isolate  British  posts, 
252;  failure  of,  gives  conserva- 
tives new  chance,  294;  founds 
Democratic-Republican  Party, 
299;  loses  influence  in  Virginia, 
301. 

Johnson,  Andrew,  181. 

Jones,  Joseph,  member  of  Commit- 
tee of  Safety,  131.      ■ 

July  Convention  (1775),  elects 
Committee  of  Safety,  110;  stops 
exportation,  111;  raises  money, 
123. 

Kempsville,  skirmish  fought  there, 

68. 
Kidd,  Captain,  283,  284. 
King  George  Committee,  disarms 

non- jurors,  119. 

Lafayette,  Marquis,  arrives  in 
Richmond,  221;  retreats,  222; 
ordered  to  Chesapeake  Bay,  265; 
saves  Richmond,  268;  retreats 
northward,  269;  follows  Corn- 
wallis,  270;  at  Green  Spring,  271; 
at  Malvern  Hill,  272;  advances 
to  Pamunkey,  273. 

Lamb,  James,  279;  282. 

Lee,  Charles,  Major-General,  comes 
to  Virginia,  90;  letter  to  Pendle- 
ton, 91. 

Lee,  Richard  Henry,  rise  of,  16; 
applies  for  a  Stamp  Act  office,  24; 


308 


INDEX 


organizes  the  Westmoreland  As- 
sociation, 26;  originates  commit- 
tees of  correspondence,  33;  ad- 
vocates boycott  in  Continental 
Congress,  36;  becomes  conserva- 
tive, 228;  joins  Madison  to  repeal 
anti-debt  laws,  292;  joins  Henry 
in  advocating  support  of  religion, 
295. 

Lee,  Thomas  Ludwell,  member  of 
Committee  of  Safety,  56. 

Lee,  William,  212. 

Leslie,  General,  invades  Virginia, 
212;  occupies  Portsmouth,  264. 

Lewis,  Andrew,  commands  patriots 
at  Gwynn's  Island,  94. 

Liverpool,  British  warship,  89. 

Loan  office,  plan  of,  16. 

Lowry,  John,  282. 

Loyalists,  take  part  in  struggle  for 
Norfolk,  58;  in  Dunmore's  force, 
82;  appeal  to  patriot  command- 
ers, 85;  Charles  Lee's  letter  con- 
cerning, 91;  everywhere  in  Vir- 
ginia, 105;  ordinance  against, 
117;  helpless  in  face  of  patriot 
majority,  120;  leave  Virginia  in 
large  numbers  in  1775,  119;  lead- 
ing in  Virginia,  129;  convention 
proceeds  against,  130;  proceeded 
against  by  May  Convention,  137; 
ordered  to  leave  Norfolk  region, 
140;  mostly  exiles  by  1776,  153; 
treated  with  greater  harshness, 
179;  revive  activities,  184;  suffer 
confiscation  of  estates,  187,  188; 
revive  in  west,  232;  travel  in 
bands,  234;  defeated  at  Shallow 
Ford,  239;  increase  in  number, 
242;  few  actual  ones  in  1781,  250; 
suspected  of  having  an  intelli- 
gence system,  257;  imprisoned  in 
1781,  259;  proceeded  against 
after  Yorktown,  276;  escape  pun- 
ishment in  southeastern  Virginia, 


278;  barred  out  from  Virginia, 
285;  few  mobbing  cases  at  end  of 
war,  290;  allowed  to  reenter 
State,  291. 

Ludwell,  Lucy,  189. 

Lynch,  Charles,  terrorizes  loyalists, 
238. 

Lyon,  Rev.  John,  254. 

McCall,  Alexander,  291. 

McDowell,  Samuel,  writes  to  Jeffer- 
son, 222. 

Madison,  James,  contributes  to  Bill 
of  Rights,  164;  wishes  repeal  of 
anti-debt  laws,  292;  opposes  state 
support  of  religion,  296;  writes 
his  Remonstrance,  297;  leads 
Federalists,  298. 

Malvern  Hill,  272. 

March  Convention  (1775),  struggle 
in,  46;  begins  organization  of 
government,  110. 

Marshall,  John,  defends  debtors, 
293. 

Mason,  George,  typical  of  liberal- 
ism, 7;  writes  boycott  agreement, 
29;  member  of  Committee  of 
Safety,  56;  131;  author  of  Bill  of 
Rights,  164;  offers  religious  com- 
promise, 173;  293. 

Matthews,  General,  begins  paroling 
citizens  in  Virginia,  251. 

May  Convention  (1776),  increases 
penalties  for  disaffection,  137; 
sends  prisoners  to  local  courts, 
152;  releases  two  prisoners,  156. 

Mercer,  James,  member  of  Com- 
mittee of  Safety,  56. 

Merchants,  unenthusiastic  for  Con- 
tinental Association,  100;  dis- 
contented with  measures  of  con- 
vention, 111;  lose  sympathy  with 
Revolution,  114;  petition  against 
exportation,  112;  many  leave 
Virginia  in  1775,  119. 


INDEX 


309 


Middlesex  Committee,  exonerates 
John  Parsons,  104. 

Militia,  organized,  110;  defects  of, 
219. 

Mitchell,  William,  286. 

Montgomery,  loyalist  outbreak  in, 
238. 

Moore,  Levi,  280;  282. 

Morgan,  Zackwell,  233. 

Muhlenberg,  Peter,  Major-General, 
commands  in  Virginia,  210;  col- 
lects troops  for  defense,  211 ;  com- 
mands troops,  266;  opposes 
Phillips,  267;  commands  Amer- 
ican van,  270. 

Nansemond  Committee,  tries  two 
merchants,  104;  denounces  John 
Agnew,  107;  summons  Betsey 
Hunter,  115. 

Neilson,  Charles,  149,  150. 

Nelson,  John,  letter  to  Jefferson, 
219. 

Nelson,  Thomas,  nominated  for 
governor,  166. 

Nelson,  Thomas,  Jr.,  gathers  mili- 
tia, 211;  elected  governor,  227; 
man  for  the  crisis,  229;  commands 
at  Williamsburg,  265. 

Newton,  Colonel  Thomas,  letter 
concerning  Princess  Anne,  257; 
writes  concerning  Tories,  276. 

Nicholas,  George,  attacks  Jefferson, 
225;  293. 

Nicholas,  Robert  Carter,  opposes 
Patrick  Henry  on  Stamp  Act,  18; 
in  the  powder  case,  50;  opposes 
independence,  158;  candidate  for 
Speaker,  172. 

Non-importation  association,  in 
Virginia  in  1770,  29. 

Non-importation  agreement,  adopt- 
ed by  August  Convention,  35. 

Non-jurors,  suffer  fines,  182. 

Norfleet,  Henry,  280;  282. 


Norfolk,  fortified  by  Dunmore,  78; 
disaffection  of,  84;  entered  by 
patriot  army,  84;  bombarded  by 
British  fleet,  86;  destroyed,  87- 
88;  Howe  concerning  destruction 
of,  89;  continued  embarrassment 
to  patriots,  140;  loyalists  im- 
prisoned there  in  1781,  277. 

Norfolk  Committee,  in  case  of 
James  Marsden,  108;  denies 
Dunmore's  charges,  109;  (Bor- 
ough), against  stoppage  of  ex- 
ports, 113. 

Northampton  Committee,  com- 
plains to  Congress,  66;  against  ex- 
ports, 113;  gratified  by  conven- 
tion, 139. 

Northumberland  Court-House,  riot 
at,  240. 

Nott,  Captain,  258. 

Oath  of  allegiance,  required  of  all 
males,  182. 

Oldmer,  George,  148;  177. 

Orange  Committee,  burns  pam- 
phlets, 107. 

Page,  John,  member  of  Committee 
of  Safety,  56;  175. 

Page,  Mann,  259. 

Paper  money,  issued  by  July  Con- 
vention, 123. 

Parker,  Joseph,  reports  on  loyalists, 
258. 

Parsons'  cause,  in  Hanover  court, 
12. 

Pendleton,  Edmund,  opposes  Pat- 
rick Henry  in  Stamp  Act,  18; 
chairman  of  Committee  of  Safety, 
56;  sketch  of,  126;  reelected  chair- 
man of  Committee  of  Safety,  131; 
president  of  May  Convention 
(1776),  150. 

Petersburg,  267,  268. 

Peyton,  Sir  John,  258. 


310 


INDEX 


Philips,  Josiah,  case  of,  190  et  seq. 

Phillips,  Major-General,  221;  266; 
267;  268. 

Phripp,  Matthew,  loyalist,  130; 
131;  133. 

Pistole  fee,  case  of,  8. 

Pittsylvania  Committee,  summons 
John  Pigg,  106. 

Planters,  take  sides  against  Eng- 
land, 26;  unitedly  patriotic  in 
Virginia,  37;  resist  England  rath- 
er than  lose  liberties,  40;  begin  re- 
sistance to  England,  96;  organize 
colony  against  England,  100; 
political  thinkers,  101;  begin 
Revolution  in  1774,  121;  decide 
unitedly  for  independence,  158; 
a  debtor  class,  188. 

Portsmouth,  Dunmore  uses  as  a 
base,  90;  Leslie  lands  at,  211; 
Arnold  encamps  at,  214;  Arnold 
establishes  himself  there,  245; 
attack  planned  against,  266; 
visited  by  Cornwallis,  271. 

Posey,  Major  Thomas,  writes  about 
Augusta  riot,  249. 

Presbyterians,  12,  295,  296. 

Preston,  William,  concerning  dis- 
affection, 234;  appeals  for  help, 
237 ;  reports  lead  mines  in  danger, 
238;  reports  bad  situation  in 
Montgomery,  246;  declares  Mont- 
gomery to  be  disaffected,  249. 

Primogeniture,  eliminated  by  Jeffer- 
son, 170. 

Prince  George  Committee,  in  case 
of  James  Marsden,  108. 

Prince  William,  first  minute  com- 
pany there,  110. 

Princess  Anne,  disaffected  ordered 
to  leave,  140;  Tories  arrested 
there  in  1781,  277. 

Princess  Anne  Committee,  protests 
against  banishment  ordinance, 
141. 


Privateers,  255;  283.' 

Privy  Council,  of  England,  in  fee 
dispute,  8;  decides  against  minis- 
ters, 13. 

Progressive  Party,  comes  into  exist- 
ence, 23;  measures  approved  by, 
in  1774,  34;  presses  for  Revolu- 
tionary methods,  124;  differs 
from  conservative,  161. 

Public  jail,  at  Williamsburg,  report 
on,  154. 

Pungoteague,  254. 

Randolph,  Edmund,  Jefferson's  rep- 
resentative, 165;  mentions  Philips 
case,  193;  287. 

Randolph,  John,  loyalist,  129. 

Randolph,  Peyton,  opposes  Patrick 
Henry  on  Stamp  Act,  18;  ring- 
leader in  boycott  agreement,  29; 
elected  chairman  of  meeting  in 
Apollo  Tavern,  33;  president  of 
the  Continental  Congress,  35; 
in  the  powder  case,  50. 

Richmond,  sacked  by  Arnold,  214; 
saved  by  Lafayette,  268. 

Riddle,  Isaac,  281. 

Ripley,  John,  279. 

Ritchie,  Archibald,  loyalist,  130; 
accused  of  violating  Association, 
142;  256. 

Robinson,  John,  sketch  of,  15;  be- 
comes a  defaulter,  16. 

Rockingham,  disaffection  in,  236. 

Roebuck,  British  warship,  89. 

Rootes,  Philip,  loyalist,  130. 

Rose,  William,  259. 

Salaries   of   ministers,    suspended, 

171. 
Saunders,  John,  case  of,  106. 
Schau,  John,  first  loyalist  mobbed, 

62. 
Shallow  Ford,  engagement  at,  239. 
Shoemaker,  Joseph,  243. 


INDEX 


311 


Simcoe,  Colonel,  265;  destroys 
stores,  269. 

Sir  Walter  Scott,  his  influence  on 
Virginia,  300. 

Slavery,  saved  by  legislature  in 
1816*,  300. 

Smallwood,  General,  264.  ■ 

Smith,  Robert,  279. 

Spotswood,  Alexander,  proposes 
military  plan,  216,  218. 

Sprowle,  Andrew,  British  quarter 
themselves  on,  62;  loyalist,  129. 

Squier,  Captain,  begins  hostilities, 
59. 

Stamp  Act,  cause  of  protest  against 
taxation,  3;  Virginia  leaders  op- 
posed to,  15;  opposed  by  Henry, 
17;  Henry's  speech  on,  20;  extent 
of  resistance  to,  uncertain,  24; 
resistance  to,  in  Williamsburg, 
25  et  seq.\  repeal  of,  fatal  to  royal 
authority,  27. 

Steuben,  Baron,  becomes  com- 
mander in  Virginia,  214;  holds  off 
British,  221;  heads  troops  at 
Cabin  Point,  265;  resists  British 
invasion,  267. 

Suffolk,  naval  stores  burned  there, 
263. 

Tabb,  John,  member  of  Committee 
of  Safety,  56. 

Tallon,  Edmund,  282. 

Tangier,  Island,  284. 

Tarleton,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Ban- 
astre,  269;  goes  to  Charlottes- 
ville, 269;  attacks  patriots,  270; 
criticizes  Cornwallis,  271;  raids 
Southside,  271. 

Test  Oath,  adopted  by  convention, 
118. 

Thornton,  Presley,  289. 

Tinsley,  Joshua,  182. 

Tories.  See  Loyalists. 

Twopenny  Act,  compounds  tobacco 


debts  in  money,  10;  device  of  rul- 
ing clique,  13. 

Vanmeter,  Garrett,  writes  of  mu- 
tiny 246. 
Viomenil,  Baron,  266. 

Walker,  Thomas,  member  of  Com- 
mittee of  Safety,  131. 

Wardrobe,  David,  99. 

Washington,  George,  presents  boy- 
cott agreement,  29;  arrives  at 
Williamsburg,  274;  determines  to 
attack  Cornwallis,  273. 

Wayne,  Anthony,  detached  to  join 
Lafayette,  268;  meets  Lafayette, 
269;  fights  skirmish,  271 ;  in  dan- 
ger at  Green  Spring,  271. 

Weedon,  General,  265. 

West,  influence  of,  in  Virginia,  15. 

Westmoreland  Committee,  in 
Wardrobe  case,  99. 

Whaley,  Commodore,  283.  i 

Wheler,  Maurice,  175. 

Whitehurst,  Joshua,  137. 

Williamson,  Joseph,  mobbed  at 
Tappahannock,  290. 

Willoughby,  John,  133;  148. 

Wills,  John  Scarborough,  278.     i 

WTilson,  John,  Norfolk  county-lieu- 
tenant, 191. 

Wingate,  Rev.  John,  case  of,  107. 

Wishart,  Colonel,  suppresses  Tories, 
277. 

Woodford,  William,  commands  Vir- 
ginia forces,  75 ;  advances  to  Nor- 
folk, 77;  issues  proclamation,  84. 

Wormeley,  John,  288,  289. 

Wormeley,  Ralph,  Jr.,  loyalist,  129; 
writes  seditious  letter,  144;  re- 
leased from  parole,  176;  255. 

Wythe,  George,  opposes  Patrick 
Henry  on  Stamp  Act,  18;  elected 
Speaker,  172. 

Yorktown,  siege  of,  274. 


CAMBRIDGE  .  MASSACHUSETTS 
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